Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, Western Tradition Partnership (WTP), Champion Painting, and Montana Shooting Sports Foundation (MSSF), sued the Montana Attorney General and the Commissioner of Political Practices, seeking a declaration that Mont. Code Ann. 13-35-227(1) violated their freedom of speech protected by the state and federal Constitutions by prohibiting political expenditures by corporations on behalf of or opposing candidates for public office. The district court declared the statute unconstitutional, granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs, enjoined enforcement of the statute, and denied the motion of Champion and MSSF for an award of attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed and entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants after applying the principles enunciated in Citizens United v. F.E.C., holding that Montana has a compelling interest to impose the challenged rationally-tailored statutory restrictions. View "Western Tradition P'ship v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Iowa Right to Life Committee (IRTL) filed a complaint in the U.S. district court, alleging, inter alia, that Iowa's campaign finance laws unconstitutionally imposed political committee status on corporations whose major purpose was something other than nominating or electing candidates. The district court certified two questions to the Supreme Court. At issue before the Court was whether a corporation must form a political committee under Iowa law if it wants to spend more than $750 advocating the election or defeat of Iowa candidates. The Court answered that a corporation like IRTL may engage in express advocacy without forming a political committee because a corporation making independent expenditures aggregating over $750 in a calendar year becomes an "independent expenditure committee" within the meaning of Iowa Code 68A.404 but not a "political committee" within the meaning of Iowa Code 68A.102(18) or a "permanent organization" within the meaning of Iowa Code 68A.402(9). View "Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a continuing political committee, alleged that three provisions of Washington election law violated the First Amendment as applied to ballot measure committees. The court held that Washington's disclosure requirements, Washington Revised Code, 42.17.090, and Washington Administrative Code 390-16-034, which required these committees to disclose the name and address of contributors giving more than $25, and additionally to disclose the employer and occupation of contributors giving more than $100, survived exacting scrutiny because they were substantially related to the important governmental interest in informing the electorate. The court held that Washington Revised Code 42.17.105(8), which prohibited a political committee from accepting from any one person contributions exceeding $5,000 within 21 days of a general election, was not closely drawn to achieve the state's important interest in informing the electorate. Therefore, section 42.17.105(8) was therefore unconstitutional as applied to ballot measure committees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Family Pac v. McKenna, et al." on Justia Law

The ordinance prohibits posting signs on utility poles, streetlights, sign posts, and trees in a public right-of-way. At the time their actions were brought, plaintiffs were both candidates for political office in an area of the city that contains "a classic urban landscape of row house neighborhoods, where most homes have no front yard." They claimed that, given their limited funds, they would have ordinarily relied heavily on signs posted on street poles to spread their political messages. Several political candidates received numerous tickets. The district court ruled in favor of the city. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the ordinance violated the First, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments. Plaintiffs conceded that the ordinance is content-neutral. It is narrowly tailored to serve significant governmental interests and leaves open ample alternatives for communication. View "Johnson v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Shortly after announcing her intention to seek election to the office of county clerk, Appellant Stacie Cook was discharged from her position as a deputy clerk by the incumbent county clerk, Appellee Lisha Popplewell, who also intended to seek election to the clerk position. Following Cook's defeat in the primary election, she brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against Popplewell and the county, alleging that she had been discharged in violation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The circuit court dismissed Cook's complaint by summary judgment, ruling that Cook's interest in being a candidate enjoyed no constitutional protection. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no reason to deviate from settled law concluding that there is no constitutional right to candidacy. View "Cook v. Popplewell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs contended that Barack Obama was constitutionally ineligible to be President of the United States. In addition to plaintiffs' constitutional claims, as well as their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their quo warranto claims for improper venue; their Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq., claims for failure to state a claim; and their Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., claims against defendants First Lady Michelle Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Vice President Joe Biden, and former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, for failure to state a claim. The court adopted the district court's classification of the parties and held that each plaintiff lacked standing; the proper venue for plaintiffs' quo warranto claims was in the District of Columbia, pursuant to D.C. Code 16-3503; FOIA did not apply to any of defendants because they were all individuals, not agencies; and plaintiffs had six months between the original complaint and the amended complaint to attempt to set forth civil RICO allegations and their failure to do so was inexcusable. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' constitutional claims for lack of Article III standing and the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' quo warranto, FOIA, or RICO claims. The dismissal of the district court was affirmed and the emergency petition for writ of mandamus was denied. View "Drake, et al. v. Obama, et al.; Barnett, et al. v. Obama, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that recently-enacted amendments to the New York City Administrative Code, commonly known as the "pay-to-play" rules, violated the First Amendment by unduly burdening protected political speech and association, the Fourteenth Amendment by denying equal protection of the laws, and the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973. The challenged provisions (1) reduced below the generally-applicable campaign contribution limited the amounts that people who have business dealings with the city, including lobbyists, could contribute to political campaigns; (2) denied matching funds for contributions by people who have business dealings with the city and certain people associated with lobbyists; and (3) extended the existing prohibition on corporate contributions to partnerships, LLCs, and LLPs. The court affirmed summary judgment as to all three provisions, finding that the laws were closely drawn to address the significant governmental interest in reducing corruption or the appearance thereof. View "Ognibene, et al. v. Parkes, et al." on Justia Law

