Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, individually and on behalf of Coalition to Preserve Arkansas Values (CPAV), brought this original action requesting the Supreme Court to review the legal sufficiency of the popular name and ballot title of the Arkansas Medical Marijuana Act. CPAV requested the Court to declare the popular name and ballot legally insufficient and hold that, if enacted, the Act would conflict with the state and federal constitutions and would violate state and federal law. CPAV further asked the Court to remove the Act from the November 6, 2012 ballot. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the Act's popular name and ballot title were legally sufficient, and therefore, the Act was proper for the inclusion on the ballot at the general election on November 6, 2012. View "Cox v. Martin" on Justia Law

LR-123 was enacted by the Montana Legislature in 2011. It proposed a vote in the November 2012 general election on whether to provide a tax credit and potential tax refund, or outright State payment, to individuals in years in which there is a certain level of projected surplus revenue. Plaintiffs filed a complaint contending LR-123 was unconstitutional because it unlawfully delegated legislative powers. The constitutional issue in this case turned upon whether LR-123 impermissibly delegated legislative power to an employee (the legislative fiscal analyst) of one of the Legislature's committees. The district court found that LR-123 unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the legislative fiscal analyst. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that LR-123 was unconstitutional on its face and therefore may not appear on the ballot in November 2012. View "MEA-MFT v. McCulloch" on Justia Law

The Maryland Dream Act seeks to exempt certain students from paying out-of-state tuition rates at higher education institutions in Maryland. Following the enactment of the Act, MDPetitions.com petitioned to refer the Act to Maryland's 2012 general election ballot. The State Board of Elections certified the petition for referendum. In response to the Board's certification, Appellants, representing a group of individuals supporting the Act, challenged its referability and sought to remove the Act from consideration on the November 2012 ballot. The trial court entered summary judgment against Appellants, finding that the Act was a proper subject for referendum. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Act was not a law "making any appropriation for maintaining the state government" within the meaning of Md. Const. art. XVI, 2, and therefore was not exempt from referendum. View "Doe v. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Latrice Westbrooks filed a Qualifying Statement of Intent with the Secretary of State's Office to declare her intent to be a candidate for the office of Court of Appeals of the State of Mississippi, District 2, Position 2. The State Board of Election Commissioners in a unanimous vote, determined that Westbrooks did not meet the qualifications to seek election. Westbrooks sought judicial review, and the circuit court entered an Order Granting Permanent Injunction and Order Granting Declaratory Judgment. The circuit court ordered the Board immediately to add Westbrooks's name to the ballot as a candidate for the office. Aggrieved, the Board appealed to the Supreme Court via a Bill of Exceptions and a Notice of Appeal. Upon review, the Court found that Westbrooks did not meet the residency requirement. Therefore, the circuit court erred in finding that Westbrooks was a qualified candidate for the position as required for candidacy. The circuit court's Order Granting Permanent Injunction and Order Granting Declaratory Judgment was vacated. View "Bryant v. Westbrooks" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claimed that West Virginia's 2011 congressional redistricting plan violated the "one person, one vote" principle that the Court held to be embodied in Article I, section 2, of the United States Constitution. A three-judge District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia agreed, declaring the plan "null and void" and enjoining West Virginia's Secretary of State from implementing it. The state defendants appealed directly to the Court. Because the District Court misapplied the standard for evaluating such challenges set out in Karcher v. Daggett, and failed to afford appropriate deference to West Virginia's reasonable exercise of its political judgment, the Court reversed. View "Tennant v. Jefferson County" on Justia Law

