Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

A candidate who won the Republican Party nomination for state representative in Ohio’s 89th House District withdrew his candidacy after the primary election. Under Ohio law, a district committee composed of the chairpersons and secretaries of the Republican Party county central committees within the district was authorized to select a replacement candidate. The committee met privately, excluding the public and a board of elections member, and chose Caleb Stidham, who was himself a member and chair of the Erie County Republican Party, as the replacement. The committee certified Stidham’s nomination to the Erie County Board of Elections.When the board of elections considered certifying Stidham for the ballot, it split evenly. The two members against certification cited concerns about the closed committee meeting and Stidham’s participation in his own selection. The Secretary of State, as authorized by statute, broke the tie in favor of certifying Stidham. Shortly after, Carl Koebel, an elector in the district, filed a mandamus action in the Supreme Court of Ohio, seeking to prevent Stidham’s certification and requesting removal from the ballot, arguing that the committee violated Ohio’s Open Meetings Act.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed Koebel’s complaint, including arguments regarding the verification affidavit and standing. Ultimately, the court denied the writ on the grounds of laches, finding Koebel had unreasonably delayed for 25 days after the Secretary of State’s decision, thereby prejudicing the board and the Secretary due to statutory deadlines for ballot printing and absentee ballot distribution. The court did not reach the merits of Koebel’s Open Meetings Act claim, instead holding that the delay barred relief. The court also granted Koebel’s motion to submit a supplemental affidavit but denied his request for attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Koebel v. Erie Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute regarding the eligibility of a candidate for the Ohio general election ballot. Judge Nathan Manning was nominated in the Republican Party primary as a candidate for state representative for the 52nd Ohio House District. Subsequently, a vacancy arose in the Ninth District Court of Appeals due to a judge’s retirement, and Governor Mike DeWine appointed Manning to fill the vacancy until a successor could be elected. Manning withdrew his state representative candidacy and was later selected by a Republican Party district committee as the candidate for the unexpired appellate court term. Mark Derrig, an elector, challenged this selection, arguing that Ohio Revised Code (R.C.) 3513.31(I) prohibited Manning’s selection because he had already been nominated for a different office in the primary election.After Derrig raised his objection, the Summit County Board of Elections convened a hearing but reached a tie vote on whether to remove Manning from the ballot. Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose broke the tie, allowing Manning’s candidacy to stand. Derrig then filed an original action for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of Ohio, seeking to compel removal of Manning’s name from the ballot.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed Derrig’s claim and interpreted R.C. 3513.31(I) in the context of Ohio’s election statutes. The court held that the statute does not prevent a party district committee from selecting a candidate for a remaining unexpired term in a judicial office, even if that candidate was previously nominated for a different office in the primary election. Therefore, Derrig did not establish a clear legal right to Manning’s removal or a clear legal duty for respondents to provide such relief. The court denied the writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Derrig v. LaRose" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, citizen sponsors of three ballot initiatives for the 2024 Montana election cycle, challenged several provisions of Senate Bill 93, enacted by the 2023 Montana Legislature, which revised laws governing the statewide initiative process. Among the challenged provisions were: a $3,700 filing fee for submitting initiative proposals (with a possible hardship waiver), a prohibition on resubmitting substantially similar measures for four years after defeat, authorization for legislative interim committees to vote on proposed measures and place the result on the petition, and granting the Attorney General authority to review the substantive legality of initiatives. When the plaintiffs submitted their initiatives, the Secretary of State’s office required payment of the filing fee or proof of hardship; the plaintiffs withheld payment, and their proposals were rejected.The case was filed in the District Court of the First Judicial District, Lewis and Clark County, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against eleven provisions of SB 93. The District Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on four claims, declaring the four challenged provisions unconstitutional, and denied relief on seven others. The parties then stipulated to dismiss all remaining claims not resolved in the plaintiffs’ favor. The District Court also denied the plaintiffs’ motion for attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the constitutionality of the challenged provisions and the denial of attorney fees. The Court held that the Legislature may not impose requirements for ballot measures exceeding the conditions set forth in the Montana Constitution. Specifically, the Court affirmed that the four-year resubmission ban, the legislative committee vote on petitions, the $3,700 filing fee, and the Attorney General’s substantive review authority all unconstitutionally impaired the people’s reserved initiative power and were facially invalid. The Court also affirmed the District Court’s denial of attorney fees, finding no abuse of discretion. View "Ellingson v. State" on Justia Law

