Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

A registered voter in Pacific County, Washington filed a recall petition against an elected county commissioner, alleging two violations of the Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA) in connection with executive sessions held to discuss litigation or potential litigation following two inmate deaths at the county jail. The petition claimed the commissioner attended executive sessions on several dates without legal counsel present, as required by law, and accused her of disregarding public input and misrepresenting the decision-making process leading to the creation of a new jail services department.The Pacific County Superior Court held a sufficiency hearing and found both charges in the recall petition factually and legally sufficient, thus permitting the recall to proceed. The petitioner relied primarily on county meeting minutes and metadata from prepared statements to support the allegations, while the commissioner challenged the accuracy and reliability of the minutes and argued there was no evidence of intent to violate the law.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington considered the sufficiency of each charge de novo. The court found that the evidence for some meetings contradicted the allegations about the absence of legal counsel, and for others, although legal counsel was not listed in the minutes, there was no evidence of intentional violation. The petitioner’s supporting exhibits only showed the commissioner received OPMA training, not that she intended to violate the Act. Regarding the second charge, the court found the allegations lacked specific facts about the date, location, and nature of the alleged misconduct and did not cite a law or standard making the conduct unlawful.The Supreme Court of Washington held both charges in the recall petition were factually and legally insufficient and reversed the superior court’s decision. View "In re Recall of Olsen" on Justia Law

Four Arizona voters, each residing in a different geographic voting district, challenged the constitutionality of the statute governing the retention election process for Arizona Court of Appeals judges. The statute, A.R.S. § 12-120.02, divides the state into four geographic voting districts, limiting which voters may participate in the retention elections for particular appellate judges. The plaintiffs argued that, because Court of Appeals judges have statewide precedential authority, all Arizona voters should be permitted to participate in their retention elections. They alleged that the district-based system violated both the Free and Equal Elections Clause and the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Arizona Constitution.In the Superior Court in Maricopa County, the State moved to dismiss the complaint, raising arguments including lack of standing and the constitutionality of the statute. The superior court granted the motion to dismiss. It found that § 12-120.02 did not violate the Free and Equal Elections Clause because there was no complete denial of the right to vote, and that the Constitution’s design did not require statewide participation in all judicial retention elections. The court also rejected the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause claim, holding that the statute treated all similarly situated voters within each district equally, and no class was treated differently from another similarly situated class.On direct review, the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona affirmed the superior court’s dismissal. The court held that the Free and Equal Elections Clause is only implicated where there is a complete denial of the right to vote or unequal weighting of votes, neither of which were present here. It also held that the one-person, one-vote principle does not apply to judicial retention elections. Regarding the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause, the court found that all voters within each geographic district are treated equally, so the statute did not violate the state constitution. View "KNIGHT v FONTES" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization dedicated to promoting electoral transparency operates a website that republishes voter registration data collected from state agencies. The group obtained New Mexico’s voter data through a third party and published it online, including information such as names, addresses, party affiliation, and voting history. After the website highlighted discrepancies in the state’s voter rolls, New Mexico’s Secretary of State publicly questioned the group’s motives and the lawfulness of its actions. The Secretary referred the group to the Attorney General for criminal investigation under state statutes that restrict the use and sharing of voter data. The group’s subsequent requests for updated voter data were denied.After the state’s refusal, the organization filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that New Mexico’s restrictions were preempted by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court issued a preliminary injunction preventing prosecution, which was later stayed by the Tenth Circuit. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court found that the NVRA preempted New Mexico’s restrictions and enjoined criminal prosecution. The court rejected most of the group’s remaining constitutional claims but, following a bench trial, held that the state engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by refusing further data requests.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the NVRA preempts New Mexico’s restrictions on the use and sharing of voter data, holding that state laws that prevent broad public disclosure of voter data conflict with the NVRA’s requirements. The Tenth Circuit did not reach the First Amendment claims, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Voter Reference Foundation v. Torrez" on Justia Law

