Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Independent candidate Gary Trudell and voter Myron Dorfman challenged the constitutionality of Vermont’s schedule for filing candidate petitions, alleging that the uniform deadline for all party (major and minor) and independent candidates was discriminatory and impermissibly impinged upon the associational and voting rights of candidates and voters under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the filing deadline was a reasonable, nondiscriminatory regulation, justified by Vermont’s regulatory interests, the Court affirmed the lower court decision declaring the deadline constitutional. View "Trudell v. Vermont " on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, filed a pro se complaint seeking an injunction to require Arkansas Secretary of State Mark Martin to place Appellant's name as a candidate for President of the United States on the 2012 Democratic primary ballot and to register all convicted felons to vote in that primary election. The circuit court granted Martin's motion to dismiss the complaint. Appellant appealed and filed a motion seeking permission to file a supplemental brief. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot and declared the motion moot, holding (1) because the election for which Appellant wanted his name placed on the ballot had already occurred, and the time for registering to vote in that election had passed, the appealed question was moot; and (2) neither exception to the mootness doctrine applied here. View "Judd v. Martin" on Justia Law

he issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned a recall petition against Mayor Terecia Bolt and Councilman Dennis Jenson of the town of Marcus. The petition included ten charges against the mayor, and six against the councilman. THe superior court concluded that only one charge against the mayor and one against the councilman was legally sufficient to support a recall election. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that none of the charges were factually or legally sufficient, and accordingly reversed the superior court's decision on the one remaining charge. View "In re Recall of Bolt" on Justia Law

The Town of Oxford introduced a resolution proposing to annex a number of acres of submerged lands. Petition circulators subsequently submitted a petition for referendum regarding the proposed solution. The petition was submitted before the public hearing on the annexation resolution but before the final enactment of the resolution. The Town Commissioners determined that the signatures affixed before final enactment of the resolution were invalid, and therefore, a referendum was not required. Petitioner filed this action, contending that the referendum petition was valid. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Petitioner, holding that signatures on a referendum petition may be collected before final enactment of the targeted annexation resolution. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the court of special appeals was correct in concluding that, pursuant to Md. Code Ann. art. 23A, 19, petition signatures gathered after introduction, but prior to commencement of the forty-five day period after final enactment of the resolution, could not be counted toward petitioning the resolution to referendum; and (2) by not counting pre-enactment signatures, the referendum effort did not succeed in obtaining a sufficient number of petition signatures for a referendum election to be held. View "Koste v. Town of Oxford" on Justia Law

Respondent filed a declaration of candidacy to run for the position of Director of Community Fire Protection District (Community Fire). Community Fire accepted Respondent's declaration of candidacy, but Respondent was subsequently disqualified because his financial interest statement had not been timely filed. Fire Chief Charles Coyne filed a petition requesting the circuit court enter an order directing Respondent to show cause why his name should not be stricken from the ballot. The trial court ruled that Respondent was disqualified from running for the position and ordered that his name be removed from the ballot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment, as (1) Chief Coyne had capacity to bring this action on behalf of Community Fire, which had standing to bring the action; (2) Respondent received adequate notice of his obligation to file a financial interest statement; and (3) the statutory financial interest statement notice requirements are constitutionally valid. View "Coyne v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Under the “Hyde Amendment,” a district court in criminal cases may award to a prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation expenses, if the position of the United States was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith, unless the court finds special circumstances, 18 U.S.C. 3006A. The district court denied such an award in a case involving four counts of conspiring and attempting to commit extortion, 18 U.S.C. 951(a) & 2 (Hobbs Act), and two counts of traveling in interstate commerce to promote and facilitate bribery, 18 U.S.C. 1952(a)(3) & 2 (Travel Act). The government alleged that Manzo, a candidate for mayor of Jersey City, sought cash payments from Dwek, an informant posing as a developer, and that, in exchange, Manzo indicated he would help Dwek with matters involving Jersey City government. The district court dismissed each Hobbs Act count because Manzo was not a public official at the time of the conduct. The Third Circuit affirmed. The court later held that receipt of something of value by an unsuccessful candidate in exchange for a promise of future official conduct does not constitute bribery under the New Jersey bribery statute and dismissed all remaining charges. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of fees. View "United States v. Manzo" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a pre-enforcement action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendant, the California Secretary of State. At issue were the California Elections Code sections 8066 and 8451, which mandated that circulators shall be voters in the district or political subdivision in which the candidate was to be voted on and shall serve only in that district or political subdivision. Plaintiffs alleged that the residency requirement violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and sought to enjoin its enforcement. The court reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs lacked standing, holding that plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient injury-in-fact to meet constitutional standing requirements. In light of plaintiffs' concrete plan and defendant's specific threat of enforcement, the court concluded that plaintiffs have met the constitutional "case or controversy" requirement. View "Libertarian Party Los Angeles, et al v. Bowen" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, groups interested in electoral and government reform, sued Minnesota, challenging the constitutionality of Minnesota's Election Day Policy and Minn. Stat. 211B.11, subd. 1, which banned the wearing of any political insignia to a polling place. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the dismissal of their First Amendment and Equal Protection claims. The court held that plaintiffs have failed to state a facial claim under the First Amendment under Minn. Stat. 211B1.11, subd. 1. The court reversed and remanded the as-applied First Amendment claim to the district court so that it could properly analyze the motion as a request for summary judgment through application of the standards articulated in Rule 56 and to give the parties sufficient opportunity to create an acceptable record. The court held that plaintiffs have failed to allege that Minnesota caused selective enforcement of the facially neutral statute and Policy and has therefore failed to state an equal protection claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Minnesota Majority, et al v. Mansky, et al" on Justia Law