Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

A nonprofit corporation focused on public policy issues published several materials criticizing ranked-choice voting in Alaska ahead of a 2020 statewide election that included a ballot proposition proposing to adopt ranked-choice voting and other election reforms. These materials included a press release announcing an educational campaign, a video posted on the nonprofit’s website and YouTube channel, a press release about a report on the effects of ranked-choice voting, and a blog post. The communications did not explicitly mention the ballot proposition by name but referred to ranked-choice voting and the upcoming election.A complaint was filed with the Alaska Public Offices Commission (the Commission), alleging that the nonprofit failed to comply with Alaska’s campaign finance laws by not registering, not reporting expenditures, and not including “paid for by” disclosures on its communications. The nonprofit acknowledged spending approximately $643 on related activities. The Commission determined that the nonprofit’s communications qualified as regulated “express communications” because, in context, they could only be interpreted as exhortations to vote against the ballot proposition. The Commission found violations but waived any penalty.The nonprofit appealed to the Superior Court for the Third Judicial District, Anchorage, challenging the statutory interpretation, the application of the law, and the constitutionality of the statutes as vague and violative of the First Amendment. The superior court affirmed the Commission’s order, holding that the statutory standards were reasonably applied, were not unconstitutionally vague, and withstood First Amendment scrutiny under exacting review.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska held that the nonprofit’s communications triggered reporting and disclosure requirements. The court ruled that the statutes, as narrowed by agency interpretation, were not unconstitutionally vague and that the disclosure and reporting requirements were substantially related to the government’s interest in an informed electorate. The judgment was affirmed. View "Alaska Policy Forum v. Alaska Public Offices Commission" on Justia Law

A candidate for the Arkansas House of Representatives, District 92, was certified to appear on the Republican primary ballot. Another Arkansas citizen, who did not reside in District 92, sued to have the candidate declared ineligible based on a past guilty plea to a felony public trust crime. The plaintiff sought to prevent election officials from counting or certifying any votes cast for the candidate.The Pulaski County Circuit Court considered the statutory framework that allows any Arkansas citizen to bring an action to enforce eligibility requirements for public office if the responsible prosecuting attorney fails to act. The court found that the prosecuting attorney knew of the candidate’s prior conviction and failed to act, and that the plaintiff, as a citizen, had standing. The court ruled the candidate ineligible to run or hold office and ordered that votes for the candidate not be counted. The court denied the plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and expenses.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case. It affirmed the circuit court’s findings that the plaintiff had standing, that the prosecuting attorney’s failure to act was sufficient, and that the candidate was ineligible under the plain language of Arkansas’s statutory disqualification provisions for those pleading guilty to public trust crimes, even if records were sealed. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s evidentiary rulings. On cross-appeal, the Supreme Court held that the statute mandates an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses to a prevailing citizen plaintiff. Thus, it reversed the denial of fees and remanded for further proceedings on that issue. The Supreme Court’s disposition was to affirm on the direct appeal and reverse and remand on the cross-appeal. View "Reed v. Yang" on Justia Law

The case concerns the non-reappointment of a local general registrar of elections in Lynchburg, Virginia. The plaintiff, previously appointed unanimously by a bipartisan electoral board, reapplied for her position after her term expired in 2023. By that time, the board’s partisan makeup had shifted to include two Republicans and one Democrat, reflecting state law. The board interviewed four candidates, including the plaintiff, but ultimately appointed a different candidate who was a registered Republican. The plaintiff, describing herself as an independent, alleged her non-reappointment was due to partisan bias rather than job performance.Following the board’s decision, the plaintiff sued the board and its two Republican members, alleging First Amendment violations tied to political animus. The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia dismissed the claim against the board itself on sovereign immunity grounds, but allowed the suit against the individual members to proceed. After a jury trial, the verdict favored the defendants. The plaintiff then appealed, raising concerns about jury selection procedures and the exclusion of certain evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the appeal. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in managing voir dire, including its refusal to allow more pointed questioning about potential jurors’ political affiliations and beliefs. The Fourth Circuit also determined that the plaintiff had not preserved most evidentiary challenges for appellate review, as she failed to make sufficient proffers or obtain definitive rulings on excluded evidence. For the limited evidentiary exclusions properly preserved, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Gibbons v. Gibbs" on Justia Law

