Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

Shawn Valentine sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Lucas County Board of Elections to place a zoning referendum on the November 5, 2024, general-election ballot. The referendum concerned a zoning amendment approved by the Spencer Township Board of Trustees, which rezoned a portion of property owned by Jeff Davis Properties, L.L.C. Valentine and others circulated a petition for the referendum but included a map that outlined the area originally requested for rezoning, not the smaller area actually rezoned by the trustees.The Lucas County Board of Elections reviewed the petition and found it contained the required number of valid signatures. However, Jeff Davis Properties filed a protest, arguing that the map included with the petition was not appropriate. The Board of Elections held a hearing and sustained the protest, deciding that the map did not comply with the requirements of R.C. 519.12(H), which mandates that a referendum petition be accompanied by an appropriate map of the area affected by the zoning proposal.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that the map submitted with the petition was misleading because it did not accurately reflect the area affected by the zoning resolution. The court found no evidence that the map was approved by the board of township trustees as reflecting the zoning amendment. Consequently, the court held that the Board of Elections did not abuse its discretion or act in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions when it sustained the protest and refused to place the referendum on the ballot. The writ of mandamus was denied, along with Valentine’s requests for costs and attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Valentine v. Schoen" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, including the National Republican Senatorial Committee, National Republican Congressional Committee, Senator J.D. Vance, and former Representative Steve Chabot, challenged the Federal Election Campaign Act’s limits on coordinated campaign expenditures. They argued that these limits, which restrict political parties from spending money on campaign advertising with input from the candidate, violate the First Amendment. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the Federal Election Commission from enforcing these limits, claiming that the restrictions increase costs, create redundancies, and hinder effective communication and spending.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio certified the constitutional question to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The district court found that the plaintiffs raised a non-frivolous question and established a factual record before certifying the question. The district court asked whether the limits on coordinated party expenditures in the Federal Election Campaign Act violate the First Amendment, either on their face or as applied to party spending in connection with "party coordinated communications."The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case en banc. The court held that the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II) remains binding and that the Act’s limits on coordinated party expenditures do not facially violate the First Amendment. The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that changes in legal doctrine, statutory amendments, and factual developments since 2001 undermined Colorado II. The court also denied the plaintiffs' as-applied challenge, noting that it was too broad and would effectively nullify Colorado II. The court concluded that the limits on coordinated party expenditures do not violate the First Amendment, either on their face or as applied to party spending in connection with "party coordinated communications." View "National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission" on Justia Law

Three Kentucky Republican Party county executive committees challenged the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance’s prohibition on expending funds to support a state constitutional amendment on the November general election ballot. The committees sought an advisory opinion from the Registry, which concluded that they could not use funds raised for party nominees to support a constitutional amendment and would need to form a political issues committee for such expenditures. The committees argued that this restriction violated their First Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky denied the committees' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the requirement to form a political issues committee imposed only a minimal burden on their First Amendment rights, justified by the governmental interest in transparency and disclosure. The court concluded that the Registry’s actions met the standards of strict scrutiny, exacting scrutiny, or rational basis review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and granted an injunction pending appeal. The court found that the executive committees were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim. It determined that the Registry’s prohibition on spending in support of a constitutional amendment burdened the committees' political speech. The court applied strict scrutiny, concluding that the Registry’s restriction was not narrowly tailored to the asserted interest in disclosure. The court noted that less restrictive alternatives, such as imposing disclosure requirements on executive committees, could achieve the same ends without restricting speech. The Registry was enjoined from enforcing its advisory opinion against the committees, and expedited briefing was ordered for the appeal. View "Boone County Republican Party Executive Committee v. Wallace" on Justia Law

