Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Two candidates, Anthony Kathol and Celestine Stadnick, sought nomination for State Senate in South Dakota’s District 27. Stadnick submitted her candidacy petition with 155 signatures, above the 50 required. However, her declaration of candidacy listed an address different from her voter registration, and Kathol challenged her candidacy on these grounds, alleging that state law demands a single principal address. Kathol also claimed many petition signatures were defective, specifically objecting to some signers listing their county as “Oglala” instead of “Oglala Lakota.”The Secretary of State reviewed Kathol’s affidavit and found that, despite some invalid signatures, Stadnick still had enough valid signatures to qualify. The Secretary rejected Kathol’s address discrepancy argument and accepted “Oglala” as a sufficient county designation for voter registration. Kathol appealed to the Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, which allowed Stadnick to intervene. In circuit court, Kathol raised new objections to additional signatures and reiterated his address argument. The circuit court found some signatures invalid but determined that listing “Oglala” substantially complied with statutory requirements. It also concluded there is no statutory requirement for a candidate’s declaration address to match voter registration. With at least 53 valid signatures, Stadnick was certified as a candidate.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the appeal. It held that the circuit court exceeded its appellate authority by considering signature challenges not raised before the Secretary and limited its review to those challenges presented to the Secretary. The Court affirmed the Secretary’s and circuit court’s determinations that the “Oglala” county designation constituted substantial compliance and that South Dakota law does not require a candidate’s declaration address to match their voter registration address. The Supreme Court affirmed the certification of Stadnick’s candidacy for District 27. View "Kathol v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A group of Oklahoma voters challenged the constitutionality of Senate Bill 1027, which imposed new restrictions and requirements on the state’s initiative and referendum petition process. Key provisions included requiring petition circulators to be registered Oklahoma voters, placing caps on the number of petition signatures that could be collected from individual counties, banning incentive-based compensation for circulators, prohibiting out-of-state contributions for petition circulation, and imposing new disclosure requirements regarding circulator compensation and funding. The petitioners argued that these changes made the petition process prohibitively expensive and violated their fundamental rights to propose and sign petitions.The Oklahoma Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction due to the urgency and statewide importance of the issues raised, given the immediate impact of S.B. 1027 on pending and future initiative petitions. No lower courts reviewed the merits of this case before the Supreme Court’s intervention; the challenge was brought directly to this court through an application for declaratory relief and prohibition of enforcement.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that several core provisions of S.B. 1027 violated both the U.S. and Oklahoma Constitutions, specifically the First Amendment and state constitutional rights to speech, assembly, and petition. The court found that the offending provisions—including the registered voter circulator requirement, county signature caps, incentive-based compensation ban, out-of-state contribution ban, and disclosure requirements—were unconstitutional and could not be severed from the Act. As a result, the court declared S.B. 1027 void in its entirety, restoring the prior statutes governing the petition process. The court granted the petitioners’ request for declaratory relief. View "McVAY v. LEPAK" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization planned to run several political advertisements critical of socialism and the Democratic Socialists of America ahead of the 2025 New York City Mayoral Election. New York’s independent expenditure disclosure law, which requires entities spending money on political elections to register and disclose information about their expenditures, was interpreted by state regulators to cover these advertisements, as the only citywide candidate affiliated with the DSA was running for mayor. The organization feared enforcement of the law against its ads and sought judicial relief.After filing its complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the organization moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the State from enforcing the disclosure law against its advertisements before the upcoming election. The district court denied this emergency motion. The organization then appealed the denial to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit while the underlying challenge to the law was stayed in the district court at the organization’s request.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. The court explained that the motion for preliminary injunction sought relief only for an injury related to the 2025 mayoral election, which had already occurred, making it impossible for the appellate court to grant effectual relief. The court further held that the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness did not apply because the underlying action remained pending in the district court, and thus could still be litigated and reviewed in the future. The appeal was therefore dismissed for lack of a live controversy, with instructions that any future appeals concerning preliminary injunctions in this matter would be heard by the same panel. View "Am. Future Fund, Inc. v. N.Y. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

