Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The Town of McBee Municipal Election Commission overturned the results of the town's September 2020 mayoral and town council elections after finding Sydney Baker violated a previous version of section 7-15-330 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2021)2 by requesting applications to vote by absentee ballot on behalf of other voters. The circuit court found there was no evidence to support the election commission's decision and reversed. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court. View "Odom v. McBee Municipal Election Commission" on Justia Law

Voters in Calhoun County, South Carolina, approved a referendum in the November 2018 general election imposing a one percent sales and use tax ("a penny tax") to fund a list of fifteen projects. Nearly five months later, Appellants filed suit, contending four of the projects were not authorized pursuant to section S.C. Code Ann. sections 4-10-300 to -390 (2019). The County responded that the statute of limitations had expired, and alternatively, the projects fell within the scope of the Act. The circuit court found the thirty-day limitations period barred the action and did not address the merits. After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding the statute of limitations had run. View "South Carolina Public Interest Foundation v. Calhoun County Council" on Justia Law

"The right to vote is a cornerstone of our constitutional republic." The voting laws implicated in this case were South Carolina statutes governing absentee voting. Pursuant to subsection 7-15-320(A) of the South Carolina Code (2019), absentee ballots could be used by certain voters who were unable to vote in person because they were absent from their county of residence on election day during the hours the polls are open. Subsection 7-15-320(B) allowed voters to cast absentee ballots when they were not absent from the county, but only if they fit into one of the listed categories of people eligible to vote by absentee ballot. Plaintiffs contended that in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, existing South Carolina law permitted all South Carolina registered voters to vote by absentee ballot in the June 9, 2020 primary election and the November 3, 2020 general election. Plaintiffs implicitly contended that if existing law did not permit this, it should. Plaintiffs asked the South Carolina Supreme Court to hear this case in its original jurisdiction. The South Carolina Republican Party was granted permission to intervene, and moved to dismiss. The Supreme Court granted the request to hear the case in its original jurisdiction, declined to dismiss on grounds raised by the South Carolina Republican Party, but dismissed on alternate grounds: the case did not present a justiciable controversy. View "Bailey v. SC State Election" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was candidate Glenn Odom’s contest of a McBee Town Council election. The McBee Municipal Election Commission ruled on the contest, and Odom appealed the Commission's decision to the circuit court. The circuit court ruled in favor of Odom, and the Commission and candidate Shilon Green (collectively, Appellants) appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court. During the election, several people attempting to vote were challenged as nonresidents of McBee. At the heart of this appeal were votes cast by four of the challenged voters. The Commission heard testimony from Odom and the four challenged voters and heard arguments from counsel. The four challenged voters testified they were McBee residents at all appropriate times and further testified they voted for Odom. In its written decision, the Commission found the four voters were eligible to vote in the election. The Commission wrote: "Because adding the four votes to the total for Glenn Odom would have changed the outcome of the election, the Municipal Election Commission hereby invalidates the September 5, 2018 election and orders a new election as is required under S.C. Code Ann. 5-15-130." Odom appealed the Commission's decision to the circuit court, arguing the Commission erred in ordering a new election instead of simply counting the four votes and declaring he was a prevailing candidate. The circuit court granted Odom's motion for reconsideration and held the Commission erred in invalidating the election and ordering a new election. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision to remand the proceedings to the Commission. The Supreme Court modified, however, the circuit court's order in two ways: (1) section 5-15-130, standing alone, required the four votes to be counted; (2) to the extent that the circuit court's decision could be read to order the Commission to declare Odom a prevailing candidate without the four votes first being counted, the Court held the four votes had to first be counted before the results of the election can be determined. The matter was remanded to the Commission and the Court ordered it to unseal the four provisional votes and apply those votes to the vote totals of the candidate(s) for whom the votes were cast, with the results of the election to then be declared accordingly. View "Odom v. Town of McBee Election Comm" on Justia Law

This case centered on the validity of a referendum question passed during the 2016 elections which granted the Dorchester County, South Carolina Council authority to issue up to $30 million in bonds for library facilities and up to $13 million for recreational facilities. Finding there was no indication the voters did not understand it, the circuit court determined it was not improper. But because the question contained two separate bond proposals and required voters to support both or neither, the South Carolina Supreme Court held it was unlawful. View "Zeigler v. Dorchester County" on Justia Law

