Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

In the 2024 general election for State Representative, District 39 in Hawaii, the two candidates were Republican Elijah Pierick and Democrat Corey Rosenlee. The election was primarily conducted by mail, with in-person voting available at voter service centers. The City Clerk of Honolulu was responsible for mailing and receiving ballots, while the State Office of Elections handled the counting. After the election, Pierick received 4,712 votes, and Rosenlee received 4,701 votes, with a vote differential of 11 in favor of Pierick. Rosenlee contested the election results, alleging mistakes in the handling of return identification envelopes and long lines at voter service centers.Rosenlee filed an election contest with the Supreme Court of Hawaii on November 25, 2024. He claimed that the Clerk made mistakes in reviewing signatures on return identification envelopes, only mailing notice of deficiencies, and managing in-person voting lines. He also alleged that the Clerk's actions violated equal protection and due process. The defendants filed motions for dismissal or summary judgment, arguing that no mistakes were made and that Rosenlee failed to provide evidence to support his claims.The Supreme Court of Hawaii reviewed the evidence and found that the Clerk followed the proper procedures for validating signatures on return identification envelopes. The court concluded that Rosenlee did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that any mistakes by the Clerk affected the election results. The court also found that the Clerk provided reasonable notice and opportunity for voters to cure deficiencies in their return identification envelopes. As a result, the court ruled in favor of the defendants and confirmed Pierick's election as State Representative, District 39. The court ordered the Chief Election Officer to deliver the certificate of election to Pierick. View "Rosenlee v. Takahashi " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Chris Robles and the California Voting Rights Initiative filed a lawsuit against the City of Ontario, alleging violations of the Voting Rights Act and the California Voting Rights Act by conducting at-large elections for city council members, which they claimed diluted the electoral influence of Latino voters. The parties eventually settled, agreeing to transition to district-based elections by 2024 and included a provision for attorney fees incurred up to that point.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County initially sustained the defendants' demurrer with leave to amend, but the parties settled and submitted a stipulated judgment. The stipulated judgment included a provision for $300,000 in attorney fees and outlined the process for transitioning to district elections. Plaintiffs later filed a motion to enforce the stipulated judgment, alleging the city violated several statutory requirements related to the districting process. The trial court found the city had not complied with the stipulated judgment but denied plaintiffs' request for additional attorney fees, stating the settlement did not provide for fees beyond those already paid.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to seek additional attorney fees under the plain language of the stipulated judgment, which allowed for fees incurred in enforcing its terms. The court reversed the trial court's order denying attorney fees and remanded the case to determine whether plaintiffs were prevailing parties and, if so, the appropriate amount of attorney fees to be awarded. The appellate court clarified that the trial court's assessment of the prevailing party should focus on whether the plaintiffs achieved their litigation objectives. View "Robles v. City of Ontario" on Justia Law

The plaintiff sought to register as a write-in candidate for the United States representative for the Third Congressional District of Connecticut in the November 2024 election. She claimed her registration was untimely due to following outdated guidance from the defendant, the Secretary of the State, which quoted an old version of the statute governing write-in candidacies. The plaintiff requested an order directing the defendant to accept her registration.The Superior Court previously dismissed the plaintiff's attempts to obtain relief for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff then brought this action under General Statutes § 9-323, seeking an emergency hearing to challenge the defendant's decision.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the case was not moot despite being heard after election day, as practical relief was still available. The court found that the plaintiff was aggrieved by the defendant's ruling, as the untimely filing was allegedly due to erroneous information provided by the defendant's office.Assuming without deciding that courts have the authority to excuse noncompliance with mandatory filing deadlines due to election official actions, the court concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The court noted that the correct deadline was clearly stated in both the cover letter and the registration form, and the plaintiff failed to exercise due diligence in resolving the apparent discrepancy.The court denied the plaintiff's request for an injunction and rendered judgment for the defendant, holding that the plaintiff's lack of due diligence did not warrant equitable relief from the mandatory statutory deadline. View "Whitnum Baker v. Secretary of the State" on Justia Law

