Petitioners sought review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 51 (2016) (IP 51). IP 51 was a proposed constitutional amendment that, if adopted by the voters, would have changed current voter registration methods for federal, state, and local elections in Oregon by requiring in-person registration, thereby eliminating “motor-voter,” online, and mail registration options. Its passage also would result in the expiration within 10 years of all current Oregon voter registrations and establish other new requirements that must be satisfied in order for Oregonians to register to vote. Petitioners argued that the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). After review, the Oregon Supreme Court agreed that IP 51, as then-drafted, did not satisfy the requirements of Oregon law and referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Nearman v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Petitioners seek review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 62 (2016) (IP 62). IP 62 applied to public employees and public employee labor organizations. If adopted by the voters, IP 62 would amend several provisions of the Oregon Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act (PECBA). Petitioners argued that the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). After review, the Oregon Supreme Court agreed that IP 62, as then-drafted, did not satisfy the requirements of Oregon law and referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Conroy v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

In 2010 the IRS began to pay unusual attention to applications for exemption from federal taxes under Internal Revenue Code 501(c) coming from groups with certain political affiliations. It used "inappropriate criteria" to identify organizations with "Tea Party’" in their names, expanded the criteria to include "Patriots and 9/12," and gave heightened scrutiny to organizations concerned with “government spending, government debt or taxes,” “lobbying to ‘make America a better place to live[,]’” or “criticiz[ing] how the country is being run[.]” The IRS used a “‘Be On the Lookout’ listing” for more than 18 months. Applicants flagged by the criteria were sent to a “team of specialists,” where they experienced significant delays and requests for unnecessary information. The IRS demanded that many groups provide names of donors; a list of issues important to the organization and its position regarding such issues; and political affiliations. After the release of the Inspector General’s report, the plaintiffs sued, citing the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, the First and Fifth Amendments, and the Internal Revenue Code’s prohibition on the unauthorized inspection of confidential “return information,” 26 U.S.C. 6103(a), 7431. Plaintiffs sought discovery of basic information relevant to class certification. The district court ordered production of “Lookout” lists. A year later, the IRS had not complied, but sought a writ of mandamus. The Sixth Circuit denied that petition and ordered the IRS to comply. View "United States v. NorCal Tea Party Patriots" on Justia Law

Pro-se plaintiff Deborah Sumner appealed a superior court order denying her Right-to-Know Law request put to the New Hampshire Secretary of State. The order also granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Sumner sought to inspect ballots cast in the town of Jaffrey during the 2012 general election. The Secretary denied her request, citing RSA 659:95, II (Supp. 2015), which exempted ballots which have been cast from the Right-to-Know Law. On appeal, Sumner argued that RSA 659:95, II, along with RSA 660:16, II (2008) and RSA 669:33, II (2008) (collectively, “the ballot exemption statutes”), violated several articles of the New Hampshire Constitution. After review, the Supreme Court held that the ballot exemption statutes did not violate the State constitution, and, therefore, affirmed. View "Deborah Sumner v. New Hampshire Secretary of State" on Justia Law

Smith was appointed to the Illinois House of Representatives to complete an unfinished term. During his campaign to be elected in his own right, his assistant, “Pete,” alerted the FBI that Smith might be corrupt. Pete began recording conversations. At the FBI’s suggestion, Pete told Smith that a constituent would provide $7,000 if Smith wrote a letter supporting her state grant application. There was no such woman; the money would come from the FBI. Smith wrote the letter and received $7,000. Smith used some of the money to pay campaign staff; a search of his home turned up the rest. At Smith’s trial for violating 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B) and 1951, the prosecutor introduced the recorded conversations with Pete. Neither side called Pete as a witness: he may have been stealing from the FBI. Pete said that he would not testify, asserting his constitutional self-incrimination privilege. The prosecutor did not seek use immunity; defense counsel did not call Pete to see whether the judge would honor his privilege assertion. Questioning why Smith did not raise the hearsay doctrine, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting an argument under the Confrontation Clause. If the statements are not hearsay, they are not testimonial. Smith was not convicted on hearsay or of out-of-court testimonial statements. Smith’s own words and deeds convicted him. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Petitioners, as members of Utah Term Limits NOW!, sponsored an initiative application in which Petitioners sought to initiate legislation imposing term limits on persons appointed by the Governor to state boards and commissions. The Lieutenant Governor rejected the initiative application. Petitioners filed a petition for extraordinary writ asking the Supreme Court to compel the Lieutenant Governor to rescind and withdraw his rejection of Petitioners’ application. After filing their petition, Petitioners ceased efforts to place the proposed initiative on the ballot. Thereafter, the Lieutenant Governor filed a suggestion of mootness. In response, Petitioners asked the Court to resolve the issues based on the “public interest” exception to the mootness doctrine. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for extraordinary writ as moot and held that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine did not apply in this case. View "Poulton v. Cox" on Justia Law

