At issue here was Utah State Bill SB54, the Utah Elections Amendments Act of 2014 (“SB54”) which reorganized the process for qualifying for a primary ballot in Utah, most importantly, by providing an alternative signature-gathering path to the primary election ballot for candidates who were unable or unwilling to gain approval from the central party nominating conventions. Prior to the passage of SB54, the Utah Republican Party (“URP”) selected its candidates for primary elections exclusively through its state nominating convention, and preferred to keep that process. In this litigation, the URP sued Utah Lieutenant Governor Spencer Cox in his official capacity (“the State”), alleging that two aspects of SB54 violated the URP’s freedom of association under the First Amendment, as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. The two challenged sections: (1) required parties to allow candidates to qualify for the primary ballot through either the nominating convention or by gathering signatures, or both (the “Either or Both Provision”); and (2) required candidates pursuing the primary ballot in State House and State Senate elections through a signature gathering method to collect a set number of signatures (the “Signature Requirement”). In two separate orders, the United States District Court for the District of Utah balanced the URP’s First Amendment right of association against the State’s interest in managing and regulating elections, and rejected the URP’s claims. Re-conducting that balancing de novo on appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. View "Utah Republican Party v. Cox" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs submitted a ballot initiative petition proposing to amend the Ohio Constitution by imposing term limits on the justices of the Ohio Supreme Court and requiring that all laws “that apply to the people of the State of Ohio . . . apply equally to the members and employees of the General Assembly.” The single-subject rule, Ohio Rev. Code 3503.062(A), allows initiative petitions to contain only “one proposed law or constitutional amendment,” so the Ohio Ballot Board split the initiative into two initiatives, each containing one proposed constitutional amendment. Plaintiffs challenged the process. Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, rejecting an argument that the process was a content-based regulation of core political speech. The Supreme Court has not viewed single-subject rules as inconsistent with the First Amendment and the Ohio Supreme Court has rejected an essentially identical challenge. Ohio’s single-subject rule applies to all petitions, regardless of their substantive messages, and may be justified without reference to the content of any initiative petitions. The rule is intended to prevent voter confusion and "logrolling." Whether Plaintiffs violate Ohio’s single-subject rule depends not on what they say, but simply on where they say it; it is a minimally burdensome and nondiscriminatory regulation. View "Committee to Impose Term Limits on the Ohio Supreme Court v. Ohio Ballot Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus sought by Relator to compel Respondent, the Delaware County Board of Elections, to place a referendum on the May 8, 2018 ballot.Relator submitted a petition for a referendum proposing a zoning amendment. The board of elections verified that the petition had a sufficient number of valid signatures and certified the petition to appear on the May 2018 ballot. Two interested parties protested against the legitimacy of the referendum. After a hearing, the elections board approved a motion to sustain the protest and decertify the measure based upon the sufficiency of the summary contained within the petition. As a result, the referendum petition was not certified for placement on the May ballot. Relator then filed the present complaint for a writ of mandamus against the board of elections. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that, on the merits, the elections board erred in refusing to place the referendum on the ballot because the petition satisfied the requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 519.12(H). View "State ex rel. Quinn v. Delaware County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus sought by Relator to compel Respondent, the Delaware County Board of Elections, to place a referendum on the May 8, 2018 ballot.Relator submitted a petition for a referendum proposing a zoning amendment. The board of elections verified that the petition had a sufficient number of valid signatures and certified the petition to appear on the May 2018 ballot. Two interested parties protested against the legitimacy of the referendum. After a hearing, the elections board approved a motion to sustain the protest and decertify the measure based upon the sufficiency of the summary contained within the petition. As a result, the referendum petition was not certified for placement on the May ballot. Relator then filed the present complaint for a writ of mandamus against the board of elections. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that, on the merits, the elections board erred in refusing to place the referendum on the ballot because the petition satisfied the requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 519.12(H). View "State ex rel. Quinn v. Delaware County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Town of Hayneville ("the Town") and Carol Scrushy petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Lowndes Circuit Court to vacate its July 7, 2017, order denying the Town and Scrushy's motion to dismiss what they characterized as an election contest filed by Darshini Bandy, Connie Johnson, and Justin Pouncey (referred to collectively as "the electors") and to enter an order dismissing the electors' action. After review, the Supreme Court found the circuit court had the power to enforce its prior orders and to void the May 23, 2017, special election, which, the court found, had not been ordered in strict compliance with the State's election laws. The July 7, 2017, judgment of the circuit court enforcing its prior orders concerning the August 2016 election and the special election to fill the vacant council seat in District A was a valid judgment. Accordingly, Scrushy and the Town were not entitled to the relief they sought. View "Ex parte Carol Scrushy & the Town of Hayneville." on Justia Law

