The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court ordering a new Democratic special primary in this challenge brought by Plaintiff, a losing candidate, holding that the number of absentee ballots invalidated as a result of the Court’s disposition of the issues remained sufficiently high to place the reliability of the November 14, 2017 special primary results seriously in doubt.After the results of the special party were determined, Plaintiff challenged them pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 9-329a, arguing that improprieties in the absentee balloting process had undermined the reliability of the results. After a hearing, the trial court ordered that a new special primary be held as a result of the improprieties. The Supreme court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) improperly concluded that supervised absentee balloting at a certain nursing home did not comply with the statutory provisions governing that process; (2) correctly concluded that Conn. Gen. Stat. 9-140b(a) prohibits a party official or candidate from directing a police officer to retrieve absentee ballots from electors and to deliver them to the town clerk; and (3) correctly concluded that certain absentee ballots were not “mailed” within the meaning of that term, as used in section 9-140b(c). View "Keeley v. Ayala" on Justia Law

Judge Persky was appointed to the superior court in 2003 and has been reelected. Dauber and others submitted a “Petition for Recall of Judge Aaron Persky” to the Registrar of Voters (Elections Code 11006, 11020-11022). Judge Persky responded that under the California Constitution, the Secretary of State was the proper official for the recall of state officers and that the petition contained an “incorrect and misleading” demand for an election to choose a successor because a vacancy would be filled by the Governor. An amended recall petition was submitted to the Registrar and approved for circulation. Judge Persky sought a temporary restraining order to compel the Registrar to withdraw its certification and refer the matter to the Secretary of State; to enjoin the petition’s circulation until the Secretary of State certified it; and to enjoin circulation while the petition contained the "misleading" statement. The court of appeal affirmed that the Registrar was the proper official to approve recall petitions for superior court judges and that the Persky recall petition was not misleading. The statutory process for recall of a “local officer” was expressly made applicable to recall of a superior court judge and is not contrary to the state constitution; it does not impermissibly distinguish between appellate courts and superior courts, including their classification as “state” or “local” officers. View "Perksy v. Bushey" on Justia Law

Judge Persky was appointed to the superior court in 2003 and has been reelected. Dauber and others submitted a “Petition for Recall of Judge Aaron Persky” to the Registrar of Voters (Elections Code 11006, 11020-11022). Judge Persky responded that under the California Constitution, the Secretary of State was the proper official for the recall of state officers and that the petition contained an “incorrect and misleading” demand for an election to choose a successor because a vacancy would be filled by the Governor. An amended recall petition was submitted to the Registrar and approved for circulation. Judge Persky sought a temporary restraining order to compel the Registrar to withdraw its certification and refer the matter to the Secretary of State; to enjoin the petition’s circulation until the Secretary of State certified it; and to enjoin circulation while the petition contained the "misleading" statement. The court of appeal affirmed that the Registrar was the proper official to approve recall petitions for superior court judges and that the Persky recall petition was not misleading. The statutory process for recall of a “local officer” was expressly made applicable to recall of a superior court judge and is not contrary to the state constitution; it does not impermissibly distinguish between appellate courts and superior courts, including their classification as “state” or “local” officers. View "Perksy v. Bushey" on Justia Law

In this election contest, the circuit court properly granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds that Appellant's petition was untimely filed under Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law (EL) 12-202(b) and barred by the doctrine of laches.More than six months after the 2016 general election, Appellant filed a petition seeking to have the candidacy of the successful candidate for the position of judge of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County decertified. Appellants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the election claims were untimely under EL 12-202(b) and barred by the doctrine of laches. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the petition was untimely filed under EL 12-202(b) because Appellant did not file the petition until more than six months after the election and more than one year after Appellant became aware of the facts that served as the basis for the election claims and several months after the election results were certified; and (2) independent of the statutory limitations period set forth in EL 12-202(b), the petition was barred by the doctrine of laches because Appellant unreasonably delayed in asserting her rights, and that delay prejudiced Appellees. View "Ademiluyi v. State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

In this election contest, the circuit court properly granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds that Appellant's petition was untimely filed under Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law (EL) 12-202(b) and barred by the doctrine of laches.More than six months after the 2016 general election, Appellant filed a petition seeking to have the candidacy of the successful candidate for the position of judge of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County decertified. Appellants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the election claims were untimely under EL 12-202(b) and barred by the doctrine of laches. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the petition was untimely filed under EL 12-202(b) because Appellant did not file the petition until more than six months after the election and more than one year after Appellant became aware of the facts that served as the basis for the election claims and several months after the election results were certified; and (2) independent of the statutory limitations period set forth in EL 12-202(b), the petition was barred by the doctrine of laches because Appellant unreasonably delayed in asserting her rights, and that delay prejudiced Appellees. View "Ademiluyi v. State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

