Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Four candidates for federal office challenged a Public Notice issued by the Media Bureau of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that interpreted federal law to require broadcasters to offer the lowest unit charge (LUC) advertising rates not only to candidates for public office but also to political parties and joint fundraising committees with non-candidate members during pre-election periods. The candidates argued that this expanded interpretation unlawfully diluted their statutory right to LUC rates by extending it to entities whose spending cannot be considered spending by or on behalf of a candidate under campaign finance law.Prior to seeking judicial review, the candidates filed an Application for Review with the FCC, urging the Commission to set aside the Media Bureau’s Public Notice as a novel and unlawful interpretation of the LUC requirement. The Commission took no action on the application for several months, even as the relevant election period approached. The candidates then filed a Petition for Review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, seeking expedited consideration. While the case was pending, the FCC Chairman circulated a proposed order to the other commissioners to dismiss the candidates’ application as an improper vehicle for review, and the Media Bureau denied a similar reconsideration petition from another party, maintaining that the Public Notice merely reiterated existing guidance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined it had jurisdiction, finding that the Public Notice was a final order of the Commission and that the Commission had constructively denied the candidates’ application by failing to act. On the merits, the court concluded that the LUC statute unambiguously limits the lowest unit charge to legally qualified candidates for public office and does not extend this benefit to political parties or joint fundraising committees with non-candidate members. The court granted the Petition for Review and set aside the FCC’s Public Notice as unlawful. View "Brown v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

The President issued an Executive Order that directed certain federal agencies to take actions related to election integrity, including creating and distributing lists of eligible voters, prioritizing prosecution of officials issuing ballots to ineligible voters, and initiating a rulemaking related to ballot tracking. The Order did not impose any requirements on states or parties outside the Executive Branch, and all actions were subject to feasibility and compliance with existing law. Shortly after the Order was issued, several states and the District of Columbia sued, arguing that the Order unconstitutionally infringed on their authority to administer elections.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts agreed with the states and entered a final judgment enjoining the federal government from implementing the challenged provisions of the Order as to the plaintiff states for the upcoming midterm elections. The government sought a stay of this injunction from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which was denied, prompting an emergency application to the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the United States granted the stay, holding that the government is likely to succeed on its argument that the District Court lacked jurisdiction because the states lacked standing and their claims were not ripe for adjudication. The Court reasoned that the Order was an internal directive that did not cause concrete or imminent harm to the states, and any alleged injury was speculative and dependent on uncertain future events. The Court also found that the government would likely suffer irreparable harm from the injunction, which interfered with the internal workings of the Executive Branch. As a result, the Supreme Court stayed the District Court’s injunction pending further appellate review. View "Trump v. California" on Justia Law

Several individuals and a nonprofit organization in Minnesota, focused on election integrity, wished to publicly advocate their interpretation that certain felons—specifically those still on supervised release—are constitutionally ineligible to vote in Minnesota. State law, however, allows felons to vote once released from incarceration, regardless of whether they are on parole or probation. Concerned about possible prosecution under a Minnesota statute that criminalizes knowingly false statements about voter eligibility made within 60 days of an election, the plaintiffs sought to continue their advocacy without facing criminal or civil penalties.After the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the group lacked standing to challenge the felon voting law in state court, the plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the election disinformation statute, arguing it violated the First Amendment. In response, the Anoka County Attorney filed a counterclaim, seeking to restrain the plaintiffs from violating the law and to obtain damages. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint and denied a preliminary injunction, concluding that the law could constitutionally restrict their speech. The plaintiffs appealed the denial of a preliminary injunction while the counterclaim remained pending.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the denial of preliminary injunctive relief and found that the plaintiffs had standing due to both actual and imminent injuries. The court held that the statute at issue regulated protected political speech based on its content and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny. The court determined that Minnesota’s law was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, as it both overreached and underreached in its restriction of speech, and also authorized unconstitutional prior restraints. The Eighth Circuit reversed the denial of a preliminary injunction in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for entry of a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs. View "Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Ellison" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization dedicated to election integrity requested a copy of Wisconsin’s voter registration list, seeking access under the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA). Wisconsin, however, is exempt from the NVRA because it has permitted same-day polling-place registration since before August 1, 1994. The state processed the request under its public-records law, which required redaction of birth dates and imposed a fee of $12,500 due to the size of the list. The organization objected to both the fee and the redactions, arguing that Wisconsin’s exemption from the NVRA was unconstitutional.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin dismissed the case. The district judge held that the plaintiff’s claims—asserting violations of the “equal state sovereignty” principle from Shelby County v. Holder and the “congruence and proportionality” requirement from City of Boerne v. Flores—were not supported by law. While the judge found that the plaintiff had Article III standing due to the alleged financial injury, he expressed doubt about prudential standing but decided the case on the merits, concluding that neither cited Supreme Court decision undermined the validity of Wisconsin’s exemption.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court agreed that the plaintiff had Article III standing but questioned prudential standing, as the legal theories invoked state, rather than individual, rights. Nonetheless, the court bypassed this issue, holding that the NVRA’s exemption for states like Wisconsin does not violate equal state sovereignty or the congruence and proportionality standard. The court emphasized that the exemption relieves, rather than imposes, federal regulatory burdens and that Congress acted under its Elections Clause authority, making City of Boerne inapplicable. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

