Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

A dispute arose regarding the statements to be included on the November 3, 2026, Idaho general election ballot describing the effect of a “yes” or “no” vote on Proposition One, the Reproductive Freedom and Privacy Act. After qualifying for the ballot, Idahoans United for Women and Families objected to the ballot statements jointly prepared by the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, arguing they mischaracterized both the initiative and existing law, and failed to clearly and concisely convey the effect of each vote as required by Idaho Code section 34-1810(1)(b). The challenged statements had already been distributed for printing and to county clerks, prompting Idahoans United to seek expedited judicial relief.Previously, in Idahoans United for Women & Families v. Labrador (Idahoans United I), the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed related ballot materials for the same initiative, directing revisions to the short ballot title and fiscal impact statement, and later approving the revised materials. After the initiative qualified for the ballot, Idahoans United objected to the Yes/No Effect Statements, but Respondents declined to revise them. Unable to resolve the dispute, Idahoans United filed an original action in the Idaho Supreme Court seeking writs of mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and granted writs of prohibition and mandamus, holding that the Yes/No Effect Statements failed to substantially comply with section 34-1810(1)(b) because they did not accurately and concisely convey the effect of a “yes” or “no” vote. The court prohibited use of the challenged statements and directed Respondents to prepare revised statements. Upon review, the court found the revised statements substantially complied with statutory requirements and allowed them to appear on the ballot. The request for a writ of certiorari was denied as duplicative, and no party was awarded costs or attorney fees. View "Idahoans United v. McGrane/Labrador" on Justia Law

In a Republican primary for State Representative in Hawaii’s District 43, two candidates, Sheila Medeiros and Kanani Souza, each received 842 votes, resulting in a tie. No candidates from other parties or nonpartisans filed for the seat. Hawaii law directs that a tie be settled “by lot.” The Chief Election Officer conducted a tie-breaker by drawing names from plastic capsules placed in a basket, and Medeiros was selected. However, election records indicated that two ballots from District 40 voters were mistakenly cast in District 43, creating an overage that could potentially affect the outcome in such a close race.Following the tie-breaker and announcement of Medeiros as the winner, Souza sought records to clarify the overage. The Office of Elections and the City’s Elections Administrator eventually confirmed that the two ballots were issued in error to District 40 voters, but the record could not show how those ballots were marked or whether they affected the race. Souza filed an election contest in the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii, alleging procedural violations and challenging the validity of the tie-breaker and the election outcome.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii found that the two extra ballots, whose votes could not be traced, rendered the result unreliable and that the improvised tie-breaker method was a rule adopted without proper rulemaking procedures, making it invalid. The court held that no candidate was validly nominated and, pursuant to its remedial authority, ordered a new election to complete the primary during the general election. The winner of this election would be deemed elected under the state constitution and take office on general election day. The court thus vacated the prior selection and returned the decision to the voters. View "Souza v. Nago" on Justia Law

A citizens’ group challenged the official ballot statements prepared by the Idaho Secretary of State and Attorney General for the 2026 general election, which would accompany Proposition One, the Reproductive Freedom and Privacy Act. The group argued that the statements describing the effect of a “yes” or “no” vote were unclear, misleading, and exceeded the statutory authority given to the officials, as they characterized both the proposed law and existing Idaho law rather than simply stating the effect of each vote.Previously, the Idaho Supreme Court had considered similar issues regarding other ballot materials for the same initiative in Idahoans United for Women & Families v. Labrador, 175 Idaho 708, 570 P.3d 1137 (2025), where it directed revisions to the short ballot title and the fiscal impact statement to ensure substantial compliance with statutory requirements. After the initiative qualified for the ballot, the officials prepared the contested Yes/No Effect Statements and distributed them to county clerks. The group’s objections were not resolved through negotiation, leading to the current original action before the Idaho Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho concluded that the group had standing under its relaxed standing doctrine, found it had original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus and prohibition, and applied the standard of substantial compliance to the ballot statements. The court held that both the “yes” and “no” statements failed to clearly and concisely communicate the effect of a vote, as required by Idaho Code section 34-1810(1)(b). The court granted writs of prohibition and mandamus, prohibited use of the challenged statements, and ordered the officials to prepare new, compliant statements by a set deadline. The request for a writ of certiorari was denied as duplicative, and no attorney fees were awarded. View "Idahoans United v. McGrane" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization dedicated to gun violence prevention filed several administrative complaints with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in 2018, alleging violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act by two entities associated with a national advocacy group. After the FEC failed to act within the statutory 120-day period, the nonprofit filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking an order compelling the FEC to act. Due to a lack of quorum, the FEC remained inactive for an extended period. Eventually, the District Court granted summary judgment to the nonprofit, ordered the FEC to act within 30 days, and later determined the FEC had not complied, thereby allowing the nonprofit to file a citizen suit against the NRA-associated entities.The national advocacy group sought to dismiss the citizen suit, arguing the District Court lacked jurisdiction. It also moved to intervene in the original action, but only for the limited purpose of unsealing the judicial record. Subsequently, after the District Court’s final judgment, the advocacy group filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) seeking relief from the orders and judgment, contending that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction due to mootness and lack of adversity. The District Court denied this motion, holding that the group, as a nonparty, lacked standing to seek relief under Rule 60(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the appeal from the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. The Court held that only parties to a lawsuit, or those who properly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment. Since the advocacy group had not used any procedural mechanism to become a party to the underlying suit, it lacked the procedural ability to appeal. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal as impermissible under binding precedent. View "Giffords v. FEC" on Justia Law

