The case involves the Arizona Republican Party (ARP) and its attorneys, who challenged the manner in which Maricopa County election officials conducted a mandatory hand count of ballots following the 2020 general election. The ARP argued that the hand count should have been based on precincts rather than voting centers, as prescribed by the Election Procedures Manual (EPM). The trial court dismissed the ARP's complaint and awarded attorney fees against the ARP and its attorneys under A.R.S. § 12-349(A)(1) and (F), which provides for such fees if a claim is groundless and not made in good faith. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's rulings.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona held that the attorney fees award was improper because the ARP's claim was not groundless, thus there was no need to determine whether the claim was made in the absence of good faith. The court found that the ARP's claim was more than "barely" colorable, as there was a plain-language conflict between § 16-602(B), which requires a precinct hand count, and the 2019 EPM, which permits a voting center hand count. The court also disagreed with the lower courts' rulings that the ARP's claim was groundless due to the unavailability of remedies, the applicability of the election-law time bar on post-election challenges to pre-election procedures, and laches. The court vacated the trial court’s and the court of appeals’ attorney fees awards. View "ARIZONA REPUBLICAN PARTY v RICHER" on Justia Law

In this case, Quinton Lucas, a registered voter, challenged the approval of Amendment No. 4 in the November 2022 general election. The amendment authorized laws that increased minimum funding for a police force established by a state board of police commissioners. Lucas claimed that the fiscal note summary printed on every ballot cast in the election materially misstated the fiscal note for the measure.The Supreme Court of Missouri, which was reviewing the case, had previously overruled the state's motion to dismiss Lucas' claim. The state had argued that Lucas' contest was time-barred, that the city lacked standing as a voter, and that the statutes providing remedies if an election contest succeeds were unconstitutional.The Supreme Court of Missouri found that the fiscal note summary was both materially inaccurate and seriously misleading. The court held that this constituted an "irregularity" of sufficient magnitude to cast doubt on the validity of the election. As a result, the court ordered a new election on the question to be conducted as part of the statewide general election on November 5, 2024. View "Lucas vs. Ashcroft" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including former members of the Montana Board of Regents, faculty organizations, student groups, and individual students, challenged the constitutionality of three bills passed by the Montana Legislature in 2021. The bills in question were HB 349, which regulated student organizations and speech on campus; HB 112, known as the "Save Women's Sports Act," which required sports teams to be designated as male, female, or coed based on biological sex; and § 2 of SB 319, which revised campaign finance laws and regulated the funding of certain student organizations. The plaintiffs argued that these bills infringed on the constitutional authority of the Board of Regents to supervise, coordinate, manage, and control the Montana University System.The District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin County, granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, declaring HB 349, HB 112, and § 2 of SB 319 unconstitutional. The court also denied the plaintiffs' request for attorney fees. Both parties appealed this order.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims and that the challenged bills were unconstitutional. The court also upheld the District Court's denial of the plaintiffs' request for attorney fees, as the justices could not reach a majority opinion on this issue. View "Barrett v. State" on Justia Law

In 2021, the Colorado state legislature passed The Ballot Measure Fiscal Transparency Act, which required certain language to be included in state-imposed titles of citizen-initiated ballot measures. If the proposal contained a tax change affecting state or local revenues, the measure’s title had to incorporate a phrase stating the change’s impact on state and district funding priorities. In 2023, Advance Colorado proposed two tax reduction measures subject to the provisions of the Act. After Colorado’s Ballot Title Setting Board included the mandated transparency language in each initiative’s title, Advance Colorado filed suit challenging the Act as unconstitutionally compelling its political speech.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied Advance Colorado's request for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the titling process qualified as government speech and, therefore, Advance Colorado was not likely to succeed on the merits of its claims. The court considered the factors used for determining the boundary between government and private speech as outlined in Shurtleff v. City of Bos., 596 U.S. 243, 252 (2022). It concluded that the history of the expression, the public’s likely perception as to who is speaking, and the extent to which the government has shaped the expression all indicated Colorado’s titling system was government speech not subject to a First Amendment compelled speech claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the Act’s requirements did not result in improperly compelled speech under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court found that the Colorado initiative titling system squarely qualified as government speech and Advance Colorado had not otherwise shown its own speech was improperly compelled by the government speech. Therefore, it could not demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its claims. View "Advance Colorado v. Griswold" on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. Eric Coomer, the former director of product strategy and security at Dominion Voting Systems, who filed a lawsuit against Make Your Life Epic LLC (doing business as ThriveTime Show) and its podcast host, Clayton Clark. The defendants had published and repeated false claims about Dr. Coomer, alleging that he was a member of "Antifa" and had rigged the 2020 presidential election in favor of Joseph R. Biden and against Donald J. Trump. Dr. Coomer's lawsuit asserted claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy.The defendants filed a "special motion to dismiss" the lawsuit under Colorado’s anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute. The District Court for the District of Colorado denied this motion, determining that Dr. Coomer would likely prevail on the merits of all three of his claims. The defendants appealed this decision, asking the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit to reverse the district court’s order.The Tenth Circuit dismissed the defendants' appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court held that the proposed interlocutory appeal fell outside of the collateral-order doctrine, which provides appellate jurisdiction over a small class of collateral rulings that, although they do not end the litigation, are appropriately deemed final. The court found that the district court's order denying the special motion to dismiss under Colorado’s anti-SLAPP statute was not completely separate from the merits of the case and thus did not meet the requirements of the collateral-order doctrine. View "Coomer v. Make Your Life Epic" on Justia Law

