Pro-se plaintiff Deborah Sumner appealed a superior court order denying her Right-to-Know Law request put to the New Hampshire Secretary of State. The order also granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Sumner sought to inspect ballots cast in the town of Jaffrey during the 2012 general election. The Secretary denied her request, citing RSA 659:95, II (Supp. 2015), which exempted ballots which have been cast from the Right-to-Know Law. On appeal, Sumner argued that RSA 659:95, II, along with RSA 660:16, II (2008) and RSA 669:33, II (2008) (collectively, “the ballot exemption statutes”), violated several articles of the New Hampshire Constitution. After review, the Supreme Court held that the ballot exemption statutes did not violate the State constitution, and, therefore, affirmed. View "Deborah Sumner v. New Hampshire Secretary of State" on Justia Law

Smith was appointed to the Illinois House of Representatives to complete an unfinished term. During his campaign to be elected in his own right, his assistant, “Pete,” alerted the FBI that Smith might be corrupt. Pete began recording conversations. At the FBI’s suggestion, Pete told Smith that a constituent would provide $7,000 if Smith wrote a letter supporting her state grant application. There was no such woman; the money would come from the FBI. Smith wrote the letter and received $7,000. Smith used some of the money to pay campaign staff; a search of his home turned up the rest. At Smith’s trial for violating 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B) and 1951, the prosecutor introduced the recorded conversations with Pete. Neither side called Pete as a witness: he may have been stealing from the FBI. Pete said that he would not testify, asserting his constitutional self-incrimination privilege. The prosecutor did not seek use immunity; defense counsel did not call Pete to see whether the judge would honor his privilege assertion. Questioning why Smith did not raise the hearsay doctrine, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting an argument under the Confrontation Clause. If the statements are not hearsay, they are not testimonial. Smith was not convicted on hearsay or of out-of-court testimonial statements. Smith’s own words and deeds convicted him. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Petitioners, as members of Utah Term Limits NOW!, sponsored an initiative application in which Petitioners sought to initiate legislation imposing term limits on persons appointed by the Governor to state boards and commissions. The Lieutenant Governor rejected the initiative application. Petitioners filed a petition for extraordinary writ asking the Supreme Court to compel the Lieutenant Governor to rescind and withdraw his rejection of Petitioners’ application. After filing their petition, Petitioners ceased efforts to place the proposed initiative on the ballot. Thereafter, the Lieutenant Governor filed a suggestion of mootness. In response, Petitioners asked the Court to resolve the issues based on the “public interest” exception to the mootness doctrine. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for extraordinary writ as moot and held that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine did not apply in this case. View "Poulton v. Cox" on Justia Law

The FEC filed suit alleging that former Senator Larry E. Craig, his campaign committee, and the committee’s Treasurer converted campaign funds to the Senator’s personal use in violation of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. 30109(a)(4). The district court granted summary judgment to the FEC and ordered the Senator to disgorge $197,535 and to pay a civil penalty of $45,000. Appellants had spent campaign funds to pay legal fees the Senator incurred in connection with efforts to withdraw his guilty plea to a criminal charge of disorderly conduct. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court did not err in finding that appellants unlawfully converted campaign contributions to personal use by spending them on Senator Craig’s effort to withdraw his guilty plea. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering disgorgement to the United States Treasury and payment of the civil penalty. View "FEC v. Craig for U.S. Senate" on Justia Law

Ben Unger, LaToya Fick and Carmen Rubio petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 65. IP 65, if enacted, would establish a “High School Graduation and College and Career Readiness Fund” (Readiness Fund) within the state General Fund for the purposes of—as the title of the fund suggests-improving high school graduation rates and college and career readiness. The measure would require the legislature, beginning in 2017, to “appropriate, allocate or otherwise make available” to the fund not less than $800 per student per year. Thereafter, the measure would require that the amounts appropriated, allocated, or otherwise made available be increased in accordance with Executive Order No. 14-14. Petitioner Unger argued the certified ballot title is deficient in several respects pertaining to the “no” vote result statement and the summary. Petitioners Fick and Rubio also challenge the ballot title, arguing that the caption does not reasonably identify the subject of IP 65, that the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ vote result statements do not accurately identify the consequences of voting one way or the other, and that the summary is deficient in that it carries forward problems with the caption and the result statements. After review, the Supreme Court rejected petitioner Unger's contention without discussion, but agreed with petitioners Fick and Rubio's contentions, and referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Unger v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cynthia Kendoll petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 52. IP 52, if enacted, would supplement federal immigration law. Federal immigration law made it unlawful for "'a person or other entity * * * to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien.'" Congress established a website, E-Verify, that permitted employers to determine whether the documentation that the employer reviewed in completing Form I-9 was authentic or, matched records on file with the federal government. Generally, federal immigration laws did not require employers to use E-Verify. Using E-Verify established a rebuttable presumption that an employer did not violate federal immigration laws even if it later turned out that the employer in fact hired an unauthorized alien. IP 52 would add a state licensing requirement that employers use E-Verify to determine their employees’ eligibility to work. Petitioner challenged the ballot title’s caption, the "yes" and "no" result statements, and the summary. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with petitioner that the caption failed to substantially comply with ORS 250.035(2)(a). The ballot title was referred back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Kendoll v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