In May 2024, Tabitha Ponder ran for a seat on the Georgia Court of Appeals but lost to Jeffrey Davis. Three weeks after the election, Ponder and Randolph Frails filed an election contest petition, claiming Davis was not a Georgia resident and thus not qualified to run. They appealed the superior court's dismissal of their petition.Before the election, Frails alone challenged Davis's qualifications under OCGA § 21-2-5, alleging Davis was not a Georgia resident. An administrative law judge initially found Davis had not proven his residency, but the Secretary of State later determined Davis met the residency requirement. Frails then sought judicial review and an emergency hearing but did not request to stay the election. The superior court dismissed Frails's petition as moot after the election results were certified, and Frails did not appeal this decision.On June 11, Ponder and Frails filed a post-election contest petition, again challenging Davis's residency and seeking to have Ponder declared the winner. The superior court dismissed their petition, citing defective verifications and their failure to act promptly. Ponder and Frails appealed, arguing errors in the superior court's rulings.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and emphasized the importance of resolving election disputes before the election occurs. The court noted that neither Ponder nor Frails took sufficient steps to expedite their claims before the election. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal without addressing the merits, citing prudential reasons to avoid invalidating elections after the fact when challengers fail to act with dispatch. The appeal was dismissed. View "Ponder v. Davis" on Justia Law

Christina Peterson, representing herself, challenged the qualifications of Valerie Vie as a candidate for probate court judge in Douglas County, Georgia. Peterson claimed that Vie had not been a resident of Douglas County for the required time to run for the office. Peterson initially filed a challenge with the local Board of Elections, which was denied. She then filed a petition for review in superior court, which was also denied. After the primary election, which Vie won, Peterson filed a second petition in superior court challenging the election results on the same grounds.The local Board of Elections held a hearing and denied Peterson's challenge. Peterson then filed a petition for review in the superior court, which was also denied. Peterson did not seek to stay the primary election and filed an application for discretionary appeal with the Supreme Court of Georgia, which was denied. Subsequently, Peterson filed a post-primary petition in superior court, which was dismissed on the grounds of collateral estoppel, res judicata, and mootness due to her failure to seek a stay of the primary election.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and dismissed Peterson's appeal. The court held that parties seeking to challenge election results must act with dispatch to resolve disputes before the election occurs. Peterson failed to expedite her challenges and did not seek a stay of the primary election. The court emphasized the importance of resolving election disputes promptly to avoid unnecessary expenses and ensure the finality of election results. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal without addressing the merits of Peterson's claims. View "Peterson v. Vie" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Tati Abu King and Toni Heath Johnson were unable to register to vote in Virginia due to felony convictions. King was convicted of felony drug possession in 2018, and Johnson was convicted of multiple felonies, including drug possession, in 2021. Virginia's constitution disenfranchises individuals convicted of felonies unless their civil rights are restored by the Governor or other appropriate authority. King and Johnson argued that this disenfranchisement violated the Virginia Readmission Act, a federal statute from 1870, which they claimed restricted Virginia from amending its constitution to disenfranchise individuals for crimes that were not felonies at common law in 1870.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed three of the four counts in the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim but allowed one count based on the Virginia Readmission Act to proceed. The defendants, including various state election officials and the Governor of Virginia, moved to dismiss the complaint on sovereign immunity grounds, which the district court rejected.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs' claim met the requirements of the Ex parte Young doctrine, which allows suits for prospective relief against state officials to prevent ongoing violations of federal law. The court affirmed the district court's decision to allow the claim to proceed against most defendants but reversed the decision regarding the Governor of Virginia and the Secretary of the Commonwealth, finding that they lacked enforcement responsibility for the challenged state action. The court concluded that the Governor and Secretary must be dismissed from the case on sovereign immunity grounds. The district court's order was thus affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "King v. Youngkin" on Justia Law

