In September 2010 RBG Bush Planes, LLC (Bush Planes) allowed two candidates for public office for the Lake and Peninsula Borough Assembly to travel on a series of preexisting flights throughout the borough. Bush Planes charged the candidates a fraction of the fuel costs associated with those flights. The Alaska Public Offices Commission investigated these charges, determined that Bush Planes’ fractional fuel-cost methodology did not represent a commercially reasonable rate, and assessed a $25,500 fine against Bush Planes for making illegal corporate contributions. Bush Planes appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the Commission. Bush Planes again appealed, this time to the Supreme Court, arguing: (1) that the Commission erred when it found Bush Planes had violated Alaska law; and (2) that the fine the Commission imposed was unconstitutionally excessive. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission. View "RBG Bush Planes, LLC v. Alaska Public Offices Commission" on Justia Law

Gerald Geier, an accountant, was the treasurer of Stop Now!, a Missouri political action committee (PAC). Geier was required to register the PAC with the Missouri Ethics Commission (MEC). Stop Now! became inactive after 2003, and the PAC’s bank account closed in 2006. When Stop Now! failed to file disclosure reports for the first three quarters of 2011, the MEC opened an investigation. The MEC subsequently filed a complaint against Geier and Stop Now!, alleging that they violated Mo. Rev. Stat. 13.046.1, 130.021.4(1) and 130.021.7 by failing to timely file disclosure reports and failing to notify the MEC of the closure of the PAC’s bank account. After a hearing, the MEC found probable cause that Geier and Stop Now! knowingly violated the applicable statutes. Geier sought judicial review, challenging, inter alia, the constitutional validity of the reporting statutes. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the MEC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the reporting statutes are constitutional as applied; (2) Geier’s challenges to the facial validity of the reporting statutes are not ripe; (3) section 105.961.3, the statute that requires the MEC’s hearings be closed to the public, does not violate the First or Sixth Amendments; and (4) the MEC had authority to investigate Geier. View "Geier v. Missouri Ethics Comm’n" on Justia Law

Appellant, Floyd Gray, filed a complaint for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment seeking to challenge the eligibility of Appellee, Mary Thomas-Barnes, as a candidate in the mayoral election in Dermott, Arkansas. Appellant alleged that Appellee was a convicted felon and therefore asked for a declaration that Appellee was unqualified to seek election. The circuit court dismissed Appellant’s complaint based on lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Appellant’s pleading, which was filed the day before the election, was an attempt to bring a pre-election challenge by post-election means. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal as moot because the election had already been held. View "Gray v. Thomas-Barnes" on Justia Law

Appellants sought to reverse a superior court order denying appellants' motion to enjoin the secretary of state from placing Initiative 1366 (I-1366) on the November 2015 general election ballot. Appellants claimed the initiative went beyond the scope of the people’s initiative power under article II, section 1 of the Washington constitution and was therefore not proper for direct legislation. The trial court ruled that: ( 1) appellants had standing to challenge the initiative as taxpayers, county election officials, and legislators; (2) this was a challenge to the scope of the initiative and therefore appropriate for preelection review; (3) the "fundamental, stated and overriding purpose" of I-1366 was to amend the constitution in violation of article II of the state constitution; (4) I-1366 violated article XXIII of the state constitution; and (5) appellants were unable to show a "clear legal or equitable right" to an injunction under “Rabon v. City of Seattle,” ( 957 P.2d 621 (1998)), because the Supreme Court had yet to decide whether preelection restrictions on initiatives infringe on free speech rights under the First Amendment or article I, section 5 of the Washington constitution. After review, the Washington Court determined that appellants did not make a clear showing that the subject matter of the initiative was not within the broad scope of the people's power of direct legislation and, as such, failed to demonstrate a clear legal right for injunctive relief. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court. View "Huff v. Wyman" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, five Tucson voters and a non-profit corporation called PIA, filed suit challenging the constitutionality of Tucson’s hybrid system for electing members of its city council. The Supreme Court has held that the primary and general elections are a “single instrumentality for choice of officers.” Because the primary and general elections are two parts of a “unitary” process, a citizen’s right to vote in the general election may be meaningless unless he is also permitted to vote in the primary. Because the constituency of the representative to be elected remains static throughout the election process, the geographical unit must also remain static throughout that process. In this case, such mismatches between voters at different stages of a single election cycle are not constitutionally permissible. The court concluded that the practical effect of the Tucson system is to give some of a representative’s constituents - those in his home ward - a vote of disproportionate weight. The court held that every otherwise eligible voter who will be a constituent of the winner of the general election must have an equal opportunity to participate in each election cycle through which that candidate is selected. Because all Tucsonans have an equal interest in determining who the nominees will be, the city may not exclude out-of-ward voters from the primaries. Thus, the court rejected the city's final argument that the hybrid system is a reasonable “residency restriction” on the right to vote. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment in favor of the city. View "Public Integrity Alliance v. City of Tucson" on Justia Law