The FEC filed suit alleging that former Senator Larry E. Craig, his campaign committee, and the committee’s Treasurer converted campaign funds to the Senator’s personal use in violation of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. 30109(a)(4). The district court granted summary judgment to the FEC and ordered the Senator to disgorge $197,535 and to pay a civil penalty of $45,000. Appellants had spent campaign funds to pay legal fees the Senator incurred in connection with efforts to withdraw his guilty plea to a criminal charge of disorderly conduct. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court did not err in finding that appellants unlawfully converted campaign contributions to personal use by spending them on Senator Craig’s effort to withdraw his guilty plea. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering disgorgement to the United States Treasury and payment of the civil penalty. View "FEC v. Craig for U.S. Senate" on Justia Law

Ben Unger, LaToya Fick and Carmen Rubio petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 65. IP 65, if enacted, would establish a “High School Graduation and College and Career Readiness Fund” (Readiness Fund) within the state General Fund for the purposes of—as the title of the fund suggests-improving high school graduation rates and college and career readiness. The measure would require the legislature, beginning in 2017, to “appropriate, allocate or otherwise make available” to the fund not less than $800 per student per year. Thereafter, the measure would require that the amounts appropriated, allocated, or otherwise made available be increased in accordance with Executive Order No. 14-14. Petitioner Unger argued the certified ballot title is deficient in several respects pertaining to the “no” vote result statement and the summary. Petitioners Fick and Rubio also challenge the ballot title, arguing that the caption does not reasonably identify the subject of IP 65, that the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ vote result statements do not accurately identify the consequences of voting one way or the other, and that the summary is deficient in that it carries forward problems with the caption and the result statements. After review, the Supreme Court rejected petitioner Unger's contention without discussion, but agreed with petitioners Fick and Rubio's contentions, and referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Unger v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cynthia Kendoll petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 52. IP 52, if enacted, would supplement federal immigration law. Federal immigration law made it unlawful for "'a person or other entity * * * to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien.'" Congress established a website, E-Verify, that permitted employers to determine whether the documentation that the employer reviewed in completing Form I-9 was authentic or, matched records on file with the federal government. Generally, federal immigration laws did not require employers to use E-Verify. Using E-Verify established a rebuttable presumption that an employer did not violate federal immigration laws even if it later turned out that the employer in fact hired an unauthorized alien. IP 52 would add a state licensing requirement that employers use E-Verify to determine their employees’ eligibility to work. Petitioner challenged the ballot title’s caption, the "yes" and "no" result statements, and the summary. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with petitioner that the caption failed to substantially comply with ORS 250.035(2)(a). The ballot title was referred back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Kendoll v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

The Institute, a Section 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, filed suit against the FEC, challenging the constitutionality of the disclosure requirements of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 52 U.S.C. 20104(f). The district court denied the Institute's request to convene a three-judge district court pursuant to the statutory provision that requires three-judge district courts for constitutional challenges to the BCRA. On the merits, the district court held that the Institute's claim was unavailing under McConnell v. FEC, and Citizens United V. FEC. The Institute appealed. The court concluded that, because the Institute’s complaint raises a First Amendment challenge to a provision of BCRA, 28 U.S.C. 2284(a) entitles it to a three-judge district court. In this case, the Institute’s attempt to advance its as-applied First Amendment challenge is not “essentially fictitious, wholly insubstantial, obviously frivolous, and obviously without merit.” Therefore, section 2284 “entitles” the Institute to make its case “before a three-judge district court.” Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated the district court's judgment, remanding for further proceedings. View "Independence Institute v. FEC" on Justia Law