In Ohio, judges in all courts of record are selected by election. Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 4, governs the fundraising and political conduct of judicial candidates. Platt, an Ohio attorney, formed the Platt for Judge Campaign Committee in 2013. Platt believes that parts of Canon 4 violate his rights to free speech, due process, and equal protection: Rule 4.1(A)(2), which prohibits a candidate from making speeches on behalf of a political party or another candidate for office; Rule 4.1(A)(3), which prohibits a candidate from publicly endorsing or opposing a candidate for another public office; Rule 4.4(A), which, save for three exceptions, prohibits a judicial candidate from personally soliciting campaign contributions; Rule 4.4(E), which creates a permissible window for soliciting and receiving campaign contributions; Rule 4.4(F), which limits the solicitation and receipt of contributions for candidates defeated before the general election; and Rule 4.4(G), which regulates the solicitation and receipt of contributions for candidates who die or withdraw from the election. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of all of Platt’s claims. Ohio’s rules strike the delicate balance between the Constitution’s commands and the state’s desire to protect judicial integrity. View "Platt v. Board of Commissioners on Grievances & Discipline of the Ohio Supreme Court" on Justia Law

In 2011, Texas adopted a new congressional districting plan and new districting maps for the state legislature. The Equal Protection Clause forbids “racial gerrymandering,” but Texas is also subject to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which is violated when a state districting plan provides “less opportunity” for racial minorities “to elect representatives of their choice.” Texas was also subject to section 5, which barred it from making any districting changes unless it could prove that they did not result in retrogression with respect to the ability of racial minorities to elect the candidates of their choice.The plan was challenged in a Texas district court. Texas submitted the plans for preclearance to the District of Columbia Circuit. For the upcoming primaries, the Supreme Court instructed the Texas court to start with the 2011 plans and make adjustments required by the Constitution and the VRA. The Texas court adopted new interim plans, which, after the D.C. Circuit denied preclearance, were used for the 2012 elections. The state repealed the 2011 plans and enacted the Texas court’s plans with minor modifications. After the Supreme Court’s 2013 "Shelby County" holding, Texas, no longer covered by section 5, obtained a vacatur of the preclearance order. The Texas court allowed a challenge to the 2013 plans and held that challenges to the 2011 plans remained live. Texas conducted its 2014 and 2016 elections under the 2013 plans. In 2017, the Texas court found defects in several districts in the 2011 federal congressional and State House plans; invalidated multiple Congressional and House Districts in the 2013 plans, holding that the Legislature failed to cure the “taint” of discriminatory intent allegedly harbored by the 2011 Legislature; held that three districts were invalid because they had the effect of depriving Latinos of the equal opportunity to elect their candidates of choice; found that HD90 was a racial gerrymander; and gave the state attorney general three days to respond.Assuming jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1253, the Court concluded that the orders qualify as interlocutory injunctions; the short time frame the attorney general was given indicated that the court did not intend to allow the elections to go ahead under the plans it had condemned. The Texas court erred in requiring the state to show that the 2013 Legislature purged the “taint” attributed to the never-used plans enacted by a prior legislature. The “good faith of [the] state legislature must be presumed.” The 2011 Legislature’s intent and the court’s interim plans, weighed with other evidence, “is plainly insufficient to prove that the 2013 Legislature acted in bad faith and engaged in intentional discrimination.” The Court reversed as to the three districts in which the Texas court relied on section 2’s “effects” test but affirmed that HD90 is a racial gerrymander. For a section 2 “effects” claim, a plaintiff must establish a geographically compact minority population sufficient to constitute a majority in a single-member district, political cohesion among the members of the minority group, bloc voting by the majority to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate, and that the district lines dilute the votes of the minority group. View "Abbott v. Perez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that a recall election to remove Plaintiff, a member of the board of selectmen of the town of Townsend, from office pursuant to the town’s recall act may not proceed because the act provides for a recall vote to take place only on grounds not alleged here.In 2017, Petitioners, ten registered voters residing in the town, submitted to the town clerk a petition seeking to recall Plaintiff, citing malfeasance and neglect of duty as grounds for the recall. Plaintiff commenced an action to enjoin the recall election, contending that the allegations made against her were legally insufficient to initiate a recall under the act. The superior court denied Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, but a single justice of the Appeals Court ordered that a preliminary injunction issue. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the recall election may not proceed because the allegations in the affidavit supporting the petition for recall do not fall within the act’s enumerated grounds. View "King v. Town Clerk of Townsend" on Justia Law

