Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

In 2010, the Arizona legislature amended Ariz. Rev. Stat. 15-1441(I) to require the election of two at-large members to the governing board of community colleges located in very populous counties. Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking a declaration that section 15-1441(I) violates Arizona’s constitutional prohibition against special laws. The superior court concluded that the legislation did not violate the special law prohibition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the test set forth in Republic Inv. Fund I v. Town of Surprise, section 15-1441(I) does not violate the special laws provision of article 4, part 2, section 19 of the Arizona Constitution. View "Gallardo v. State" on Justia Law

Ohio voters can cast a ballot in person on Election Day, or by using absent voter’s ballot procedures, Ohio Rev. Code 3509.01. One can vote by mail or early, in person, at a designated location if a request is timely received. Overseas uniformed military, those subject to disability or confinement, those in unforeseen hospitalization and those confined for a misdemeanor or awaiting trial can submit ballot applications up to 90 days before an election. Boards of elections send teams to obtain the ballots from confined voters. While teams visit nursing homes up to a month before the election, they wait until Election Day to visit the jails: persons jailed after 6:00 P.M. on the Friday before Election Day who are not released in time to vote on Election Day and who have not already voted are unable to vote. If a voter or the voter’s minor child is “confined in a hospital as a result of an accident or unforeseeable medical emergency” an absentee ballot application can be delivered to the board by 3:00 P.M. on Election Day and the ballot can be entrusted to a family member or to a team for delivery. No corresponding provision exists for persons in jail on Election Day. Plaintiffs alleged violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, the Voting Rights Act, and the Seventeenth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit instructed the district court to dismiss. The organizational plaintiff did not establish concrete and particularized injury to itself or its members. Even if it could demonstrate Article III standing, it asserts the rights of third parties. Its relationship with the persons whom it seeks to help—unidentified, future late-jailed voters—does not resemble the close relationship of the lawyer-client or doctor-patient relationships recognized by the Supreme Court. View "Fair Elections OH v. Husted" on Justia Law

On August 21, 2014, the Secretary of State certified a proposed initiated act known as “An Act to Increase the Arkansas Minimum Wage” to the county boards of election commissioners and advised the county boards that the proposed initiated act would be Issue No. 5 on the November 4, 2014 general-election ballot. Petitioner brought this original action challenging the sufficiency of the petition, contending that the petition had not been timely filed and that the proposed initiated act was not facially valid because it relied on forged notaries to reach the signature threshold. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the petition was timely filed and that the petition, on its face, contained the requisite signatures of a sufficient number. View "Stephens v. Martin" on Justia Law

On June 24, 2014, Thad Cochran, a Republican nominee for United States Senator, won the Republican primary runoff. His opponent, Chris McDaniel, filed an election contest with the State Republican Executive Committee (SREC) on August 4, 2014 – forty-one days after the election. The SREC declined to consider McDaniel’s complaint, and McDaniel appealed. The trial judge found that McDaniel did not meet the twenty-day deadline to file his election contest and dismissed the case. On appeal, McDaniel argued that no deadline existed to contest a primary election. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the Supreme Court found that there indeed was a deadline, and McDaniel failed to file his election contest within twenty days. The dismissal was affirmed. View "McDaniel v. Cochran" on Justia Law

On May 15, 2012, Karl H. Lewies won the primary election for the position of Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney. Because he had no opponent in the general election, he knew he would be elected as the prosecuting attorney, and he was. He was scheduled to be sworn into office on January 14, 2013. On November 23, 2012, he filed two petitions for review against the county commissioners of Fremont County. One petition for review was on behalf of Flying "A"Ranch, Inc., and others, and the other petition was on behalf of E. C. Gwaltney, III. The petitions sought to overturn the designation by the county commissioners of certain roads as being public roads rather than private roads. In early 2013, the county commissioners, represented by Blake Hall, the deputy prosecutor hired by the prosecutor that Lewies had defeated in the primary, filed motions in both cases seeking to have Lewies disqualified from representing the petitioners in those cases. Lewies filed motions in both cases to withdraw as counsel for the petitioners. In each of the cases, Lewies had named two of the commissioners in both their official and individual capacities. The commissioners filed motions in both cases to dismiss the actions against them in their individual capacities. Substitution counsel entered appearances for the county commissioners in both cases. The court made preliminary rulings that Lewies could not represent any parties in the two cases; that the county would be awarded attorney fees against him personally for having to file the motion to disqualify; that an action against the two commissioners in their individual capacities could not be joined with a petition for judicial review; and that attorney fees would not be awarded against Lewies for having named them in their individual capacities. During the hearing, Lewies contended that substitution counsel should have been disqualified from representing the commissioners and that a deputy prosecutor should represent them. Ultimately the trial court entered a written order affirming its preliminary rulings. After several hearings, the court entered its memorandum decision in both cases awarding the county attorney fees in the sum of $1,185.00 against Mr. Lewies personally pursuant to Rule 11(a)(1), and Lewies appealed. Because there was no legal basis for the award, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Lewies v. Fremont County" on Justia Law

