Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Santa Clara County’s Board of Supervisors responded to significant anticipated federal funding cuts, stemming from Congress’s enactment of H.R. 1, by declaring an emergency and calling for a special election to seek voter approval for Measure A—a five-year general sales tax increase. The Board determined that these federal cuts would have an immediate and severe impact on healthcare and social safety net services for county residents, and that waiting until the next general election would result in deep service reductions. The Board’s resolution outlined detailed findings about the emergency’s nature and magnitude, and the measure was placed before voters in a special election.Prior to the election, individual county residents challenged the legal sufficiency of the emergency declaration in the Superior Court of Santa Clara County. They argued that the “cases of emergency” exception in article XIII C, section 2 of the California Constitution was improperly applied, and that the measure’s ballot question and impartial analysis were not impartial or accurate as required by the Elections Code. After expedited proceedings, the trial court denied their petition regarding the emergency declaration but ordered agreed-upon modifications to some ballot language.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the “cases of emergency” clause should be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning—referring to unforeseen circumstances requiring immediate action—and does not require a narrow or specially defined scope. The court found that the Board’s resolution and findings provided sufficient factual basis for the emergency declaration and that the trial court’s handling of judicial notice, even if imperfect, was not prejudicial. The court declined to address arguments about the specific ballot language or impartial analysis, finding those issues moot. The judgment denying the writ was affirmed. View "Holtz v. Moreles" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to a proposed Nebraska constitutional amendment, the “Fairness for Girls” initiative, which seeks to establish constitutional protections for sex-separate athletics, ensuring equal access to athletic opportunities for females. The sponsors filed the initiative text and an object statement with the Nebraska Secretary of State, then submitted petition signatures. The object statement was printed on the petition and signature sheets, and the full text was available to signers. The Secretary of State certified the initiative for placement on the 2026 general election ballot.Cara Ullman filed a complaint in the District Court for Lancaster County, alleging the initiative’s object statement did not comply with Nebraska statutory requirements, specifically Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 32-1401 and 32-1405. Ullman claimed the statement failed to describe the legal effect and the object sought to be secured. She requested an injunction to prevent the Secretary from placing the initiative on the ballot. After motions and a hearing, the district court dismissed Ullman’s complaint on the merits, holding that the object statement was a concise summary of the legal effect and object, and that the petition substantially complied with statutory requirements.The Nebraska Supreme Court independently reviewed the legal issues, focusing on whether the initiative's object statement satisfied statutory requirements. The Court held that the object statement met the requirement to concisely state the legal effect of the filing and the object sought, noting it was consistent with the initiative’s text and not misleading. The Court clarified that Nebraska law does not require the object statement to summarize all major provisions, only to identify the overall purpose. Accordingly, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the legal sufficiency of the initiative and denying the requested injunction. View "Ullman v. Evnen" on Justia Law

Kristina Gulley, who previously served as justice of the peace for District 10 in Pulaski County, Arkansas, sought reelection after having been disqualified in earlier proceedings due to two prior misdemeanor hot-check convictions from 1997 and 2003. Multiple prior legal actions had resulted in findings that these convictions constituted “infamous crimes” under article 5, section 9 of the Arkansas Constitution, rendering her ineligible to run for or hold public office. Despite these rulings, Gulley again filed as a candidate in the 2026 primary election. Registered voters in the district challenged her eligibility, seeking a declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus to prevent her name from appearing on the ballot and to prohibit counting any votes cast for her.The Pulaski County Circuit Court held an expedited hearing, denied Gulley’s requests for a continuance and for relief from judgment, and reaffirmed her ineligibility based on the prior convictions. The court found that neither the sealing of her record nor a gubernatorial pardon restored her eligibility to run for office, and it ordered the Board of Election Commissioners not to certify her as a candidate or count votes for her. Gulley appealed, challenging the circuit court’s findings on factual and constitutional grounds. However, she did not obtain a stay of the court’s order or the certification of the election results.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Arkansas determined that the appeal was moot because the March 2026 primary election had already occurred, and the election results had been certified. The court held that no effective relief could be granted as to the election in question, and none of the recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Arkansas granted the motion to dismiss the appeal as moot and dismissed the case. View "GULLEY v. JEFFREY" on Justia Law