Political parties may apply to the Secretary of State for state funds to reimburse expenses connected with administering primary elections. After Wendy Davis was certified as the Democratic nominee for State Senate District 10 in the primary election, Davis’s Republican opponent sued to remove Davis from the general election ballot. The challenge failed, and Davis prevailed in the general election. The state and county Democratic Party chairpersons subsequently applied for reimbursement of attorney’s fees related to defending the challenge to Davis’s candidacy. The Secretary of State declined to reimburse the legal expenses to the Democratic Party because the party incurred those expenses after the primary election and in connection with the general election. The district court upheld the Secretary’s decision. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the legal expenses were plainly connected to the primary election because they were based on Davis’s alleged constitutional ineligibility to appear on the primary election ballot. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Secretary did not abuse his discretion in denying the requested reimbursement from the primary election fund, as the Secretary is not obligated to reimburse a political party for legal expenses incurred in defending its nominee’s right to appear on the general-election ballot. View "Cascos v. Tarrant County Democratic Party" on Justia Law

The Union County Election Commission disqualified Roger Browning from running for Union County Superintendent of Education, finding that he was not a qualified elector of the Union County School District. The Circuit Court overturned the Commission’s decision and issued an injunction requiring Browning’s name to be placed on the ballot for the general election. James Basil, the incumbent Union County Superintendent of Education appealed the circuit court’s decision, arguing that Browning did not meet the residency requirement to serve as county superintendent. After review, the Supreme Court held that Browning, a resident of the New Albany Municipal Separate School District, was not eligible to run for Union County Superintendent of Education. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Circuit Court and rendered judgment in Basil’s favor. View "Basil v. Browning" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that the towns of Woodbury and Bethlehem held a referendum on the question of whether to approve a resolution by the Board of Education for Regional School District Number 14 authorizing the issuance of bonds and notes to finance school construction expenses without complying with the provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. 10-56, 10-47c and 9-226 requiring towns to publish warning of a referendum in the same manner as provided for the election of town officials. Plaintiffs contended that this failure rendered the referendum null and void ab initio. Defendants, the towns and the board of education, filed motions to strike Plaintiffs’ claims, which the trial court granted in part. As to the remaining claims, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendants’ failure to comply with the notice provisions of the governing statutes did not automatically require the invalidation of the referendum; and (2) there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the results of the referendum were seriously in doubt as the result of Defendants’ failure to properly warn the referendum pursuant to the applicable statute. View "Arras v. Reg’l Sch. Dist. No. 14" on Justia Law

In 2015, Red Clay Consolidated School District (Red Clay) sought approval from voters to increase certain school-related property taxes. The referendum passed. Plaintiffs were residents of Red Clay who opposed the tax increase but did not vote because they were unable to access the polls. Plaintiffs brought this complaint asserting that Red Clay deprived them of their right to vote without due process of law and denied them equal protection, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that Red Clay violated Del. Const. art. I, 3, which states that all elections shall be free and equal. Specifically, Plaintiffs asserted that Red Clay raised impediments to voting by elderly and disabled residents, who Red Clay believed would oppose the tax increase. Red Clay filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court of Chancery denied Red Clay’s motion, concluding that Plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to move beyond the pleading stage. View "Young v. Red Clay Consolidated Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Relator, Richard Burroughs, submitted a nominating petition containing twenty-four valid signatures to run as an independent candidate for the city of Akron ward 8 council position in the November 3, 2015 election. The Summit County Board of Elections rejected four petition signatures because they did not match the signatures on the electors’ voter-registration forms. Relator sought a writ of mandamus ordering the Board to certify him for the city of Akron ward 8 council position in the general election. On the authority of State ex rel. Crowl v. Delaware County Bd. of Elections, also decided today, the Supreme Court granted a writ, concluding that the Board abused its discretion in rejecting the four petition signatures and in denying Relator a place on the ballot. View "State ex rel. Burroughs v. Summit County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law