Sheriel Perkins lost the 2013 Greenwood mayoral race by 206 votes. She filed an election contest against the winner, Mayor Carolyn McAdams. In her complaint, Perkins alleged illegal voting and fraud. But at trial, the only evidence she produced was that fifty-two absentee ballots were wrongly counted and one absentee ballot and nine affidavit ballots were wrongly rejected. Her other claims of illegal voting and fraud had no evidentiary support. Thus, the trial court granted McAdams’s motion for a directed verdict and entered a judgment in McAdams’s favor. Perkins appealed; however, the contested mayoral term ended June 30, 2017. So her appeal was made moot by the time of this opinion. Conceding mootness, Perkins still insisted the Mississippi Supreme Court should consider the merits of her illegal-voting claim under the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine. The Supreme Court found Perkins presented no evidence that anyone voted illegally in a precinct outside of his or her residence. Rather, according to her own witnesses, it was the election materials - not the voters - that ended up in the wrong precincts. And Mississippi statutory law was clear that misdelivery of election materials would not prevent the holding of an election. "Instead, poll managers should provide a suitable substitute procedure, which is exactly what occurred here." The Court therefore dismissed Perkins' appeal as moot. View "Perkins v. McAdams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Relator’s request for a writ of mandamus and/or a writ of prohibition to compel Respondent, the Wood County Board of Elections, to remove a charter amendment petition from the November 2017 ballot. Relator challenged the validity of the petition, alleging that it exceeded the municipal powers of self-government set forth in the Ohio Constitution, and alleging that the petition had insufficient valid signatures to qualify for the ballot. Respondent concluded that the petition was valid. The Supreme Court affirmed Respondent’s decision rejecting Relator’s protest arguments, holding that Relator’s protest had no merit. View "State ex rel. Espen v. Wood County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied relief in this original action seeking writs of mandamus and prohibition in regards to a zoning referendum. Relators argued that the zoning referendum did not comply with Ohio Rev. Code 519.12(H) because it did not reference the name of the property owner. Therefore, Relators argued that the referendum should removed from the November 7, 2017 ballot. The Supreme Court held (1) Relators’ mandamus claim must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because, although Relators framed their mandamus request in terms of compelling the board of elections to discharge affirmative duties, their true objectives were a declaratory injunction and a prohibitory injunction; and (2) the decision of the board denying Relators’ protest was authorized by law, and therefore, Relators were not entitled to a writ of prohibition. View "State ex rel. Tam O'Shanter Co. v. Stark County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

This opinion followed the Supreme Court’s August 30, 2017 summary order denying Petitioners’ petition for extraordinary relief filed pursuant to Utah Code 20A-7-508(6)(a) pertaining to certain aspects of a final ballot title. Petitioners were among a group of sponsors who obtained sufficient signatures to have an initiative placed on the November 2017 ballot for the Pleasant Grove City municipal election. The City attorney prepared the final ballot title, which led to this petition being filed. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that Petitioners failed to satisfy their burden under Utah R. App. P. 19 of demonstrating that they possessed no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy other than the filing of a petition directly with the Supreme Court. View "Zonts v. Pleasant Grove City" on Justia Law

In 2014, two Green Party members sought to appear on the Illinois general election ballot as candidates for state representative. Because the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/1-1) deemed the Green Party a “new” political party in both districts in which they sought ballot placement, both were required to obtain nomination petition signatures equaling 5% of the number of voters in the prior regular election for state representative in their district. The signatures had to be collected in the 90 days preceding the petition deadline, with each petition sheet be notarized. Neither candidate met those requirements. In their suit under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. State ballot access laws seek to balance state interests with “the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.” The Supreme Court has never required a state to make a particularized showing of the existence of voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, or the presence of frivolous candidacies before the imposition of reasonable restrictions on ballot access. The signature and notarization requirements, even in conjunction with the 90‐day petitioning window and geographic layouts of the districts at issue, do not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendment. View "Tripp v. Scholz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus sought by Joseph Simonetti seeking to compel the Summit County Board of Elections and Secretary of State (collectively, Respondents) to place his name on the November 7, 2017 ballot as a candidate for a city council position. Respondents refused to certify Simonetti’s candidacy after finding that Simonetti did not sign the statement of candidacy that appeared on his fourth petition paper, which contained twenty-one electors’ signatures, before the electors signed the nominating petition. In denying the writ, the Supreme Court held (1) Respondents properly attributed weight to the fourth petition paper itself, which, on its fact, indicated a failure to comply with Ohio Rev. Code 3513.261; and (2) Simonetti failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that Respondents abused their discretion by crediting less weight to the contrary evidence. View "State ex rel. Simonetti v. Summit County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied writs of mandamus sought by Relators to compel the Mahoning County Board of Elections (BOE) and its individual members (collectively, Respondents) to certify Relators’ petitions to place two proposed amendments to the Youngstown City Charter on the November 2017 ballot: the People’s Bill of Rights for Fair Elections and Access to Local Government and the Youngstown Drinking Water Protection Bill of Rights. The BOE voted not to certify the amendments to appear on the ballot on the grounds that they exceeded the city’s initiative power. In denying the requested writs, the Supreme Court held that the BOE did not violate a clear legal duty when it refused to certify the petitions to place the proposed amendments on the ballot. View "State ex rel. Flak v. Betras" on Justia Law

The American Civil Rights Union (ACRU) challenged the Philadelphia City Commissioners’ failure to purge the city’s voter rolls of registered voters who are currently incarcerated due to a felony conviction. Because state law prohibits felons from voting while they are in prison, the ACRU argues that the National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. 50207, requires the Commissioners to remove them from the voter rolls. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The unambiguous text of the Act states that while states are required to make reasonable efforts to remove registrants for certain reasons, states are merely permitted—not required— to provide for removal of registrants from the official list based on criminal conviction. The 2002 Help America Vote Act, 42 U.S.C. 15301, also cited by ACRU, contains no private right of enforcement. View "American Civil Rights Union v. Philadelphia City Commissioner" on Justia Law

Under Illinois law, a political party that has not attained sufficient votes in past elections must field candidates for all offices on the ballot in the political subdivision in which it wishes to compete. In the 2012 election, the Libertarian Party could field a candidate for Kane County auditor only if it also proposed candidates for six other offices. In its suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Party argued that the full-slate requirement violated its right of political association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Seventh Circuit agreed, rejecting an argument that the requirement is justified by its interests in political stability, preventing ballot overcrowding, and avoiding voter confusion. The core of the fundamental right to political association is the right to band together in a political party to advance a policy agenda by electing the party’s members to office. That necessarily includes the candidates’ right to appear on the ballot under the party banner. For a minor party and its nominees, Illinois’s full-slate requirement extinguishes those rights unless the party fields candidates in races it may want no part of. This is a severe burden on fundamental constitutional rights. Illinois has not offered a compelling state interest to justify it. By incentivizing minor parties to manufacture frivolous candidacies, the full-slate requirement actually thwarts the interests Illinois invokes. View "Libertarian Party of Illinois v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied writs of mandamus requested by Relators - the members of the Athens County and Medina County Committees of Petitioners - seeking to compel Respondents - Relators’ respective county board of elections - to certify initiative petitions to the November ballot. The petitions, which proposed the adoption of a county charter, were denied on the grounds that they were invalid. The Supreme Court held that the boards of elections were justified in finding the petitions invalid and that that issue was dispositive. Because the committees failed to establish a clear legal duty on the part of the boards to place the charter petitions on the ballot, the committees were not entitled to writs of mandamus. View "State ex rel. McGinn v. Walker" on Justia Law