The relator, Justin Tjaden, sought a writ of mandamus to have his name placed on the November 5, 2024, general-election ballot as an independent candidate for the office of state representative of Ohio House District 99. Tjaden's petition was found to be 124 valid signatures short of the required number. He argued that the boards of elections exceeded their authority by invalidating signatures as "not genuine" and violated his procedural due process and equal protection rights. Tjaden also contended that the statutory requirement for independent candidates to submit a petition with signatures amounting to at least one percent of registered voters who cast ballots for governor in the 2022 general election was unconstitutional.The Geauga County Board of Elections determined that Tjaden's petition contained 371 valid signatures, which was insufficient to qualify for the ballot. Tjaden attempted to challenge this decision in the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas but was unsuccessful due to procedural issues. He then filed a complaint in the same court and a mandamus action in the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Supreme Court dismissed his first mandamus action based on the jurisdictional-priority rule but allowed him to file a second mandamus action after his common-pleas-court case was removed to federal court.The Supreme Court of Ohio denied Tjaden's writ of mandamus. The court held that Tjaden did not have enough valid signatures to qualify for the ballot, even if all contested signatures were deemed valid. The court also found that Tjaden's procedural due process rights were not violated, as the mandamus action provided him with the necessary process. Additionally, the court declined to address Tjaden's equal protection claim, stating that even if the statute were declared unconstitutional, there would be no statutory requirement for an independent candidate to qualify for the ballot. Thus, the court denied the writ. View "State ex rel. Tjaden v. Geauga County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The appellant, a Democratic Party activist and former candidate for Plano City Council, was indicted for violating Section 255.004(b) of the Texas Election Code. This statute prohibits knowingly representing in a campaign communication that the communication emanates from a source other than its true source, with the intent to injure a candidate or influence the result of an election. The appellant sent text messages that appeared to come from a Republican or conservative campaign, identifying Republicans in local nonpartisan races. In response, the appellant filed a pretrial application for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional as it regulated core political speech and was not narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.The trial court denied the appellant's application. On appeal, the Fifth Court of Appeals agreed with the appellant, finding that the statute was not narrowly tailored and did not survive strict scrutiny. The appellate court held that the statute's broad reach was problematic and ordered the trial court to dismiss the indictment.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case upon the State's petition. The State argued that the statute was narrowly drafted and survived strict scrutiny. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that Section 255.004(b) of the Texas Election Code was unconstitutional. The court found that the statute was a content-based restriction on protected speech and did not meet the strict scrutiny standard. It was not narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest of preventing dishonest conduct in elections. The court affirmed the Fifth Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the statute violated the First Amendment. View "EX PARTE STAFFORD" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including Vicente Topasna Borja, challenged the federal Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) and Hawaii’s Uniform Military and Overseas Voters Act (UMOVA). Borja, a former Hawaii resident now living in Guam, argued that these laws violate equal protection by allowing former Hawaii residents who move abroad or to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) to vote absentee in Hawaii’s federal elections, while those who move to other U.S. Territories cannot.The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the enforcement of UOCAVA but granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the plaintiffs did not have a fundamental right to vote in Hawaii’s federal elections and that those who move from a state to a territory are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class. Therefore, the court applied rational basis review and concluded that UOCAVA and UMOVA satisfied this standard.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that rational basis review, not strict scrutiny, applies to UOCAVA and UMOVA’s overseas voting provisions. The court reasoned that these laws do not deprive residents within a geographically defined governmental unit from voting in a unit-wide election nor dilute the voting power of qualified voters within Hawaii. The court found that the differential treatment of former Hawaii residents who move to other U.S. Territories versus those who move abroad or to the CNMI is rationally related to legitimate governmental interests. The court also rejected the argument that individuals who move from Hawaii to other U.S. Territories constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class warranting heightened scrutiny.The Ninth Circuit concluded that UOCAVA and UMOVA’s classifications satisfy rational basis review and affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the defendants. View "BORJA V. NAGO" on Justia Law