In anticipation of 2010 elections, the group challenged Wisconsin's "total of $10,000 in any calendar year" limit on individual contributions to state and local candidates, political parties, and political committees. WIS. STAT. 11.26(4). They sought an injunction. The district court held that abstention was appropriate pending resolution a state supreme court case concerning campaign-finance rule GAB 1.28, which expanded the scope of political speech subject to Wisconsin’s regulatory regime. After the November 2010 elections nine state senators faced recall elections. The district court again denied an injunction that would have allowed the group to raise unlimited funds during the recalls. A motions panel held that the First Amendment challenge was likely to succeed and issued an injunction pending appeal. The Seventh Circuit vacated the abstention order, and remanded for entry of a permanent injunction. The constitutionality of section 11.26(4) does not depend on whether GAB 1.28 survives review; it is unconstitutional to the extent that it limits contributions to committees engaged solely in independent spending for political speech. Independent expenditures do not pose a threat of actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption, the only governmental interest strong enough to justify restrictions on political speech. View "WI Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Barland" on Justia Law

Petitioners Fred Girod, Rod Monroe, David Schamp, Cary Johnson, Hobart Kytr and Steven Fick sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 21 (2012), arguing that the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). Initiative Petition 21 would amend a number of statutory provisions pertaining to the commercial harvest and sale of salmon from the Oregon portion of the Columbia River. In this case, the Supreme Court found that in stating that the measure "may affect Columbia River Compact, tribal fishing rights, and fishing management agreements," it merely speculated that there was a possibility that the measure may affect the various laws and agreements listed in entirely unspecified ways. A possibility that enactment of a measure may produce unspecified consequences is not an "effect" within the meaning of ORS 250.035(2)(d). The summary therefore did not substantially comply with the statutory requirement to state the "effect" of the measure, and, for that additional reason, the Court held that ballot title must be referred back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Girod v. Kroger" on Justia Law

In the 1990s, Appellee Stephen Rambler mailed letters in an attempt to extort money from approximately thirty individuals by threatening to reveal certain sexually explicit correspondence if they did not pay him. Based on this conduct, Appellee was charged with violating federal law by mailing "threatening communications." Nearly ten years later, in November 2005, Appellee was elected mayor of Wrightsville, York County. He assumed office in January 2006. Two months later, the Commonwealth filed a complaint in quo warranto seeking to remove Appellee from office pursuant to Article II, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Commonwealth alleged that the federal offense constituted an "infamous crime" in Pennsylvania, and requested an order declaring Appellee unqualified for his mayoral office. The common pleas court ultimately issued an opinion and order in favor of the Commonwealth, removing Appellee from office, and disqualifying him from holding any office of trust or profit in Pennsylvania. Appellee appealed, claiming that his federal extortion conviction did not qualify as an infamous crime because his conviction only carried a maximum sentence of two years which is comparable to a misdemeanor sentence in state court. The Superior Court reversed. The Supreme Court found in its review that "Appellee sought to reap dishonest gain… This type of behavior is, quite obviously, 'inconsistent with commonly accepted principles of honesty and decency,' and is, moreover, akin to 'swindling, cheating, and other crimes of a kindred nature.'" The Court reversed the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Rambler" on Justia Law