Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

A nonpartisan candidate filed a complaint challenging the primary election ballot in Hawaii, arguing that the requirement for voters to select a political preference violated the Hawaii Constitution and various state statutes. The plaintiff sought an order to redesign the ballot and declare the current ballot invalid.The State of Hawaii, Office of Elections, and the Chief Election Officer moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim or lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Hawaii reviewed the case and found that the plaintiff's claims under HRS §§ 11-173.5, 11-174.5, and 91-14 were not valid because no election results had been posted, which is a prerequisite for these statutes. Additionally, the court found that the plaintiff did not have standing to challenge all statewide ballots under HRS § 11-172, as he was only a candidate in the Mayor's race in Honolulu. The court also determined that the plaintiff's complaint did not state a claim under HRS § 11-172 because the alleged ballot defects would not impact his nonpartisan race.The Supreme Court of Hawaii dismissed the election contest claims for failure to state a claim. The court also construed the complaint as a petition for a writ of mandamus but denied the petition, finding that the plaintiff did not establish a clear and indisputable right to the relief requested or a lack of other means to address the alleged wrong. The court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Dicks v. State " on Justia Law

The Stark County Board of Elections considered and voted to purchase Dominion Voting Systems equipment during four meetings. These discussions and decisions occurred in executive sessions, which are closed to the public. Look Ahead America and Merry Lynne Rini filed a complaint alleging that the board violated Ohio’s Open Meetings Act by not limiting its executive-session discussions to matters where premature disclosure would give an unfair competitive or bargaining advantage.The Stark County Court of Common Pleas upheld the board’s actions, interpreting R.C. 121.22(G)(2) to mean that the premature-disclosure clause applied only to the last-listed reason for entering executive session, not to the purchase of property. The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing with the trial court’s interpretation.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and disagreed with the lower courts. The court held that the premature-disclosure clause in R.C. 121.22(G)(2) applies to all the permissible reasons listed for entering executive session, not just the last one. The court reversed the Fifth District’s judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial applying this interpretation. View "Look Ahead Am. v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the Utah Legislature's repeal and replacement of a citizen initiative known as "Proposition 4," which aimed to reform the state's redistricting process to prevent partisan gerrymandering. Proposition 4, passed by Utah voters in 2018, established an Independent Redistricting Commission and set forth neutral redistricting standards, including a prohibition on partisan gerrymandering. However, before the next redistricting cycle, the Utah Legislature enacted Senate Bill 200 (S.B. 200), which repealed Proposition 4 and replaced it with a new law that did not include the same anti-gerrymandering provisions and weakened the role of the Independent Commission.In the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the plaintiffs argued that the Legislature's actions violated the Utah Constitution by nullifying the reforms enacted by the people through Proposition 4. The district court dismissed this claim, holding that the Legislature has the authority to amend or repeal any statute, including those enacted by citizen initiative, without limitation. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on two constitutional provisions: the Initiative Provision in article VI, section 1, which grants the people the power to initiate legislation, and the Alter or Reform Clause in article I, section 2, which states that the people have the right to alter or reform their government. The court concluded that these provisions, when read together, limit the Legislature's power to amend or repeal a citizen initiative that reforms the government. The court held that the people’s right to reform the government through an initiative is constitutionally protected from legislative actions that would impair the reform enacted by the people.The Utah Supreme Court reversed the district court's dismissal of Count V, which challenged the Legislature's repeal and replacement of Proposition 4, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court emphasized that legislative changes to a government-reform initiative must not impair the reform and must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest if they do. View "League of Women Voters v. Utah State Legislature" on Justia Law

A group of citizens in the Town of Bel Air, Maryland, submitted a document to the town's Board of Commissioners, purporting to be a petition for a referendum on a comprehensive rezoning ordinance. The document, however, did not meet the requirements of the town's charter for such a petition. The Board of Commissioners determined that the document was invalid and did not send it to the Board of Election Judges for verification of signatures. The citizens filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Harford County, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Board of Commissioners' determination was invalid and an order directing the town to verify the signatures on the document. The circuit court ruled in favor of the citizens, declaring the Board of Commissioners' determination invalid and ordering the town to verify the signatures.The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the Board of Commissioners correctly determined that the document did not meet the requirements of the town's charter to be considered a valid petition for a referendum. The court also held that the Board of Commissioners was not required to send the document to the Board of Election Judges for verification of signatures before making this determination. The court remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to enter a declaratory judgment consistent with its opinion. View "Town of Bel Air v. Bodt" on Justia Law

