Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Two registered voters challenged the language of a school district bond measure prior to the November 2024 election. The Los Angeles Unified School District sought voter approval to issue $9 billion in bonds, repaid by property taxes. The district’s board adopted a ballot label stating the tax rate as “2.5¢ per $100 of assessed valuation,” while the voter information materials described the tax rate as "$25.04 per $100,000." The challengers argued that the ballot label should have used the same unit as the voter information materials, and filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking four specific amendments to the ballot label.Los Angeles County Superior Court denied the petition, holding that the statutory requirement to state the tax rate per $100,000 applied only to voter information materials, not the ballot itself. The court found that the ballot label substantially complied with legal requirements since the tax rate denominator was correctly stated elsewhere. The election proceeded, and the bond measure was approved by voters.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. Although the election had already occurred and the appeal was technically moot, the court exercised its discretion to decide the issue because it was of public interest and likely to recur. The court held that the ballot for a school bond measure must state the tax rate in the same terms as the corresponding tax rate statement mailed to voters, specifically per $100,000 of assessed valuation as required by Elections Code section 9401(c). The judgment denying the petition was reversed, and the trial court was directed to dismiss the petition as moot. The motion to dismiss the appeal was denied, and parties were ordered to bear their own costs. View "Osborne v. Logan" on Justia Law

A candidate for Knox County Sheriff submitted the required election petition and consent form, swearing to meet statutory qualifications for the office, including at least two years of supervisory employment experience in law enforcement or corrections. He provided documentation and testimony from his previous employer, the Chattanooga Housing Authority Police Department, confirming his supervisory role over contract officers. A registered voter and deputy sheriff challenged the candidate’s qualifications, particularly contesting the sufficiency of his supervisory experience. At the hearing, the candidate declined to testify, but his former supervisor and a contract officer testified about his supervisory duties.A presiding officer appointed by the Secretary of State heard the challenge and found that the candidate’s position did not constitute sufficient supervisory employment experience under the relevant statute, reasoning that his supervisory authority was limited and primarily over independent contractors rather than employees. The officer recommended that the candidate’s consent form be invalidated. The candidate objected to this recommendation.The Secretary of State issued a final decision, adopting the presiding officer’s findings regarding certification but concluding that the candidate’s supervisory experience as a Criminal Investigator satisfied the statutory requirement. The Secretary of State interpreted supervisory employment experience to mean supervision of personnel as a job responsibility, regardless of whether the supervised individuals were direct employees or contractors. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the interpretation of the statute de novo and the Secretary of State’s factual findings for substantial evidence. The Court held that the Secretary of State’s interpretation and application of the statute were correct and supported by substantial evidence, and affirmed the decision allowing the candidate to appear on the ballot. View "Landers v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

The case revolves around whether Arizona’s Secretary of State was required to follow the state’s Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when publishing the Election Procedures Manual (EPM), a comprehensive set of rules governing election procedures. In 2023, the Secretary published a draft EPM, allowed a fifteen-day public comment period, and then submitted a revised version for approval to the Governor and Attorney General, who approved it. The final EPM was issued on December 30, 2023. The Republican National Committee (RNC) challenged the process, arguing that the Secretary had not complied with APA rulemaking requirements, specifically citing the abbreviated comment period and seeking to invalidate the EPM or several of its provisions.Maricopa County Superior Court reviewed the RNC’s claims and granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss, finding that the EPM was not subject to the APA due to a distinct statutory process outlined in A.R.S. § 16-452. The court also rejected the RNC’s claims that specific EPM provisions conflicted with state and federal law. The RNC appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the EPM was subject to the APA and that the Secretary had not substantially complied with its requirements, especially regarding the notice-and-comment period.The Arizona Supreme Court, reviewing the case de novo, vacated the appellate court’s opinion and reinstated the superior court’s dismissal. The Court held that A.R.S. § 16-452 constitutes a comprehensive, self-contained rulemaking process “otherwise provided by law,” exempting the EPM from the APA’s procedures. The EPM’s validity is not contingent on APA compliance. The Supreme Court remanded for consideration of the RNC’s alternative claims, but the main holding was that the EPM is not subject to APA rulemaking requirements. View "REPUBLICAN NATL COMMITTEE v. FONTES" on Justia Law