In this special proceeding before Michael Heavican, the Chief Justice of the Nebraska Supreme Court, Heavican concluded that Robert Krist be included on the primary election ballot as a Democratic candidate for Nebraska governor.Tyler Davis objected to the inclusion of Krist’s name on the primary ballot, alleging that Krist’s candidate filing form was not effective because Krist made a change of political party affiliation in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 32-612. Nebraska Secretary of State John Gale denied the objection, determining that Krist was a nonpartisan registered voter with no political party affiliation prior to February 12, 2018, and therefore, his Nebraska voter registration application filed that day declaring his “Party Affiliation” as a Democrat was a declaration of a political party affiliation, not a change of political party affiliation. Heavican concluded that Gale properly denied Davis’ objection, concluding that non-partisan is not a “political party affiliation” but rather is the lack of a political party affiliation. View "Davis v. Gale" on Justia Law

Two sets of petitioners challenged the Oregon Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 33 (2018) (IP 33). If adopted, IP 33 would require that “government employee unions” annually report certain information to the Secretary of State, primarily how dues would be spent on union administration. Chief petitioners Schworak and Mitchell challenged the summary, while petitioners Lutz and Schwartz challenged all parts of the certified ballot title. After reviewing the petitioners’ arguments, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the proposed caption, the “no” result statement, and the summary did not substantially comply and must be modified. The “yes” result statement did substantially comply and did not require modification. View "Lutzv. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

At issue here was Utah State Bill SB54, the Utah Elections Amendments Act of 2014 (“SB54”) which reorganized the process for qualifying for a primary ballot in Utah, most importantly, by providing an alternative signature-gathering path to the primary election ballot for candidates who were unable or unwilling to gain approval from the central party nominating conventions. Prior to the passage of SB54, the Utah Republican Party (“URP”) selected its candidates for primary elections exclusively through its state nominating convention, and preferred to keep that process. In this litigation, the URP sued Utah Lieutenant Governor Spencer Cox in his official capacity (“the State”), alleging that two aspects of SB54 violated the URP’s freedom of association under the First Amendment, as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. The two challenged sections: (1) required parties to allow candidates to qualify for the primary ballot through either the nominating convention or by gathering signatures, or both (the “Either or Both Provision”); and (2) required candidates pursuing the primary ballot in State House and State Senate elections through a signature gathering method to collect a set number of signatures (the “Signature Requirement”). In two separate orders, the United States District Court for the District of Utah balanced the URP’s First Amendment right of association against the State’s interest in managing and regulating elections, and rejected the URP’s claims. Re-conducting that balancing de novo on appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. View "Utah Republican Party v. Cox" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs submitted a ballot initiative petition proposing to amend the Ohio Constitution by imposing term limits on the justices of the Ohio Supreme Court and requiring that all laws “that apply to the people of the State of Ohio . . . apply equally to the members and employees of the General Assembly.” The single-subject rule, Ohio Rev. Code 3503.062(A), allows initiative petitions to contain only “one proposed law or constitutional amendment,” so the Ohio Ballot Board split the initiative into two initiatives, each containing one proposed constitutional amendment. Plaintiffs challenged the process. Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, rejecting an argument that the process was a content-based regulation of core political speech. The Supreme Court has not viewed single-subject rules as inconsistent with the First Amendment and the Ohio Supreme Court has rejected an essentially identical challenge. Ohio’s single-subject rule applies to all petitions, regardless of their substantive messages, and may be justified without reference to the content of any initiative petitions. The rule is intended to prevent voter confusion and "logrolling." Whether Plaintiffs violate Ohio’s single-subject rule depends not on what they say, but simply on where they say it; it is a minimally burdensome and nondiscriminatory regulation. View "Committee to Impose Term Limits on the Ohio Supreme Court v. Ohio Ballot Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus sought by Relator to compel Respondent, the Delaware County Board of Elections, to place a referendum on the May 8, 2018 ballot.Relator submitted a petition for a referendum proposing a zoning amendment. The board of elections verified that the petition had a sufficient number of valid signatures and certified the petition to appear on the May 2018 ballot. Two interested parties protested against the legitimacy of the referendum. After a hearing, the elections board approved a motion to sustain the protest and decertify the measure based upon the sufficiency of the summary contained within the petition. As a result, the referendum petition was not certified for placement on the May ballot. Relator then filed the present complaint for a writ of mandamus against the board of elections. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that, on the merits, the elections board erred in refusing to place the referendum on the ballot because the petition satisfied the requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 519.12(H). View "State ex rel. Quinn v. Delaware County Board of Elections" on Justia Law