Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a group of relators seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Lorain County Board of Elections to place a zoning-amendment referendum on the November 5, 2024, general-election ballot. The relators had filed a referendum petition against a municipal ordinance that rezoned approximately 300 acres of property. However, the Board of Elections sustained a protest by intervening respondents, DBR Commercial Realty, L.L.C., and Kathryn Craig, and removed the referendum from the ballot, arguing that the relators failed to file a complete certified copy of the ordinance as required by R.C. 731.32.The relators initially received what they claimed were incomplete copies of the ordinance from the clerk of the Vermilion City Council. Despite knowing the copies were incomplete, they attempted to correct the deficiencies themselves by adding missing pages from the county recorder’s office. However, the copy they filed with the finance director was still missing two pages. The Board of Elections held a protest hearing and concluded that the relators did not strictly comply with R.C. 731.32, which requires a complete certified copy of the ordinance to be filed before circulating a referendum petition.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and upheld the Board of Elections' decision. The court emphasized that R.C. 731.32 requires strict compliance, and the relators' failure to file a complete certified copy of the ordinance rendered their petition defective. The court denied the writ of mandamus, stating that the Board did not abuse its discretion or disregard applicable law in sustaining the protest and removing the referendum from the ballot. The court also denied various motions to strike evidence and for oral argument, but granted the relators' motion to amend the case caption. View "State ex rel. Brill v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

In the summer of 2024, the Nebraska Secretary of State announced he would not implement recent statutory amendments allowing individuals convicted of felonies to vote upon completing their sentences, deeming the amendments unconstitutional. In response, individuals who had completed their sentences filed for a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary and county election commissioners to implement the amendments and allow them to register to vote.The case was brought directly to the Nebraska Supreme Court. The relators argued that the amendments provided a clear right to vote and imposed a clear duty on the respondents to allow voter registration. The Secretary, supported by an Attorney General's opinion, argued that the amendments were unconstitutional, asserting that the power to restore voting rights lies with the Board of Pardons, not the Legislature.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case, noting that fewer than five judges found the amendments unconstitutional, as required by the Nebraska Constitution to invalidate a legislative act. Consequently, the court determined that the relators had established the prerequisites for mandamus relief. The court issued a peremptory writ directing the Secretary and election commissioners to use voter registration forms required by the amendments and to register the individual relators upon receipt of complete applications. The court also ordered the Secretary to remove any disqualification on registration not contained within the amendments and to comply fully with the new statutory provisions. View "State ex rel. Spung v. Evnen" on Justia Law

In response to challenges faced during the 2020 election, the Texas Legislature enacted S.B. 1 in 2021, which restricts paid "vote harvesting services." This law aims to protect the privacy of mail-in voters by prohibiting compensated interactions intended to influence votes. Plaintiffs, a coalition of organizations, challenged this provision on vagueness and First Amendment grounds, seeking injunctions against various Texas officials.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas enjoined the enforcement of the vote harvesting provision of S.B. 1 on September 28, 2024, nearly three years after the law took effect and just three weeks before voting was to begin. The State of Texas then moved to stay the district court's order pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and granted the State's request for a stay. The court emphasized the Supreme Court's guidance in Purcell v. Gonzalez, which advises against altering election laws close to an election due to potential voter confusion and administrative burdens. The court found that the district court's injunction, issued after mail-in ballots had already been distributed, could lead to significant confusion and disruption.The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to S.B. 1 was not "entirely clearcut," failing to meet the criteria that might justify an exception to the Purcell principle. The court noted that the law's provisions were designed to protect voter privacy and security, similar to protections upheld by the Supreme Court for in-person voting. Consequently, the motion to stay the district court's injunction pending appeal was granted. View "La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott" on Justia Law