A group of registered voters in South Carolina, all under the age of sixty-five, challenged a provision of state law that restricts “no excuse” absentee-by-mail voting to voters sixty-five years of age or older. These plaintiffs argued that the statute unconstitutionally discriminates against them on account of age, in violation of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, and also violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The law at issue allows voters sixty-five and older to vote absentee by mail for any reason, while voters under sixty-five can only do so if they meet specific, narrow criteria such as disability, military service, or certain employment conflicts.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, where the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants—the South Carolina State Election Commission and related officials—on both constitutional claims. The district court found that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a violation of either the Twenty-Sixth Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the appeal. This court held that the plaintiffs have standing and that South Carolina’s age-based absentee-by-mail voting scheme violates the Twenty-Sixth Amendment because it abridges the right to vote on account of age by providing greater ballot access to older voters. However, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss the Equal Protection claim, as age is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause and the plaintiffs did not challenge the law under rational basis or Anderson-Burdick scrutiny. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment on the Twenty-Sixth Amendment claim, affirmed the Equal Protection ruling, and remanded the case for appropriate remedy. View "Grant v. Belangia" on Justia Law

A former county court judge in Leflore County, Mississippi, sought to run for county court judge in the general election scheduled for November 3, 2026. After filing his qualifying statement of intent, the current judge filed a petition with the Leflore County Election Commission, asserting that the former judge did not meet the residency requirements for candidacy because he had sold his Leflore County home and moved to Grenada County in 2023. The petition argued that the candidate had not resided in Leflore County for the required two years before the qualifying date or before the election date.The Leflore County Election Commission held a hearing, during which the candidate challenged the commission’s jurisdiction to decide candidate qualifications for county court judge. The commission consulted the secretary of state’s office, which indicated the commission had authority to review qualifications under relevant statutes. The commission then voted to disqualify the candidate, removing his name from the ballot. The candidate appealed to the Circuit Court of Leflore County. The circuit court ruled that the election commission did not have jurisdiction to determine the qualifications of a county court judge candidate and ordered the candidate’s name be placed back on the ballot. In the alternative, the circuit court found that the commission had applied the wrong residency standard.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the circuit court’s judgment that the election commission lacked statutory authority to rule on the qualifications of candidates for county court judge, as the relevant statutes specifically excluded such offices from the commission’s jurisdiction. The court vacated as moot the remaining parts of the circuit court’s judgment, found the commission’s exclusion of the candidate improper, and directed that the candidate’s name be returned to the ballot. View "In Re: Petition to Disqualify Adams" on Justia Law