A city council in Ohio advanced a proposed ordinance to the voters for approval at the November 2026 general election. The measure, known as Issue 16, sought to increase the city’s income tax rate from 1.5% to 1.9% for six years, with the additional revenue earmarked for infrastructure improvements and equipment purchases. The proposed ordinance would maintain the existing cap on the credit residents could claim for taxes paid to other municipalities, meaning residents working elsewhere would not receive a credit for the 0.4% increase. The city council approved the ballot language, which was then reviewed and approved by the county board of elections and the Ohio Secretary of State.Individuals and organizations opposing the tax increase challenged the ballot language, arguing it was misleading for failing to inform voters about the unchanged credit provision. They sought a writ of mandamus to invalidate Issue 16 and impound the election results. The relators also attempted to bring the action as a statutory taxpayer suit and requested attorney fees.Before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the respondents argued that the claims lacked standing, were barred by laches due to delay, and that the ballot language complied with applicable law. The court dismissed the claims of one organization for lack of standing, finding it was not composed of local electors. The court also found the relators had not properly commenced a statutory taxpayer action and denied their motion for costs and attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the board of elections and Secretary of State did not abuse their discretion or disregard the law, as the ballot language complied with the specific statutory requirements for municipal-income-tax issues under R.C. 718.04(C)(2). The court denied the writ of mandamus and the request for attorney fees, and dismissed the claims of the non-elector organization for lack of standing. View "State ex rel. Avon Lake Commt. for the Citizens and Electors Rights to Vote on City Income Tax Increases v. Gracia" on Justia Law

Two commissioners of a state elections oversight body sought a writ of mandamus to compel the agency they supervise to provide administrative support necessary for the commission to convene meetings. The commission had been unable to meet for several months due to the absence of a chairperson and lack of direct contact information among members. The agency, which maintains the commission’s mailing list and facilitates communications, refused to provide support unless requested by a chairperson or by majority vote at a public meeting. This deadlock prevented the commission from fulfilling its statutory duties, including selecting a new chairperson.The commissioners repeatedly asked the agency for staff support and access to the mailing list, but these requests were denied. They then filed a petition with the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i, arguing that their inability to meet stemmed directly from the agency’s refusal to provide required administrative assistance. The agency argued that only a chairperson or a majority vote could trigger its duty to provide support, and later shifted its position to suggest that a joint request from five members outside a formal meeting would suffice.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that when the commission lacks a chairperson and cannot convene a meeting, any single member may request the agency’s staff support to schedule and notice a meeting. The agency must comply with such requests, enabling the commission to meet and select a chairperson pro tem by majority vote. The court granted the writ of mandamus, clarifying that this rule ensures the commission can carry out its duties and the public’s right to open government is protected. View "Cushnie v. Nago" on Justia Law

A prospective candidate sought to appear on the ballot for the office of United States representative in Connecticut’s First Congressional District under a reserved party designation, “Epic American Liberty.” The candidate, having formed a party designation committee, applied for nominating petition forms and was informed by the Secretary of the State that September 2, 2026, was the deadline for the committee to file a statement endorsing him. After initially being told he lacked sufficient signatures, he ultimately received approval for meeting the signature requirement. However, the party designation committee did not file the required endorsement by the deadline. The Secretary rescinded approval of the nomination. The candidate then withdrew his candidacy and, through certification, attempted to nominate another individual, who was the Republican Party’s nominee, to fill the vacancy on the Epic party line.This dispute was brought directly to the Connecticut Supreme Court under General Statutes § 9-323, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the Secretary to approve the candidate’s petition and accept the replacement nomination. The Secretary contended that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the candidate had withdrawn and the replacement nominee was statutorily barred from being substituted under the Epic designation. The court found both plaintiffs had colorable claims and standing, noting that the candidate would maintain his candidacy if the replacement nominee was disqualified, and thus the case was not moot.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the Secretary properly declined to approve the candidate’s nominating petition because the party designation committee failed to timely file the required endorsement. The court assumed, without deciding, that it may exercise equitable powers in extraordinary circumstances, but found no such circumstances here, as the committee could have filed the endorsement any time before the deadline. As a result, the plaintiffs’ claims for relief were denied and judgment was rendered for the defendant. View "Greenstein v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Several individuals sought to appear as Republican candidates for the Catoosa County Commission in the May 2024 primary election. The local county Republican Party (CCRP), believing that existing state law and party rules did not sufficiently protect against non-Republicans qualifying, adopted a new rule requiring candidates to interview with the CCRP executive committee and obtain a “qualifying affidavit.” When four candidates failed to secure this affidavit and were denied qualification, they brought suit against the CCRP and certain individual members, arguing the rule was unauthorized and prevented their lawful qualification.Reviewing the case, the Superior Court of Catoosa County granted the candidates a temporary restraining order, then a permanent injunction prohibiting the CCRP from enforcing the affidavit rule. After the CCRP persisted in refusing to qualify the candidates, the court found the CCRP and several members in contempt, awarded attorney fees to the candidates, and extended the injunction. The court also awarded attorney fees against certain CCRP members who were not named parties in the litigation. Appeals followed: the CCRP and named members challenged the injunction, contempt finding, and attorney fees; nonparty CCRP members appealed the attorney fee award.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the injunction, holding that county-level party organizations are not authorized by Georgia law to create independent candidate qualification rules beyond those established by the state party and statute. The permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of the qualifying-affidavit rule was upheld, as was the contempt finding and attorney fee award against most named appellants. However, the contempt finding against two individuals was reversed for lack of evidence. The Court dismissed the appeal by nonparty CCRP members for failure to follow the required discretionary appellate procedure for attorney fee awards. View "CATOOSA COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY v. HENRY" on Justia Law

