Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

A citizens’ group challenged the official ballot statements prepared by the Idaho Secretary of State and Attorney General for the 2026 general election, which would accompany Proposition One, the Reproductive Freedom and Privacy Act. The group argued that the statements describing the effect of a “yes” or “no” vote were unclear, misleading, and exceeded the statutory authority given to the officials, as they characterized both the proposed law and existing Idaho law rather than simply stating the effect of each vote.Previously, the Idaho Supreme Court had considered similar issues regarding other ballot materials for the same initiative in Idahoans United for Women & Families v. Labrador, 175 Idaho 708, 570 P.3d 1137 (2025), where it directed revisions to the short ballot title and the fiscal impact statement to ensure substantial compliance with statutory requirements. After the initiative qualified for the ballot, the officials prepared the contested Yes/No Effect Statements and distributed them to county clerks. The group’s objections were not resolved through negotiation, leading to the current original action before the Idaho Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho concluded that the group had standing under its relaxed standing doctrine, found it had original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus and prohibition, and applied the standard of substantial compliance to the ballot statements. The court held that both the “yes” and “no” statements failed to clearly and concisely communicate the effect of a vote, as required by Idaho Code section 34-1810(1)(b). The court granted writs of prohibition and mandamus, prohibited use of the challenged statements, and ordered the officials to prepare new, compliant statements by a set deadline. The request for a writ of certiorari was denied as duplicative, and no attorney fees were awarded. View "Idahoans United v. McGrane" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization dedicated to gun violence prevention filed several administrative complaints with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in 2018, alleging violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act by two entities associated with a national advocacy group. After the FEC failed to act within the statutory 120-day period, the nonprofit filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking an order compelling the FEC to act. Due to a lack of quorum, the FEC remained inactive for an extended period. Eventually, the District Court granted summary judgment to the nonprofit, ordered the FEC to act within 30 days, and later determined the FEC had not complied, thereby allowing the nonprofit to file a citizen suit against the NRA-associated entities.The national advocacy group sought to dismiss the citizen suit, arguing the District Court lacked jurisdiction. It also moved to intervene in the original action, but only for the limited purpose of unsealing the judicial record. Subsequently, after the District Court’s final judgment, the advocacy group filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) seeking relief from the orders and judgment, contending that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction due to mootness and lack of adversity. The District Court denied this motion, holding that the group, as a nonparty, lacked standing to seek relief under Rule 60(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the appeal from the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. The Court held that only parties to a lawsuit, or those who properly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment. Since the advocacy group had not used any procedural mechanism to become a party to the underlying suit, it lacked the procedural ability to appeal. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal as impermissible under binding precedent. View "Giffords v. FEC" on Justia Law

In 2024, a Nebraska resident challenged the legal sufficiency of two initiative petitions submitted for the November general election. One petition sought to legalize medical cannabis; the other proposed regulatory measures. The challenge alleged that numerous signatures were invalid due to circulator fraud and improper notarization, contending that after excluding these signatures, the petitions lacked the minimum number required by the Nebraska Constitution. The Secretary of State, having initially certified the petitions, also filed a cross-claim seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the sufficiency of the signatures and the validity of the measures.The District Court for Lancaster County reviewed the claims. It found that while some signatures should lose their presumption of validity due to proven circulator fraud or improper notarization, the challengers had not shown that enough signatures were invalid to render the petitions legally insufficient. The court rejected the argument that improper notarization by a notary on some pages should invalidate all pages notarized by that individual, distinguishing circulator fraud from notarial errors. It also declined to draw adverse inferences from witnesses who had invoked the Fifth Amendment, citing Nebraska statutory law and the circumstances of ongoing criminal investigations.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order. The Court held that Barkley v. Pool, a precedent concerning circulator fraud, does not require blanket invalidation of signatures based on notary impropriety. It further held that the trial court did not err in declining to draw adverse inferences from Fifth Amendment invocations. Ultimately, the Court found no legal or factual error in the district court’s determinations regarding the validity of the petitions, the sufficiency of signatures, or the denial of a motion to amend pleadings. The district court’s order was affirmed. View "Kuehn v. Evnen" on Justia Law