An attorney who chaired the Davidson County Election Commission was also employed at a law firm that represented the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. The Election Commission became involved in a dispute over whether a citizen-initiated tax-repeal referendum should be placed on the ballot, a measure opposed by the city government and certain city council members. The attorney, acting as commission chair, supported certifying the referendum. Following pressure from city officials, including a council member who threatened to withdraw city business from the law firm if the attorney continued supporting the referendum, the law firm terminated the attorney’s employment after he refused to change his position.The attorney filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, asserting violations of his First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, among other claims. The district court denied motions to dismiss based on qualified immunity filed by both the council member and the law firm. The court concluded that the council member’s alleged conduct violated clearly established First Amendment law and that the law firm, as a private entity, was not entitled to qualified immunity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that both the council member and the law firm were eligible to assert qualified immunity due to their public functions in this context. The court held that the council member was not entitled to qualified immunity because the complaint plausibly alleged he violated clearly established First Amendment rights by causing the attorney’s firing due to protected speech. However, the court found that the law firm was entitled to qualified immunity, as there was no clearly established law prohibiting a law firm from firing an employee in response to client pressure under these circumstances. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity for the council member, reversed as to the law firm, and remanded for further proceedings. View "DeLanis v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville" on Justia Law

Six residents of the Town of Newburgh sued the Town and its Town Board, alleging that the Board’s at-large electoral system unlawfully diluted the votes of Black and Hispanic residents, in violation of Section 17-206 of the New York Voting Rights Act (NYVRA). The plaintiffs argued that the method of electing all five Town Board members at-large prevented Black and Hispanic voters, who together made up about 40% of the population, from electing their preferred candidates or influencing election outcomes. They sought a court declaration that the at-large system violated the NYVRA and an injunction requiring the Town to implement a different electoral system.The Town of Newburgh moved for summary judgment, arguing that Section 17-206 was facially unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. and New York Constitutions, and that its current election system complied with the NYVRA. The Supreme Court, Orange County, granted the Town’s motion, holding that the Town could challenge the statute because it allegedly could not comply with the NYVRA without violating equal protection, and declared the provision—and the entire NYVRA—unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the Town lacked capacity to bring this challenge since it had not shown that compliance with the NYVRA would force it to violate equal protection, and that the Supreme Court erred in invalidating the statute.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the Town of Newburgh, as a political subdivision created by the State, could not bring a facial constitutional challenge to the NYVRA's vote-dilution provision. The court reaffirmed the longstanding rule that political subdivisions generally lack authority to challenge state laws unless a narrow exception applies, and found that no such exception was met here. The Appellate Division’s order was affirmed. View "Clarke v Town of Newburgh" on Justia Law

A woman who immigrated from Vietnam to the United States and became active in the Vietnamese community in Sioux City, Iowa, organized a campaign in 2020 to assist Vietnamese Americans—many of whom had limited English proficiency and were unfamiliar with the U.S. election system—in registering to vote and casting absentee ballots. Her efforts were not solely for civic engagement; she hoped these voters would support her husband, who was a candidate in the election. She facilitated the process by providing forms, translating, and returning completed documents to the county auditor. However, she also engaged in fraudulent conduct by instructing family members to complete and submit voting documents for absent adult children, and in some cases, she filled out and signed the forms herself. In total, she submitted 26 documents with forged signatures. The county auditor became suspicious and contacted the FBI, leading to her arrest and indictment on 52 counts of voter fraud under two federal statutes.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa presided over her trial. The court used model jury instructions that did not require the jury to find that she knew her conduct was illegal or that the children did not consent to her actions, despite her request for such an instruction. The jury found her guilty on all counts, and her motion for judgment of acquittal was denied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed whether the jury instructions accurately reflected the law and whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. The court held that the instructions properly conveyed the required mental states—knowledge and willfulness—and did not need to require knowledge of the specific law violated. The court also found the evidence sufficient for conviction, including for counts involving equivocal testimony, based on the defendant’s pattern of conduct. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Several individuals were nominated by the Nevada Republican Party to serve as potential electors for the 2020 presidential election. After the Democratic candidates won the Nevada popular vote, these individuals challenged the results in state court, seeking to be declared the legitimate electors. Their challenge was denied by the district court, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed that decision. Despite this, the individuals held a ceremony in Carson City, signed documents purporting to cast Nevada’s electoral votes for the Republican candidates, and mailed these documents to various officials, including the Chief Judge of the United States District Court in Las Vegas, Nevada.Based on these actions, the State charged the individuals with crimes under NRS 205.110 (uttering or offering forged instruments) and NRS 239.330 (offering a false or forged instrument to be filed in a public office). The indictment was filed in Clark County, where the federal courthouse is located. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the alleged offenses were complete upon mailing the documents from Douglas County, and thus venue was improper in Clark County. The Eighth Judicial District Court agreed, finding that the crimes were completed upon mailing and dismissed the indictment for improper venue.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the offenses charged were not complete upon mailing, but rather required the delivery and receipt of the documents at the intended location in Clark County. The court concluded that venue was proper in Clark County because the alleged crimes involved the delivery of false documents to a recipient in that county. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. DeGraffenreid" on Justia Law

