Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Eight defendants who held positions with Clay County, Kentucky, were charged with conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), based on participation in a vote-buying scheme in three election cycles, 2002 to 2007. Candidates pooled money to pay “vote haulers” to deliver voters for a particular slate of candidates. To ensure that they voted for the correct slate, co-conspiring election officers and poll workers reviewed the ballots. When the proper slate was confirmed, the voter got a token or marking and was paid in a location away from the polls. Conspirators retained lists to avoid double payments and to keep track of whose votes could be bought in future elections and used absentee voting and voter-assistance forms to implement the scheme. When electronic voting machines were introduced, conspiring poll workers misinformed voters that they did not need to click “cast ballot” after selecting candidates; poll workers would enter the voting booth after the voter exited and change the electronic ballot to reflect the slate before casting the ballot. The Clay County Board of Elections was alleged to be the racketeering enterprise in the conspiracy. They were convicted after a seven week trial. The Sixth Circuit vacated, based on cumulative errors in evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

Petitioners claimed that Article V, Section 16(b) of the state charter was unconstitutional. They argued that section 16(b) deprived them of their inherent right to be free of age-based discrimination, particularly because the section mandates that jurists retire the year they turn 70 years old. In prior decisions, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that Article V, Section 16(b) was not so irrational as to be considered unconstitutional. The Court denied petitioners' application for relief and dismissed the case with prejudice. View "Friedman v. Corbett" on Justia Law

In 2010, voters approved an amendment to the Florida Constitution providing for express new state constitutional standards to govern the apportionment of legislative districts. Those standards were enumerated in Fla. Const. art. III, 21. Pursuant to its Fla. Const. art. III, 16 jurisdiction, the Supreme Court declared the Legislature's original plan apportioning districts for the Senate to be facially invalid, whereupon the Legislature adopted a revised plan. The Supreme Court upheld the facial validity of the revised plan. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint alleging that the revised Senate map violated the express standards contained in article III, section 21. The Legislature moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, asserting that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a challenge to the 2012 legislative apportionment plan. After the circuit court denied the motion, the Legislature sought extraordinary relief directing the circuit court to dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate fact-based challenges to the validity of the 2012 legislative apportionment plan, that the circuit court's exercise of jurisdiction here would not interfere with the binding judgment of the Supreme Court, and that the Legislature failed to meet its burden of demonstrating entitlement to relief. View "Fla. House of Representatives v. League of Women Voters of Fla. " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of certain sections of California Senate Bill 6 (SB 6). SB 6, implementing California's Proposition 14 (Prop. 14), fundamentally changes the California election system by eliminating party primaries and general elections with party-nominated candidates, and substituting a nonpartisan primary and a two-candidate runoff. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the appeal; Plaintiff Chamness' case was not moot where his claim was capable of repetition because future election administrators would deny him the ability to use the designation "Independent" on the primary ballot; Plaintiffs Frederick's and Wilson's appeal were moot because they only sought declaratory relief affecting future elections; and Intervenor Galacki's claims regarding his write-in candidacy and the vote he cast for himself in the general election were moot. In Case No. 11-56449, the court held that Chamness failed to establish that SB 6 severely burdened his rights, and upheld the constitutionality of the statute as reasonably related to furthering the state's important interest in efficiently regulating elections. In Case No. 56303, the court held that the trial court acted well within its discretion in concluding that allowing Galacki to intervene would entail substantial delays and inefficiencies resolving the case, and in therefore denying Galacki's motion as untimely. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order granting defendants summary judgment and denying Galacki's motion to intervene. View "Chamness v. Maldonado" on Justia Law

County Council enacted a bill providing that Appellant forfeited his councilmanic position, concluding that Appellant had moved his residence from his councilmanic district to a correctional facility in South Carolina after having been convicted of failing to file a federal tax return. Appellant challenged the authority of the County Council to expel him as a member based upon its interpretation of the term "residence" in the County Charter as a "temporary place of abode." The circuit court granted summary judgment for the County and County Council. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "residence" in the Charter embodies the notion of domicile, such that Appellant did not move his residence by virtue of his five-month incarceration. View "Jones v. Anne Arundel County" on Justia Law