Only 25% of registered California voters participated in the June 2014 primary; only 42% voted in the November 2014 general election. To increase participation in the democratic process, California enacted the Voter’s Choice Act (VCA), modeled after Colorado’s successful election system. A ballot is automatically mailed to every registered voter 29 days before the election date, Cal. Elec.Code 4005(a)(8)(A). A voter may cast a completed ballot by mailing it in, depositing the ballot at a designated “ballot dropoff location” (a large locked mailbox), or submitting it at a “vote center.” The voter may cast his ballot as soon as he receives it. Rather than require all 58 California counties to implement this new voting system immediately, the VCA authorizes 14 counties to opt in on or after January 1, 2018. All other counties may implement the all-mailed system on or after January 1, 2020. Within six months of each election conducted under the system, the California Secretary of State must submit to the legislature a detailed report assessing turnout and other metrics of success. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction in a suit alleging that the VCA violated the Equal Protection Clause by restricting the fundamental right to vote on the basis of county of residence, without sufficient justification. View "Short v. Brown" on Justia Law

On May 1, 2018, Respondents-proponents Dr. Tom Coburn, Brooke McGowan, and Ronda Vuillemont-Smith timely filed Referendum Petition No. 25, State Question No. 799 (the petition) with the Oklahoma Secretary of State. The petition sought to refer HB 1010xx to the people of Oklahoma for their approval or rejection at the regular election to be held on November 6, 2018. Protestants, several educators and organizations purporting to represent Oklahoma educational interests, timely filed an original action protesting the legal sufficiency of the petition, asserting the gist of the petition was legally insufficient for several reasons, and further asserted the petition was legally insufficient for failure to include an exact copy of the text of the measure as required by 34 O.S. Supp. 2015 sec. 1. Finding the referendum was indeed insufficient, the Oklahoma Supreme Court declared it invalid and ordered stricken from the November 2018 ballot. View "Oklahoma's Children, Our Future, Inc. v. Coburn" on Justia Law

State law did not preempt a proposal to amend the charter of the City of Bloomington to require voter approval before the City can implement organized collection of solid waste.Appellants petitioned the City for a ballot initiative seeking the enactment of an ordinance that would require voter approval before the City could implement organized waste collection. The City declined to place Appellants’ proposed amendment on a ballot on the ground that Minn. Stat. 115A.94 preempted the field of regulation by the process by which a city organizes waste collection. The district court granted summary judgment for the City. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the legislature did not intend to occupy the field of regulation of the process of organizing collection of solid waste; and (2) therefore, Appellants’ proposed charter amendment was not preempted by state law. View "Jennissen v. City of Bloomington" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the Montana Mining Association’s (MMA) request to overrule the Attorney General’s determination that Initiative 186 (I-186) is legally sufficient in this original proceeding.If enacted, I-186 would alter the mine permitting process by adding a requirement to mines’ reclamation plans. The Attorney General determined that the initiative was legally sufficient. MMA filed this original action asking the Supreme Court to determine that I-186 violates Mont. Code Ann. 13-27-105, which requires that an initiative issue delegating rulemaking authority be “effective no sooner than October 1 following approval.” The Supreme Court denied MMA’s request, holding that the issue of whether I-186 delegates rulemaking authority is outside the scope of the Attorney General’s legal-suffiency review, and therefore, the issue is also outside the scope of the Supreme Court’s pre-election initiative review. View "Montana Mining Ass’n v. State" on Justia Law