In 2024, a Nebraska resident challenged the legal sufficiency of two initiative petitions submitted for the November general election. One petition sought to legalize medical cannabis; the other proposed regulatory measures. The challenge alleged that numerous signatures were invalid due to circulator fraud and improper notarization, contending that after excluding these signatures, the petitions lacked the minimum number required by the Nebraska Constitution. The Secretary of State, having initially certified the petitions, also filed a cross-claim seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the sufficiency of the signatures and the validity of the measures.The District Court for Lancaster County reviewed the claims. It found that while some signatures should lose their presumption of validity due to proven circulator fraud or improper notarization, the challengers had not shown that enough signatures were invalid to render the petitions legally insufficient. The court rejected the argument that improper notarization by a notary on some pages should invalidate all pages notarized by that individual, distinguishing circulator fraud from notarial errors. It also declined to draw adverse inferences from witnesses who had invoked the Fifth Amendment, citing Nebraska statutory law and the circumstances of ongoing criminal investigations.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order. The Court held that Barkley v. Pool, a precedent concerning circulator fraud, does not require blanket invalidation of signatures based on notary impropriety. It further held that the trial court did not err in declining to draw adverse inferences from Fifth Amendment invocations. Ultimately, the Court found no legal or factual error in the district court’s determinations regarding the validity of the petitions, the sufficiency of signatures, or the denial of a motion to amend pleadings. The district court’s order was affirmed. View "Kuehn v. Evnen" on Justia Law

The dispute arose when the Missouri General Assembly passed House Bill 1 (HB 1) in September 2025, which would repeal the 2022 congressional districts and establish new ones. Organizers opposed to HB 1 submitted a referendum petition to the Secretary of State, meeting both the signature and timing requirements set by the Missouri Constitution. The Secretary of State, however, issued a Certificate of Insufficiency, asserting that the Missouri Constitution does not authorize a referendum on congressional redistricting acts passed by the General Assembly, and directed that the petition not be placed on the November 2026 ballot.After this, Richard von Glahn, a proponent of the referendum, filed suit in the Cole County Circuit Court seeking to overturn the Secretary’s decision and prevent implementation of HB 1. The circuit court upheld the Secretary’s determination. Von Glahn appealed, and the Supreme Court of Missouri en banc granted discretionary transfer to address the important legal issue presented.The Supreme Court of Missouri en banc held that the Missouri Constitution’s article III, section 49, plainly authorizes the people to approve or reject by referendum “any act of the general assembly,” including congressional redistricting legislation. The Court found that none of the exceptions in article III, section 52(a) applied to HB 1 and rejected arguments that redistricting laws are exempt from referendum. The Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment, ordered the Secretary to certify the petition as sufficient, place it on the November 2026 ballot, and enjoined use of the HB 1 districts unless and until approved by voters. The congressional districts established in 2022 remain in effect for the 2026 election unless HB 1 is approved and takes effect thereafter. View "von Glahn vs. Hoskins" on Justia Law

Petition supporters submitted an initiative petition proposing to amend the Missouri Constitution, having followed the statutory process for approval and certification of the ballot title by the Secretary of State. After signature gathering and timely submission, the Secretary of State was required to determine the petition’s compliance with the Missouri Constitution and Missouri statutes and to issue a certificate of sufficiency or insufficiency. Instead, shortly before the deadline, the Secretary issued a certificate declaring the petition insufficient without specifying any constitutional defects, vacated the original ballot title, and issued a new ballot title.The petition supporters, all qualified Missouri voters, challenged the Secretary’s actions in the Cole County Circuit Court, seeking reversal of the insufficiency certification and reinstatement of the original ballot title. The circuit court upheld the Secretary’s decision. The petition supporters appealed, and due to the importance of the legal issues, the Supreme Court of Missouri en banc took discretionary jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Missouri en banc found that the Secretary failed to comply with statutory requirements by not stating any reasons for insufficiency in his certificate, thus preserving nothing for appellate review. The Court further held that hypothetical constitutional violations, which might arise only if the amendment were adopted, are not ripe for pre-election review. The Court rejected the Secretary’s claims regarding single-article and single-subject violations as meritless and determined he lacked authority to vacate the certified ballot title and issue a new one. The Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment, ordered the Secretary to issue a certificate of sufficiency for the initiative petition, to place it on the November 2026 ballot with the original ballot title, and to take all necessary steps to ensure its inclusion before September 8, 2026. View "Harris vs. Hoskins" on Justia Law