Following the May 7, 2013, Democratic primary for the Ward 5 seat on the Greenwood City Council, the Greenwood Municipal Democratic Executive Committee certified Dorothy Ann Glenn as the winner and thus the Democratic nominee for the Ward 5 seat on the City Council. Runner-up Andrew Powell challenged the election results, contending that Glenn was not a resident of Ward 5 at the time of the election and that she consequently was ineligible to run for that office. Powell sought a special primary runoff election, without Glenn's name on the ballot. The Circuit Court of Leflore County, Special Election Tribunal, found that Glenn was not a resident of Ward 5, held that she was not qualified to hold the position of Greenwood City Council Member for Ward 5, set aside the results of the election, and ordered a special primary runoff election without Glenn's name on the ballot. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part and vacated the order of the circuit court for a special primary runoff election. View "Glenn v. Powell" on Justia Law

Appellee, the current Pine Bluff mayor, filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that she held the office of mayor through 2016 and a writ of mandamus to prohibit Appellants - the Jefferson County Election Commission and Commissioners - from taking any actions with regard to municipal elections in either the May 2014 primary election or the November 2014 general election. The circuit court found in Appellee’s favor and prohibited Appellants from holding any elections for the Pine Bluff municipal offices of mayor, treasurer, and city clerk and directing them to not count votes or certify winners in such races. After Appellants appealed, the May 2014 primary election was held, and no candidate was certified as the winner of any of those three municipal offices. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) any review of this appeal as it related to the May 2014 primary election was necessarily moot; and (2) because a decision by this Court could not have any practical legal effect with regard to the impending November 2014 election, review of the circuit court’s order prohibiting Appellants from holding elections in November 2014 was also moot. View "Jefferson Cnty. Election Comm'n v. Hollingsworth" on Justia Law

In May 2012, election officials in six Colorado counties had the theoretical ability to learn how individuals voted because the ballots were traceable. Citizen Center, a Colorado non-profit organization, sued the Secretary of State and the clerks for five of the six counties, contending that the use of traceable ballots violated members' federal constitutional rights involving: (1) voting, (2) free speech and association, (3) substantive due process, (4) equal protection, and (5) procedural due process. In addition, Citizen Center sued five of the clerks for violation of the Colorado Constitution. All defendants moved to dismiss for lack of standing, and the clerks included an alternative argument for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court dismissed the complaint on standing grounds without reaching the merits of the clerks' argument under Rule 12(b)(6). Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded: (1) the claims were partially moot because the Secretary of State adopted new regulations banning some of the challenged practices; (2) Citizen Center had standing on the "live" parts of the claims involving denial of equal protection and procedural due process, but its alleged injury in fact was too speculative for standing on the right-to-vote, free-speech-and-association and substantive-due-process claims; and (3) the first amended complaint failed to state a valid claim against the clerks for denial of equal protection or procedural due process. These conclusions resulted in a termination of all claims except the federal claims against the Secretary of State for denial of equal protection and procedural due process. View "Citizen Center v. Gessler" on Justia Law

Petitioners, acting individually and on behalf of a ballot-question committee, filed this original action challenging the timeliness and sufficiency for an initiative petition for a proposed constitutional amendment with the popular name of “The Arkansas Alcohol Beverage Amendment” that was certified by Respondent in his official capacity as Arkansas Secretary of State for the November 4, 2014 general election ballot. Intervenors were members of a ballot-question committee and the sponsor of the proposed constitutional amendment. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding (1) the petition was timely filed; and (2) the ballot title was legally sufficient. View "Richardson v. Martin" on Justia Law

In September 2010, the New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office received information regarding polling telephone calls made to New Hampshire residents that were described as containing negative content about United States congressional candidate Ann McLane Kuster. The AG investigated, and concluded that the Bass Victory Committee (he authorized campaign committee of former United States Congressman Charles F. Bass) had engaged in “push-polling” as defined in RSA 664:2, XVII (2008) (amended 2014) without complying with the disclosure requirements set forth in RSA 664:16-a. The Attorney General appealed a superior court order that dismissed his petition for civil penalties against the Committee. The AG argued that the trial court erroneously determined that the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) preempted RSA 664:16-a. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire Attorney General v. Bass Victory Committee " on Justia Law