A candidate for the Arkansas House of Representatives was challenged by his opponent, who argued that she was ineligible to run for office due to a prior disposition in a 2018 hot-check case. The challenger claimed that the opponent had been found guilty of violating the Arkansas Hot Check Law, which, under state constitutional and statutory provisions, would render her ineligible for election. The evidence included a district court docket showing a disposition labeled “GUILTY – BOND FORFEITURE,” as well as payment of fines, fees, and restitution related to the charge. The opponent did not contest the existence of the underlying case but denied that she had been convicted or found guilty.The case was first heard in the Pulaski County Circuit Court. After a hearing that included testimony from court and law enforcement personnel about the court’s procedures, and review of the district court records, the circuit court concluded that the bond forfeiture was not an admission of guilt. The court found that the opponent had neither entered a plea nor been found guilty by the court. The circuit court therefore held that she had not been convicted of an infamous crime or a public trust crime under Arkansas law, and denied the challenger’s petition for declaratory judgment and mandamus.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the record and the circuit court’s findings under a clearly erroneous standard. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that a bond forfeiture, without a plea or factual finding of guilt, does not constitute a conviction or render a candidate ineligible under Article 5, Section 9 of the Arkansas Constitution or the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court rejected the challenger’s remaining arguments and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "DAY V. WARDLAW" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization dedicated to election integrity, along with two individual members, filed administrative complaints with the Wisconsin Elections Commission, alleging that the Commissioners themselves had failed to properly enforce certain aspects of federal election law regarding voter-ID requirements and management of voter registration lists. The Commission, citing ethical concerns about adjudicating complaints against itself, declined to review the complaints on their merits but suggested alternative remedies, such as referral to a district attorney or appeal to a state court. Dissatisfied, the organization and its members filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, seeking to compel the Commission to address their complaints under federal law.The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that neither the organization nor its members had Article III standing because they failed to show a concrete injury. The plaintiffs were permitted to amend their complaint, but upon doing so, the district court again dismissed the action, finding that their alleged injuries were intangible and insufficient to establish standing under federal law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that alleged procedural violations of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) did not constitute a concrete injury in fact necessary for Article III standing, as there was no historic or common-law analog for suing the government merely for failing to follow statutory procedures. The court further determined that HAVA did not create a private right of action enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the plaintiffs’ claims of organizational or associational standing were inadequately supported. The Seventh Circuit thus affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing. View "Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Millis" on Justia Law

Two individuals, a political commentator and a state legislator, brought suit against Minnesota officials to challenge a state statute that criminalizes the dissemination of “deep fake” content intended to influence elections. The law applies to realistic depictions that could mislead a reasonable person into believing a public figure engaged in speech or conduct they did not. The commentator created an AI-generated video of Vice President Harris, which he labeled as parody with a clear disclaimer. The legislator shared the same video without any disclaimer. Both plaintiffs argued that the statute infringed their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.After the complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, the district court found that the commentator lacked standing because the only videos he posted were labeled as parody and thus not covered by the statute. The court concluded that the legislator did have standing, since she shared content that could plausibly be seen as a deep fake under the law. However, the court denied her motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding she had unreasonably delayed in seeking relief—waiting over sixteen months after the statute’s enactment without sufficient explanation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the commentator did not demonstrate a credible threat of prosecution or show any evidence of injury, including from third parties. The court also determined that the legislator’s delay in seeking a preliminary injunction undermined her claim of irreparable harm, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying extraordinary relief. The Eighth Circuit left open the possibility of further proceedings on the merits, including a permanent injunction, but affirmed the denial of preliminary relief. View "Kohls v. Ellison" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization based in Virginia, which advocates for election integrity, requested access to South Carolina’s statewide voter registration list from the state’s Election Commission. The request was made under the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), which generally requires states to make certain records about voter list maintenance available for public inspection and copying. South Carolina’s Election Commission denied the request, citing a state law that restricts disclosure of the voter list to individuals registered to vote within the state. The nonprofit responded by notifying the Election Commission that this refusal violated the NVRA and, after receiving a reiteration of the Commission’s position, filed a federal lawsuit seeking disclosure of the list.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina reviewed the case. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to the nonprofit, concluding that the NVRA requires disclosure of the voter list and preempts the conflicting state law. The district court ordered the Election Commission to disclose the list. The Election Commission then moved for reconsideration, but the district court denied this motion. The Election Commission appealed both the grant of summary judgment and the denial of reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. On appeal, the Election Commission argued for the first time that the nonprofit lacked Article III standing to sue under the NVRA. The Fourth Circuit held that standing is a threshold jurisdictional issue and that the record lacked sufficient factual findings on standing, as the issue was not previously addressed in the district court. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the nonprofit has standing to bring the suit. The merits of the case were not addressed on appeal. View "Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Wooten" on Justia Law

