The Libertarian Party challenged Ohio’s ballot qualification law, Rev. Code 3501.38(E)(1), arguing selective enforcement and violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Under the law, a political party may qualify by obtaining at least “three percent of the total vote cast” for governor or president “at the most recent regular state election” or through a petition. A petition-formed party must nominate a candidate for the general election by petition, filed “[n]ot later than one hundred ten days before the” general election, and, for statewide offices, “signed by at least fifty qualified electors who have not voted as a member of a different political party at any primary election within the current year or the immediately preceding two calendar years.” For local office, five qualifying signatures are required. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Party did not establish state action with respect to its selective enforcement claim. The Party did not demonstrate that Ohio law deprives it of membership or affiliation in a general sense and was not severely burdened by the requirement that it select candidates by petition, rather than by primary. The state articulated a legitimate interest in its law, sufficient in light of the Party’s claimed burdens. View "Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases challenge provisions of a recently enacted North Carolina election law. Session Law 2013-381.2 imposed a number of voting restrictions. The law required in-person voters to show certain photo IDs, beginning in 2016, which African Americans disproportionately lacked, and eliminated or reduced registration and voting access tools that African Americans disproportionately used. Prior to the enactment of SL 2013-381, the legislature requested and received racial data as to usage of the practices changed by the proposed law. Upon receipt of the race data, the General Assembly enacted legislation that restricted voting and registration in five different ways, all of which disproportionately affected African Americans. The court concluded that the asserted justifications for the law cannot and do not conceal the State’s true motivation: taking away minority voters' opportunity because they were about to exercise it. Therefore, the court concluded that the General Assembly enacted the challenged provisions of the law with discriminatory intent. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to enjoin the challenged provisions of the law. View "N.C. State Conference v. McCrory" on Justia Law

On February 5, 2016, Governor Sam Brownback received statutorily required notice of District Magistrate Judge Tommy Webb’s departure from the bench. On June 15, 2016, three judges filed this petition for a writ of mandamus seeking a writ requiring the governor to immediately appoint an interim district magistrate judge for Haskall County. Specifically, Petitioner alleged that the governor failed to appoint a successor district magistrate judge in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 25-312a, which states that any “appointment made by the governor…shall be made within 90 days following receipt of notice….” The Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the ninety-day time limit for the governor’s appointment of a district magistrate judge is directory rather than mandatory under precedent and is thus a discretionary act not subject to mandamus. View "Ambrosier v. Brownback" on Justia Law

After MFA formed a campaign committee less than 30 days before the November 4, 2014, election and violated Missouri law section 130.011(8), MFA filed suit against the executive director of the Missouri Ethics Commission (MEC), in his official capacity, seeking to declare unconstitutional the 30-day formation deadline. The district court granted a temporary restraining order, but after the election, dismissed MFA’s suit as not ripe. The court concluded that MFA has Article III standing to challenge section 130.011(8) on First Amendment grounds where MFA’s self-censorship is objectively reasonable; although the 2014 election has passed, this case is not moot where MEC can at any time implement its policy and assess the fee for violation of the formation deadline in section 130.011(8) and, in the alternative, this action is not moot under the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness; and MFA’s case is ripe for review where MFA asserts the harm of self-censorship, based on its compliance with section 130.011(8). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Missourians for Fiscal Accountability v. Klahr" on Justia Law

In April 2015, the Missouri General assembly passed House Bill 150 (HB 150), which made changes to Missouri’s unemployment benefits compensation statutes. The Governor subsequently vetoed HB 150. In September 2015, during a veto session, the Missouri Senate reconsidered HB 150 and voted to override the governor’s veto. Appellants filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that HB 150 is unconstitutional and requested an injunction prohibiting HB 150 from being executed or enforced. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Senate lacked authority to vote to override the Governor’s veto during the veto session because only bills returned by the Governor on or after the fifth day before the end of the regular legislative session can be taken up during a September veto session. View "Pestka v. State" on Justia Law

