Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Micah Phillips (then a 12-year veteran of the Dallas Fire Department) announced his candidacy in the Democratic primary for a seat on the Dallas County Commissioners Court. At that time, city laws prevented city employees from seeking office in any county overlapping the city of Dallas (as Dallas County did). The City subsequently terminated Phillips for violating those laws. This suit was dismissed on the pleadings by the district court, and Phillips challenged those laws both facially and as applied to him. Finding no reversible error, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. View "Phillips v. City of Dallas" on Justia Law

In 2012 Alabama redrew the boundaries of its 105 House and 35 Senate districts to minimize each district’s deviation from precisely equal population and avoid retrogression with respect to racial minorities’ “ability to elect their preferred candidates of choice” under the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. 10304(b), by maintaining roughly the same black population percentage in existing majority-minority districts. The district court rejected an equal protection claim of “racial gerrymander.” The Supreme Court vacated. Analysis of the racial gerrymandering claim as referring to the state “as a whole,” rather than district-by-district, was erroneous. Showing that race-based criteria did not significantly affect the drawing of some districts did not defeat a claim that such criteria predominantly affected the drawing of others. The objectors’ claimed that individual majority-minority districts were racially gerrymandered, and those districts must be reconsidered. There was “strong, perhaps overwhelming, evidence that race did predominate as a factor” with respect to one district. An equal population goal is not a “traditional” factor in determining whether race “predominates,” but is taken as a given. The district court and the Alabama legislature relied upon a mechanically numerical view as to what counts as forbidden retrogression and asked how to maintain the present minority percentages in majority-minority districts. The Act does not require maintenance of a particular numerical minority percentage. It requires the jurisdiction to maintain a minority’s ability to elect a preferred candidate of choice. View "Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Leading up to the 2012 state Senate elections in Texas, Texas failed to gain preclearance of its recently enacted Senate redistricting plan as required under then-existing law. Because Texas’s new plan had not been precleared, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit and successfully blocked the plan for the 2012 elections. A three-judge district court panel in San Antonio enjoined Texas’s plan and ordered an interim plan in its place. But after the election, the Supreme Court held that the Voting Rights Act’s coverage formula, which automatically subjected Texas to the preclearance requirement, was unconstitutional. Regardless, after the Court’s decision, Texas repealed the contested redistricting plan and adopted the court-imposed plan in its place, thus mooting Plaintiffs’ lawsuit. The district court then awarded Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees and costs. Texas appealed the award of costs. Because the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court erroneously characterized Plaintiffs as prevailing parties, the Fifth Circuit reversed. View "Davis v. Abbott" on Justia Law

Parks, incumbent mayor of East St. Louis, is seeking reelection in the April 2015 election. East St. Louis officials run for office on a nonpartisan basis. Parks’ nominating petitions were subject to Election Code rules governing petitions for independent candidates, 10 ILCS 5/10-3.1, which require signatures by a minimum number of qualified voters of the political subdivision. Under the formula for determining that number, petitions for East St. Louis mayoral candidates were required to have a minimum of 136 valid signatures. Parks filed petitions with 171 signatures. Jackson-Hicks, also a candidate for mayor, filed an objection under 10 ILCS 5/10-8. At a hearing, the attorney for the Election Board presented evidence that at least 48 signatures on Parks’ petitions were invalid; 12 additional signatures were questioned on the grounds that those persons were not registered to vote at the time they signed. The Election Board denied the objection, stating that the objection was in the proper form; that all required notices had been issued and served; and that Parks’ nominating papers had “insufficient signatures.” Despite this deficiency, the Board found “substantial compliance” and ordered that Parks’ name appear on the ballot. The circuit court and appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding the minimum signature requirement mandatory. View "Jackson-Hicks v. East St. Louis Bd. of Election Comm'rs" on Justia Law

In March 2013, Reeder received a letter from Phelon, the press secretary for Illinois Senate President Cullerton, informing Reeder that his request for Senate media credentials as a writer for the Illinois Policy Institute (IPI) was denied because IPI was registered as an Illinois lobbying entity. Phelon explained that Senate rules forbid credentials for anyone associated with a lobbying entity. Reeder tried again in January 2014 to obtain media credentials from the Illinois House of Representatives and Senate, arguing that IPI was no longer registered as a lobbyist. The Senate took the position that IPI was still required to register as a lobbyist given its retention of a lobbying firm that employed the same staff and office space as IPI itself. It again denied Reeder’s application. The Illinois House responded in kind. Reeder and IPI sued Illinois House Speaker Madigan and Cullerton, and their press secretaries under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of the press, and his rights to due process and equal protection. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, concluding that the denial of credentials qualified as legislative activity and entitled the defendants to immunity. View "Reeder v. Madigan" on Justia Law

