Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

This proceeding arose from an objection filed on March 6, 2012 by Appellant, the Nebraska Republican Party, with the Nebraska Secretary of State in which it challenged, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 32-624, the candidate filing of Bob Kerrey for the U.S. Senate. The Secretary of State issued his determination opinion concluding that Kerrey's name could appear on the May 15, 2012 primary election ballot. Appellant filed a petition for review of the determination opinion. The district court dismissed the case on March 21, 2012 with prejudice. At issue on appeal was whether section 32-624, which requires that an order be made by a judge "on or before the fifty-fifth day preceding the election" in order to reverse a decision of the Secretary of State, would prohibit the Supreme Court from granting relief after that fifty-five-day limitation period had run. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under the statutory procedure established by the Legislature, it lacked the authority to grant the relief sought by Appellant because the fifty-five limitation period had run. View "Neb. Republican Party v. Gale" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court addressed an Application for Relief in an Election Code matter, over which it retained limited jurisdiction following a remand on October 4, 2010. The issue involved the effect of the District Court's decision in "Morrill v. Weaver," (224 F.Supp.2d 882 (E.D. Pa. 2002)). In "Morrill," Section 2911(d) of the Election Code (25 P.S. 2600 et seq.), which the federal court construed as imposing a district residency requirement for affiants circulating nomination papers violated the First Amendment. The district court permanently enjoined the Commonwealth from enforcing the statutory provision, and the Commonwealth did not appeal that decision. The question of the constitutionality of Section 2911(d) and the effect of Morrill arose in connection with a challenge to the nomination paper submitted by Carl Stevenson as an independent candidate for the office of State Representative in Pennsylvania’s 134th Legislative District in the 2010 general election. Michael Gibson and Robert Mader filed a petition to set aside in the Commonwealth Court, raising both signature challenges and a global challenge to Stevenson’s nomination paper. The objectors' global challenge alleged that signatures on three pages of the nomination paper were invalid because the circulator of those pages resided outside the 134th Legislative District, in supposed violation of Section 2911(d). Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth and the Secretary are bound by the district court decision in "Morrill" and may not enforce Section 2911(d) as written. View "In Re: Nomination Petitions and Papers of Carl Stevenson" on Justia Law

During the 2008 campaign, Joe, a plumber working near Toledo, asked then-candidate Obama about a proposed tax plan’s impact on Joe’s ability to own a business. The interaction was replayed by national media. Joe later accepted media requests and criticized Obama’s policies, resulting in Senator McCain’s reference to "Joe the Plumber." After Joe’s media moment, employees of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, Obama supporters, searched his name in databases and that the Inspector General found no legitimate agency purpose for those searches. Defendants were suspended from their positions. Joe filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation and violation of privacy rights. The district court granted defendants judgment on the pleadings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not suffer sufficient adverse action: he did not suffer a threat to his livelihood, was not defamed, did not endure a search or seizure, and did not experience the public disclosure of embarrassing information. He did not allege continuing investigation or "chilling" of First Amendment rights; "a person of ordinary firmness" would not be deterred or chilled. In his privacy claim, Joe did not identify an interest "fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." View "Wurzelbacher v. Jones-Kelley" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of obstruction of justice for failing to disclose the full extent of his knowledge regarding the mailing of a letter that could reasonably be believed to constitute an attempt at voter intimidation. Defendant, a Republican candidate for a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives at the time, contended that there was insufficient probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant and that, therefore, the evidence obtained pursuant to it should have been suppressed at his trial. The court held that there was sufficient probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant to search defendant's home and campaign headquarters. The court rejected defendant's First Amendment claim. Although defendant was never prosecuted for a violation of the election laws, in light of the contents of the letter and the facts surrounding its distribution, there was a fair probability that the campaign mailing constituted a tactic of intimidation intended to induce its recipients to refrain from voting. Accordingly, the order of the district court denying the motion to suppress was affirmed. View "United States v. Nguyen" on Justia Law