McCormick County voters elected Clarke Anderson Stearns as their Sheriff in the November 8, 2016, general election. After the election, Appellants brought this action alleging "Stearns does not possess the necessary qualifications to be Sheriff of McCormick County." Based on that claim, Appellants "specifically request[ed]" the circuit court issue an order "enjoining the Defendant Stearns from serving as Sheriff of McCormick County." Before the circuit court action was filed, however, the losing candidate in the general election, J.R. Jones, filed a Title 7 election protest with the McCormick County Board of Canvassers. Jones filed the challenge on November 16, 2016. The county board held a hearing on November 21. By a vote of 3-to-3, the county board took no action on Jones's protest. Jones did not appeal the county board's decision. Jones then filed this action in circuit court on December 7, 2016, joined as plaintiff by the South Carolina Democratic Party and the McCormick County Democratic Party. This appeal presented two issues for the South Carolina Supreme Court's resolution: (1) whether a challenge to an elected official's legal qualifications to serve in the office to which he has just been elected must be brought pursuant to the administrative provisions of Title 7 of the South Carolina Code, or whether such a challenge may be brought in circuit court; and (2) whether the "certified law enforcement officer" requirement to serve as sheriff, found in subsection 23-11- 110(A)(5) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2018), required the certification to come from South Carolina authorities, as opposed to authorities in another state. The Supreme Court determined the plaintiffs in this case were permitted to bring the action in circuit court, but the necessary certification to serve as sheriff need not come from South Carolina authorities. The Court affirmed the result of the circuit court's decision, which did not remove the elected McCormick County Sheriff from office. View "Jones v. South Carolina Republican Party" on Justia Law

The circuit court ruled Appellant Kim Murphy was not qualified to be a candidate for election to a Richland County seat on the District 5 Richland-Lexington School Board of Trustees (School Board). The circuit court based this ruling on its conclusion that Murphy resided in Lexington County. Upon review, the South Carolina Supreme Court first found the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over Respondents' declaratory judgment action challenging Murphy's qualifications. Second, the Court held there was probative evidence in the record supporting the circuit court's conclusion that Murphy resided in Lexington County. Therefore, the Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling that Murphy is not qualified to be a candidate for election to a Richland County seat on the School Board. View "Gantt v. Selph" on Justia Law

Appellant-Respondent George Tempel and Respondents-Appellants the State Election Commission and South Carolina Republican Party appealed a circuit court order concerning the candidacy of Respondent-Appellant Paul Thurmond for Senate District 41. Thurmond electronically filed a Statement of Economic Interests (SEI). Thirty minutes later, he filed his Statement of Intention of Candidacy (SIC) for the Republican Party primary for Senate District 41. However, he did not file a paper copy of his SEI along with his SIC as required by section 8-13-1356(B). All of the other Republican contenders for the Senate District 41 seat were decertified for failing to comply with section 8-13-1356(B). However, Thurmond's name remained on the ballot, and he received over 1,700 votes. He was subsequently declared the Republican candidate for the seat. The circuit court found Thurmond was not exempt from the filing requirement of section 8-131356(B) of the South Carolina Code. S.C. Code Ann. 8-13-1356(B) (Supp. 2011). Thus, Thurmond was disqualified as the Republican nominee for the District 41 seat. The judge ordered the Republican Party to conduct a special primary election pursuant to section 7-11-55. S.C. Code Ann. 7-11-55 (Supp. 2011). Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order. View "Tempel v. So. Carolina Election Comm'n" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was declaratory relief in connection with an alleged improper certification of certain candidates by the Florence County Republican Party for the June 12, 2012, party primary.  Plaintiffs Florence County Election Commission, David Alford, South Carolina State Election Commission, and Marci Andino contended these candidates were improperly certified because they failed to comply with the requirements for filing a Statement of Economic Interests (SEI) contained in S.C. Code Ann. 8-13-1356 (Supp. 2011), as interpreted by the Court in "Anderson v. S.C. Election Comm'n," Op. No. 27120 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed May 2, 2012).  The County Republicans argued the candidates were exempt under 8-13-1356(A) from the filing requirements of 8-13-1356(B).  The Court granted declaratory relief to Plaintiffs and declared the County Republicans improperly construed the relevant statutory provisions to determine certain candidates were exempt from the requirements of 8-13-1356(B). View "Florence County Democratic Party v. Florence County Republican Party" on Justia Law

Petitioners Beaufort County and several officials from county boards of elections and registration sought a declaration from the Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction that the General Assembly has neither authorized the State Election Commission or the County Election Commissions to conduct a Presidential Preference Primary in 2012, nor mandated that Petitioners bear the financial burden of conducting the primary. The South Carolina Republican Party scheduled a Presidential Preference Primary for January 21, 2012. In the 2011-2012 Appropriations Act, the General Assembly provided that filing fees received from candidates to run in primary elections may be used by the State Election Commission to conduct the 2012 Presidential Preference Primary elections. In addition, the State Election Commission is authorized to use funds originally appropriated for ballot security to conduct the Presidential Preference Primary elections and the statewide primaries and runoffs. Petitioners contended the General Assembly did not authorize the State Election Commission or the County Election Commissions to conduct a Presidential Preference Primary in 2012 or any election cycle thereafter. In addition, Petitioners argued the amount set forth in the Appropriations Act were insufficient to cover the actual costs to the counties of conducting the 2012 primary. Because the Court was "firmly persuaded" that the General Assembly, through passage of Provisos 79.6 and 79.12 for fiscal year 2011-2012, intended to suspend the temporal limitation in S.C. Code Ann. 17-11-20(B)(2) (Supp. 2010), the Court entered judgment for Respondents the State Election Commission. View "Beaufort County v. SC Election Commission" on Justia Law