The case concerns a closely contested Democratic primary election for alderman of Ward 3 in Senatobia, Mississippi, in which Allen Tanksley defeated Michael Cathey by a single vote. Cathey alleged several irregularities in the handling of absentee ballots, including that some were improperly counted or excluded, that absentee ballots were not properly distinguished from regular ballots, that the ballot box was not properly secured, and that he was denied timely access to examine the ballot box and related materials.Following the election, the Tate County Democratic Executive Committee initially determined that irregularities warranted a new election, but the Chancery Court of Tate County set aside this determination and issued an injunction. Cathey then filed a formal election contest in the Circuit Court of Tate County, alleging procedural and substantive errors affecting the election’s outcome. After a hearing, the circuit court found that Cathey had not met his burden of proof on any claim. The court upheld the validity of a written agreement giving authority over the ballot box to the city clerk, found Cathey was not denied access to relevant materials, and concluded that there was no evidence of fraud or improper ballot tampering. The circuit court declared Tanksley the winner.Cathey appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. The Supreme Court found that the city clerk’s breaking of the ballot box seal, in violation of Mississippi Code Section 23-15-911, constituted a “gross violation” of mandatory election law, creating a loss of confidence in the election’s integrity, especially given the unexplained counting of a contested absentee ballot. The Court held that, even absent proof of fraud, the breach of ballot box security warranted a special election. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the circuit court’s judgment and ordered a new special election for the office. View "Cathey v. Tanksley" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization and two registered Minnesota voters challenged the state’s requirement that absentee voters obtain a witness certification in order to cast an absentee ballot. The organization assists its members with the absentee voting process. The plaintiffs argued that the requirement violates two federal laws: the Voting Rights Act, by conditioning the right to vote on a “voucher” from a witness, and the Civil Rights Act’s Materiality Provision, by potentially denying the right to vote based on errors or omissions in witness certifications that are not material to determining voter eligibility.The case began in district court, where the Secretary of State moved to dismiss, arguing the plaintiffs lacked standing and failed to state claims. The district court denied the motion, finding the organization had standing. It ruled that the plaintiffs stated a claim under the Voting Rights Act for unregistered voters and under the Civil Rights Act for registered voters. The Secretary then sought discretionary review. The Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded the organization had standing but held that the witness certification requirement did not violate either federal law, reversing the district court and remanding with instructions to dismiss the case.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the appeal. It held that the witness certification does not violate the Voting Rights Act for unregistered voters because it does not require proving eligibility by the voucher of another; the witness merely attests to the presentation of residency documentation, not personal knowledge of the voter’s qualifications. The court also held that, as to registered voters, the witness certification is not a paper relating to an “act requisite to voting” under the Civil Rights Act’s Materiality Provision, as it does not pertain to a determination of voter eligibility. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to state claims under either federal law. View "Minnesota Alliance for Retired Americans Educational Fund vs. Simon" on Justia Law

Several organizations and individuals challenged provisions of a 2021 Texas law known as Senate Bill 1, which imposed new requirements on mail-in voting, regulated voter assistance, and restricted compensation for certain election-related activities. The plaintiffs, including advocacy groups and individuals with disabilities, argued that these provisions discriminated against voters with disabilities in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Key facts included reports of rejected mail-in ballots due to missing identification numbers and claims that the law’s requirements created barriers for disabled voters.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas held a bench trial and found that nine provisions of Senate Bill 1 were inconsistent with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court permanently enjoined the Texas Secretary of State and various local officials from enforcing these provisions. The defendants, including the Governor of Texas and other state and county officials, appealed the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision in its entirety. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the identification provisions, as they could not show a substantial risk of future injury to any specific member or demonstrate organizational standing under Supreme Court precedent. The court also found that the plaintiffs’ challenges to voter assistance and compensation provisions were foreclosed by prior Fifth Circuit decisions and failed for lack of standing or on the merits. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court’s grant of permanent injunctive relief was improper and reversed the injunction, declining to interfere with the Texas Legislature’s election regulations. View "La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a former New Mexico state senator, used leftover campaign funds to make charitable donations, including a $200 contribution to assist a high school student with attending a pre-law program. These donations were made to individuals and organizations that did not qualify as tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. New Mexico’s Campaign Reporting Act (CRA) prohibits most campaign expenditures, but lists certain permitted uses, including donations to 501(c)(3) organizations. After the Secretary of State discovered the $200 donation during a random audit, she determined it violated the CRA and requested the plaintiff to reimburse his campaign fund. The plaintiff refused, arguing that enforcing the CRA in this way violated his First Amendment rights, and the matter was referred to the State Ethics Commission and Attorney General.In the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, the plaintiff sought a declaration that the restriction was facially unconstitutional, and injunctive relief. The district court initially granted a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the CRA for such donations, viewing the plaintiff’s claim as a facial overbreadth challenge and finding it likely to succeed. However, after further proceedings and in light of an affidavit from the Secretary of State, the district court concluded the CRA did not prohibit protected speech, granted summary judgment for the defendant, and denied a permanent injunction. The district court allowed the plaintiff’s as-applied challenge to proceed separately; the plaintiff appealed only the denial of his facial challenge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the CRA’s prohibition on donations to non-501(c)(3) organizations and individuals facially regulates activity protected by the First Amendment. The court vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings, directing the lower court to determine the appropriate constitutional test and apply it to the CRA’s challenged prohibitions. View "Ortiz y Pino v. Oliver" on Justia Law