At the February 2010 primary, there was no name printed on the Republican ballot for the office of member of the St. Clair County board of review, and no candidate was nominated as a write-in. In March, the Republican Party central committee appointed plaintiff as its candidate, and, in April, made a filing with the county clerk, entitled “resolution/certificate of appointment.” Plaintiff circulated and filed nominating petitions and other required documents, pursuant to Election Code section 7–61. The electoral board sustained an objection so that plaintiff’s name did not appear on the November ballot. Trial and appellate courts affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, first holding that it could address the moot issue under the exception for matters of public interest. The lower courts applied the wrong section of the statute, which contains different sections for different situations. View "Wisnasky-Bettorf v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Sanchez rose through the ranks of Chicago politics and became Commissioner of Streets and Sanitation. He was a leader of the Hispanic Democratic Organization, and, acting as a city official and a political operative, participated in a scheme to award city jobs to campaign workers in violation of orders and consent decrees, known as the Shakman decrees, enjoining the city from patronage hiring for most positions. Del Valle managed campaigns staffed by Sanchez's branch of the HDO and had significant influence in choosing individuals for positions. On retrial, Sanchez was convicted of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and Del Valle of perjury, 18 U.S.C. 1623. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning the court's handling of testimony about driving while intoxicated and arguing with a police officer; denial of severance; and the government's failure to prove economic loss. City jobs are money or property for purposes of mail fraud and the indictment sufficiently alleged deprivation of money or property.View "United States v. Delvalle" on Justia Law

Almost two million Indiana voters cast their ballots for Secretary of State in November 2010. The Indiana Democratic Party sought to have the winner in the election, Republican Charlie White, declared ineligible to assume office because he had not been registered to vote at the address at which he resided in July 15, 2010, the deadline for certifying candidates for state office. The Indiana Recount Commission dismissed the petition and later denied it. The circuit court reversed, directing that the Commission declare White ineligible. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and affirmed the Commission's dismissal, holding that the the Commission's action was not arbitrary, capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law because the Indiana Democratic Party's challenge was untimely. View "White v. Ind. Democratic Party" on Justia Law

Several hundred citizens of the Town of Fishers, including Plaintiffs, filed a petition with the Fishers Town Clerk seeking a referendum on whether the Town should convert itself from a town into a second class city. The Town Council subsequently passed a resolution proposing a reorganization with Fall Creek Township that would merge the two entities into a reorganized city. Plaintiffs filed suit in U.S. District Court, seeking to compel the Town Council to schedule their petition for a referendum. Thereafter, the Fishers Town Council and the Township held a public meeting during which both entities adopted the final reorganization plan. A referendum on the plan was scheduled for the November 2012 general election. The Town Council subsequently passed a resolution ordering a referendum on Plaintiffs' proposal in the general election. Defendants then moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint, which the federal district court denied. The Supreme Court accepted certification to address a question of state law and held that a political unit may reorganize into a city under Indiana's Reorganization Act in a manner that eliminates voting rights recognized under Indiana law, including reorganization as a city with a council elected entirely at large and a mayor appointed by that council. View "Kole v. Faultless" on Justia Law

Two petitioners sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition (IP) 28 (2012). Before 2009, Oregon imposed a 6.6 percent tax rate on a corporation's "taxable income." In 2009, the voters approved Ballot Measure 67, which modified the marginal tax rate that corporations pay on their taxable income. Petitioner Patrick Green raised a single challenge to the caption, the "yes" vote result statement, the "no" vote result statement, and the summary. He contended that each part of the ballot title was defective because it referred to a tax on "corporate income" rather than a tax on corporate "profits" or "taxable income." He reasoned that the use of the phrase "corporate income" was misleading because it failed to communicate that the tax would fall only on corporate profits. Petitioner Dan Harmon raised a similar challenge, noting that what the IP would have modified was a corporate excise tax and that the ballot title should have either referred to an excise tax or used the phrase "taxable income." In his view, either phrase would have been more accurate and less misleading than the use of the unmodified term "income." In each instance, the certified ballot title used the term "income," even though that term can refer to more than one type of income and even though those differing types of income may have significantly different tax consequences. The Supreme Court concluded the Attorney General advanced no legitimate reason for not using a more accurate term, which would reduce the potential for misleading the voters that the certified ballot title currently presents. The Court agreed with Petitioners that referring to a tax on corporate "income" was, without more, misleading. Accordingly, the Court referred the caption, the "yes" result statement, the "no" result statement, and the summary to the Attorney General for modification. View "Green/Harmon v. Kroger" on Justia Law

LULAC filed suit against the City alleging that the voting method adopted by the City Charter diluted minority voting strength, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973. The City and LULAC settled in December 1996, and the district court entered a consent decree in accordance with the parties' settlement. At issue on appeal was whether the district court properly granted a joint motion by the City and LULAC to modify temporarily the consent decree. Because the court concluded that the district court erred in approving the temporary modification without following the procedures mandated by an earlier panel, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Leag. of Untd. Latin Amer. Ctzn. v. City of Boerne, et al." on Justia Law