Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in June, 2012
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The Government appealed the district court's grant of Defendants-Appellees WIlliam Danielczyk and Eugene Biagi's motion to dismiss count four, paragraph 10(b) of their indictment, which alleged that they conspired and facilitated direct contributions to Hillary Clinton's 2008 presidential campaign in violation of federal election laws. The district court reasoned that in light of "Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission" (130 S.Ct. 876 (2010)), section 441b(a) of the Election Campaign Act of 1971 was unconstitutional as applied to Appellees. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court and reversed, finding that the lower court misapplied "Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont," (539 U.S. 146 (2003)) as the basis for its dismissal of count four. View "United States v. Danielczyk" on Justia Law

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The Board of County Commissioners of Frederick County (BOCC) appointed a nine-member charter board in 2011. The Maryland Constitution provides that the BOCC shall hold a special election for consideration of additional nominated charter board members under certain circumstances. Petitioners, individuals who sought membership on the charter board, circulated a petition in support of nominating candidates for consideration at a special election. The Frederick County Board of Elections (the Board) determined that Petitioners did not satisfy the statutory and constitutional requirements necessary for the BOCC to call a special election. The circuit court judge affirmed the determination made by the Board that the petition contained an insufficient number of valid signatures to require the BOCC to hold a special election. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and held (1) the Board applied the correct standard for reviewing and validating petition signatures under Md. Code An. Elec. Law 6-203(a), as interpreted by the Court in recent opinions; (2) the doctrine of collateral estoppel was not applicable to the circumstances of this case; and (3) the mandatory petition signature requirements in 6-203(a) and COMAR 33.06.03.06B(1) were not unconstitutional. View "Burruss v. Bd. of County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

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Montana state law provides that a "corporation may not make ... an expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political committee that supports or opposes a candidate or a political party." Mont. Code 13–35–227(1). The Montana Supreme Court rejected a claim that the statute violated the First Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed the Montana decision, based on its 2010 decision, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, in which the Court struck down a similar federal law, holding that "political speech does not lose First Amendment protection simply because its source is a corporation." Dissenting Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan stated that "Montana’s experience, like considerable experience elsewhere since the Court’s decision in Citizens United, casts grave doubt on the Court’s supposition that independent expenditures do not corrupt or appear to do so." View "Am. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock" on Justia Law

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California law permits public employees to create an agency shop bargaining unit so that all employees are represented by a union. Employees who do not join must pay "chargeable expenses;" the union may not require nonmembers to fund ideological projects. In 2005, SEIU, a public-sector union, sent its annual "Hudson notice," setting and capping monthly dues, and stating that the fee could increase without notice. That month, the Governor called for a special election on propositions opposed by SEIU. After the 30-day objection period, SEIU sent a letter announcing a temporary 25% dues increase and elimination of the cap: an "Emergency Temporary Assessment to Build a Political Fight-Back Fund." Nonmembers could not avoid paying. The district court entered summary judgment favoring a class of nonmembers who paid into the fund. The Ninth Circuit reversed, employing a balancing test: whether procedures reasonably accommodated interests of the union, the employer, and nonmember employees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the case is not moot, despite SEIU offering a refund. When a state establishes an agency shop that exacts union fees as a condition of public employment, dissenting employees are forced to support an organization with whose principles they may disagree. Compulsory subsidies for private speech are subject to exacting First Amendment scrutiny and cannot be sustained unless there is a comprehensive regulatory scheme and compulsory fees are a necessary incident of the larger regulatory purpose that justified the required association. When a union imposes a special assessment or dues increase to meet undisclosed expenses, it must provide fresh notice and may not exact funds without consent. Failure to provide a fresh Hudson notice was unjustified; treatment of nonmembers who opted out after the initial Hudson notice also ran violated the First Amendment. They were required to pay 56.35% of the special assessment even though all the money was slated for electoral uses. View "Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union Local 1000" on Justia Law

