Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

A city council in Ohio advanced a proposed ordinance to the voters for approval at the November 2026 general election. The measure, known as Issue 16, sought to increase the city’s income tax rate from 1.5% to 1.9% for six years, with the additional revenue earmarked for infrastructure improvements and equipment purchases. The proposed ordinance would maintain the existing cap on the credit residents could claim for taxes paid to other municipalities, meaning residents working elsewhere would not receive a credit for the 0.4% increase. The city council approved the ballot language, which was then reviewed and approved by the county board of elections and the Ohio Secretary of State.Individuals and organizations opposing the tax increase challenged the ballot language, arguing it was misleading for failing to inform voters about the unchanged credit provision. They sought a writ of mandamus to invalidate Issue 16 and impound the election results. The relators also attempted to bring the action as a statutory taxpayer suit and requested attorney fees.Before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the respondents argued that the claims lacked standing, were barred by laches due to delay, and that the ballot language complied with applicable law. The court dismissed the claims of one organization for lack of standing, finding it was not composed of local electors. The court also found the relators had not properly commenced a statutory taxpayer action and denied their motion for costs and attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the board of elections and Secretary of State did not abuse their discretion or disregard the law, as the ballot language complied with the specific statutory requirements for municipal-income-tax issues under R.C. 718.04(C)(2). The court denied the writ of mandamus and the request for attorney fees, and dismissed the claims of the non-elector organization for lack of standing. View "State ex rel. Avon Lake Commt. for the Citizens and Electors Rights to Vote on City Income Tax Increases v. Gracia" on Justia Law

Two commissioners of a state elections oversight body sought a writ of mandamus to compel the agency they supervise to provide administrative support necessary for the commission to convene meetings. The commission had been unable to meet for several months due to the absence of a chairperson and lack of direct contact information among members. The agency, which maintains the commission’s mailing list and facilitates communications, refused to provide support unless requested by a chairperson or by majority vote at a public meeting. This deadlock prevented the commission from fulfilling its statutory duties, including selecting a new chairperson.The commissioners repeatedly asked the agency for staff support and access to the mailing list, but these requests were denied. They then filed a petition with the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i, arguing that their inability to meet stemmed directly from the agency’s refusal to provide required administrative assistance. The agency argued that only a chairperson or a majority vote could trigger its duty to provide support, and later shifted its position to suggest that a joint request from five members outside a formal meeting would suffice.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that when the commission lacks a chairperson and cannot convene a meeting, any single member may request the agency’s staff support to schedule and notice a meeting. The agency must comply with such requests, enabling the commission to meet and select a chairperson pro tem by majority vote. The court granted the writ of mandamus, clarifying that this rule ensures the commission can carry out its duties and the public’s right to open government is protected. View "Cushnie v. Nago" on Justia Law

A prospective candidate sought to appear on the ballot for the office of United States representative in Connecticut’s First Congressional District under a reserved party designation, “Epic American Liberty.” The candidate, having formed a party designation committee, applied for nominating petition forms and was informed by the Secretary of the State that September 2, 2026, was the deadline for the committee to file a statement endorsing him. After initially being told he lacked sufficient signatures, he ultimately received approval for meeting the signature requirement. However, the party designation committee did not file the required endorsement by the deadline. The Secretary rescinded approval of the nomination. The candidate then withdrew his candidacy and, through certification, attempted to nominate another individual, who was the Republican Party’s nominee, to fill the vacancy on the Epic party line.This dispute was brought directly to the Connecticut Supreme Court under General Statutes § 9-323, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the Secretary to approve the candidate’s petition and accept the replacement nomination. The Secretary contended that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the candidate had withdrawn and the replacement nominee was statutorily barred from being substituted under the Epic designation. The court found both plaintiffs had colorable claims and standing, noting that the candidate would maintain his candidacy if the replacement nominee was disqualified, and thus the case was not moot.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the Secretary properly declined to approve the candidate’s nominating petition because the party designation committee failed to timely file the required endorsement. The court assumed, without deciding, that it may exercise equitable powers in extraordinary circumstances, but found no such circumstances here, as the committee could have filed the endorsement any time before the deadline. As a result, the plaintiffs’ claims for relief were denied and judgment was rendered for the defendant. View "Greenstein v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Several individuals sought to appear as Republican candidates for the Catoosa County Commission in the May 2024 primary election. The local county Republican Party (CCRP), believing that existing state law and party rules did not sufficiently protect against non-Republicans qualifying, adopted a new rule requiring candidates to interview with the CCRP executive committee and obtain a “qualifying affidavit.” When four candidates failed to secure this affidavit and were denied qualification, they brought suit against the CCRP and certain individual members, arguing the rule was unauthorized and prevented their lawful qualification.Reviewing the case, the Superior Court of Catoosa County granted the candidates a temporary restraining order, then a permanent injunction prohibiting the CCRP from enforcing the affidavit rule. After the CCRP persisted in refusing to qualify the candidates, the court found the CCRP and several members in contempt, awarded attorney fees to the candidates, and extended the injunction. The court also awarded attorney fees against certain CCRP members who were not named parties in the litigation. Appeals followed: the CCRP and named members challenged the injunction, contempt finding, and attorney fees; nonparty CCRP members appealed the attorney fee award.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the injunction, holding that county-level party organizations are not authorized by Georgia law to create independent candidate qualification rules beyond those established by the state party and statute. The permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of the qualifying-affidavit rule was upheld, as was the contempt finding and attorney fee award against most named appellants. However, the contempt finding against two individuals was reversed for lack of evidence. The Court dismissed the appeal by nonparty CCRP members for failure to follow the required discretionary appellate procedure for attorney fee awards. View "CATOOSA COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY v. HENRY" on Justia Law