In 2010, the House of Representatives passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), by a vote of 219 to 212, following significant debate over whether PPACA included taxpayer funding for abortion. Driehaus, a Representative from Ohio and an anti-abortion Democrat, was an outspoken advocate of the “no taxpayer funding for abortion in the PPACA” movement, insisting that he would not vote for PPACA without inclusion of the Stupak-Pitts Amendment, expressly forbidding use of taxpayer funds “to pay for any abortion or to cover any part of the costs of any health plan that includes coverage of abortion” except in cases of rape, incest, or danger to the life of the mother. Driehaus voted for the PPACA without the Amendment. President Obama later issued Executive Order 13535: “to … ensure that [f]ederal funds are not used for abortion services … consistent with a longstanding [f]ederal statutory restriction … the Hyde Amendment.” Debate continues as to whether PPACA includes federal funding for abortion. SBA, an anti-abortion public-advocacy organization, publicly criticized Driehaus, among other congressmen, for his vote. Driehaus considered SBA’s statement untrue and filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission, alleging violation of Ohio Revised Code 3517.21(B) (Unfair Political Campaign Activities). OEC found probable cause of a violation. SBA sued, claiming that the statute was an unconstitutional restriction on free speech. Driehaus counterclaimed defamation. Staying the other claims, pending agency action, the district court granted summary judgment, holding that associating a political candidate with a mainstream political position, even if false, cannot constitute defamation. The Sixth Circuit Affirmed. View "Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 8 (2016), arguing that the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). IP 8 would alter the authority of metropolitan service districts in Oregon by eliminating the authority of a metropolitan service district to engage in various planning functions related to land use, urban growth, air and water quality, and transportation. The Attorney General did not dispute that the reference in the results statements to a “regional plan for managing urban growth” was too broad to apprise potential petition signers and voters of the effect of the elimination of districts' authority to engage in those planning functions; it necessitated assuming that they would readily understand all that was entailed in a regional plan under current state law. Moreover, it failed to cover the role of a metropolitan service district as the federally mandated metropolitan planning organization charged with carrying out federal air and water quality planning responsibilities. The Supreme Court therefore referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Schoenheit v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

In 2013, the General Assembly passed Act 1413 of 2013, which made numerous changes to the portions of the Arkansas Code pertaining to initiatives and referenda. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint against Mark Martin, in his official capacity as the Secretary of State, alleging that certain sections of the Act violated the Seventh Amendment of the state Constitution. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Secretary Martin from enforcing the Act. Dustin McDaniel, acting in his official capacity as Attorney General, intervened in the action. The circuit court concluded that certain provisions of Act 1413 violated the Constitution because the provisions would cause citizens to lose their ability to propose legislative measures and laws directly to the people. The court then permanently enjoined Secretary Martin from enforcing those portions of the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that some of the sections of the Act declared unconstitutional by the circuit court were, in fact, constitutional. View "McDaniel v. Spencer" on Justia Law

The City of Delaware and Berkshire Township contracted for a proposed joint economic development district, and the Berkshire Township Board of Trustees adopted a resolution approving the contract. Colleen Mann circulated part-petitions, including part-petition Nos. 2 and 5, calling for a referendum on the resolution. The Delaware County Board of Elections (“Board”) rejected part-petitions No. 2 and 5 in their entirety, concluding that the part-petitions lacked the required number of valid signatures. Relators, Mann and two other individuals, commenced this action in mandamus against the Board and its members seeking to compel the Board to certify the referendum petition for the May 5, 2015 special-election ballot. The Supreme Court granted the writ and ordered the Board to recalculate the number of valid signatures, holding (1) there was insufficient evidence from which the Board could infer that Mann knew that two specific signatures were false; and (2) therefore, the Board abused its discretion when it rejected the two part-petitions in their entirety. View "State ex rel. Mann v. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The district court declared a vacancy in the Adams County School District 12 Director District 4 school board director position because defendant-appellee Amy Speers was elected but unqualified to serve. An issue arose when the two candidates signed affidavits affirming that they met all the requisite qualifications to hold the office, but unbeknownst to Speers, the School District had redrawn the director districts in 2012, and had placed Speers' home outside of Director District 4. The School District's designated election officer was also unaware that Speers no longer met the residency requirement, and deemed both petitions sufficient. Neither the sufficiency of Speers' petition nor her certification to the ballot was challenged within the five-day window (under C.R.S. 1-4-909(1) (2014)). The election officer's certification of both candidates to the ballot was therefore valid. In a final attempt to effectively withdraw Speers from the election, the Secretary of State issued an emergency rule at the end of the final day of the election that instructed the clerks not to count the ballots cast for Speers. A district court invalidated this rule as incompatible with Colorado's election code, and we upheld that court's decision in "Hanlen v. Gessler," (333 P.3d 41 2014)) because "questions regarding a certified candidate's eligibility [must] be determined by a court, not an election official." On remand, the district court considered plaintiff-appellant Enrico Figueroa's claims that Speers was not eligible to hold office, that the votes cast for her were invalid, and this he was legally elected to the Director District 4 position. The district court concluded that because neither Figueroa nor any other party sought any judicial intervention whatsoever prior to the election, Figueroa had "slept on his rights" and thus Speers had won the election. Regarding Speers, the court found that there was no dispute that she was ineligible to hold the office for which she was elected and because she had not sought to take the oath of office and did not intend to cure the residency defect, her election was voided. The court then declared a vacancy in the Director District 4 position. Figueroa appealed directly to the Colorado Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court held that, though Speers was unqualified to serve, no court declared her to be unqualified until after the voting had been completed. In this situation, the legally elected party is the party who receives the most legal votes. Thus, Speers was legally elected because she received the most legal votes, meaning Figueroa was not legally elected. The district court therefore correctly voided her election and declared a vacancy under the provisions of Colorado' selection code, and its judgment was affirmed. View "Figueroa v. Speers" on Justia Law