This opinion was intended to bring finality to litigation concerning the state’s congressional redistricting that has spanned nearly four years in state courts. This case was before the Supreme Court for approval of a final congressional districting plan in accordance with the Court’s previous opinion in Apportionment VII and the Fair Districts Amendment. The Court approved in full the trial court’s “Order Recommending Adoption of a Remedial Map,” and directed that the plan approved here shall be used in the 2016 congressional elections and thereafter until the next decennial redistricting. In so doing, the Court rejected the Legislature’s contention that this decision moves the “goalposts” on the Legislature in its redrawing of the districts and dismissed the contention that the courts adopted a plan drawn by “Democratic operatives.” View "League of Women Voters v. Detzner" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, petitioners sought review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petitions 45 and 46 (2016) (IP 45 and IP 46), contending that the caption, the “yes” results statements, and the summaries did not comply with requirements set out in ORS 250.035(2). IP 46 was an alternative proposal to IP 45. Both Initiative Petitions would have amended aspects of a bill that the legislature enacted during the 2015 legislative session, Senate Bill (SB) 324 (Or Laws 2015, ch 4). SB 324 made changes to a 2009 state law that permitted the Oregon Environmental Quality Commission (EQC) to adopt standards and requirements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and to adopt low carbon fuel standards for gasoline, diesel, and alternative fuels, as well as a schedule to reduce by 2020 the average amount of greenhouse gas emissions by 10 percent below 2010 levels. IP 46 would change parts of the original 2009 law and SB 324, repeating some (but not all) of the changes contained in IP 45, and making other changes. After review of petitioners’ arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that text of the Initiative Petitions did not substantially comply with that statutory standard. The Supreme Court therefore referred both ballot titles to the Attorney General for modification of the caption, the “yes” result statements, and the summaries. View "Blosser v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition (IP) 40 (2016), contending that the caption, the “yes” result statement, and the summary did not comply with requirements set out in ORS 250.035(2). IP 40 was a proposed statute that would make several changes to state law relating to the use and speaking of the English language. Section 1 declared English to be the official language of the State of Oregon and then required that official state actions be taken in English. Section 1 further provided that, with exceptions, persons who spoke only English must be eligible for all programs, benefits, and opportunities of the state and its subdivisions, including employment; and that English-only speakers may not be penalized, or have their rights or opportunities impaired, solely because they speak only English. Section 2 set out exceptions to certain aspects of section 1, detailing purposes for which the state and its “political subdivisions” may use a language other than English. Section 5 granted standing to any resident or person doing business in Oregon to seek a declaratory judgment as to whether a violation of the proposed statute has occurred and, if so, to obtain injunctive relief, with costs and reasonable attorney fees awarded to the prevailing party. After review of the initiative petition, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the “yes” result statement did not substantially comply with that statutory standard. The Attorney General was ordered to modify the “yes” result statement to more clearly and accurately describe two significant components of IP 40 not already captured in that statement. View "Kendoll v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

In November 2009, County of Alameda voters approved Measures I and J levying special parcel taxes by the Albany Unified School District. Plaintiff-appellant Golden Gate Hill Development Company, Inc. was the owner of a parcel of real property in the City of Albany subject to the tax. In February 2014, appellant filed suit against the County and District seeking a refund of taxes paid under the Measures. Golden Gage Hill alleged the tax rates in the Measures were improper because different rates are imposed on residential and nonresidential properties, as well as nonresidential properties of different sizes. The complaint referenced a recent decision in this district, “Borikas v. Alameda Unified School Dist.” (214 Cal.App.4th 135 (2013)), which declared invalid a different parcel tax with similar rate classifications. Respondents moved to dismiss, contending the complaint failed to state a claim because, under Code of Civil Procedure section 860, et seq. (“the validation statutes”), appellant was required to present its claims in a “reverse validation action” within 60 days of passage of the Measures. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Because appellant has not shown there was a basis for its refund claim independent of the alleged invalidity of the Measures, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Golden Gate Hill Development Co. v. County of Alameda" on Justia Law

In September 2010 RBG Bush Planes, LLC (Bush Planes) allowed two candidates for public office for the Lake and Peninsula Borough Assembly to travel on a series of preexisting flights throughout the borough. Bush Planes charged the candidates a fraction of the fuel costs associated with those flights. The Alaska Public Offices Commission investigated these charges, determined that Bush Planes’ fractional fuel-cost methodology did not represent a commercially reasonable rate, and assessed a $25,500 fine against Bush Planes for making illegal corporate contributions. Bush Planes appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the Commission. Bush Planes again appealed, this time to the Supreme Court, arguing: (1) that the Commission erred when it found Bush Planes had violated Alaska law; and (2) that the fine the Commission imposed was unconstitutionally excessive. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission. View "RBG Bush Planes, LLC v. Alaska Public Offices Commission" on Justia Law