In August 2022, the appellants filed a complaint and petition in Rice County District Court, seeking to prevent the use of electronic voting machines with embedded modems in the upcoming November 2022 general election. They alleged that these machines were not properly certified or secure, in violation of Minnesota law, and requested an order restraining the county from using the modem functions during the election. The complaint named the Director of Rice County Property Tax and Elections as a defendant, and the Minnesota Secretary of State intervened as a party.The Rice County District Court dismissed the section 204B.44 claim in January 2023, citing several jurisdictional defects, including mootness because the 2022 election had already occurred, and insufficient service of process on all candidates as required by statute. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, focusing on the lack of service to all candidates as the basis for its decision and did not address the other grounds identified by the district court.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the appellants’ claim under Minnesota Statutes section 204B.44 was moot because the relief sought pertained solely to the 2022 general election, which had already taken place. The court rejected the argument that the claim could be redirected to future elections and clarified that section 204B.44 challenges must be specific to a single election. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, but did so on the alternative ground of mootness, without reaching the issue of service of process on all candidates. View "Benda for Common-sense vs. Anderson" on Justia Law

A group of landowners in Summit County, Utah, challenged a proposed ballot measure to incorporate a new municipality called West Hills. The sponsor of the incorporation, Derek Anderson, had modified the proposed boundaries after the statutory deadline for landowners to request exclusion from the new municipality had passed. As a result, certain landowners whose properties were added late were unable to seek exclusion, even though similarly situated landowners had previously been allowed to do so.The landowners filed suit in the Third District Court, Silver Summit, arguing that the Municipal Incorporation Code, as applied, violated the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause of the Utah Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment for the landowners, finding the code unconstitutional as applied and invalidating the certification of the West Hills ballot measure. The court determined that the plaintiffs were “specified landowners” who would have been entitled to exclusion if their properties had been added earlier, and that the legislature’s interest in certainty did not justify the disparate treatment.The sponsor then filed an emergency petition for extraordinary relief with the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, seeking to overturn the district court’s order before the upcoming election. The Utah Supreme Court, after expedited briefing and oral argument, denied the petition for extraordinary relief. The court held that, under the unique circumstances, it would not exercise its discretion to issue a writ due to the potential disruption and confusion in the election process, including the risk of voter suppression and interference with electioneering efforts. The denial was without prejudice to the sponsor’s ability to pursue an appeal or interlocutory review of the district court’s order. View "Anderson v. Bates" on Justia Law

Huntington Beach, a charter city in Orange County, amended its city charter through Measure A, which authorized the city to require voter identification for municipal elections beginning in 2026. This measure was passed by local voters. In response, the California Legislature enacted Elections Code section 10005, effective January 1, 2025, which prohibits any local government from requiring voter identification for voting unless mandated by state or federal law. The statute was specifically intended to address Huntington Beach’s Measure A.Following the passage of Measure A, the State of California, through the Attorney General and Secretary of State, filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Orange County, seeking to invalidate the voter identification provision in the city charter. The City of Huntington Beach demurred, arguing the issue was not ripe since the provision had not yet been implemented. The trial court sustained the demurrer, but after procedural developments and further hearings, ultimately denied the state’s petition, finding that the charter provision did not violate the right to vote or implicate the integrity of the electoral process. The state timely appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. Applying the four-part “home rule” test, the court held that Elections Code section 10005 addresses a matter of statewide concern—integrity of the electoral process—and is narrowly tailored to prevent discriminatory barriers to voting. The court concluded that section 10005 preempts the Huntington Beach charter provision. The judgment of the trial court was reversed and remanded with directions to issue a writ of mandate invalidating the charter provision, enter a permanent injunction against its enforcement, and declare it preempted by state law. View "P. ex rel. Bonta v. City of Huntington Beach" on Justia Law