The dispute arose when the Missouri General Assembly passed House Bill 1 (HB 1) in September 2025, which would repeal the 2022 congressional districts and establish new ones. Organizers opposed to HB 1 submitted a referendum petition to the Secretary of State, meeting both the signature and timing requirements set by the Missouri Constitution. The Secretary of State, however, issued a Certificate of Insufficiency, asserting that the Missouri Constitution does not authorize a referendum on congressional redistricting acts passed by the General Assembly, and directed that the petition not be placed on the November 2026 ballot.After this, Richard von Glahn, a proponent of the referendum, filed suit in the Cole County Circuit Court seeking to overturn the Secretary’s decision and prevent implementation of HB 1. The circuit court upheld the Secretary’s determination. Von Glahn appealed, and the Supreme Court of Missouri en banc granted discretionary transfer to address the important legal issue presented.The Supreme Court of Missouri en banc held that the Missouri Constitution’s article III, section 49, plainly authorizes the people to approve or reject by referendum “any act of the general assembly,” including congressional redistricting legislation. The Court found that none of the exceptions in article III, section 52(a) applied to HB 1 and rejected arguments that redistricting laws are exempt from referendum. The Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment, ordered the Secretary to certify the petition as sufficient, place it on the November 2026 ballot, and enjoined use of the HB 1 districts unless and until approved by voters. The congressional districts established in 2022 remain in effect for the 2026 election unless HB 1 is approved and takes effect thereafter. View "von Glahn vs. Hoskins" on Justia Law

Petition supporters submitted an initiative petition proposing to amend the Missouri Constitution, having followed the statutory process for approval and certification of the ballot title by the Secretary of State. After signature gathering and timely submission, the Secretary of State was required to determine the petition’s compliance with the Missouri Constitution and Missouri statutes and to issue a certificate of sufficiency or insufficiency. Instead, shortly before the deadline, the Secretary issued a certificate declaring the petition insufficient without specifying any constitutional defects, vacated the original ballot title, and issued a new ballot title.The petition supporters, all qualified Missouri voters, challenged the Secretary’s actions in the Cole County Circuit Court, seeking reversal of the insufficiency certification and reinstatement of the original ballot title. The circuit court upheld the Secretary’s decision. The petition supporters appealed, and due to the importance of the legal issues, the Supreme Court of Missouri en banc took discretionary jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Missouri en banc found that the Secretary failed to comply with statutory requirements by not stating any reasons for insufficiency in his certificate, thus preserving nothing for appellate review. The Court further held that hypothetical constitutional violations, which might arise only if the amendment were adopted, are not ripe for pre-election review. The Court rejected the Secretary’s claims regarding single-article and single-subject violations as meritless and determined he lacked authority to vacate the certified ballot title and issue a new one. The Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment, ordered the Secretary to issue a certificate of sufficiency for the initiative petition, to place it on the November 2026 ballot with the original ballot title, and to take all necessary steps to ensure its inclusion before September 8, 2026. View "Harris vs. Hoskins" on Justia Law

A group of qualified electors and residents of Sidney sought to amend the city charter to establish a procedure for recalling elected officials. They filed a petition with the city clerk containing 561 signatures, which they believed met the threshold for submission to the voters. Their proposal was submitted under a provision in the Sidney Charter allowing amendments as provided by the Ohio Constitution. However, the city clerk rejected the petition, citing noncompliance with Ohio Revised Code section 731.32, which she interpreted as requiring a certified copy of the proposed amendment to be filed before circulating the petition.Following this rejection, the electors initiated a mandamus action in the Supreme Court of Ohio. They requested an order compelling the city council to certify the petition to the county board of elections and further sought to have the board verify the signatures and place the amendment on the ballot if sufficient. They also sought attorney fees and court costs. The respondents argued that the petition was invalid for procedural reasons, including the application of R.C. 731.32. The board of elections had not yet reviewed the petition, as it had not been transmitted by the city clerk.The Supreme Court of Ohio found that R.C. 731.32 does not apply to proposed amendments to a city charter unless the municipal charter incorporates that statute into its amendment process; the Sidney Charter does not do so. Thus, the city clerk erred in rejecting the petition on this basis. The court granted a limited writ of mandamus, ordering the city clerk to transmit the petition to the county board of elections for a determination of sufficiency. If the petition is found sufficient, the city council must provide by ordinance for submission of the proposed amendment to the voters within the constitutional timeframe. The requests for attorney fees and court costs, and relief against the law director and board of elections, were denied. View "State ex rel. Turner v. Barhorst" on Justia Law

A group of residents and electors from the city of Trenton proposed an amendment to the city charter that would prohibit the construction of data centers within the city. They submitted a petition with 336 valid signatures to the city council to have this amendment placed on the ballot. The Butler County Board of Elections confirmed the number of valid signatures and reported that 1,277 voters participated in the most recent general municipal election, while 8,197 individuals were registered to vote at that time.The Trenton City Council convened and concluded that the petition did not contain a sufficient number of signatures, reasoning that the requirement was ten percent of all registered voters, not ten percent of votes cast. Accordingly, the council refused to certify the petition to the board of elections for inclusion on the ballot. The residents then filed an action for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of Ohio, seeking to compel the council to place the amendment before the voters and to recover court costs and attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the relevant constitutional provisions and its prior decisions. The court held that, consistent with Article XVIII, Sections 8, 9, and 14 of the Ohio Constitution and its decision in State ex rel. Huebner v. W. Jefferson Village Council, the required number of signatures for a charter amendment petition is ten percent of the votes cast in the last preceding general municipal election, not ten percent of all registered voters. The court found that the petitioners had exceeded the required number of signatures and ordered the city council to pass an ordinance certifying the petition to the board of elections for submission to the electors at a special election within the constitutionally specified timeframe. The court denied the request for court costs and attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Blankenship v. Trenton City Council" on Justia Law