The case involves the Ohio Democratic Party and two voters, Norman Wernet and Eric Duffy, who filed a mandamus action against Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose. They sought to compel LaRose to rescind Directive 2024-21, which requires individuals delivering absentee ballots for family members or disabled voters to complete an attestation at the board of elections and prohibits returning such ballots to a drop box. The directive aims to prevent "ballot harvesting" and ensure the integrity and security of absentee ballot delivery.Previously, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio ruled in League of Women Voters of Ohio v. LaRose that certain Ohio laws limiting who can return absentee ballots for disabled voters were preempted by the federal Voting Rights Act. Following this, LaRose issued Directive 2024-21 and later Directive 2024-24 and Advisory 2024-03, which provided additional guidance but did not substantially alter the original directive.The Ohio Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the relators' claims were barred by laches due to their unreasonable delay in filing the complaint. The court noted that the directive was issued on August 31, but the complaint was not filed until September 27, a 24-day delay. This delay was deemed unreasonable, especially given the time-sensitive nature of election-related matters. The court also found that the delay caused material prejudice to the Secretary of State and county boards of elections, as absentee voting had already begun, and changing the procedures at this stage would lead to voter confusion and administrative burdens.The Ohio Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus based on laches and did not address the merits of the relators' claims. The court also denied the motion to intervene filed by the Republican National Committee and the Ohio Republican Party but accepted their brief as an amici curiae brief. View "State ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v. LaRose" on Justia Law

Petitioners Jennifer McGill and Cherokee Nation Entertainment, LLC challenged the sufficiency of a proposed constitutional amendment regarding the Pope County casino license. They alleged that the Arkansas Secretary of State, John Thurston, improperly certified the amendment for the ballot. The petitioners claimed that the number of valid signatures was insufficient and that the popular name and ballot title were inadequate. Local Voters in Charge (LVC), the sponsor of the amendment, and Jim Knight intervened in the case.The Arkansas Supreme Court had previously granted expedited consideration and bifurcated the proceedings into two counts. For Count I, the court appointed a special master to resolve factual disputes about the number of valid signatures. The special master found that LVC had properly certified that no paid canvasser had disqualifying offenses and that LVC did not violate the pay-per-signature ban. The special master disqualified some signatures but concluded that LVC still had enough valid signatures to meet the requirement.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the special master’s findings and determined that LVC complied with the statutory requirements for certifying paid canvassers. The court also found that the petitioners did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that LVC violated the pay-per-signature ban. As a result, the court denied the petition on Count I, allowing the proposed amendment to remain on the ballot. The court’s decision was based on the lack of clear error in the special master’s findings and the petitioners' failure to meet their burden of proof. View "McGill v. Thurston" on Justia Law

In this case, the relator, Marcell Strbich, sought a writ of mandamus against the Montgomery County Board of Elections and its members. Strbich claimed that the board failed to provide proper training to precinct election officials regarding the use of unacceptable forms of photo identification, including IDs issued to noncitizens. He requested the court to compel the board to provide this training in accordance with Ohio law and a directive issued by the Secretary of State.The case was reviewed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. The evidence showed that before the evening of September 25, the board did not provide the required training to precinct election officials. Similarly, before September 29, the board did not provide the required training to voting-location managers. The board later updated its training materials and began providing the necessary training from the evening of September 25 for precinct election officials and from September 29 for voting-location managers. The board also planned to email the updated training materials to those who had not received the proper training.The Supreme Court of Ohio found that the case was moot for precinct election officials who attended training on or after the evening of September 25 and for voting-location managers who attended training on or after September 29. However, the case was not moot for those who attended training before these dates. The court granted a writ of mandamus in part, ordering the board to provide the required training to the affected individuals. The board could comply by emailing the updated training materials to these individuals. The writ was denied as moot for those who had already received the updated training. View "State ex rel. Strbich v. Montgomery County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

A county auditor filed an administrative complaint against the Secretary of State, alleging that the statewide voter registration file, known as I-Voters, lacked adequate security measures and safeguards to prevent unauthorized access and erroneous removal of eligible voters, thus violating the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). The Secretary of State moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it was speculative and that the file complied with federal standards. The administrative body agreed and dismissed the complaint.The county auditor then sought judicial review in the Iowa District Court for Polk County, arguing that the administrative body had erred in dismissing his complaint without an evidentiary hearing. The Secretary of State contended that the county auditor lacked standing and that the complaint was insufficient. The district court dismissed the petition, concluding that the county auditor had not demonstrated an injury in fact.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the county auditor had standing due to his role as the county commissioner of elections, which gave him a specific, personal, and legal interest in the integrity of the voter registration file. The court also found that the administrative body had improperly resolved factual questions without allowing an opportunity for the presentation of evidence. The court held that the county auditor's allegations were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss and that the administrative body should not have decided factual issues at the motion to dismiss stage.The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Linn County Auditor v. Iowa Voter Registration Commission" on Justia Law