Two nonprofit organizations dedicated to increasing voter participation, especially among underrepresented groups, sent mail ballot applications to Kansas voters during the 2020 election. These mailings included applications that had been partially prefilled with voter information obtained from public and commercial sources. Due to outdated or inaccurate data, many applications contained errors, leading to voter confusion and administrative burdens for local election officials who had to process erroneous or duplicate applications and respond to concerned voters.Following this experience, the Kansas legislature enacted a law prohibiting private entities from mailing partially prefilled advance ballot applications to registered voters. The nonprofits challenged the law in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, arguing that it infringed on their First Amendment rights. The district court initially enjoined enforcement of the law, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, instructing the district court to apply intermediate scrutiny unless it found the law was enacted with an improper purpose. On remand, the district court found that the Kansas legislature had acted with an improper purpose, concluded that strict scrutiny should apply, and again enjoined the law.On the second appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings de novo. The appellate court held that the district court erred in finding improper legislative intent, as there was no sufficient evidence in the law’s text, justifications, or legislative history to support that conclusion. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Tenth Circuit found that the law served significant governmental interests—minimizing voter confusion, facilitating efficient election administration, and fostering confidence in elections—and was narrowly tailored to those interests without substantially burdening protected speech. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. View "VoteAmerica v. Schwab" on Justia Law

A candidate who won the Republican Party nomination for state representative in Ohio’s 89th House District withdrew his candidacy after the primary election. Under Ohio law, a district committee composed of the chairpersons and secretaries of the Republican Party county central committees within the district was authorized to select a replacement candidate. The committee met privately, excluding the public and a board of elections member, and chose Caleb Stidham, who was himself a member and chair of the Erie County Republican Party, as the replacement. The committee certified Stidham’s nomination to the Erie County Board of Elections.When the board of elections considered certifying Stidham for the ballot, it split evenly. The two members against certification cited concerns about the closed committee meeting and Stidham’s participation in his own selection. The Secretary of State, as authorized by statute, broke the tie in favor of certifying Stidham. Shortly after, Carl Koebel, an elector in the district, filed a mandamus action in the Supreme Court of Ohio, seeking to prevent Stidham’s certification and requesting removal from the ballot, arguing that the committee violated Ohio’s Open Meetings Act.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed Koebel’s complaint, including arguments regarding the verification affidavit and standing. Ultimately, the court denied the writ on the grounds of laches, finding Koebel had unreasonably delayed for 25 days after the Secretary of State’s decision, thereby prejudicing the board and the Secretary due to statutory deadlines for ballot printing and absentee ballot distribution. The court did not reach the merits of Koebel’s Open Meetings Act claim, instead holding that the delay barred relief. The court also granted Koebel’s motion to submit a supplemental affidavit but denied his request for attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Koebel v. Erie Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute regarding the eligibility of a candidate for the Ohio general election ballot. Judge Nathan Manning was nominated in the Republican Party primary as a candidate for state representative for the 52nd Ohio House District. Subsequently, a vacancy arose in the Ninth District Court of Appeals due to a judge’s retirement, and Governor Mike DeWine appointed Manning to fill the vacancy until a successor could be elected. Manning withdrew his state representative candidacy and was later selected by a Republican Party district committee as the candidate for the unexpired appellate court term. Mark Derrig, an elector, challenged this selection, arguing that Ohio Revised Code (R.C.) 3513.31(I) prohibited Manning’s selection because he had already been nominated for a different office in the primary election.After Derrig raised his objection, the Summit County Board of Elections convened a hearing but reached a tie vote on whether to remove Manning from the ballot. Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose broke the tie, allowing Manning’s candidacy to stand. Derrig then filed an original action for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of Ohio, seeking to compel removal of Manning’s name from the ballot.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed Derrig’s claim and interpreted R.C. 3513.31(I) in the context of Ohio’s election statutes. The court held that the statute does not prevent a party district committee from selecting a candidate for a remaining unexpired term in a judicial office, even if that candidate was previously nominated for a different office in the primary election. Therefore, Derrig did not establish a clear legal right to Manning’s removal or a clear legal duty for respondents to provide such relief. The court denied the writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Derrig v. LaRose" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, citizen sponsors of three ballot initiatives for the 2024 Montana election cycle, challenged several provisions of Senate Bill 93, enacted by the 2023 Montana Legislature, which revised laws governing the statewide initiative process. Among the challenged provisions were: a $3,700 filing fee for submitting initiative proposals (with a possible hardship waiver), a prohibition on resubmitting substantially similar measures for four years after defeat, authorization for legislative interim committees to vote on proposed measures and place the result on the petition, and granting the Attorney General authority to review the substantive legality of initiatives. When the plaintiffs submitted their initiatives, the Secretary of State’s office required payment of the filing fee or proof of hardship; the plaintiffs withheld payment, and their proposals were rejected.The case was filed in the District Court of the First Judicial District, Lewis and Clark County, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against eleven provisions of SB 93. The District Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on four claims, declaring the four challenged provisions unconstitutional, and denied relief on seven others. The parties then stipulated to dismiss all remaining claims not resolved in the plaintiffs’ favor. The District Court also denied the plaintiffs’ motion for attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the constitutionality of the challenged provisions and the denial of attorney fees. The Court held that the Legislature may not impose requirements for ballot measures exceeding the conditions set forth in the Montana Constitution. Specifically, the Court affirmed that the four-year resubmission ban, the legislative committee vote on petitions, the $3,700 filing fee, and the Attorney General’s substantive review authority all unconstitutionally impaired the people’s reserved initiative power and were facially invalid. The Court also affirmed the District Court’s denial of attorney fees, finding no abuse of discretion. View "Ellingson v. State" on Justia Law

