Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

After applying legal precedent establish in Fischer v. State Board of Elections (Fischer II), the trial court found the legislative redistricting plans of H.B. 1 facially unconstitutional and issued a temporary injunction preventing the Secretary of State and Board of Elections from implementing the legislative districts created by the Bill. The Legislative Research Commission (LRC) appealed, asking the Supreme Court to overrule the constitutional standards for redistricting legislative districts delineated in Fischer II. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Bill violated the Kentucky Constitution by failing to achieve sufficient population equality and by failing to preserve county integrity. Remanded to enjoin permanently the conduct of any election under the district boundaries established by the Bill. View "Legislative Research Comm'n v. Fischer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff alleged that defendants violated the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), 42 U.S.C. 15301-15545, by failing to conduct a general election recount, in which plaintiff lost, in accordance with HAVA provisions. Because HAVA section 301 was not intended to benefit voters and candidates in local elections with respect to recounts, such individuals did not have a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim. View "Crowley v. State of Nevada, et al." on Justia Law

In early 2011, Colleen Mathis was selected as the chairperson of the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (IRC). In October 2011, the Governor notified the Commissioners of allegations that they had committed substantial neglect of duty and gross misconduct in office. The next month, the Secretary of State sent a letter to Mathis removing her from the IRC. Two-thirds of the Senate concurred in the removal, and Mathis was removed from office. Three days later, the IRC petitioned the Supreme Court for special action relief, claiming that the Governor exceeded her limited removal authority and that the Governor and the Senate violated separation-of-powers principles by usurping powers of the IRC and the judiciary. The Court accepted special action jurisdiction and (1) concluded, as a matter of law, that neither of the Governor's two stated grounds for removing Mathis constituted substantial neglect of duty or gross misconduct in office, as required by the Arizona Constitution; and (2) ordered that Mathis be reinstated as chair of the IRC. View "Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n v. Mathis" on Justia Law

Ralph Nader, an independent candidate for President in the 2004 presidential election, and his Maine presidential electors (collectively, Nader) filed a six-count complaint against the Maine Democratic Party (MDP) and others, alleging that Defendants took direct action, and conspired with others, to prevent Nader from appearing on the ballot in Maine and other jurisdictions as a candidate in the 2004 presidential election. The superior court granted Defendants' special motions to dismiss Nader's complaint pursuant to the Maine anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute, concluding that Defendants satisfied their burdens under the statute of showing that their activity of challenging nomination petitions was activity manifesting their right of petition under the state and federal Constitutions and that Nader had failed to meet his burden of showing Defendants' efforts were devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, concluding that the Maine anti-SLAPP statute may not be invoked to achieve dismissal of claims alleging abuses of process without giving the plaintiff the opportunity to establish a prima facie case to support the claims. Remanded. View "Nader v. Me. Democratic Party" on Justia Law

Proposition 200, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-166(F)(the registration provision), required prospective voters in Arizona to provide proof of U.S. citizenship in order to register to vote and required registered voters to show identification to cast a ballot at the polls, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-579(A)(the poll place provision). At issue on appeal was whether Proposition 200 violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973, was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment or Twenty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution, or was void as inconsistent with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973gg et seq. The court upheld Proposition 200's requirement that voters show identification at the polling place, but concluded that the NVRA superseded Proposition 200's registration provision as that provision was applied to applicants using the National Mail Voter Registration Form to register to vote in federal elections. View "Gonzalez, et al. v. State of Arizona, et al." on Justia Law

In an original proceeding, the Supreme Court reviewed the Ballot Title Setting Board's findings that proposed Initiative 2011-2012 No. 45, its title, and its ballot title and submission clause contained a single subject. Upon review, the Court held that the Title Board was correct: Initiative 45 and its Titles stated a single subject: "public control of waters." The Court concluded this title complied with article V section 1(5.5) of the Colorado Constitution and section 1-40-106.5, C.R.S. (2011). View "In the Matter of the Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2011-2012 No. 45" on Justia Law