A group of qualified electors and residents of Sidney sought to amend the city charter to establish a procedure for recalling elected officials. They filed a petition with the city clerk containing 561 signatures, which they believed met the threshold for submission to the voters. Their proposal was submitted under a provision in the Sidney Charter allowing amendments as provided by the Ohio Constitution. However, the city clerk rejected the petition, citing noncompliance with Ohio Revised Code section 731.32, which she interpreted as requiring a certified copy of the proposed amendment to be filed before circulating the petition.Following this rejection, the electors initiated a mandamus action in the Supreme Court of Ohio. They requested an order compelling the city council to certify the petition to the county board of elections and further sought to have the board verify the signatures and place the amendment on the ballot if sufficient. They also sought attorney fees and court costs. The respondents argued that the petition was invalid for procedural reasons, including the application of R.C. 731.32. The board of elections had not yet reviewed the petition, as it had not been transmitted by the city clerk.The Supreme Court of Ohio found that R.C. 731.32 does not apply to proposed amendments to a city charter unless the municipal charter incorporates that statute into its amendment process; the Sidney Charter does not do so. Thus, the city clerk erred in rejecting the petition on this basis. The court granted a limited writ of mandamus, ordering the city clerk to transmit the petition to the county board of elections for a determination of sufficiency. If the petition is found sufficient, the city council must provide by ordinance for submission of the proposed amendment to the voters within the constitutional timeframe. The requests for attorney fees and court costs, and relief against the law director and board of elections, were denied. View "State ex rel. Turner v. Barhorst" on Justia Law

A group of residents and electors from the city of Trenton proposed an amendment to the city charter that would prohibit the construction of data centers within the city. They submitted a petition with 336 valid signatures to the city council to have this amendment placed on the ballot. The Butler County Board of Elections confirmed the number of valid signatures and reported that 1,277 voters participated in the most recent general municipal election, while 8,197 individuals were registered to vote at that time.The Trenton City Council convened and concluded that the petition did not contain a sufficient number of signatures, reasoning that the requirement was ten percent of all registered voters, not ten percent of votes cast. Accordingly, the council refused to certify the petition to the board of elections for inclusion on the ballot. The residents then filed an action for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of Ohio, seeking to compel the council to place the amendment before the voters and to recover court costs and attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the relevant constitutional provisions and its prior decisions. The court held that, consistent with Article XVIII, Sections 8, 9, and 14 of the Ohio Constitution and its decision in State ex rel. Huebner v. W. Jefferson Village Council, the required number of signatures for a charter amendment petition is ten percent of the votes cast in the last preceding general municipal election, not ten percent of all registered voters. The court found that the petitioners had exceeded the required number of signatures and ordered the city council to pass an ordinance certifying the petition to the board of elections for submission to the electors at a special election within the constitutionally specified timeframe. The court denied the request for court costs and attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Blankenship v. Trenton City Council" on Justia Law

Two nonprofit organizations that engage in nationwide issue advocacy challenged Delaware’s Elections Disclosure Act, which requires groups spending over $500 on electioneering communications near an election to publicly disclose donors giving more than $100 during the relevant cycle. The law’s disclosure obligations are broad: they are not limited to donors earmarking funds for political ads, nor can donors avoid disclosure by restricting the use of their contributions. The law also looks back several years for purposes of disclosure. The organizations, which have not previously run such communications in Delaware but claim they intend to do so in the upcoming election, argue that the law violates the First Amendment.After the organizations filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, they sought a preliminary injunction to halt enforcement of the Act. The District Court denied the request, finding no likelihood of success on the facial challenge because prior Third Circuit precedent, Delaware Strong Families v. Attorney General of Delaware, had upheld the Act and the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta did not clearly abrogate that ruling. The court also doubted the as-applied challenge, citing the plaintiffs’ failure to offer specific evidence of harm to donors. The District Court emphasized the law’s decade-long enforcement and the lack of urgent need to change the status quo.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the denial. Applying a deferential standard, the court found that the plaintiffs had not made a clear showing of entitlement to a preliminary injunction. It held that even with some likelihood of success and possible irreparable injury, the balance of equities and the public interest favored preserving the longstanding status quo. The court affirmed the District Court’s order denying the preliminary injunction. View "Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Albence" on Justia Law