Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

In 2006, the Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless and Service Employees International Union, Local 1199 sued Blackwell, then Ohio Secretary of State, challenging provisions of Ohio’s 2006 Voter ID law under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The parties negotiated consent orders in 2006 and 2008. NEOCH and SEIU successfully sought attorneys’ fees with respect to the 2008 orders. The Ohio Secretary of State appealed the fee and cost award, and the parties ultimately negotiated a consent decree signed by the district court in April 2010. In June 2010, the plaintiffs again sought attorneys’ fees and costs, for work performed regarding prior motions for attorneys’ fees submitted in the litigation, during the appeal of the award of attorneys’ fees, and negotiating the consent decree. The district court granted the motion in part, but because it found that the motion regarded a supplemental fee request, it reduced the fee award to three percent of the award granted in the main case. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the state’s argument that the 2010 consent decree was a settlement in full of all of the plaintiffs’ claims, waiving any claim for further attorneys’ fees. View "NE OH Coalition for Homeless v. Sec'y of State of OH" on Justia Law

In these two cases, Petitioners, members of the Minnesota Legislature and others, filed petitions pursuant to Minn. Stat. 204B.44 seeking an order requiring Mark Ritchie, the Minnesota Secretary of State, to use the titles designated by the Minnesota Legislature for two proposed constitutional amendment ballot questions that were scheduled to appear on the November 2012 general election ballot. Petitioners contended that by failing to use the title designated by the Legislature for each ballot question, Respondents failed to comply with the statutory requirement to "provide an appropriate title" for the ballot question. The Supreme Court granted the petitions, holding that when the Legislature has included a title for a ballot question in the bill proposing a constitutional amendment, the "appropriate title" the Secretary of State must provide for that ballot question is the title designated by the Legislature. View "Limmer v. Ritchie" on Justia Law

This action was brought under Minn. Stat. 204B.44 seeking to correct an alleged error in the preparation of the ballot for the general election. Specifically, Petitioners sought to prevent the people of Minnesota from voting on the question of whether photographic identification should be required to vote in Minnesota. Without expressing an opinion as to the merits of changing Minnesota law to require photographic identification to vote, the Supreme Court concluded that Petitioners were not entitled to relief, holding that Petitioners did not meet their burden of demonstrating that there was an error that required the judiciary to intercede. View "League of Women Voters Minn. v. Ritchie" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a school district is subject to the campaign-finance reporting requirements found in Minn. Stat. 211A and whether the complaint in this matter stated a claim under Minn. Stat. 211B.06, which prohibits the dissemination of false campaign material. The Supreme Court held (1) a school district is a "corporation" under section 211A.01 and therefore can qualify as a "committee" subject to chapter 211A's campaign-finance reporting requirements if it acts "to promote or defeat a ballot question"; (2) because Appellants' complaint, filed with the Office of Administrative Hearings, stated a prima facie claim that the school district here was a "committee" under section 211A.01 that promoted a ballot question, the ALJ assigned to the matter erred in dismissing the complaint without an evidentiary hearing; and (3) the complaint failed to state a prima facie violation of section 211B.06 with respect to two allegedly false statements. Remanded. View "Abrahamson v. St. Louis County Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In this original proceeding, the issue before the Supreme Court concerned the election complaint filed by Plaintiff Khistina DeJean. She was one of four candidates for mayor of Honolulu in the August 11, 2012 primary election. She came in last, and challenged the primary alleging (among other things) that some polling places opened late, and the media discriminated against her. Plaintiff argued that the cumulative effect of these issues meant she was not treated fairly in the election. Plaintiff asked the Court to allow her to remain on the November 6, 2012 general election ballot as candidate for mayor. "It is not sufficient for a plaintiff challenging an election to allege a poorly run and inadequately supervised election process that evinces room for abuse or possibilities of fraud. An election contest cannot be based upon mere belief or indefinite information." Accordingly, the Supreme Court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants and dismissed Plaintiff's case. View "Dejean v. Nago " on Justia Law

Petitioner filed with the Secretary of State's (Secretary) office an affidavit of candidacy as the Republican candidate for Minnesota State Senate, District 61. Petitioner's affidavit did not include a telephone number as required by statute, and therefore, Petitioner's affidavit was rejected. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition with the Supreme Court seeking an order requiring the Secretary to place his name on the 2012 general election ballot as a candidate for state senate. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the Secretary properly rejected Petitioner's affidavit of candidacy because Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements for filing to run for elective office. View "In re Petition of Pfliger" on Justia Law

In June 2012, Petitioner filed an affidavit of candidacy and nominating petition with the Secretary of State's (Secretary) office, seeking to run as an independent candidate for Minnesota state representative. The Secretary rejected Petitioner's nominating petition because it did not bear her residence as required by statute and because Petitioner's statement of political party or political principle exceeded the three-word limit required by statute. Petitioner petitioned the Supreme Court to require the Secretary to list her on the 2012 general election ballot as a candidate for state representative. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the Secretary properly denied Petitioner's nominating petition, as (1) candidates for public office must strictly comply with the statutory requirements for filing for office, and (2) the statement of political party or political principle on the pages of Petitioner's nominating petition exceeded the three-word limit required by statute. View "Anderson v. Ritchie" on Justia Law

On January 27, 2012, the Yuma County Superior Court disqualified Alejandrina Cabrera under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 38-201(C) from appearing on the ballot as a candidate for the San Luis City Council. Concluding that section 38-201(C)'s language requirement must be read "in the context of the political office at issue," the court found that Cabrera was not sufficiently proficient in English to perform as a city council member for San Luis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, in relevant part, that (1) the trial court correctly interpreted section 38-201(C); and (2) the trial court's interpretation of the statute did not unconstitutionally violate Cabrera's right to participate in government. View "Escamilla v. Cuello" on Justia Law

Petitioners brought an original proceeding to the Supreme Court to challenge the validity of Initiative 166. They requested the Court rule that the Attorney General and Secretary of State did not comply with their responsibilities under law when they failed to bar I-166 from appearing on the general election ballot. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Attorney General and Secretary of State acted in compliance with their duties under law, and that the initiative met all statutory requirements. Accordingly, the Court denied the petition. View "Montanans Opposed to I-166 v. Bullock" on Justia Law

Respondent Arthur E. Mallory was Churchill County's district attorney. Appellant John O'Connor is an elector and registered voter within Churchill County. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was the narrow question of whether the office of district attorney is a state office for the purpose of determining whether district attorneys are subject to term limits under the "state office" portion of Article 15, Section 3(2) of the Nevada Constitution. Reviewing the Constitution as a whole, the Supreme Court's resolution of this inquiry was controlled by Article 4, Section 32 of the Constitution, which plainly declares district attorneys to be "county officers." Because Article 4, Section 32 identifies district attorneys as county officers, it follows that the office of district attorney cannot be considered a "state office" for term-limits purposes, and thus, district attorneys are not subject to term limits under the "state office" portion of Article 15, Section 3(2). Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's order denying appellant's petition to set aside respondent's election to a consecutive term as the Churchill County District Attorney. View "In re Contested Election of Mallory" on Justia Law