In an original proceeding, the Supreme Court reviewed the Ballot Title Setting Board's findings that proposed Initiative 2011-2012 No. 3, its title, and its ballot title and submission clause contained a single subject. Upon review, the Court held that the Title Board was correct: Initiative 3 and its Titles stated a single subject: "the public's rights in the waters of natural streams." The Court concluded this title complied with article V section 1(5.5) of the Colorado Constitution and section 1-40-106.5, C.R.S. (2011). View "In the Matter of the Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2011-2012 No. 3" on Justia Law

Before the 2010 primary election, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether Appellant Dennis Montoya, a candidate for a Court of Appeals judgeship, was properly disqualified by the Secretary of State (the Secretary) from receiving public campaign funding under the New Mexico Voter Action Act (the Act). This case gave the Court its first opportunity to construe the Act, explain its previous oral ruling affirming the Secretary, and to address Appellant’s constitutional challenges to the Act as well as the civil penalty the Secretary imposed upon him. The dispute in this case centered on the provision in Section 1-19A-5(A), that "[a]n applicant candidate may contribute an amount of seed money from the applicant candidate's own funds up to" the $5000 limit. Appellant argues that his "general" contributions were intended to cover other kinds of expenses such as the costs of seeking his party's support at local preprimary convention gatherings leading up to the state preprimary convention. As such, these contributions were not intended to pay for the kinds of expenses that seed money is intended to cover and to limit. The Supreme Court concluded that when Appellant contributed more than $8000 of his own money to the campaign, while simultaneously applying for public funds, he violated the Act. Under the law, the Secretary had no choice but to disqualify him from public financing, and she did so. Furthermore, the Court concluded Appellant "misplaced" his reliance on "a number of federal cases to suggest that a civil penalty cannot be imposed on him for voluntarily exercising his First Amendment right to free speech." The Court affirmed the district court's judgment in this case. View "Montoya v. Herrera" on Justia Law

Petitioner Donna Boley filed a petition asking for a writ of mandamus directed to Respondents, the Secretary of State of West Virginia and Frank Deem. Petitioner was an incumbent state senator seeking re-election for the Third Senatorial District (District 3). Deem sought to challenge Petitioner for the Republican Party's 2012 nomination and was certified as eligible by the Secretary to have his name placed on the ballot. Petitioner filed the petition challenging Deem's eligibility to be a candidate for state senator against her, asserting that Deem did not met the residency requirements contained in the state Constitution and the Senate Redistricting Act of 2011. Deem conceded that a plain reading of the residency requirements made him ineligible to be a candidate for state senator in District 3 but argued that the residency requirements should be declared unconstitutional. The Supreme Court found that the residency requirements were constitutional and granted the requested writ, ordering the Secretary to withdraw her certification of Deem's candidacy for state senator in District 3 and commanding that Deem's name be removed from ballots to be used in the May 2012 Republican party primary election. View "State ex rel. Boley v. Tennant" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint and moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, alleging section 16, article V, of the Iowa Constitution, as implemented by Iowa Code sections 46.2, 46.4-46.10, and 46.14, violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the laws. The court concluded that the State Judicial Nominating Commission was a "special limited purpose" entity for its sole function was to select the most qualified candidates for judicial appointments and forward the names of these candidates to the Governor for a final appointment. This narrow function had a disproportionate effect on a definable group of constituents - members of the Iowa Bar - over other voters in the state. Therefore, the election of the attorney members of the Commission was an election of special interest. Applying rational basis review, the court agreed that the district court's Iowa system of election for the Commission's attorney members by and from members of the Iowa Bar was rationally related to Iowa's legitimate interests. Therefore, Iowa's system did not violate plaintiffs' rights under the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Carlson, et al. v. Justice David Wiggins, et al." on Justia Law