Two nonprofit organizations that engage in nationwide issue advocacy challenged Delaware’s Elections Disclosure Act, which requires groups spending over $500 on electioneering communications near an election to publicly disclose donors giving more than $100 during the relevant cycle. The law’s disclosure obligations are broad: they are not limited to donors earmarking funds for political ads, nor can donors avoid disclosure by restricting the use of their contributions. The law also looks back several years for purposes of disclosure. The organizations, which have not previously run such communications in Delaware but claim they intend to do so in the upcoming election, argue that the law violates the First Amendment.After the organizations filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, they sought a preliminary injunction to halt enforcement of the Act. The District Court denied the request, finding no likelihood of success on the facial challenge because prior Third Circuit precedent, Delaware Strong Families v. Attorney General of Delaware, had upheld the Act and the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta did not clearly abrogate that ruling. The court also doubted the as-applied challenge, citing the plaintiffs’ failure to offer specific evidence of harm to donors. The District Court emphasized the law’s decade-long enforcement and the lack of urgent need to change the status quo.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the denial. Applying a deferential standard, the court found that the plaintiffs had not made a clear showing of entitlement to a preliminary injunction. It held that even with some likelihood of success and possible irreparable injury, the balance of equities and the public interest favored preserving the longstanding status quo. The court affirmed the District Court’s order denying the preliminary injunction. View "Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Albence" on Justia Law

A dispute arose from the City and County of Honolulu’s first special election for the District IV councilmember seat, held August 8, 2026. The controversy centered on whether the term limit provision in the Revised Charter—which prohibits anyone from being “elected to the office of councilmember for more than two consecutive four-year terms”—barred the incumbent, who had been elected in both 2019 (in a special election following the invalidation of the 2018 results) and 2022, from running again for the 2027–2031 term. The 2019 election had followed a court-ordered re-run between the same two candidates after irregularities invalidated the 2018 contest.After the Acting City Clerk rejected objections to the incumbent’s eligibility, a candidate filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, which ruled the incumbent ineligible. Because ballots had already been printed, election officials notified voters that votes for the incumbent would not count toward determining an eligible candidate for the next round. As no candidate received a majority in the August election, officials prepared to advance the top two eligible candidates, excluding the incumbent, to the second special election.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed both the procedural and substantive issues. The court held that the Circuit Court should have dismissed the declaratory judgment action as procedurally improper, because Hawai‘i Revised Statutes § 12-8 provided the exclusive remedy for pre-election eligibility challenges. However, the Supreme Court determined it could address the merits under the statutes governing election contests. On the merits, the court concluded the incumbent was “elected to” two consecutive four-year terms and was thus ineligible to run for a third consecutive term under the Revised Charter. The court ordered that only the two eligible candidates be placed on the ballot for the second special election. Judgment was entered for the defendants. View "Iwasa v. Nago" on Justia Law

An organization based in Virginia requested access to Minnesota’s Registered Voter List under a federal statute, asserting it was entitled to the records despite Minnesota’s exemption from the law. Minnesota denied the request, citing its exemption as a state with continuous election-day registration since August 1, 1994. The organization also sought the information under a Minnesota statute, but was again denied because no Minnesota-registered voter joined the request. The organization acknowledged it could obtain the information by recruiting a Minnesota voter but did not do so. It then filed suit, claiming Minnesota’s exemption from the federal disclosure requirement was unconstitutional, alleging informational injury and other adverse consequences.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota reviewed the case. Minnesota moved to dismiss, and the United States intervened to defend the statute’s constitutionality. The district court dismissed the organization’s claim on the merits, concluding that the “equal sovereignty” principle does not apply to Congress’s authority under the Elections Clause.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered whether the organization had Article III standing. The court reviewed standing de novo and focused on whether the plaintiff had suffered a concrete injury in fact. The court held that a purely informational injury does not satisfy Article III’s requirements and found the plaintiff’s alleged downstream consequences insufficient, as they lacked a nexus to the interests Congress sought to protect. The court concluded the plaintiff failed to allege a concrete injury and therefore lacked standing.The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. View "Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Simon" on Justia Law