During the 2015 municipal election in Stamford, a local political committee chairman engaged in submitting fraudulent absentee ballot applications and ballots on behalf of residents who neither completed applications nor voted by absentee ballot. The town clerk, despite knowing it was unlawful, provided voting sets to the chairman and his associates. Investigations revealed that the signatures on several applications did not match the genuine signatures of the supposed applicants, leading to the discovery that multiple fraudulent applications and ballots had been submitted.The case was initially tried in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the defendant was found guilty on fourteen counts each of false statement in absentee balloting and forgery in the second degree. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request during trial to call an expert witness to rebut the prosecution's handwriting expert. The Appellate Court affirmed the conviction, finding no abuse of discretion, given that the defense failed to timely disclose its intention to call an expert and did not provide meaningful information about the expert's expected testimony.Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, the defendant focused on whether denial of his late request to present expert testimony constituted an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that the trial court acted within its discretion, as the defense had not demonstrated good cause for the late disclosure and failed to identify the expert or substantiate the expert's proposed testimony. The Court also noted that any alleged surprise regarding the prosecution’s expert testimony was avoidable, since the expert’s overall conclusion was disclosed in the arrest warrant affidavit long before trial. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment. View "State v. Mallozzi" on Justia Law

An individual sought the Democratic Party nomination for a Maryland House of Delegates seat in District 12B for the 2026 primary election. Shortly before filing his candidacy certificate, he changed his voter registration to reflect a residential address within District 12B, although he had long resided at a different address in District 31. The certificate of candidacy listed the District 12B address as his residence. The incumbent delegate and a registered voter of District 12B challenged the candidacy, alleging the candidate was not a resident of District 12B when he filed and made false statements about his address on official documents.The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County initially dismissed the challenge as premature, reasoning that the constitutional residency requirement for delegates applied only six months before the general election, not at the time of filing. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed and remanded, holding the challenge was ripe for adjudication. After an evidentiary hearing on remand, the circuit court found the candidate’s true residence and domicile remained at his longtime District 31 address at the time of filing. The court concluded he had not abandoned that domicile, did not reside at the District 12B address, and had made a material misrepresentation on his certificate of candidacy. The court disqualified him from the ballot.On further direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed. It held that, pursuant to Maryland law, a candidate who materially misrepresents their residential address on a certificate of candidacy invalidates that certificate. The Court clarified that the candidate must provide either a current address or a voter registration address, but only if it is current, and that a false statement about residence warrants disqualification. The Supreme Court also ruled that an attorney from the General Assembly who enters an appearance after the legislative session begins waives the statutory right to postponement under such circumstances. View "Dove v. Simmons" on Justia Law

A group sought access to certain court forms used to notify election officials when a person under guardianship has been found incompetent to vote. These forms, known as Notice of Voting Eligibility (NVE) forms, contain personal information about the individual and details about the court’s finding of incompetency. The group submitted public records requests for completed NVE forms held by the Walworth County register in probate, seeking to identify individuals found incompetent to vote. The requests were denied, and the group filed a mandamus action to compel disclosure.The Walworth County Circuit Court denied the request, holding that NVE forms were confidential under Wisconsin law. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals initially reversed, but because of a prior, conflicting published appellate decision (Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Reynolds), the Wisconsin Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration. On remand, the Court of Appeals held it was bound by the Reynolds precedent and affirmed the circuit court’s denial.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case. It clarified the standard for mandamus actions in public records cases, holding that courts should focus solely on whether the requester has a legal right to the records, and not on other traditional mandamus elements. The court concluded that NVE forms are “court records pertinent to the finding of incompetency” and are therefore “closed” under Wisconsin Statute § 54.75, which protects the privacy of individuals in guardianship proceedings. As a result, the forms are exempt from disclosure under the public records law, the group has no legal right to access them, and the writ of mandamus must be denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Secord" on Justia Law

Following the 2020 presidential election, three individuals—Shawn Smith, Ashley Epp, and Holly Kasun—formed an unincorporated association called the United States Election Integrity Plan (USEIP) to investigate what they believed was widespread election fraud in Colorado. In 2021, USEIP organized volunteers to go door-to-door canvassing, asking voters questions about their voting history and, in some instances, about whom they voted for. The Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP, the League of Women Voters of Colorado, and Mi Familia Vota (collectively, the Voter Organizations) filed suit against USEIP and its founders, alleging that these canvassing activities constituted voter intimidation.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment for USEIP, holding that unincorporated associations could not be sued under the statutes invoked: Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The district court then held a bench trial against the individual defendants. After the plaintiffs presented their case, the district court granted judgment on partial findings for the individuals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c), finding insufficient evidence that any defendant engaged in voter intimidation. The court denied the defendants’ subsequent motion for attorney’s fees.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of USEIP, holding that unincorporated associations can be sued under both Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act and § 1985. The appellate court found that the district court’s exclusion of USEIP significantly narrowed the scope of relevant evidence at trial, affecting the plaintiffs’ substantial rights. The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial against all defendants. The related appeal regarding attorney’s fees was dismissed as moot. View "Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP v. Smith" on Justia Law

