Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

David Ward and Michael Whittaker were commissioners for the Jefferson County Fire Protection No. 2 (the District). Two citizens of the District, Harry Goodrich and Linda Saunders (the petitioners), initiated a recall proceeding against Ward and Whittaker, alleging various counts of misfeasance. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the recall petition should advance to the signature-gathering phase of the recall process. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and held that one of the four charges against Ward and Whittaker may advance to the next phase of the recall process. View "In re Recall of Ward" on Justia Law

Joseph Lodge was a judge of a county superior court who sought to run for election to a new term in that office. To qualify for the primary election ballot, Lodge needed to obtain 525 valid signatures on his nominating petitions. Lodge timely filed ninety-nine nominating petitions containing a total of 1,110 signatures. Jill Kennedy, a qualified elector, challenged Lodge's petitions, arguing that they did not substantially comply with Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-314, -331, and -333 because they did not specify the office that Lodge was seeking. The superior court entered judgment for Kennedy and ordered that Lodge's name not be placed on the 2012 primary or general election ballots. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the petitions failed to substantially comply with statutory requirements. View "Kennedy v. Lodge" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Stand Up for Democracy petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the Board of State Canvassers to certify its referendum petition for inclusion on the November 2012 ballot. Intervening defendant Citizens for Fiscal Responsibility, challenged the certification of plaintiff’s referendum petition, alleging that it failed to comply with the type-size requirement of MCL 168.482(2) and that the doctrine of substantial compliance, whereby technical deficiencies are resolved in favor of certification, did not apply. The Court of Appeals agreed with both assertions, but concluded it was required to follow its decision in "Bloomfield Charter Township v Oakland County Clerk" and conclude that the petition substantially complied with MCL 168.482(2) and that certification was required. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, overturning "Bloomfield Charter" and dismissed the case: "because MCL 168.482(2) uses the mandatory term 'shall' and does not, by its plain terms, permit certification of deficient petitions with regard to form or content, a majority of [the] Court [held] that the doctrine of substantial compliance is inapplicable to referendum petitions submitted for certification." View "Stand Up for Democracy v. Mich. Sec'y of State" on Justia Law

After the U.S. Supreme Court declared a campaign finance statute in Arizona to be unconstitutional, the Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure Commission sought an opinion from the Nebraska attorney general as to the constitutionality of Nebraska's Campaign Finance Limitation Act (CFLA). Under the CFLA, candidates for certain covered elective offices and other public officials could choose to abide or not to abide by voluntary spending limits. A candidate who abided by the limits and raises and spent qualifying amounts in accordance with the CFLA became eligible for public funds. The attorney general opined that the CFLA would likely be found to be unconstitutional by a court, and the Commission determined it would not enforce the CFLA. The attorney general was then directed to file an action in court to determine the validity of the CFLA. The Supreme Court found that the CFLA substantially burdened the First Amendment rights of Nebraska citizens and that it was, therefore, unconstitutional. View "State ex rel. Bruning v. Gale" on Justia Law

State Attorney-General and county-prosecutor candidates may not accept campaign contributions from Medicaid providers or any person with an ownership interest in a Medicaid provider, Ohio Rev. Code 3599.45. The plaintiff physicians are Medicaid providers who attempted to contribute to Cordray’s 2010 campaign for reelection as Ohio Attorney General. When the campaign learned that the plaintiffs were Medicaid providers, however, it refused to accept their contributions. The plaintiffs challenged the statute. The district court upheld the law as supported by a general interest in “preventing corruption,” stating that the court should not “second guess” the Ohio Legislature’s means of furthering that interest. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The contribution ban is not closely drawn to “avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.” A claim that the law prevents corruption, is “dubious at best.” View "Lavin v. Husted" on Justia Law

The appeals consolidated in this opinion arose from lawsuits challenging three proposed initiatives - a tobacco tax initiative, a minimum wage initiative, and a payday loan initiative. The underlying suits sought to prevent the initiatives from appearing on Missouri's ballot for the November 2012 election. Each of the cases challenged the constitutional validity of Mo. Rev. Stat. 116.175, which directs that the state auditor "shall assess the fiscal impact of" any proposed initiative petition and prepare a fiscal note and fiscal note summary. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in the tobacco initiative case, affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment in the minimum wage case, and affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment in the payday loan initiative cases, holding (1) section 116.175's statutory directives do not conflict with Mo. Const. art IV, 13, which provides that no duty shall be imposed on the state auditor by law which is not related to the supervising and auditing of the receipt and expenditure of public funds; and (2) the secretary of state's summary statements and the auditor's fiscal notes and fiscal note summaries for the proposed initiatives were fair and sufficient View "Brown v. Carnahan" on Justia Law