Gerald Geier, an accountant, was the treasurer of Stop Now!, a Missouri political action committee (PAC). Geier was required to register the PAC with the Missouri Ethics Commission (MEC). Stop Now! became inactive after 2003, and the PAC’s bank account closed in 2006. When Stop Now! failed to file disclosure reports for the first three quarters of 2011, the MEC opened an investigation. The MEC subsequently filed a complaint against Geier and Stop Now!, alleging that they violated Mo. Rev. Stat. 13.046.1, 130.021.4(1) and 130.021.7 by failing to timely file disclosure reports and failing to notify the MEC of the closure of the PAC’s bank account. After a hearing, the MEC found probable cause that Geier and Stop Now! knowingly violated the applicable statutes. Geier sought judicial review, challenging, inter alia, the constitutional validity of the reporting statutes. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the MEC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the reporting statutes are constitutional as applied; (2) Geier’s challenges to the facial validity of the reporting statutes are not ripe; (3) section 105.961.3, the statute that requires the MEC’s hearings be closed to the public, does not violate the First or Sixth Amendments; and (4) the MEC had authority to investigate Geier. View "Geier v. Missouri Ethics Comm’n" on Justia Law

Appellant, Floyd Gray, filed a complaint for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment seeking to challenge the eligibility of Appellee, Mary Thomas-Barnes, as a candidate in the mayoral election in Dermott, Arkansas. Appellant alleged that Appellee was a convicted felon and therefore asked for a declaration that Appellee was unqualified to seek election. The circuit court dismissed Appellant’s complaint based on lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Appellant’s pleading, which was filed the day before the election, was an attempt to bring a pre-election challenge by post-election means. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal as moot because the election had already been held. View "Gray v. Thomas-Barnes" on Justia Law

Appellants sought to reverse a superior court order denying appellants' motion to enjoin the secretary of state from placing Initiative 1366 (I-1366) on the November 2015 general election ballot. Appellants claimed the initiative went beyond the scope of the people’s initiative power under article II, section 1 of the Washington constitution and was therefore not proper for direct legislation. The trial court ruled that: ( 1) appellants had standing to challenge the initiative as taxpayers, county election officials, and legislators; (2) this was a challenge to the scope of the initiative and therefore appropriate for preelection review; (3) the "fundamental, stated and overriding purpose" of I-1366 was to amend the constitution in violation of article II of the state constitution; (4) I-1366 violated article XXIII of the state constitution; and (5) appellants were unable to show a "clear legal or equitable right" to an injunction under “Rabon v. City of Seattle,” ( 957 P.2d 621 (1998)), because the Supreme Court had yet to decide whether preelection restrictions on initiatives infringe on free speech rights under the First Amendment or article I, section 5 of the Washington constitution. After review, the Washington Court determined that appellants did not make a clear showing that the subject matter of the initiative was not within the broad scope of the people's power of direct legislation and, as such, failed to demonstrate a clear legal right for injunctive relief. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court. View "Huff v. Wyman" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, five Tucson voters and a non-profit corporation called PIA, filed suit challenging the constitutionality of Tucson’s hybrid system for electing members of its city council. The Supreme Court has held that the primary and general elections are a “single instrumentality for choice of officers.” Because the primary and general elections are two parts of a “unitary” process, a citizen’s right to vote in the general election may be meaningless unless he is also permitted to vote in the primary. Because the constituency of the representative to be elected remains static throughout the election process, the geographical unit must also remain static throughout that process. In this case, such mismatches between voters at different stages of a single election cycle are not constitutionally permissible. The court concluded that the practical effect of the Tucson system is to give some of a representative’s constituents - those in his home ward - a vote of disproportionate weight. The court held that every otherwise eligible voter who will be a constituent of the winner of the general election must have an equal opportunity to participate in each election cycle through which that candidate is selected. Because all Tucsonans have an equal interest in determining who the nominees will be, the city may not exclude out-of-ward voters from the primaries. Thus, the court rejected the city's final argument that the hybrid system is a reasonable “residency restriction” on the right to vote. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment in favor of the city. View "Public Integrity Alliance v. City of Tucson" on Justia Law

Political parties may apply to the Secretary of State for state funds to reimburse expenses connected with administering primary elections. After Wendy Davis was certified as the Democratic nominee for State Senate District 10 in the primary election, Davis’s Republican opponent sued to remove Davis from the general election ballot. The challenge failed, and Davis prevailed in the general election. The state and county Democratic Party chairpersons subsequently applied for reimbursement of attorney’s fees related to defending the challenge to Davis’s candidacy. The Secretary of State declined to reimburse the legal expenses to the Democratic Party because the party incurred those expenses after the primary election and in connection with the general election. The district court upheld the Secretary’s decision. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the legal expenses were plainly connected to the primary election because they were based on Davis’s alleged constitutional ineligibility to appear on the primary election ballot. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Secretary did not abuse his discretion in denying the requested reimbursement from the primary election fund, as the Secretary is not obligated to reimburse a political party for legal expenses incurred in defending its nominee’s right to appear on the general-election ballot. View "Cascos v. Tarrant County Democratic Party" on Justia Law