Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court agreed with Plaintiffs in this declaratory judgment action, holding that Ind. Code 3-9-2-3 to -6 prohibits or otherwise limits corporate contributions to political action committees (PACs) or other entities that engage in independent campaign-related expenditures.Plaintiffs filed suit against several state officials responsible for enforcing Indiana's election laws, arguing that Ind. Code 3-9-2-4 and 3-9-2-5 were unconstitutional as applied. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of standing, concluding that Plaintiffs had not suffered an injury. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether sections 3-9-2-3 to -6 prohibit corporate contributions to Super PACs like the fund at issue. The Court of Appeals answered by holding that sections 3-9-2-3 to -6 prohibit corporate contributions to PACs earmarked for independent campaign-related expenditures. View "Indiana Right to Life Victory Fund v. Morales" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus ordering the Crawford County Board of Elections to certify Relator's name as a candidate for a seat on the Galion City Council on the November 7 general election ballot, holding that the Board properly invalidated a part-petition in its entirety.The Board notified Relator by letter that it would not certify her name as a candidate for a seat on the Galion City Council after determining that one of the part-petitions circulated by Relator contained two signatures that were signed by the same person and invalidating the part-petition in its entirety. Relator subsequently commenced this mandamus action, arguing that the Board should not have invalidated the entire part-petition containing the forged signature. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the Board properly invalidated the part-petition on which one signatory signed both her name and her husband's name. View "State ex rel. Robinson v. Crawford County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus and dismissed declaratory judgment and injunctive relief claims sought by Mariah Crenshaw to force the removal of every candidate for the offices of judge and clerk of the Cleveland Municipal Court from the November 2023 ballot, holding that Crenshaw failed to establish that she was entitled to the writ.In this original action, Crenshaw argued that each candidate in question failed to file a nominating petition signed by the requisite number of electors and that one candidate did not meet the residency requirements and sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to prevent the board of elections from permitting future candidates for the offices of judge and clerk to appear on the ballot without complying with section 5 of the Cleveland City Charter. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding (1) the signature and residency requirements of section 5 of the city charter do not apply to candidates for the offices of judge or clerk of the Cleveland Municipal Court; and (2) the declaratory judgment and injunctive relief claims are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "State ex rel. Crenshaw v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal reversing the judgment of the trial court determining that because of racially polarized voting, the at-large method of election had impaired Latino voters' ability to elect candidates of their choice or to influence the outcome of an election, holding that the court of appeal misconstrued the California Voting Rights Act of 2001 (CVRA), Cal. Elec. Code 14025 et seq.The trial court in this case concluded that the at-large method of electing city council members in the City of Santa Monica diluted Latinos' ability to elect their preferred candidates and their ability to influence the outcome of council elections and, as a remedy, ordered the City to conduct a special election using a map drafted by an expert who testified at trial. The court of appeal reversed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) a court presented with a dilution claim should undertake a searching evaluation of the totality of the facts and circumstances; and (2) remand was required for the court of appeal to evaluate the dilution standard of the CVRA under this standard. View "Pico Neighborhood Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's request seeking writ of mandamus compelling the Medina County Board of Elections to place a local liquor option on the November 7, 2023 general election ballot in this expedited election case, holding that Petitioner's petition was invalid in its entirety under Ohio Rev. Code 4301.333(C)(2).Petitioner sought from the board of elections a petition for the purpose of obtaining a permit that would allow him to serve liquor on Sundays. The board of elections denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner's failure to attach the affidavit required under section 4301.333 meant that his petition was invalid under section 4301.333(C)(2). Petitioner subsequently sought mandamus relief seeking an order compelling the board to place a local liquor option on the ballot or, alternatively, an order compelling the board to provide him with certain information. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) Petitioner did not advance a compelling reason as to why the local option should be placed on the ballot; and (2) Petitioner was not entitled to mandamus relief based on any failure of the board of elections to follow the procedure set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 4301.33. View "State ex rel. Lambert v. Medina County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court finding that Frank Piocos was not eligible to be a candidate for Roosevelt County Attorney, holding that the district court had substantial, credible evidence to support a finding that Piocos was not a resident of Roosevelt County for voting purposes on November 8, 2022.In January 2022, Piocos filed as a candidate for County Attorney. Piocos elected on November 8, 2022. On January 20, 2023, Contestant brought this action challenging Piocos's eligibility based on residency grounds. The district court determined that the election was void because Piocos was not a resident of Roosevelt County for thirty days prior to the election. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) for purposes of voting under Mont. Code Ann. 13-1-112, the Legislature's intent was for a person to have a place of abode in the county to which the person intends to return even when absent; and (2) the district court did not err when it found that Piocos did not reside in Roosevelt County without making a factual finding of where he did reside. View "Downs v. Piocos" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a limited writ of mandamus ordering Secretary of State Frank LaRose to reconvene the Ohio Ballot Board and directed the ballot board to adopt ballot language that accurately described a proposed amendment regulating actions of the "State," holding that the term "citizens of the State" in the ballot language was misleading.At issue was a constitutional amendment proposed by initiative petition titled "The Right to Reproductive Freedom with protections for Health and Safety" and the ballot language adopted by the ballot board for the November 7, 2023 election. Relators sought a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted a limited writ ordering the ballot board and LaRose to reconvene and adopt ballot language that accurately conveyed that the proposed amendment limited the ability of the state, as defined by the amendment, to burden, penalize, or prohibit abortion. View "State ex rel. Ohioans for Reproductive Rights v. Ohio Ballot Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Jacob Bennett was not barred from serving on the Harford County Council because of his employment as a schoolteacher by the Harford County Board of Education, thus reversing the contrary order and declaratory judgment of the circuit court.After Bennett was elected to the Council in the November 2022 general election a dispute arose between Bennett and Harford County concerning whether he was precluded from serving simultaneously as a member of the Council and as an employee of the Board by either section 207 of the Harford County Charter or the common law doctrine of incompatible positions. The circuit court ruled in favor of the County on the basis that the Board should be treated as a County for purposes of Charter 207. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither Charter 207 nor the doctrine of incompatible positions barred Bennett from simultaneously serving as a member of the Council and an employee of the Board. View "Bennett v. Harford County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal reversing the trial court's judgment concluding that the at-large method of electing city council members in the City of Santa Monica diluted Latino voters' ability to elect their preferred candidates and their ability to influence the outcome of council elections, holding that the court of appeals misconstrued the California Voting Rights Act of 2001, Cal. Elec. Code 14025 et seq. (CVRA).The superior court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs on their claims that the racially polarized voting in the City violated the CVRA. The superior court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs and ordered the City to conduct a special election using a seven-district map drafted by an expert who testified at trial. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that there had been no dilution of Latino voters' ability to elect their preferred candidates or their ability to influence the outcome of the election. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a court presented with a dilution claim should undertake a searching evaluation of the totality of the facts and circumstances; and (2) because the court of appeal did not evaluate the dilution element of the CVRA under the proper standard, remand was required. View "Pico Neighborhood Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica" on Justia Law

Indiana law allows 13 categories of voters, including “elderly” voters—those 65 or older--to vote by mail. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Indiana Election Commission extended absentee-voting privileges to all registered Indiana voters for the June 2020 primary but did not renew that order for the November general election. Indiana voters who were allowed to vote absentee in the primary, but who do not otherwise qualify for absentee voting, unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction requiring Indiana to permit unlimited absentee voting, citing the Twenty-Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. Weeks before the 2020 general election, the Seventh Circuit (Tully I) affirmed, finding that the plaintiffs had not made a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits in light of Supreme Court precedent holding that the right to vote does not include a claimed right to receive absentee ballots.Returning to the district court, the plaintiffs abandoned their Fourteenth Amendment claim. The court concluded that Tully I constituted controlling authority. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on different grounds. Given the circumstances under which Tully I was issued, that decision does not constitute the law of the case and is not binding. Considering the merits anew, the court held that Indiana’s granting the opportunity to vote by mail to elderly voters does not abridge the right to vote of those under 65 and does not violate the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. View "Tully v. Okeson" on Justia Law