Plaintiff Ralph White sought to remove Ann Johnston as mayor of the City of Stockton and to enjoin placing her name on the municipal election ballot of June 2012 for reelection as mayor. White contended Johnston was ineligible to sit as mayor and to run for reelection under section 606 of the Stockton City Charter. Because Johnston had served two terms as a council member prior to being elected mayor, White asserted she was ineligible to serve as mayor and to run for reelection. The trial court denied White’s petition for an alternative writ. Johnston’s name was placed on the June 2012 ballot, as was White’s, who also was running for mayor. Johnston received the most votes in the election and qualified for a runoff election. White did not qualify. That November, Johnston lost the general election. The trial court denied White’s petition for writ of mandate, finding section 606 was ambiguous because it did not clearly and plainly impose a cumulative term limit. It then found the City’s construction of section 606 as not imposing a cumulative limit was reasonable and not clearly erroneous in light of the official ballot pamphlet used when the voters adopted section 606 and the City’s consistent practice of not reading section 606 as imposing a cumulative limit. The City of argued, and the trial court found, the measure did not impose a cumulative limit. The Court of Appeal agreed with the City and affirmed the judgment. View "White v. City of Stockton" on Justia Law

Tyron Francois, a Democrat, filed paperwork to run as a write-in candidate for Broward County Commission for District 2. A resident voter filed a complaint alleging that Francois was not properly qualified to be a write-in candidate because he did not physically live within the boundaries of the district as required by Fla. Stat. 99.0615. In response, Francois argued that section 99.0615 is facially unconstitutional. The circuit court found that section 99.0615 is constitutional and disqualified Francois as a write-in candidate. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the statute is facially unconstitutional because the timing of its residency requirement for write-in candidates conflicts with the timing of the residency requirement for county commission candidates as established by Fla. Const. art. VIII, 1(e). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 99.0615 contravenes the residency requirement applicable to county commissioners under Fla. Const. art. VIII, 1(e), and thus Francois properly qualified as a write-in candidate; and (2) write-in candidates are included within the intended meaning of “opposition” as used in a different constitutional provision, and therefore, it was appropriate for the Democratic Party’s primary election to be closed to only Democratic-registered voters. View "Brinkmann v. Francois" on Justia Law

The Independence Institute, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation, conducts research and educates the public on public policy. During the 2014 Colorado gubernatorial campaign, the Institute intended to air an advertisement on Denver-area television that was critical of the state’s failure to audit its new health care insurance exchange. The Institute was concerned that the ad qualified as an “electioneering communication” under the Colorado Constitution and, therefore, to run it the Institute would have to disclose the identity of financial donors who funded the ad. The Institute resisted the disclosure requirement, arguing that the First Amendment prohibited disclosure of donors to an ad that is purely about a public policy issue and is unrelated to a campaign. The Tenth Circuit court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Colorado Secretary of State. "Colorado’s disclosure requirements, as applied to this advertisement, meet the exacting scrutiny standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. . . . The provision serves the legitimate interest of informing the public about the financing of ads that mention political candidates in the final weeks of a campaign, and its scope is sufficiently tailored to require disclosure only of funds earmarked for the financing of such ads." View "Independence Institute v. Williams" on Justia Law

In 2013, Envision Spokane gathered enough signatures to place a local initiative on the ballot that would establish a "Community Bill of Rights." Petitioners filed this declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of the Envision Initiative. The petitioners included Spokane County, individual residents of Spokane (including two city council members acting in their individual capacities), for-profit corporations and companies in Spokane (including Pearson Packaging Systems and the utility company A vista Corporation), and nonprofit associations (including the Spokane Association of Realtors, the Spokane Building Owners and Managers Association, the Spokane Home Builders Association, and local chambers of commerce). The trial judge ruled that (1) petitioners had standing to challenge the initiative and (2) the initiative exceeded the scope of the local initiative power. She therefore instructed that it be struck from the ballot. Envision Spokane appealed, and the Court of Appeals held that petitioners lacked standing and ordered the initiative be put on the next available ballot. The first issue before the Supreme Court in this case was who has standing to bring those types of challenges. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals created new limits on who can bring such challenges, but the Supreme Court reversed and adhered to existing standards because they adequately ensured that only those affected by an ordinance may challenge it. Applying those existing standards, the Supreme Court found that petitioners in this case had standing to bring this challenge. The second issue in this case was the substance of the petitioners' challenge: whether the initiative's subject matter fell within the scope of authority granted to local residents. The Court affirmed the trial court's finding that this local initiative exceeds the scope of local initiative power and should not have been put on the ballot. View "Spokane Entrepreneurial Ctr. v. Spokane Moves to Amend the Constitution" on Justia Law