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Jamilah Nasheed appealed from the trial court's judgment in favor of Robin Wright-Jones on Wright-Jones' petition challenging the qualifications of Nasheed to run for election in the Democratic Party primary for state senator for the 5th district. The trial court found the residency requirement of the Missouri Constitution was ambiguous and Nasheed did not satisfy that requirement to run in the 5th district. An exception in Mo. Const. art. III, 6 provides that if the repportionment of the districts is less than one year before the general election, candidates may reside in any district from which a portion was incorporated into the new district where the candidate seeks office, even if the candidate does not reside in that incorporated portion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Nasheed was eligible to run in the 5th district because the exception did not require Nasheed to live within the boundaries of the reapportioned senate district she sought to represent. View "Wright-Jones v. Nasheed " on Justia Law

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Rochelle Gray appealed from the judgment of the trial court in favor of Sylvester Taylor on Gray's petition challenging the qualifications of Taylor to run for election in the Democratic Party primary for state representative in the 75th district. The trial court held that although Taylor did not reside within the boundaries of the new district, the Missouri Constitution required only that he have resided for one year in the county or any of the district from which the new district was created through reapportionment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in the context of reapportionment within one year of a general election, the Constitution requires that a candidate satisfies the one-year residency requirement by residing in the county or any district from which a portion was incorporated in the new district where the candidate seeks office, even if the candidate does not reside in that portion. View "Gray v. Taylor" on Justia Law

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Consolidated cases were brought before the Supreme Court on interlocutory transfer without a ruling from the superior court. Petitioners are New Hampshire voters and the towns and municipalities in which some of them live. They sought a declaration that Laws 2012 Chapter 9 violated the State Constitution. After thorough review of the record, the Supreme Court determined that the petitioners did not meet their burden of proving that the redistricting plan in Laws 2012 Chapter 9 violated the State Constitution, therefore, they were not entitled to the declaration they sought. View "City of Manchester v. Secretary of State " on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Mazdabrook Commons Homeowner's Association, Inc. manages a common-interest community in which individual owners agree to certain common rules and restrictions for the benefit of the entire group. The Rules and Regulations of the community bar signs except as provided in a "Declaration." Defendant Wasim Khan lived in a planned townhouse community managed by Mazdabrook Commons. In 2005, Defendant ran for Parsippany Town Council and posted two signs in support of his candidacy at his private residence: one inside the window of his townhouse and another inside the door. Mazdabrook notified Defendant that the signs violated the association's rules and ordered their removal. Mazdabrook's regulations banned all residential signs except "For Sale" signs. Upon review, the Supreme Court "balance[ed] the minimal interference with Mazdabrook's private property interest against [Defendant's] free speech right to post political signs on his own property" and found that the sign policy in question violated the free speech clause of the State Constitution. View "Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners' Ass'n v. Khan" on Justia Law

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This case involved the proper interpretation of a Massachusetts election law that governed the filing of a vacancy, where a candidate nominated for state, city or town office withdraws, dies, or otherwise becomes ineligible prior to an election, G.L.c. 53, section 14(14), and its application to the presidential and vice-presidential candidates of a minor political party. The court concluded that this matter was properly before the court where plaintiffs have established an actual controversy; section 14 applied to presidential electors and assumed by extension to the presidential and vice-presidential candidates the electors have pledged to support; although section 14, as written, was not a model of clarity and its meaning not without uncertainty, the court interpreted it in a manner largely consistent with the interpretation proffered by the Secretary; and finally, aligning the court's analysis under art. 9 with that of the equal protection clause, the court perceived no constitutional deficiency in the election law scheme. View "Libertarian Assoc. of Massachusetts & another v. Secretary of the Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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This suit arose after Project Vote learned that students at Norfolk State University, a historically African-American college, experienced problems in registering to vote in the November 2008 primary and general elections in Virginia. At issue was whether Section 8(i)(l) of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), which required public disclosure of "all records concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters," 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-6(i)(l), applied to completed voter registration applications. The court held that the district court correctly interpreted Section 8(i)(l), concluding that it did not apply to such applications and holding that defendants had violated the NVRA by refusing to disclose the completed applications with voters' Social Security numbers redacted. View "Project Vote v. Long" on Justia Law