Illinois law provides that election officials must count mail-in ballots postmarked or certified no later than election day, as long as those ballots are received within two weeks after election day. Congressman Michael Bost and two other political candidates filed suit against the Illinois State Board of Elections and its executive director, asserting that counting ballots received after election day violates federal statutes that set a single election day for federal offices. The plaintiffs alleged that the challenged law would require them to expend additional campaign resources, potentially harm their reputations, and deprive them of a fair electoral process. Congressman Bost, in particular, claimed he would need to extend campaign activities and monitoring efforts for two additional weeks, incurring costs and risking a reduction in his margin of victory.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the case, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the injuries alleged—such as increased campaign costs and potential reputational harm—were speculative or voluntarily incurred. The Seventh Circuit emphasized that Congressman Bost had won his prior election with a significant margin and found the plaintiffs’ injuries to be neither concrete nor particularized enough to support standing.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Congressman Bost, as a candidate for office, does have standing to challenge the rules governing vote counting in his election. The Court reasoned that candidates possess a concrete and particularized interest in the integrity and legality of the electoral process, which is distinct from the generalized interest of voters. The judgment of the Seventh Circuit was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Bost v. Illinois Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

A candidate for Justice of the Supreme Court sought to participate in the Texas Republican primary by submitting a ballot application to the party chair. The application was rejected as deficient, specifically due to concerns about the validity and sufficiency of the submitted signatures. The candidate disputed the rejection, arguing both that his original application met requirements and that he cured any alleged defects by submitting an amended application after the statutory deadline. The timing of the submissions was central: the original application was filed just hours before the deadline, and the amended materials were submitted several days after the deadline had passed.After the application was rejected, the candidate sought temporary injunctive relief in a state district court. The trial court denied this request, and the candidate did not appeal the denial or seek emergency relief from the court of appeals. Instead, he pursued a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court of Texas, arguing that the party chair had a ministerial duty to accept his amended application and certify him as a candidate.The Supreme Court of Texas denied the petition for writ of mandamus. The court held that mandamus is inappropriate where there are genuinely disputed material facts, and noted that the trial court had ruled against the candidate on the core factual dispute regarding the sufficiency of his signatures. Further, the court concluded that the law does not require election officials to accept amendments to ballot applications after the statutory deadline, especially when initial submissions occur at the very end of the filing period. The court found no violation of a ministerial duty or clear abuse of discretion by the party chair and thus denied the extraordinary relief requested. View "In re Rogers" on Justia Law

A petitioner sought a declaratory judgment regarding the legal sufficiency of a proposed constitutional ballot initiative, known as Ballot Issue 4. This initiative aimed to amend the Montana Constitution to limit the powers and privileges of "artificial persons"—including corporations, nonprofit corporations, limited liability companies, unincorporated associations, and certain foreign entities—by expressly restricting their ability to engage in election and ballot issue activities. The initiative would revoke all powers previously granted to artificial persons under Montana law, regrant only those necessary for lawful business or charitable purposes, and specifically prohibit election-related activities except for certain political committees. The petitioner contended that all provisions of the initiative were integral to a unified purpose: preventing artificial persons from participating in political spending.The Montana Attorney General, supported by amici, determined that Ballot Issue 4 was legally insufficient because it violated the separate-vote requirement of Article XIV, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution. According to the Attorney General, the initiative encompassed multiple changes that were not closely related, including broad revocations and regrants of powers to artificial persons, and affected diverse areas of law beyond the stated intent. The petitioner challenged this determination, arguing that the initiative constituted a single, unified scheme and that none of its provisions could sensibly be considered separately.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana exercised original jurisdiction to review the Attorney General’s legal sufficiency determination. The Court held that Ballot Issue 4 violated the separate-vote requirement because it proposed more than one substantive constitutional change—specifically, both limiting artificial persons’ powers to those expressly provided and revoking and regranting powers in a manner that extended beyond election-related activities. The Court affirmed the Attorney General’s rejection of the initiative and denied the petitioner’s request to declare it legally sufficient. View "Transparent Election Initiative v. Knudsen" on Justia Law