The case arose after the Wyoming Legislature amended the election code to require voters who wished to change their party affiliation before a primary election to do so at least 96 days prior to the primary. Several individuals were affected by this new deadline: some were unable to vote for their preferred candidates in the 2024 primary because they could not change party affiliation after the cutoff, while others, who ran for office, were unsuccessful in their respective primaries. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the 96-day party affiliation deadline, arguing it violated their rights under the Wyoming Constitution to open, free, and equal elections, untrammeled exercise of suffrage, and equal political rights.The District Court of Laramie County granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of State, holding that the statutes establishing the 96-day party affiliation deadline were a valid exercise of legislative authority to regulate elections and did not violate constitutional voting rights or equal protection. The plaintiffs appealed only the district court’s ruling on the party affiliation deadline.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case de novo, considering only legal questions as the facts were stipulated. The Court held that the right to vote in Wyoming, including in primary elections, is fundamental, but that the legislature is also constitutionally charged with securing the purity of elections. Employing a balancing approach informed by the Anderson-Burdick standard, the Court found the 96-day deadline imposed only a slight burden on voting rights, justified by the state’s legitimate interest in preventing party raiding and ensuring orderly elections. The Court further held that the deadline did not violate equal protection, as all electors had an equal opportunity to affiliate before the cutoff, and distinctions drawn between new registrants and previously registered voters were not constitutionally impermissible. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Malcom v. Gray" on Justia Law

Arizona voters approved Proposition 211, the Voters’ Right to Know Act, to address “dark money” in elections by requiring disclosure of the original sources of major campaign media spending, including contributions passed through intermediaries. The law applies to individuals and entities that spend significant amounts on campaign media, mandating public disclosure of donors who directly or indirectly contribute more than $5,000 per election cycle. It also includes recordkeeping requirements, opt-out provisions for donors, and enforcement by the Citizens Clean Elections Commission. Plaintiffs, Americans for Prosperity and its Foundation, alleged that these compelled disclosures and requirements violate their First Amendment rights by chilling speech and association, and they sought to enjoin the law.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs advanced both facial and as-applied constitutional challenges. The district court applied the Supreme Court’s exacting scrutiny standard and dismissed all claims, finding Proposition 211 substantially related to Arizona’s strong informational interest, imposing only modest administrative burdens, and being narrowly tailored. The court noted the opt-out provision protected donors and that plaintiffs did not allege sufficient facts for an as-applied challenge.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Proposition 211’s disclosure requirements were substantially related to Arizona’s important governmental interest in electoral transparency, imposed modest burdens, and were narrowly tailored. The appellate court rejected the plaintiffs’ facial challenge, finding they did not demonstrate a substantial number of unconstitutional applications. The as-applied challenge failed for lack of specific allegations of harm. The court also affirmed the dismissal of compelled association claims, finding no unconstitutional compulsion. The disposition by the Ninth Circuit was to affirm the district court’s dismissal of all claims. View "AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY V. MEYER" on Justia Law

Missouri enacted a congressional redistricting map in 2022 and then adopted a new map in 2025. Under the Missouri Constitution, a newly enacted law like the 2025 map does not become effective until approved by voters in a referendum, provided enough signatures are collected for such a petition. The Missouri Supreme Court held in September 2026 that the 2025 map “is not the law and has never been the law” and would not take effect unless approved in the 2026 election referendum, so the 2022 map remained in force for the upcoming election.After the Missouri Supreme Court’s ruling, a group of voters and candidates filed suit in federal court, arguing that the U.S. Constitution required Missouri to use the 2025 map in the 2026 election. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri issued a temporary restraining order on September 8, effectively requiring the use of the 2025 map. However, this order was stayed by the Supreme Court of the United States on September 10. Despite this, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit subsequently ordered the District Court to enter a permanent injunction requiring use of the 2025 map, prompting further review.The Supreme Court of the United States granted a stay of the District Court’s September 21 and 22 injunctions and the Eighth Circuit’s mandate and order, maintaining the prior stay, and prohibiting any federal court orders requiring use of the 2025 map in the 2026 election. The Court held that the 2022 map must be used in the ongoing election, given Missouri law and the Purcell principle, which discourages altering election rules during an ongoing election. The Supreme Court’s stay will remain unless further order is issued. View "People Not Politicians v. Onder" on Justia Law

The federal government expanded the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program to allow state and local authorities to verify the citizenship status of registered voters and individuals registering to vote. This new version of the program incorporated Social Security Administration (SSA) records, including social security numbers, and permitted bulk searches. Under the modified program, personal information would be cross-checked with SSA databases, and if citizenship could not be confirmed, individuals would be required to provide additional proof to register or remain registered to vote.The League of Women Voters and other organizations sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), SSA, and related federal entities, claiming that the modified SAVE program violated confidentiality provisions of the Social Security Act, the Privacy Act of 1974, and was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The organizations sought summary judgment. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in their favor, vacated the modified SAVE program, and denied the government’s request for a stay. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also denied a stay, with a dissent.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the government’s application for a stay. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff organizations likely had standing but concluded their claims were unlikely to succeed on the merits. The Court explained that 8 U.S.C. §1373, enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), authorizes DHS to request and receive information about citizenship status from other agencies, overriding restrictions in other laws. The Supreme Court granted the government’s application for a stay, allowing the modified SAVE program to operate pending appeal and possible review by the Supreme Court. View "Department of Homeland Security v. League of Women Voters" on Justia Law