The Town of Hayneville ("the Town") and Carol Scrushy petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Lowndes Circuit Court to vacate its July 7, 2017, order denying the Town and Scrushy's motion to dismiss what they characterized as an election contest filed by Darshini Bandy, Connie Johnson, and Justin Pouncey (referred to collectively as "the electors") and to enter an order dismissing the electors' action. After review, the Supreme Court found the circuit court had the power to enforce its prior orders and to void the May 23, 2017, special election, which, the court found, had not been ordered in strict compliance with the State's election laws. The July 7, 2017, judgment of the circuit court enforcing its prior orders concerning the August 2016 election and the special election to fill the vacant council seat in District A was a valid judgment. Accordingly, Scrushy and the Town were not entitled to the relief they sought. View "Ex parte Carol Scrushy & the Town of Hayneville." on Justia Law

Two sets of petitioners challenged the Oregon Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 28 (IP 28). IP 28, if adopted, would add an exception to the constitutional protections recognized in Vannatta v. Keisling, 931 P2d 770 (1997). Petitioners challenged the caption, the “yes” and “no” result statements, and the summary. Finding revisions warranted for all elements to the ballot title, the Oregon Supreme Court referred the matter back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Markley/Lutz v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing a petition to remove an elected officer, holding that the petition failed to comply with the requirement set forth in Va. Code 24.2-233 and -235 that the signatures of petitioners who are registered voters equal to ten percent of the votes case in the last election be made under penalty of perjury.The circuit court dismissed the petition at issue on the grounds that the petition was not signed under penalty of perjury by a number of registered voters equal to ten percent of the votes cast in the prior election for that office. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, reading sections 24.2-233 and -235 together, the text of the statutes requires that the signatures of ten percent of the registered voters on a petition for the removal of an elected officer must be signed under penalty of perjury. View "Commonwealth v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s orders denying certain elected officers attorney fees, costs, and disbursements, holding that equities did not support such awards under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA).Lynn Nemeth, a Whitehall elector, sought a recall election to determine whether the mayor of Whitehall and some Town Council members (collectively, the Elected Officers) should be recalled from their respective positions. The district court granted the Elected Officers’ petition for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment, finding that Nemeth’s recall petitions and circulation sheets did not substantially conform to the statutory forms. The district court eventually decided that the Elected Officers were not entitled to attorneys fees or costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the equities did not support awarding fees and costs under the UDJA because the proper way to stop a recall election based on an insufficient recall petition is to request an injunction pursuant to the Montana Recall Act; and (2) the Elected Officers were not entitled to attorney fees and costs under either Mont. Code Ann. 25-10-711(1)(b) or Mont. Code Ann. 25-10-101(8). View "Davis v. Ramey" on Justia Law

Intervening defendants could not be required to pay a portion of prevailing plaintiffs' attorneys fees and costs, awarded under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b) and 52 U.S.C. 10310(e), when intervening defendants were not charged with any wrongdoing and could not be held liable for the relief that plaintiffs sought. In Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989), the Supreme Court precluded the assessment of attorneys fees and costs against intervenors who were "blameless," meaning that they were not charged as wrongdoers and legal relief could not have been obtained from them. In this racial gerrymandering case, the Fourth Circuit held that Zipes was controlling and that the Commonwealth could not be held liable for attorneys fees and costs incurred by plaintiffs in litigating against the entry of Intervening Congressmen or against Intervening Congressmen's positions. Under the traditional American rule, plaintiffs must bear those intervention-related fees. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order awarding attorneys fees and costs, remanding for reconsideration of plaintiffs' petitions for fees. View "Brat v. Personhuballah" on Justia Law