The case involves the Federal Election Commission (FEC), the Campaign Legal Center, and the political action committee Correct the Record. The Campaign Legal Center alleged that Correct the Record coordinated with Hillary Clinton's 2016 presidential campaign and spent close to $6 million without disclosing these expenditures as contributions. Correct the Record argued that these expenditures were exempt from disclosure due to the FEC's "internet exemption," which exempts unpaid internet communications from contribution limitations and disclosure requirements.The FEC dismissed the complaint, leading to a lawsuit by the Campaign Legal Center. The district court ruled in favor of the Campaign Legal Center, finding that the FEC's dismissal was contrary to law. The FEC appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the FEC's interpretation of the "internet exemption" was contrary to the Federal Election Campaign Act's regulation of coordinated expenditures. The court also found that the FEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in dismissing allegations of coordination between Correct the Record and the Clinton campaign. The case was remanded back to the FEC for further action consistent with the court's decision. View "Campaign Legal Center v. Federal Election Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to several voting requirements in Wisconsin, including the requirement that absentee ballots be returned only by mail or in person to the clerk's office and not to a secure drop box. The Circuit Court for Dane County dismissed the claim related to the drop box, citing a previous decision, Teigen v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, which determined that the use of ballot drop boxes was not allowed under Wisconsin law.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, however, disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of the law. The Supreme Court found that the language of the relevant statute, Wisconsin Statute § 6.87(4)(b)1, allows for the use of ballot drop boxes. The court noted that the statute requires that a completed absentee ballot be "mailed by the elector, or delivered in person, to the municipal clerk issuing the ballot or ballots." The court interpreted this to mean that delivering a ballot to a drop box is a means of delivering it in person "to the municipal clerk."The court also rejected the argument that the use of drop boxes contravenes the legislative policy expressed in Wisconsin Statute § 6.84(1), which states that absentee balloting must be "carefully regulated." The court found that drop boxes are a form of regulation and are consistent with the decentralized system of election administration in Wisconsin.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin therefore reversed the order of the Circuit Court for Dane County dismissing the claim related to the drop box and remanded the case back to the lower court to reinstate the claim. View "Priorities USA v. Wisconsin Elections Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves the Upstate Jobs Party (UJP) and two of its leaders who sued the Commissioners of the New York State Board of Elections over campaign finance regulations. UJP, an independent body, argued that it is similarly situated to political parties because both nominate candidates that compete in the same elections. UJP claimed that New York's preferential treatment of parties violates the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. UJP also asserted First Amendment violations, alleging that New York's campaign finance rules distinguishing between parties and independent bodies are not closely drawn to a sufficient state interest in preventing corruption or the appearance thereof.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York determined that differences in contribution limits applicable to parties and independent bodies violate the Fourteenth and the First Amendments. However, it also determined that allowing parties but not independent bodies to maintain so-called “housekeeping accounts” did not violate either amendment. Both UJP and the State Board appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part the district court’s judgment. The court held that parties and independent bodies are not similarly situated, and that the state’s contribution limits and housekeeping account exception are closely drawn to serve the state’s anticorruption interests. Therefore, the court concluded that the state’s campaign finance laws withstand all constitutional challenges raised. View "Upstate Jobs Party v. Kosinksi" on Justia Law

The case involves the Tennessee Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) challenging a state policy that requires some convicted felons to submit additional documentation to confirm their eligibility to vote. The NAACP argued that this policy violated the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA). A district court agreed with the NAACP and permanently enjoined the policy in the middle of the 2024 election cycle. Tennessee's Secretary of State and Coordinator of Elections appealed this decision and sought a stay of the injunction pending appeal.The district court's decision was based on the finding that the NAACP had standing to challenge the policy and that the policy violated the NVRA. The court held that the policy was unnecessary for determining the eligibility of those with felony convictions as the state had other information at its disposal to make that decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted the stay for two reasons. First, the injunction triggered the Supreme Court’s “Purcell principle,” which instructs federal courts not to disrupt state election rules close to an election. Second, the court found that the NAACP likely did not present enough evidence to prove its standing to challenge the Documentation Policy. The court concluded that the NAACP's claim that the policy forced it to divert its resources to help those convicted of felonies track down the records they need to register was not supported by specific facts. View "Tennessee Conference of the NAACP v. Lee" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to two Delaware voting statutes: one allowing absentee voters to request "permanent absentee" status, and the other authorizing qualified, registered voters to vote in person at least 10 days before an election. The plaintiffs, a citizen who plans to serve as an election inspector and a Delaware State Senator, argued that these statutes conflict with the Delaware Constitution's provisions governing elections and voting.The case was initially filed in the Court of Chancery, which dismissed it on jurisdictional grounds. The plaintiffs then pursued their claims in the Superior Court. The Superior Court found that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the case and ruled in their favor, declaring the challenged statutes unconstitutional.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed the Superior Court's decision. The Supreme Court found that neither plaintiff had standing to challenge the statutes. The court held that the State Senator, who was not up for re-election until 2026, did not face an imminent or particularized harm. The court also found that the citizen, who planned to serve as an election inspector, did not have standing because his role as an inspector did not give him the authority to turn away lawful voters based on his personal belief that the challenged statutes were invalid. Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that they had standing as registered voters, finding that their alleged injury was a generalized grievance shared by all voters, not a particularized harm. As a result of these findings, the court did not address the merits of the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. View "Albence v. Mennella" on Justia Law

The case involves two groups of plaintiffs, referred to as the Schneider plaintiffs and the Page plaintiffs, who challenged the title and one-sentence "yes/no" statements prepared by the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Commonwealth (Secretary) for Initiative Petition 23-36. This petition proposed to replace the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) tests, currently used as a measure of student competency for high school graduation, with a system where students must satisfactorily complete coursework certified by their district as showing mastery of state academic standards.The plaintiffs filed their complaints in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, arguing that the title and one-sentence statements were misleading and inconsistent with the requirements of G. L. c. 54, § 53. The Page plaintiffs contended that the statements only mentioned the elimination of MCAS without stating that it would be replaced with something else. The Schneider plaintiffs argued that the statements did not disclose that the petition would prohibit the use of any uniform statewide assessment as a graduation requirement.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that the title and one-sentence statements accurately characterized the petition's proposal to eliminate MCAS tests as a graduation requirement. The court noted that while the petition also proposed a new assessment scheme and prohibited any future statewide assessment from being used as a graduation requirement, these were not distinct regulatory features of the petition. The court concluded that the title and one-sentence statements did not need to describe every feature of the petition. The court also rejected the additional arguments forwarded by the Page plaintiffs. The court remanded the matter to the county court for entry of a judgment declaring that the Attorney General and Secretary's title and one-sentence statements were in compliance with the requirements of G. L. c. 54, § 53. View "Schneider v. Attorney General" on Justia Law