On December 1, 2015, Gary Lee filed a petition and declaration of candidacy for sheriff at the Hamilton County Board of Elections. On January 4, 2016, David Duclos filed a written protest with the Board of Elections, alleging that Lee’s application was incomplete because it did not include the result sheet of an FBI background check. During the course of a protest hearing held by the Board, the report from the FBI was entered into evidence. The Board then denied the protest. On January 14, 2016, Duclos filed a mandamus complaint but, five days later, sought to dismiss that action and filed a new complaint for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition on the grounds of laches, concluding that Duclos unreasonably delayed bringing this action to the prejudice of Respondents. View "State ex rel. Duclos v. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

In 2012, Plaintiffs brought this action arguing that they were unlawfully removed from the Commonwealth’s active voter registry for having failed to vote in the 2008 election for Resident Commissioner. On interlocutory appeal, the First Circuit held that the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) bars Puerto Rico from removing voters from the registry for the office of Resident Commissioners unless they fail to participate in the preceding two general federal elections. On remand, the district court found in favor of Plaintiffs and issued injunctive and declaratory relief from removing otherwise eligible voters from the active election registry unless HAVA's requirements are met. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the National Voter Registration Act does not apply to Puerto Rico and thus does not supersede the Commonwealth’s voter deactivation procedures; (2) HAVA invalidates the deactivation procedures of Article 6.021 of Puerto Rico Act No. 2011 insofar as it applies to voter eligibility for federal elections; and (3) Plaintiffs may bring a private cause of action seeking relief under HAVA pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. View "Colon-Marrero v. Garcia-Velez" on Justia Law

Cornerstone Developers, Ltd. sought extraordinary relief to prevent a tax levy for Sugarcreek Township from appearing on the March 15, 2016 election ballot because it was allegedly not in compliance with state laws. The Supreme Court (1) granted in part the requested writ of mandamus, holding that the Board of Election was under a clear legal duty to remove the levy from the ballot because it was untimely; but (2) declined to issue a writ of prohibition because the Board was not engaged in a quasi-judicial function when it prepared the ballot. View "State ex rel. Cornerstone Developers, Ltd. v. Greene County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

In 2015, Derrick Shepherd filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and for Injunctive Relief. He filed a notice of candidacy qualifying form with the Jefferson Parish Clerk of Court’s office in which he certified that he would be a candidate for the office of State Representative for District 87 of the Louisiana House of Representatives in the primary election to be held on October 24, 2015. Shepherd's petition alleged that the District Attorney for the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District, filed a petition objecting to Shepherd's candidacy because Shepherd pled guilty to a felony in a United States District Court in 2008, and it had been less than fifteen years since he completed his sentence, circumstances which disqualified Shepherd from seeking office pursuant to La. Const. art. I, section 10(B). At the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing, the district court rendered judgment in Shepherd’s favor, declaring Article I, section 10(B) of the Constitution null and void for failure to comply with the requirements of Article XIII, section 1 of the Constitution for promulgation of amendments to the Constitution. After reviewing the record, the legislative instruments, and the constitutional provision at issue, the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with the district court that the constitutionally mandated requirements for amending the constitution were not followed in this case. View "Shepherd v. Schedler" on Justia Law

Petitioners, chair of the state Democratic Executive Committee and the members of the state Democratic Executive Committee for the Ninth Senatorial District, requested the issuance of a writ of mandamus against Respondents, the Governor and members of the state Republic Executive Committee for the Ninth Senatorial District, seeking to compel the Governor to fill a vacancy in the West Virginia Senate from a list of three candidates to be selected by Petitioners. The Supreme Court issued a rule to show cause and ordered Respondents to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not be awarded as requested by Petitioners. After an oral hearing, the Supreme Court denied the requested writ, holding that the vacancy is to be filled from a list of three candidates to be selected by the Republic Executive Committee for the Ninth Senatorial District based upon the outgoing senator’s most recent affiliation with the Republican Party. View "State ex rel. Biafore v. Tomblin" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a City of Wichita ordinance that reduces the severity level of a first-offense conviction for possession of marijuana under certain circumstances. Relying upon the Kansas initiative and referendum statute, Kan. Stat. Ann. 12-3013, the city council submitted a general description of the proposed ordinance as a ballot question. City electors approved the ordinance in the April 2015 general election. The State subsequently filed this petition in quo warranto asking the Supreme Court to declare the ordinance null and void. The State also asked the Court to permanently prohibit the City from publishing, implementing and enforcing the ordinance, arguing, inter alia, that it was not adopted with the procedures set forth in section 12-3013(a). The Supreme Court agreed and granted the State’s request for a writ in quo warranto, holding that the ordinance is null and void because its proponents failed to follow the procedural requirements of the Kansas initiative and referendum statute. View "State ex rel. Schmidt v. City of Wichita" on Justia Law