Several individuals sought the Republican nomination for Governor in Georgia’s 2026 primary election. Under state law, only certain officials—including the Lieutenant Governor—could create a special “leadership committee” that was permitted to raise and spend unlimited funds in direct coordination with their campaigns. Burt Jones, the Lieutenant Governor, formed such a committee to support his own campaign. Brad Raffensperger, Georgia’s Secretary of State, also ran in the primary, but his supporters—including Safe Affordable Georgia, a hybrid political action committee (PAC) chaired by Raffensperger—were subject to contribution and coordination restrictions and could not operate a leadership committee.Safe Affordable Georgia filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, challenging these campaign finance restrictions as violating the First Amendment. The group sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the contribution and coordination limits against it, specifically so it could support Raffensperger’s campaign during the ongoing primary. The district court denied the motion for preliminary injunction. Safe Affordable Georgia appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, seeking expedited review.By the time the Eleventh Circuit heard the appeal, the 2026 primary election was over and Raffensperger’s campaign had ended. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the case was moot because the court could no longer provide meaningful relief relating to the completed election. The court also found that the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness did not apply, as there was no reasonable expectation that the same dispute would recur involving the same parties. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it as moot. View "Safe Affordable Georgia, Inc. v. Chairman of the State Ethics Commission" on Justia Law

Several candidates, including Georgia’s Lieutenant Governor and Secretary of State, sought the Republican nomination for Governor in Georgia’s 2026 primary. Under Georgia law, only certain officeholders, such as the incumbent Lieutenant Governor, could establish “leadership committees,” which allowed them to raise and spend unlimited funds and coordinate directly with their campaigns. Safe Affordable Georgia, a hybrid PAC chaired by Secretary Raffensperger, could not coordinate with his campaign or raise unlimited funds to support him.Safe Affordable Georgia filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against state officials, arguing that Georgia’s campaign finance scheme violated the First Amendment by treating it differently from leadership committees. The PAC sought a preliminary injunction to bar enforcement of contribution and coordination limits against it, aiming to support Raffensperger in the ongoing primary. The district court denied the request for emergency injunctive relief, and the PAC appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.While the appeal was pending, the primary election concluded and Raffensperger’s campaign ended. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined that, because the election was over and the PAC’s requested relief focused specifically on the 2026 primary, federal courts could no longer offer meaningful relief. The court held that the case was moot and did not qualify for the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception because there was no reasonable expectation the same situation would recur for the same party. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss it as moot. View "USA v. Waeckerle" on Justia Law