The case arose after the Wyoming Legislature amended the election code to require voters who wished to change their party affiliation before a primary election to do so at least 96 days prior to the primary. Several individuals were affected by this new deadline: some were unable to vote for their preferred candidates in the 2024 primary because they could not change party affiliation after the cutoff, while others, who ran for office, were unsuccessful in their respective primaries. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the 96-day party affiliation deadline, arguing it violated their rights under the Wyoming Constitution to open, free, and equal elections, untrammeled exercise of suffrage, and equal political rights.The District Court of Laramie County granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of State, holding that the statutes establishing the 96-day party affiliation deadline were a valid exercise of legislative authority to regulate elections and did not violate constitutional voting rights or equal protection. The plaintiffs appealed only the district court’s ruling on the party affiliation deadline.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case de novo, considering only legal questions as the facts were stipulated. The Court held that the right to vote in Wyoming, including in primary elections, is fundamental, but that the legislature is also constitutionally charged with securing the purity of elections. Employing a balancing approach informed by the Anderson-Burdick standard, the Court found the 96-day deadline imposed only a slight burden on voting rights, justified by the state’s legitimate interest in preventing party raiding and ensuring orderly elections. The Court further held that the deadline did not violate equal protection, as all electors had an equal opportunity to affiliate before the cutoff, and distinctions drawn between new registrants and previously registered voters were not constitutionally impermissible. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Malcom v. Gray" on Justia Law

Arizona voters approved Proposition 211, the Voters’ Right to Know Act, to address “dark money” in elections by requiring disclosure of the original sources of major campaign media spending, including contributions passed through intermediaries. The law applies to individuals and entities that spend significant amounts on campaign media, mandating public disclosure of donors who directly or indirectly contribute more than $5,000 per election cycle. It also includes recordkeeping requirements, opt-out provisions for donors, and enforcement by the Citizens Clean Elections Commission. Plaintiffs, Americans for Prosperity and its Foundation, alleged that these compelled disclosures and requirements violate their First Amendment rights by chilling speech and association, and they sought to enjoin the law.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs advanced both facial and as-applied constitutional challenges. The district court applied the Supreme Court’s exacting scrutiny standard and dismissed all claims, finding Proposition 211 substantially related to Arizona’s strong informational interest, imposing only modest administrative burdens, and being narrowly tailored. The court noted the opt-out provision protected donors and that plaintiffs did not allege sufficient facts for an as-applied challenge.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Proposition 211’s disclosure requirements were substantially related to Arizona’s important governmental interest in electoral transparency, imposed modest burdens, and were narrowly tailored. The appellate court rejected the plaintiffs’ facial challenge, finding they did not demonstrate a substantial number of unconstitutional applications. The as-applied challenge failed for lack of specific allegations of harm. The court also affirmed the dismissal of compelled association claims, finding no unconstitutional compulsion. The disposition by the Ninth Circuit was to affirm the district court’s dismissal of all claims. View "AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY V. MEYER" on Justia Law

Missouri enacted a congressional redistricting map in 2022 and then adopted a new map in 2025. Under the Missouri Constitution, a newly enacted law like the 2025 map does not become effective until approved by voters in a referendum, provided enough signatures are collected for such a petition. The Missouri Supreme Court held in September 2026 that the 2025 map “is not the law and has never been the law” and would not take effect unless approved in the 2026 election referendum, so the 2022 map remained in force for the upcoming election.After the Missouri Supreme Court’s ruling, a group of voters and candidates filed suit in federal court, arguing that the U.S. Constitution required Missouri to use the 2025 map in the 2026 election. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri issued a temporary restraining order on September 8, effectively requiring the use of the 2025 map. However, this order was stayed by the Supreme Court of the United States on September 10. Despite this, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit subsequently ordered the District Court to enter a permanent injunction requiring use of the 2025 map, prompting further review.The Supreme Court of the United States granted a stay of the District Court’s September 21 and 22 injunctions and the Eighth Circuit’s mandate and order, maintaining the prior stay, and prohibiting any federal court orders requiring use of the 2025 map in the 2026 election. The Court held that the 2022 map must be used in the ongoing election, given Missouri law and the Purcell principle, which discourages altering election rules during an ongoing election. The Supreme Court’s stay will remain unless further order is issued. View "People Not Politicians v. Onder" on Justia Law