The case involves two groups of plaintiffs challenging several provisions in a 2022 manual issued by the Secretary of State, which provided instructions for election challengers and poll watchers. The plaintiffs argued that the provisions conflicted with the Michigan Election Law or required formal rulemaking under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The Court of Claims consolidated the cases and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on several points, finding that certain provisions of the manual were invalid under Michigan law.The Court of Claims found that the manual's requirements for election-challenger credentials, the communication restrictions between challengers and election inspectors, the categorization of challenges as permissible or impermissible, and the prohibition of electronic devices in absent voter ballot processing facilities violated the Michigan Election Law. The court ordered the Secretary of State to either rescind or revise the manual to comply with its opinion. The defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and issued a mixed ruling. The court held that the Secretary of State has the authority to require a uniform form for election-challenger credentials and that this requirement does not conflict with the Michigan Election Law. The court also upheld the manual's communication restrictions, except for the requirement that challengers at absent voter ballot processing facilities must raise issues to a challenger liaison who is not an election inspector. The court found that the categorization of challenges as permissible or impermissible was generally lawful but invalidated the provision allowing a challenger liaison to deem a challenge impermissible based on their assessment of its validity. The court declared the challenge to the prohibition of electronic devices moot due to subsequent statutory amendments and vacated the lower court's opinions on that issue. View "O'Halloran v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

In Illinois, voters can cast their ballots by mail, and election officials can receive and count these ballots for up to two weeks after Election Day, provided they are postmarked or certified by Election Day. Plaintiffs, including Illinois voters and political candidates, challenged this procedure, arguing it unlawfully extends the voting period and dilutes their votes. They also claimed it forced them to spend additional resources on their campaigns beyond Election Day. The district court dismissed their claims, ruling that Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue and also rejected the claims on the merits.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the case, concluding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Illinois ballot receipt procedure. The court found that Plaintiffs did not allege a sufficient injury in fact, as their claims of vote dilution and additional campaign expenditures were deemed too speculative and generalized. Plaintiffs appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that Plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not allege a concrete and particularized injury. The court found that any potential vote dilution would affect all Illinois voters equally, making it a generalized grievance. Additionally, the court determined that the claimed campaign expenditures were speculative and not directly traceable to the Illinois ballot receipt procedure. Therefore, the court concluded that Plaintiffs did not meet the requirements for Article III standing and affirmed the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

In July 2024, Judge Marcus L. Hunter filed a notice of candidacy for the office of Associate Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court, certifying that he had filed his federal and state income tax returns for the previous five years. Elisa Knowles Collins, a resident of District Two, challenged his candidacy, alleging that Judge Hunter falsely certified his tax filings. At trial, Collins presented an affidavit from the Louisiana Department of Revenue indicating no confirmed tax filings for Hunter for 2021, 2022, and 2023. Hunter's accountant testified that she electronically filed his 2022 and 2023 tax returns, but they were rejected by the IRS.The 19th Judicial District Court overruled Collins' challenge, finding that although she established a prima facie case, Hunter provided sufficient evidence to counter it. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, affirmed this decision, with two judges dissenting, arguing that Hunter did not meet his burden of proof.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and found that Hunter failed to provide sufficient evidence to rebut Collins' prima facie case. The court noted that Hunter did not testify or provide copies of his tax returns, and his accountant's testimony and documents were insufficient to prove that the tax returns were filed. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' judgments, declared Hunter ineligible as a candidate, and directed the Secretary of State to remove his name from the ballot or void any votes cast for him if the ballot had already been printed. View "COLLINS VS. CHAMBERS" on Justia Law

ACORN International sued the Montana Secretary of State, Christi Jacobsen, seeking records to justify the costs of accessing the Montana voter file and a declaratory judgment that the Secretary violated the "right to know" provisions of the Montana Constitution. The Secretary charges $1,000 for a one-time request or $5,000 for an annual subscription to the voter file. ACORN argued these fees were unreasonably high and not justified under the law.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, ruling that the fees were lawful. The court did not address ACORN's claim regarding the violation of the "right to know" provisions.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the fees charged by the Secretary for access to the voter file are lawful under Montana law, as they reflect the actual costs of maintaining the voter registration system, Montana VOTES. The court also found that the fees do not violate the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) because the NVRA does not specifically address electronic voter databases. Additionally, the court ruled that the Secretary did not violate ACORN's "right to know" under the Montana Constitution, as the Secretary's response to ACORN's request was reasonable given the information provided.The main holdings are that the Secretary's fees for the voter file are lawful and do not violate the NVRA, and that there was no violation of the "right to know" provisions of the Montana Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling. View "ACORN International v. Jacobsen" on Justia Law