Ohio enacted a law to prevent foreign nationals from influencing its elections by banning their political contributions and expenditures. The law defines "foreign nationals" to include lawful permanent residents, unlike the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), which exempts them. Plaintiffs, including advocacy organizations and lawful permanent residents, challenged the law on First Amendment grounds, arguing it violated their rights. The district court agreed, finding the law unconstitutional as applied to lawful permanent residents and issued a preliminary injunction preventing Ohio from enforcing the law against all foreign nationals.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted the preliminary injunction, reasoning that the law was overbroad and violated the First Amendment rights of lawful permanent residents. The court allowed Ohio to enforce the law against foreign governments and political parties but severed the definition of "foreign national" to exclude lawful permanent residents. Ohio appealed the decision and requested an emergency stay of the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and granted Ohio's motion for a stay. The court found that Ohio was likely to succeed on the merits, concluding that the law was not overbroad and did not violate the First Amendment rights of lawful permanent residents. The court held that Ohio has a compelling interest in preventing foreign influence in its elections, which includes lawful permanent residents. The court also determined that the law was narrowly tailored to serve this interest and was neither overinclusive nor underinclusive. The stay allows Ohio to enforce the law while the appeal is considered. View "OPAWL - Building AAPI Feminist Leadership v. Yost" on Justia Law

In 2018, Campaign Legal Center (CLC) filed an administrative complaint with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) alleging that 45Committee, Inc. violated the Federal Election Campaign Act by not registering as a political committee. After nearly two years of inaction by the FEC, CLC sued the FEC, seeking a declaration that the FEC's failure to act was "contrary to law." The court agreed and ordered the FEC to act within thirty days. When the FEC did not appear to act within that period, the court allowed CLC to bring a citizen suit against 45Committee.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially found that the FEC had failed to act on CLC's complaint and issued a default judgment against the FEC. The court ordered the FEC to act within thirty days, but the FEC did not notify the court or CLC of any action taken. Consequently, the court allowed CLC to bring a citizen suit against 45Committee. However, it later emerged that the FEC had held a reason-to-believe vote within the thirty-day period, which failed to garner the necessary votes to proceed with an investigation or dismiss the complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court was correct in dismissing CLC's citizen suit. The appellate court held that the FEC's holding of a reason-to-believe vote within the thirty-day period constituted conformance with the contrary-to-law determination. Therefore, the preconditions for bringing a citizen suit were not met, as the FEC had taken the required action by holding the vote, even though the vote did not result in a decision to investigate or dismiss the complaint. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the citizen suit. View "Campaign Legal Center v. 45Committee, Inc." on Justia Law

KalshiEx LLC, a regulated commodities exchange, sought to offer "Congressional Control Contracts" allowing individuals to bet on the outcome of the November 2024 congressional elections. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) prohibited these contracts, arguing they constituted gaming or election gambling, which is illegal in many states. Kalshi challenged this decision under the Administrative Procedure Act, claiming the CFTC's determination was arbitrary and capricious.The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in favor of Kalshi, finding that the CFTC erred in categorizing the contracts as gaming or gambling. The court vacated the CFTC's decision, reasoning that the term "gaming" did not apply to election contracts and that the contracts did not involve illegal activity under state law. The CFTC then sought a stay of the district court's judgment while it pursued an appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the CFTC's emergency motion for a stay pending appeal. The court denied the motion, concluding that the CFTC failed to demonstrate that it or the public would suffer irreparable harm without a stay. The court noted that the CFTC's concerns about potential harms, such as market manipulation and threats to election integrity, were speculative and not substantiated by concrete evidence. The court left open the possibility for the CFTC to renew its stay request if more concrete evidence of irreparable harm emerged during the appeal. The administrative stay was dissolved. View "KalshiEX LLC v. CFTC" on Justia Law