This case revolves around the appointment of a general registrar of elections in Lynchburg, Virginia. The plaintiff, Christine Gibbons, was appointed as registrar in 2018 by a board consisting of two Democrats and one Republican. Her term expired in 2023, at which point the board had two Republican members and one Democratic member. The board informed Gibbons that she would have to reapply for her position. Despite reapplying, the two Republican members voted to appoint a different candidate who was a registered Republican. Gibbons sued the board and its two Republican members, alleging that the decision not to reappoint her was based on her political affiliation, which she claimed violated the First Amendment.The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that sovereign immunity barred all of Gibbons’ claims. The district court dismissed Gibbons’ claims against the board itself as barred by sovereign immunity, but denied the individual board members’ motions to dismiss. The court concluded that the board members could be sued for equitable relief in their official capacities and for damages in their personal capacities. The board members appealed both orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the appellants’ motions to dismiss. The court rejected the board members’ argument that sovereign immunity bars Gibbons’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against them in their official capacities. The court also rejected the board members’ assertion that Gibbons’ damages claims against them are barred by sovereign immunity. The court concluded that individual members of Virginia electoral boards may be sued in their official capacities for equitable relief under Ex parte Young and that Gibbons’ claims for damages against the board members in their personal capacities are not barred by sovereign immunity. View "Gibbons v. Gibbs" on Justia Law

In 2016, Jesse Benton, a political operative, received funds from Roman Vasilenko, a foreign national, and contributed those funds to a fundraiser supporting then-Presidential candidate Donald Trump. Benton was subsequently convicted of six felonies related to the unlawful contribution and related campaign finance filings. Benton appealed his conviction on several grounds, including challenges to the government’s decision to prosecute campaign finance crimes under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the admissibility of an earlier pardoned conviction, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the jury charge.The District Court denied Benton's motion to dismiss the charges, ruling that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act could be applied to false campaign finance filings. The court also allowed the admission of Benton's earlier pardoned conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and its use at sentencing. After a three-day jury trial, Benton was found guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to eighteen months' incarceration and twenty-four months' supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the government had discretion to prosecute under either the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). The court also found no error in the district court's admission of Benton's pardoned conviction under Rule 404(b) and declined to review Benton's challenge to the use of the pardoned conviction at sentencing. Finally, the court rejected Benton's challenges to the jury instructions, finding that any error was invited by Benton himself. View "United States v. Benton" on Justia Law

The case revolves around an initiative petition proposed by Nevadans for Reproductive Freedom (NRF) to establish a constitutional right to reproductive freedom. The petition would grant every individual the right to make decisions regarding all matters related to pregnancy, including prenatal care, childbirth, postpartum care, birth control, vasectomy, tubal ligation, abortion, abortion care, management of a miscarriage, and infertility care. Respondents Donna Washington and Coalition for Parents and Children challenged the petition in district court, alleging that it failed to meet statutory and constitutional requirements and sought to prevent the Secretary of State from placing the initiative on the ballot. They argued that the initiative petition violated the single-subject requirement because it considered multiple medical procedures, instead of being limited to only pregnancy or abortion. The district court granted the injunction, finding the initiative petition invalid for three reasons: it does not contain a single subject, its description of effect is misleading, and it requires an expenditure of money without raising the necessary revenue.The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court's decision. The court found that all the medical procedures considered in the initiative petition concern reproduction and are germane to each other and the initiative's single subject of establishing a right to reproductive freedom. The court also concluded that the description of effect was legally sufficient and the initiative petition does not require an expenditure of funds. Therefore, the court held that the district court erred in preventing the Secretary of State from placing the initiative petition on the ballot. View "Nevadans for Reprod. Freedom v. Washington" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to New Jersey's primary election ballot design, known as the "county-line" ballot. The plaintiffs, Andy Kim, Sarah Schoengood, and Carolyn Rush, who are all Democratic candidates for various offices, argue that the county-line ballot design infringes their First Amendment rights. They contend that the design unfairly favors candidates endorsed by local party leaders, placing them in prime ballot positions, while disadvantaging those who are not endorsed or choose not to associate with certain candidates.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, where the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the use of county-line ballots and require the use of office-block format ballots instead. The District Court granted the injunction, finding that the plaintiffs had shown a severe burden on their First Amendment rights and that the state's interests did not outweigh these burdens.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court of Appeals agreed that the county-line ballot design imposed a severe burden on the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. It also found that the design likely violated the Elections Clause of the Constitution, which limits a state's power to regulate elections. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims, and that they would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction. The court also found that the balance of harms and the public interest favored the plaintiffs. View "Kim v. Hanlon" on Justia Law

In this case, Vince Fong, a candidate for the California State Assembly District 32 and Congressional District 20, filed nomination papers for both offices for the March 5, 2024, primary election. The Secretary of State refused to accept his nomination papers for the 20th Congressional District, citing section 8003, subdivision (b) of the Elections Code, which states that no person may file nomination papers for more than one office at the same election. Fong sought a writ of mandate ordering the Secretary to accept his papers and include his name on the certified list of candidates for the 20th Congressional District.The Superior Court of Sacramento County granted Fong’s request, holding that section 8003, subdivision (b) only applied to the independent nomination of candidates, and because Fong was not seeking to utilize the independent nomination process, the statute did not apply to him. The Secretary of State appealed this decision, arguing that section 8003, subdivision (b) should be interpreted as a general prohibition against running for more than one office at the same election.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District agreed with the superior court and concluded that section 8003, subdivision (b) only applies to the independent nomination process and therefore has no application to the facts before them. The court held that the Secretary of State's interpretation of the statute, which would have broadly applied the prohibition to all candidates, ignored the context of the statute as a whole. The court denied the Secretary's petition for a writ of mandate. View "Weber v. Superior Court" on Justia Law