Three registered electors from Bridgeport filed a writ of error challenging a trial judge's decision to deny their applications for arrest warrants for two individuals who allegedly violated election laws during the 2023 Democratic primary for the mayoral office. The plaintiffs claimed that the trial judge misinterpreted the relevant statute, General Statutes § 9-368, which they argued mandated the issuance of arrest warrants upon their complaint. The state of Connecticut, the defendant in error, argued that the writ should be dismissed because the plaintiffs were neither statutorily nor classically aggrieved by the denial of their applications.The Superior Court for the judicial district of Fairfield, with Judge Thomas J. Welch presiding, denied the applications for arrest warrants. The judge concluded that § 9-368 was inconsistent with the federal and state constitutions and the rules of practice, as it allowed for the issuance of arrest warrants based on a standard less than probable cause and without coordination with the Division of Criminal Justice. The judge did not reach the substantive merits of the applications and suggested that the matter could be referred to a prosecuting authority.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs in error were not required to establish statutory aggrievement to bring a writ of error. However, the court dismissed the writ on the grounds that the plaintiffs were not classically aggrieved. The court determined that the plaintiffs lacked a specific, personal, and legal interest in the arrest and prosecution of those who allegedly violated election laws, as they were private citizens without a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another. Consequently, the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the trial judge's denial of their arrest warrant applications. View "In re Criminal Complaint & Application for Arrest Warrant" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Siddhanth Sharma, a convicted felon, challenged North Carolina's felony-disclosure requirement for candidates running for federal office. This state law mandates that candidates disclose any felony convictions and provide additional information about the convictions and the restoration of citizenship rights. Sharma, who announced his candidacy for North Carolina’s Thirteenth Congressional District seat, argued that this requirement violated the Qualifications Clause and the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed Sharma's claims. The court found that Sharma had standing to challenge the felony-disclosure requirement but concluded that it did not constitute an additional qualification for office. The court also held that the requirement did not violate the First Amendment, as it served a substantial interest in promoting an informed electorate and posed only a modest burden. Sharma's challenge to the address-disclosure requirement was dismissed for lack of standing, as the court found his injury insufficiently particularized.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the felony-disclosure requirement is constitutional. The court reasoned that the requirement does not exclude candidates from the ballot or disadvantage political viewpoints, and it falls within the state's authority to regulate elections. The court also found that the requirement imposes only a light burden on First Amendment rights and serves the state's interest in fostering an informed electorate. However, the court vacated the judgment on the address-disclosure challenge and remanded it to the district court with instructions to dismiss it as moot, as Sharma's address was already publicly available in the voter-search database. View "Siddhanth Sharma v. Alan Hirsch" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Kansas's restrictions on private parties partially filling out mail-ballot applications before sending them to registered voters. Plaintiffs, VoteAmerica and Voter Participation Center (VPC), argue that these restrictions violate their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. They seek an injunction to prevent Kansas officials from enforcing the law.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas ruled in favor of the plaintiffs after a bench trial based on stipulated facts. The court applied strict scrutiny to the law, finding that it violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. The court held that the mailing of prefilled applications was protected speech and that the law was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The court also found that the law infringed on the plaintiffs' associational rights and declared the law unconstitutionally overbroad.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court first determined that the prefilled applications should be considered separately from the cover letter included in the mailings. It then concluded that mailing the prefilled applications constitutes speech protected by the First Amendment. However, the court rejected the application of strict scrutiny under the Meyer-Buckley framework, finding that the law did not restrict access to a fundamental avenue of political discourse. The court also rejected the argument that the law was subject to strict scrutiny due to speaker discrimination, as the law's speaker-based exception did not reflect a content preference.The Tenth Circuit held that the proper level of scrutiny for the law is intermediate scrutiny, as the law is a content-based but viewpoint-neutral regulation. The court reversed the district court's rulings on the overbreadth and freedom-of-association claims, remanding for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants on these claims. The court also remanded the free-speech claim for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, applying intermediate scrutiny. View "VoteAmerica v. Schwab" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Chris Robles and the California Voting Rights Initiative sued the City of Ontario, alleging violations of the Voting Rights Act and the California Voting Rights Act due to the city's at-large method of electing council members, which they claimed diluted Latino electoral influence. The parties settled, agreeing to transition to district-based elections by 2024 and included a provision for attorney fees incurred up to that point.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County initially sustained the city's demurrer but later entered a stipulated judgment based on the settlement. Plaintiffs later filed a motion to enforce the stipulated judgment, claiming the city violated several statutory requirements during the districting process. The court found the city had not complied with the stipulated judgment but questioned the validity of the settlement terms. Eventually, the city adopted the plaintiffs' proposed district map.Plaintiffs sought additional attorney fees for enforcing the stipulated judgment. The trial court denied this request, interpreting the stipulated judgment as precluding further fees and deeming plaintiffs' enforcement efforts unnecessary. Plaintiffs appealed this decision.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reversed the trial court's order. The appellate court held that the plain language of the stipulated judgment allowed plaintiffs to seek attorney fees for enforcing its terms. The case was remanded for the trial court to determine if plaintiffs were prevailing parties and, if so, the appropriate amount of attorney fees. The appellate court clarified that the determination of the prevailing party should be based on whether the party achieved its litigation objectives, not on the perceived necessity of their actions. View "Robles v. City of Ontario" on Justia Law