Following the passage of Proposition 50, which revised congressional district maps in California, a community group in Riverside County alleged a discrepancy in the number of ballots counted versus ballots cast during the 2025 special election. Acting on the group’s report, the county sheriff’s department obtained search warrants from the Riverside County Superior Court and seized large quantities of ballots and election materials. The county registrar defended the official tally and explained the discrepancy at a public meeting. Despite the Attorney General’s request for a pause to review the investigation, the sheriff’s department advanced their search and began counting ballots, only halting after direct communication from the Attorney General.The Attorney General issued formal directives to the sheriff, instructing him to pause the investigation, preserve all seized materials, and provide case records for review. The sheriff initially did not respond, began counting ballots, then paused the count and secured the materials. Subsequent communications from the Attorney General reiterated these directives and requested records. After further seizures by the sheriff’s department, the Attorney General initiated litigation, seeking a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, which denied relief on procedural grounds. The Attorney General then sought review in the Supreme Court of California.The Supreme Court of California held that the Attorney General, under the state Constitution and Government Code section 12560, possesses the authority to give binding directions to sheriffs regarding specific investigations when necessary to ensure uniform and adequate enforcement of state laws. The court concluded the directives issued in this case were within the Attorney General’s lawful authority and sufficiently specific. It granted writ relief, ordering the sheriff and department to comply with the Attorney General’s instructions to pause investigative actions, retain seized records (with certain exceptions), and provide requested materials. Each party was directed to bear its own costs. View "Bonta v. Bianco" on Justia Law

A group of Riverside County residents, having voted in the November 2025 special election on Proposition 50, challenged the actions of the county sheriff’s department. The sheriff, responding to claims by a community group of a significant discrepancy between unofficial poll worker ballot intake logs and the Registrar of Voters’ final certified count, obtained search warrants and seized approximately 650,000 voted ballots. The Registrar of Voters maintained any discrepancy was minimal and within normal bounds, and no party disputed that the alleged discrepancy could not have changed the election outcome.After the sheriff’s department seized and began examining the ballots, the voters filed a petition for a writ of mandate directly in the Supreme Court of California. They argued the sheriff’s actions violated the Elections Code’s strict rules regarding the custody of ballots and requested the court order the immediate return of the ballots to the Registrar. The Registrar did not oppose this relief, and both the Secretary of State and Attorney General supported the petitioners’ position. The sheriff argued his actions were lawful as part of a criminal investigation supported by search warrants.The Supreme Court of California held that the seizure and removal of the ballots from the Registrar’s custody was unlawful under Elections Code section 15551, subdivision (d). The Court explained that the Elections Code specifically requires that voted ballots remain in the custody of the elections official at all times and that this rule applies even during criminal investigations. The Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the sheriff to return all packages containing voted ballots to the Registrar and to refrain from further handling of the ballots, but denied the request for additional relief regarding non-ballot election materials and chain-of-custody reporting. The Court’s order superseded the previously issued superior court search warrants to the extent of any conflict. View "Cervantes v. Bianco" on Justia Law

Two candidates for public office in the November 2026 Delaware general election challenged the constitutionality of the state’s permanent absentee voting statute. They argued that the statute unlawfully expanded absentee voting beyond the categories permitted by the Delaware Constitution and that the Department of Elections failed to adequately verify the continued eligibility of permanent absentee voters, thereby enabling ineligible individuals to vote by absentee ballot.Previously, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware considered cross-motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent use of the permanent absentee voting process for the 2026 election. The Court of Chancery found that the statute did not expand the constitutionally enumerated categories of absentee voters but rather limited permanent absentee status to a subset of those groups. The court further held that the statute did not permit voting by those ineligible to vote absentee and that the Department’s procedures for maintaining the permanent absentee list, though not perfect, did not render every application of the statute unconstitutional. The Court of Chancery thus granted summary judgment to the defendants.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the decision of the Court of Chancery. The Supreme Court held that the permanent absentee voting statute neither expanded absentee voting eligibility beyond the categories set by the Delaware Constitution nor permitted ineligible individuals to vote by absentee ballot. The Court also held that the plaintiffs failed to meet the high burden required for a facial constitutional challenge, as the statute could be applied constitutionally. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment upholding the statute. View "Hocker v. Albence" on Justia Law