Republican voters alleged that Maryland’s Sixth Congressional District was gerrymandered in 2011 in retaliation for their political views. Six years after the General Assembly redrew the District, plaintiffs sought to enjoin election officials from holding congressional elections under the 2011 map. The district court denied the motion and stayed further proceedings pending the Supreme Court’s disposition of partisan gerrymandering claims in Gill v. Whitford. The Supreme Court affirmed. In granting a preliminary injunction a court must consider whether the movant has shown “that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Plaintiffs made no such showing. They did not move for a preliminary injunction until six years, and three general elections, after the 2011 map was adopted, and three years after their first complaint was filed. The delay largely arose from a circumstance within plaintiffs’ control. In considering the balance of equities, that unnecessary, years-long delay weighed against their request. The public interest in orderly elections also supported the decision. Plaintiffs represented to the court that any injunctive relief would have to be granted by August 18, 2017, to ensure the timely completion of a new districting scheme in advance of the 2018 election season. Despite the court’s undisputedly diligent efforts, that date had passed by the time the court ruled. There was also legal uncertainty surrounding any potential remedy for the asserted injury; the court reasonably could have concluded that a preliminary injunction would have been against the public interest and might have had a needlessly disruptive effect on the electoral process. View "Besinek v. Lamone" on Justia Law

Members of the Wisconsin Legislature are elected from single-member legislative districts. The legislature redraws district boundaries following each census. After the 2010 census, the legislature passed Act 43. Democratic voters alleged that Act 43 harms the Democratic Party’s ability to convert Democratic votes into Democratic legislative seats by “cracking” certain Democratic voters among different districts in which those voters fail to achieve electoral majorities and “packing” other Democratic voters in a few districts in which Democratic candidates win by large margins. They cited an “efficiency gap” that compares each party’s respective “wasted” votes, i.e., votes cast for a losing candidate or for a winning candidate in excess of what that candidate needs to win. The district court enjoined application of Act 43 and required redistricting. The Supreme Court vacated for lack of standing. A plaintiff may not invoke federal-court jurisdiction unless he can show “a personal stake in the outcome,” by proof that he has suffered the “invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized.” If the plaintiffs’ alleged harm is the dilution of their votes, that injury is district-specific, not statewide. A plaintiff who complains of gerrymandering, but who does not live in a gerrymandered district, “assert[s] only a generalized grievance.” Claims that their votes have been diluted require revising only such districts as are necessary to reshape the voter’s district. Statewide injury to Wisconsin Democrats is a collective political interest, not an individual legal interest. Injury-in-fact is not based on intent but requires proof of a burden on the plaintiffs’ votes that is “actual or imminent," not ‘hypothetical. Studies showing that Act 43 skewed Wisconsin’s statewide map in favor of Republicans do not address the effect that a gerrymander has on the votes of particular citizens. The Court remanded to give the plaintiffs an opportunity to prove concrete and particularized injuries to their individual votes. View "Gill v. Whitford" on Justia Law

At issue in this election case was the validity of petitions submitted to qualify a slate of candidates to run for election to the Democratic Town Committee for the sixth district of the city of Hartford. Specifically at issue was whether election officials are required to reject these petitions if the petitions’ circulator knows or should know that the petitions contain an incorrect address for one of the candidates listed.In this action for a writ of mandamus compelling invalidation of certain petitions created for candidates for the Hartford Democratic Town Committee, the Supreme Court concluded that the dispositive issue was whether the acceptance of such petitions constitutes a “ruling of an election official,” an essential predicate to a party’s standing to proceed under Conn. Gen. Stat. 9-329a. The Court held that such an acceptance does not constitute such a ruling.Here, the superior court granted the motion filed by Alyssa Peterson et al. to intervene as defendants. Peterson filed a counterclaim, and judgment was entered for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the acceptance of petitions bearing a purportedly incorrect address for one candidate would not constitute a ruling of an election official, and therefore, Peterson lacked standing under section 9-329a. View "Arciniega v. Feliciano" on Justia Law