In this case, the City of Hammond and three individual voters challenged Indiana’s use of the “Missouri Plan”—a system in which the governor appoints superior court judges from a list of nominees vetted by a nonpartisan commission, followed by periodic retention elections—in Lake County. They argued that, unlike most other Indiana counties where superior court judges are chosen in open elections, the Missouri Plan in Lake County gives minority voters, who make up over 40% of the voting-age population there, less opportunity than white voters elsewhere in the state to select judges of their choice. Plaintiffs relied on demographic disparities and asserted that the system violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division, entered summary judgment for the defendants. The district court found that Seventh Circuit precedent, specifically Quinn v. Illinois, foreclosed the plaintiffs’ claim, holding that Section 2 does not require any particular office to be filled by election rather than appointment. The district judge also noted contrary circuit precedent in Bradley v. Work, which addressed similar facts, but concluded that Quinn was controlling.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court concluded that, under the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Louisiana v. Callais, Section 2 liability attaches only where circumstances strongly suggest intentional discrimination. The appellate court found no evidence that Indiana’s use of the Missouri Plan in Lake County was motivated by racial discrimination, as the change was prompted by concerns over partisanship and inefficiency in the courts rather than race. The court thus held that Section 2 could not impose liability under these facts and affirmed the summary judgment for the defendants. View "City of Hammond v Lake County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

A group of candidates and political party committees, including then-Senate candidate JD Vance and various Republican campaign committees, challenged federal limits on coordinated campaign expenditures by political parties under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). These limits restrict the amount a party can spend in direct coordination with a candidate’s campaign. Plaintiffs argued that the restrictions violate the First Amendment, especially given modern developments in campaign finance law and enforcement tools such as earmarking and disclosure requirements. JD Vance maintained standing to challenge the law, as he had an active Statement of Candidacy and a campaign committee, despite later becoming Vice President.The case was first reviewed by the en banc United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which upheld FECA’s coordinated-expenditure limits. The Sixth Circuit relied primarily on the Supreme Court’s 2001 precedent, Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II), which had previously sustained these limits against First Amendment challenges. However, several Sixth Circuit judges questioned whether Colorado II remained good law in light of more recent Supreme Court decisions, including McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission and Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate.The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and ultimately reversed the Sixth Circuit. The Court held that FECA’s limits on political-party coordinated expenditures violate the First Amendment. Applying rigorous scrutiny, the Court determined that the limits are not necessary, narrowly tailored, or proportionate to the government’s interest in preventing circumvention of candidate contribution limits, especially given the effectiveness of existing earmarking rules and disclosure laws. The Court explicitly overruled Colorado II, concluding that subsequent precedents have rendered it obsolete. The judgment of the Sixth Circuit was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission" on Justia Law

During the 2020 election cycle, an organization formed with the stated mission of advocating for certain economic and governmental policies in Colorado. The group, overseen by a sole board member and a contractor, spent over $17 million that year, with around $4 million (about 23.4% of its expenditures) directed at supporting or opposing three statewide ballot initiatives. Its activities included funding signature-gathering efforts and contributing to other issue committees involved in those propositions. Members of the public filed a complaint alleging the organization was required to register and disclose as an “issue committee” under Colorado’s campaign finance laws, which apply to groups with a major purpose of supporting or opposing ballot issues.The Elections Division initially dismissed the complaint, interpreting the law to require a major purpose focused on a specific ballot measure, not ballot initiatives generally. The Deputy Secretary of State disagreed, reinstated the proceedings, and, after an administrative hearing, the Administrative Law Judge found the organization had a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy. A Final Agency Order imposed a fine and mandated disclosure. On appeal, the district court reversed, finding the law did not support aggregating the organization’s activities across multiple initiatives. The Colorado Court of Appeals then reversed again, holding that the law permitted aggregation and that the organization’s activities met the major purpose standard, also rejecting the organization’s First Amendment arguments.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case, interpreting the constitutional definition of “issue committee.” The court held that determining whether an organization has a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy requires a holistic, fact-specific evaluation of its creation, spending, and activities, considering aggregate activity across multiple ballot issues. Applying this standard, the court found that, although the organization was active in ballot issue advocacy, its spending on such activities (less than a quarter of its overall expenditures) did not rise to the level of a major purpose. The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Unite for Colo. v. Colo. Dep't of State" on Justia Law