The Institute, a Section 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, filed suit against the FEC, challenging the constitutionality of the disclosure requirements of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 52 U.S.C. 20104(f). The district court denied the Institute's request to convene a three-judge district court pursuant to the statutory provision that requires three-judge district courts for constitutional challenges to the BCRA. On the merits, the district court held that the Institute's claim was unavailing under McConnell v. FEC, and Citizens United V. FEC. The Institute appealed. The court concluded that, because the Institute’s complaint raises a First Amendment challenge to a provision of BCRA, 28 U.S.C. 2284(a) entitles it to a three-judge district court. In this case, the Institute’s attempt to advance its as-applied First Amendment challenge is not “essentially fictitious, wholly insubstantial, obviously frivolous, and obviously without merit.” Therefore, section 2284 “entitles” the Institute to make its case “before a three-judge district court.” Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated the district court's judgment, remanding for further proceedings. View "Independence Institute v. FEC" on Justia Law

Dr. Willie Wilson timely submitted his petition and qualification papers to the Mississippi State Democratic Executive Committee (the “Party”), to run for President in the 2016 Democratic primary. The Party rejected Dr. Wilson’s petition but later reconsidered and requested the Mississippi Secretary of State to place Dr. Wilson’s name on the primary ballot. But, because absentee and overseas military voting had already begun, the Secretary of State refused. The Circuit Court of Hinds County refused to grant Dr. Wilson an injunction and he appealed. Under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court found that Dr. Wilson’s due process rights were violated, so the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wilson v. Hosemann" on Justia Law

Ohio prohibited persons from disseminating false information about a political candidate in campaign materials during the campaign season “knowing the same to be false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not, if the statement is designed to promote the election, nomination, or defeat of the candidate.” Ohio Rev. Code 3517.21(B)(10), specifically prohibiting false statements about a candidate’s voting record. The statute established a multi-step complaint process involving the Elections Commission, culminating in referral to a prosecutor. If convicted in subsequent state court proceedings, violators could be sentenced to prison or fined. In 2010, then-Congressman Driehaus filed a complaint alleging that SBA issued a press release accusing him of voting for “taxpayer-funded abortion” by voting for the Affordable Care Act. The Commission issued a probable cause finding. SBA sued Driehaus and state officials. That case was consolidated with a similar case, adding the Commission as a defendant. The U.S. Supreme Court found the case ripe as a facial challenge, despite the dismissal of Commission proceedings. On remand, the district court granted SBA summary judgment, holding that Ohio’s political false statement laws were content-based restrictions that fail strict scrutiny review. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, characterizing the laws as content-based restrictions that burden core protected political speech, not narrowly tailored to achieve state interests in promoting fair elections. View "Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus" on Justia Law

The complaint in this case was brought both individually and as a class action. Plaintiffs, a police union and others, asserted that Montgomery County, a charter county, was not authorized to use its fiscal and human resources to urge approval of a law enacted by the County Council that limited bargaining rights and that had been petitioned to referendum. The circuit court concluded that the government speech doctrine does not constitute an affirmative authority for government to advocate and spend money on political campaigns. The Court of Special Appeals, however, concluded that the County had inherent power to use properly appropriated funds for a governmental purpose and that advocacy on the non-partisan ballot measure was a governmental purpose. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that a charter county is authorized to use its resources to encourage the electorate of the County to support or opposed a measure that may have a significant impact on the operations of the County government. View "Fraternal Order of Police v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law