Santa Clara County’s Board of Supervisors responded to significant anticipated federal funding cuts, stemming from Congress’s enactment of H.R. 1, by declaring an emergency and calling for a special election to seek voter approval for Measure A—a five-year general sales tax increase. The Board determined that these federal cuts would have an immediate and severe impact on healthcare and social safety net services for county residents, and that waiting until the next general election would result in deep service reductions. The Board’s resolution outlined detailed findings about the emergency’s nature and magnitude, and the measure was placed before voters in a special election.Prior to the election, individual county residents challenged the legal sufficiency of the emergency declaration in the Superior Court of Santa Clara County. They argued that the “cases of emergency” exception in article XIII C, section 2 of the California Constitution was improperly applied, and that the measure’s ballot question and impartial analysis were not impartial or accurate as required by the Elections Code. After expedited proceedings, the trial court denied their petition regarding the emergency declaration but ordered agreed-upon modifications to some ballot language.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the “cases of emergency” clause should be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning—referring to unforeseen circumstances requiring immediate action—and does not require a narrow or specially defined scope. The court found that the Board’s resolution and findings provided sufficient factual basis for the emergency declaration and that the trial court’s handling of judicial notice, even if imperfect, was not prejudicial. The court declined to address arguments about the specific ballot language or impartial analysis, finding those issues moot. The judgment denying the writ was affirmed. View "Holtz v. Moreles" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to a proposed Nebraska constitutional amendment, the “Fairness for Girls” initiative, which seeks to establish constitutional protections for sex-separate athletics, ensuring equal access to athletic opportunities for females. The sponsors filed the initiative text and an object statement with the Nebraska Secretary of State, then submitted petition signatures. The object statement was printed on the petition and signature sheets, and the full text was available to signers. The Secretary of State certified the initiative for placement on the 2026 general election ballot.Cara Ullman filed a complaint in the District Court for Lancaster County, alleging the initiative’s object statement did not comply with Nebraska statutory requirements, specifically Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 32-1401 and 32-1405. Ullman claimed the statement failed to describe the legal effect and the object sought to be secured. She requested an injunction to prevent the Secretary from placing the initiative on the ballot. After motions and a hearing, the district court dismissed Ullman’s complaint on the merits, holding that the object statement was a concise summary of the legal effect and object, and that the petition substantially complied with statutory requirements.The Nebraska Supreme Court independently reviewed the legal issues, focusing on whether the initiative's object statement satisfied statutory requirements. The Court held that the object statement met the requirement to concisely state the legal effect of the filing and the object sought, noting it was consistent with the initiative’s text and not misleading. The Court clarified that Nebraska law does not require the object statement to summarize all major provisions, only to identify the overall purpose. Accordingly, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the legal sufficiency of the initiative and denying the requested injunction. View "Ullman v. Evnen" on Justia Law

Kristina Gulley, who previously served as justice of the peace for District 10 in Pulaski County, Arkansas, sought reelection after having been disqualified in earlier proceedings due to two prior misdemeanor hot-check convictions from 1997 and 2003. Multiple prior legal actions had resulted in findings that these convictions constituted “infamous crimes” under article 5, section 9 of the Arkansas Constitution, rendering her ineligible to run for or hold public office. Despite these rulings, Gulley again filed as a candidate in the 2026 primary election. Registered voters in the district challenged her eligibility, seeking a declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus to prevent her name from appearing on the ballot and to prohibit counting any votes cast for her.The Pulaski County Circuit Court held an expedited hearing, denied Gulley’s requests for a continuance and for relief from judgment, and reaffirmed her ineligibility based on the prior convictions. The court found that neither the sealing of her record nor a gubernatorial pardon restored her eligibility to run for office, and it ordered the Board of Election Commissioners not to certify her as a candidate or count votes for her. Gulley appealed, challenging the circuit court’s findings on factual and constitutional grounds. However, she did not obtain a stay of the court’s order or the certification of the election results.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Arkansas determined that the appeal was moot because the March 2026 primary election had already occurred, and the election results had been certified. The court held that no effective relief could be granted as to the election in question, and none of the recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Arkansas granted the motion to dismiss the appeal as moot and dismissed the case. View "GULLEY v. JEFFREY" on Justia Law

Two nonprofit organizations dedicated to increasing voter participation, especially among underrepresented groups, sent mail ballot applications to Kansas voters during the 2020 election. These mailings included applications that had been partially prefilled with voter information obtained from public and commercial sources. Due to outdated or inaccurate data, many applications contained errors, leading to voter confusion and administrative burdens for local election officials who had to process erroneous or duplicate applications and respond to concerned voters.Following this experience, the Kansas legislature enacted a law prohibiting private entities from mailing partially prefilled advance ballot applications to registered voters. The nonprofits challenged the law in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, arguing that it infringed on their First Amendment rights. The district court initially enjoined enforcement of the law, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, instructing the district court to apply intermediate scrutiny unless it found the law was enacted with an improper purpose. On remand, the district court found that the Kansas legislature had acted with an improper purpose, concluded that strict scrutiny should apply, and again enjoined the law.On the second appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings de novo. The appellate court held that the district court erred in finding improper legislative intent, as there was no sufficient evidence in the law’s text, justifications, or legislative history to support that conclusion. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Tenth Circuit found that the law served significant governmental interests—minimizing voter confusion, facilitating efficient election administration, and fostering confidence in elections—and was narrowly tailored to those interests without substantially burdening protected speech. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. View "VoteAmerica v. Schwab" on Justia Law