Several individuals sought the Republican nomination for Governor in Georgia’s 2026 primary election. Under state law, only certain officials—including the Lieutenant Governor—could create a special “leadership committee” that was permitted to raise and spend unlimited funds in direct coordination with their campaigns. Burt Jones, the Lieutenant Governor, formed such a committee to support his own campaign. Brad Raffensperger, Georgia’s Secretary of State, also ran in the primary, but his supporters—including Safe Affordable Georgia, a hybrid political action committee (PAC) chaired by Raffensperger—were subject to contribution and coordination restrictions and could not operate a leadership committee.Safe Affordable Georgia filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, challenging these campaign finance restrictions as violating the First Amendment. The group sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the contribution and coordination limits against it, specifically so it could support Raffensperger’s campaign during the ongoing primary. The district court denied the motion for preliminary injunction. Safe Affordable Georgia appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, seeking expedited review.By the time the Eleventh Circuit heard the appeal, the 2026 primary election was over and Raffensperger’s campaign had ended. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the case was moot because the court could no longer provide meaningful relief relating to the completed election. The court also found that the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness did not apply, as there was no reasonable expectation that the same dispute would recur involving the same parties. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it as moot. View "Safe Affordable Georgia, Inc. v. Chairman of the State Ethics Commission" on Justia Law

Several candidates, including Georgia’s Lieutenant Governor and Secretary of State, sought the Republican nomination for Governor in Georgia’s 2026 primary. Under Georgia law, only certain officeholders, such as the incumbent Lieutenant Governor, could establish “leadership committees,” which allowed them to raise and spend unlimited funds and coordinate directly with their campaigns. Safe Affordable Georgia, a hybrid PAC chaired by Secretary Raffensperger, could not coordinate with his campaign or raise unlimited funds to support him.Safe Affordable Georgia filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against state officials, arguing that Georgia’s campaign finance scheme violated the First Amendment by treating it differently from leadership committees. The PAC sought a preliminary injunction to bar enforcement of contribution and coordination limits against it, aiming to support Raffensperger in the ongoing primary. The district court denied the request for emergency injunctive relief, and the PAC appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.While the appeal was pending, the primary election concluded and Raffensperger’s campaign ended. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined that, because the election was over and the PAC’s requested relief focused specifically on the 2026 primary, federal courts could no longer offer meaningful relief. The court held that the case was moot and did not qualify for the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception because there was no reasonable expectation the same situation would recur for the same party. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss it as moot. View "USA v. Waeckerle" on Justia Law

Santa Clara County’s Board of Supervisors responded to significant anticipated federal funding cuts, stemming from Congress’s enactment of H.R. 1, by declaring an emergency and calling for a special election to seek voter approval for Measure A—a five-year general sales tax increase. The Board determined that these federal cuts would have an immediate and severe impact on healthcare and social safety net services for county residents, and that waiting until the next general election would result in deep service reductions. The Board’s resolution outlined detailed findings about the emergency’s nature and magnitude, and the measure was placed before voters in a special election.Prior to the election, individual county residents challenged the legal sufficiency of the emergency declaration in the Superior Court of Santa Clara County. They argued that the “cases of emergency” exception in article XIII C, section 2 of the California Constitution was improperly applied, and that the measure’s ballot question and impartial analysis were not impartial or accurate as required by the Elections Code. After expedited proceedings, the trial court denied their petition regarding the emergency declaration but ordered agreed-upon modifications to some ballot language.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the “cases of emergency” clause should be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning—referring to unforeseen circumstances requiring immediate action—and does not require a narrow or specially defined scope. The court found that the Board’s resolution and findings provided sufficient factual basis for the emergency declaration and that the trial court’s handling of judicial notice, even if imperfect, was not prejudicial. The court declined to address arguments about the specific ballot language or impartial analysis, finding those issues moot. The judgment denying the writ was affirmed. View "Holtz v. Moreles" on Justia Law