Curtis Francis and another man, Michael Dax, were collecting signatures near the Jamestown Civic Center, a designated polling place, on voting day. They were doing so in an effort to get an initiated measure regarding environmental concerns placed on the next ballot. While they were collecting signatures, it began to rain. They moved under a canopy covering an entrance to the polling place. They continued collecting signatures as individuals walked past them to vote. One voter told an election clerk about Francis and Dax's activities. The clerk informed the county auditor. The auditor, along with a plain-clothed security officer, went to speak with Francis and Dax. They informed the two it was illegal to collect signatures within 100 feet of a polling place. Dax began arguing with the auditor; Francis continued collecting signatures. A police officer was dispatched. The officer confiscated the signatures, but did not arrest Francis or Dax. After the incident, the officer forwarded a report to the county prosecutor. The prosecutor filed charges against Francis for collecting signatures within 100 feet of an open polling place. Francis appealed after conditionally pleading guilty to gathering signatures within 100 feet of a polling place. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the electioneering law he was charged under did not violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and was a reasonable restriction on the North Dakota Constitution's initiated ballot measure provision. The Court also concluded Francis has failed to show he was selectively prosecuted. View "North Dakota v. Francis" on Justia Law

The Green Party of Hawaii and seven registered voters who voted in the 2012 General Elections (collectively, Green Party) filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that certain methodologies and procedures used by the Office of Elections in the 2012 election were invalid under the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act (HAPA). The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Office of Elections, concluding that the challenged procedures were not subject to HAPA rulemaking requirements. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s judgment in part, holding that the procedures used to determine that there will be a sufficient number of ballots ordered for each precinct for a general or primary election and the policy for counting votes cast on ballots for the incorrect precinct are rules under HAPA and, therefore, are subject to HAPA’s rulemaking requirements. View "Green Party of Hawaii v. Nago" on Justia Law

In 2015, Respondents-Proponents Shawn Sheehan, Linda Reid, and Melvin Moran filed Initiative Petition No. 403 (State Question No. 779), with the Oklahoma Secretary of State. The petition sought to amend the Oklahoma Constitution by adding a new Article 13-C, creating the Oklahoma Education Improvement Fund. Funds generated by the one-cent tax would be distributed to public school districts, higher education institutions, career and technology centers, and early childhood education providers for certain educational purposes outlined in the proposed article. Petitioners filed suit to challenge the gist of the measure post-circulation and the sufficiency of the Attorney General's rewritten ballot title. After review of the matter, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held the time for challenging the gist of a measure had expired, and found that the Attorney General's rewritten ballot title was deficient. "We agree that the ballot title is misleading if it does not mention the Board of Equalization's role in limiting appropriations. In addition, the ballot title should refrain from partiality and should clarify the amount of the sales and use tax as well as its allocation." Pursuant to 34 O.S. Supp. 2015, sec. 10 (A)6 , the Court corrected and amended the ballot title. View "OCPA Impact, Inc v. Sheehan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against two public officials in their official capacities, alleging that the procedures they enforce for placing initiatives on Nebraska state and municipal ballots violate his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and seeking declaratory and prospective injunctive relief. The district court dismissed all but the Fourteenth Amendment claim against Nebraska Secretary of State John Gale, entered judgment for plaintiff on that claim, enjoined Gale from enforcing certain provisions of the Nebraska Constitution, and awarded plaintiff attorneys' fees and costs. The Supreme Court made clear in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife that a wish to engage in future conduct, alone, does not provide the immediacy needed for threatened enforcement of a contested law to constitute injury in fact. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish standing to bring his Fourteenth Amendment claim where his interest in placing an initiative on the ballot, even if evidenced by a sworn statement and sample petition filed with Gale, is insufficient to establish an imminent threat of enforcement. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to prove he has standing to assert his interest as a petition signer where there is no evidence that plaintiff is registered to vote. Accordingly, the court vacated that portion of the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions. View "Bernbeck v. Gale" on Justia Law

Appellants filed a complaint challenging a referendum petition. The purpose of the petition was to refer to the voters in the November 2016 general election the question of whether the death penalty should be reinstated. Appellants sought to enjoin the Secretary of State from placing the referendum on the ballot, alleging that the referendum petition was not legally sufficient because a list of sponsors filed with the petition did not include the name of Governor Pete Ricketts, who allegedly engaged in activities that established that he was a sponsor of the referendum. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Ricketts’ alleged financial or other support of the referendum did not make him a a person “sponsoring the petition,” as that phrase is used in Neb. Rev. Stat. 32-1405(1); and (2) therefore, the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "Hargesheimer v. Gale" on Justia Law