Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices subpoenaed documents and testimony from the National Organization for Marriage (NOM) seeking the names of donors to NOM in order to determine whether NOM had complied with Maine's campaign laws during the 2009 election season. The superior court affirmed the Commission's decision not to vacate or modify the subpoenas. Appellants, including NOM and Stand for Marriage Maine PAC, appealed, contending that the Commission's subpoenas infringed on their right to freedom of association because disclosure would expose NOM's donors to threats, harassment, and reprisal. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, concluding that the record did not support Appellants' constitutional argument. View "Nat'l Org. for Marriage v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed the underlying action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the witness residency requirement on nominating petitions impermissibly burdened their rights to free speech and free association under the First Amendment. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, with the Board's motion premised entirely on its assertion that plaintiffs have not suffered a legally cognizable injury and thus lacked standing. The district court denied the Board's motion as to standing and granted plaintiffs' motion on the merits. The district court declared the witness residency requirement unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement. Although the Board's witness residency requirement served the Commonwealth's interest in policing fraud potentially permeating the electoral process and therefore meeting the first part of the strict scrutiny standard, the Board produced no concrete evidence of persuasive force explaining why plaintiffs' proposed solution, manifestly less restrictive of their First Amendment rights, would be unworkable or impractical. Accordingly, the court affirmed in all respects the judgment of the district court. View "Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Judd" on Justia Law

Ralph Nader, a candidate in the 2004 election, filed a civil complaint along with four of his presidential electors (collectively, Nader) in 2009 against the Maine Democratic Party and several other entities and individuals involved in the election (collectively, MDP). The complaint alleged that MDP directed the filing of two challenges to Nader's candidacy. MDP filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to Maine's anti-SLAPP statute, which permits defendants to file a special motion to dismiss civil claims against them that are based on the defendants' exercise of the constitutional right to petition. The superior court granted the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for consideration of the special motion to dismiss pursuant to a newly announced standard for applying the anti-SLAPP statute. On remand, the superior court concluded that Nader had satisfied the newly announced standard and denied MDP's special motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the entirety of Nader's complaint against MDP, holding that the motion to dismiss Nader's complaint pursuant to Maine's anti-SLAPP statute should have been granted. View "Nader v. Me. Democratic Party" on Justia Law

On December 21, 2012, Petitioner, the Independence Party candidate in the November 6, 2012 election for the U.S. House of Representatives, filed this petition pursuant to Minn. Stat. 204B.44 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and asserting three claims: (1) Minn. Stat. 202A. 16(2), which identifies those who can participate in and vote at a precinct caucus, violates his First Amendment rights; (2) the Secretary of State improperly withheld from him the e-mail addresses of registered voters in his district in violation of the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act; and (3) the district court's refusal to accept his election contest for filing infringed on his constitutional right of access to the courts. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding (1) laches bars Petitioner's first two claims, as Petitioner unreasonably delayed bringing these claims and granting relief on the claims would do substantial prejudice to the orderly administration of elections; and (2) Petitioner's third claim falls outside the scope of section 204B.44. View "Carlson v. Ritchie" on Justia Law

Under Illinois law, a candidate for the state legislature seeking placement on the general election ballot without having participated in a primary (or having replaced a candidate who did) must submit a nominating petition signed by a certain number of eligible voters. In July 2012, the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners determined that five Republican candidates for the state legislature had not collected the requisite numbers of signatures and denied their petitions to be listed on the ballot in the 2012 general election. In September the candidates and supporters sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the statutory scheme violated their constitutional rights to free speech and association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed, holding that the doctrine of laches barred their claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, after holding that laches does not apply because the delay in filing suit did not impact the Board’’ ability to fashion prospective relief in future elections. The requirement that candidates seeking ballot access submit nominating petitions is reasonable and nondiscriminatory, and serves the important regulatory interests of protecting the integrity of elections from frivolous candidates and preventing voter confusion; it does not unconstitutionally burden the candidates’ and voters’ expressive and associational rights. View "Navarro v. Neal" on Justia Law

Petitioner served two terms as a Public Service Commissioner (PSC). While serving his first term at the PSC, Respondent, campaign manager for Petitioner's opponent in the upcoming election, filed four complaints against Petitioner with the Commissioner of Political Practices (Commissioner), alleging that Petitioner had violated the statutory Code of Ethics by accepting gifts of substantial value from two corporations with which the PSC regularly dealt and by using state resources to aid his reelection campaign and for personal business. Following a three-day hearing on Respondent's complaints, a hearing examiner determined that Petitioner violated Mont. Code Ann. 2-2-104 two times by receiving "gifts of substantial value" and violated Mont. Code Ann. 2-2-121 five times by using state facilities and equipment for election purposes. The Commissioner affirmed, ordering Petitioner to pay $5,750 in fines and $14,945 for the costs of the hearing. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by concluding (1) Respondent had legal standing to file ethics complaints against Petitioner; (2) Petitioner received unlawful gifts; (3) Petitioner improperly used State facilities for political purposes; and (4) the penalty statute for ethics violations was not unconstitutionally vague. View "Molnar v. Fox" on Justia Law