Appellant-Respondent George Tempel and Respondents-Appellants the State Election Commission and South Carolina Republican Party appealed a circuit court order concerning the candidacy of Respondent-Appellant Paul Thurmond for Senate District 41. Thurmond electronically filed a Statement of Economic Interests (SEI). Thirty minutes later, he filed his Statement of Intention of Candidacy (SIC) for the Republican Party primary for Senate District 41. However, he did not file a paper copy of his SEI along with his SIC as required by section 8-13-1356(B). All of the other Republican contenders for the Senate District 41 seat were decertified for failing to comply with section 8-13-1356(B). However, Thurmond's name remained on the ballot, and he received over 1,700 votes. He was subsequently declared the Republican candidate for the seat. The circuit court found Thurmond was not exempt from the filing requirement of section 8-131356(B) of the South Carolina Code. S.C. Code Ann. 8-13-1356(B) (Supp. 2011). Thus, Thurmond was disqualified as the Republican nominee for the District 41 seat. The judge ordered the Republican Party to conduct a special primary election pursuant to section 7-11-55. S.C. Code Ann. 7-11-55 (Supp. 2011). Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order. View "Tempel v. So. Carolina Election Comm'n" on Justia Law

This was an expedited election case in which Relators, taxpayers and committee members representing the petitioners supporting the issue, requested a writ of mandamus to compel Respondent, the county board of elections, to submit a levy-decrease question to the electorate at the November 6, 2012 general election. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the board of elections neither abused its discretion nor clearly disregarded Ohio Rev. Code 5705.261 and 5705.192 by removing Relators' levy-decrease initiative from the November 6 ballot where the voter-approved levy did not increase the rate of the preexisting voter-approved levies. View "State ex rel. Taxpayers for Westerville Sch. v. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

This was an expedited election case for writs of mandamus and prohibition to find Akron Ordinance No. 271-2012 to be invalid and to order Respondents, the Summit County board of elections and the secretary of state of Ohio, to reconvene forthwith and adopt ballot language that properly described the proposed charter amendment for the November 6, 2012 general election. The Supreme Court denied the writs, holding that Relator did not establish his entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief, as (1) the proposed charter amendment did not violate the Akron Charter; and (2) the board of elections and secretary of state did not abuse their discretion or clearly disregard applicable law by rejecting Relator's argument concerning the approved ballot language, and the ballot language for the proposed charter amendment approved by the board of elections and secretary of state properly described the amendment. View "State ex rel. Kilby v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Appellee brought a lawsuit challenging 11 C.F.R. 104.20(c)(9), a regulation promulgated by the Federal Election Commission (FEC), that purported to implement section 201(f)(2)(F) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), 2 U.S.C. 434. The court held that appellee easily satisfied the requirements of 5 U.S.C. 702 and demonstrated his Article III standing by showing that he would be unable to obtain disclosure of information under the BCRA because of the allegedly unlawful restrictions imposed by section 104.20(c)(9). On the merits, the court held that the district court erred in holding that Congress spoke plainly when it enacted 2 U.S.C. 434(f), thus foreclosing any regulatory construction of the statute by the FEC. Moreover, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, the court did not find that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue in this case. Indeed, it was doubtful that, in enacting 2 U.S.C 434(f), Congress even anticipated the circumstances that the FEC faced when it promulgated section 104.20(c)(9). The court reversed and vacated summary judgment in favor of appellee, remanding to the district court. Upon remand, the district court shall first refer the matter to the FEC for further consideration. View "Van Hollen, Jr. v. FEC, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner brought an original action seeking a writ of mandamus requiring the Secretary of State to accept its petitions for an initiated constitutional amendment to be placed on the November 6, 2012 ballot. Petitioner sought the writ of mandamus against the Secretary, requiring him to accept Petitioner's petition as timely filed containing, prima facie, the required number of signatures for an initiated constitutional amendment, and further ordering the Secretary to permit Petitioner thirty days to cure any shortcomings in its petition. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition, holding (1) Petitioner had standing to invoke the Court's jurisdiction; but (2) Petitioner failed to submit a facially valid petition and did not qualify for the additional thirty days to cure deficiencies. View "Ark. Hotels & Entm't Inc. v. Martin" on Justia Law