The Union County Election Commission disqualified Roger Browning from running for Union County Superintendent of Education, finding that he was not a qualified elector of the Union County School District. The Circuit Court overturned the Commission’s decision and issued an injunction requiring Browning’s name to be placed on the ballot for the general election. James Basil, the incumbent Union County Superintendent of Education appealed the circuit court’s decision, arguing that Browning did not meet the residency requirement to serve as county superintendent. After review, the Supreme Court held that Browning, a resident of the New Albany Municipal Separate School District, was not eligible to run for Union County Superintendent of Education. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Circuit Court and rendered judgment in Basil’s favor. View "Basil v. Browning" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that the towns of Woodbury and Bethlehem held a referendum on the question of whether to approve a resolution by the Board of Education for Regional School District Number 14 authorizing the issuance of bonds and notes to finance school construction expenses without complying with the provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. 10-56, 10-47c and 9-226 requiring towns to publish warning of a referendum in the same manner as provided for the election of town officials. Plaintiffs contended that this failure rendered the referendum null and void ab initio. Defendants, the towns and the board of education, filed motions to strike Plaintiffs’ claims, which the trial court granted in part. As to the remaining claims, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendants’ failure to comply with the notice provisions of the governing statutes did not automatically require the invalidation of the referendum; and (2) there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the results of the referendum were seriously in doubt as the result of Defendants’ failure to properly warn the referendum pursuant to the applicable statute. View "Arras v. Reg’l Sch. Dist. No. 14" on Justia Law

In 2015, Red Clay Consolidated School District (Red Clay) sought approval from voters to increase certain school-related property taxes. The referendum passed. Plaintiffs were residents of Red Clay who opposed the tax increase but did not vote because they were unable to access the polls. Plaintiffs brought this complaint asserting that Red Clay deprived them of their right to vote without due process of law and denied them equal protection, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that Red Clay violated Del. Const. art. I, 3, which states that all elections shall be free and equal. Specifically, Plaintiffs asserted that Red Clay raised impediments to voting by elderly and disabled residents, who Red Clay believed would oppose the tax increase. Red Clay filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court of Chancery denied Red Clay’s motion, concluding that Plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to move beyond the pleading stage. View "Young v. Red Clay Consolidated Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Relator, Richard Burroughs, submitted a nominating petition containing twenty-four valid signatures to run as an independent candidate for the city of Akron ward 8 council position in the November 3, 2015 election. The Summit County Board of Elections rejected four petition signatures because they did not match the signatures on the electors’ voter-registration forms. Relator sought a writ of mandamus ordering the Board to certify him for the city of Akron ward 8 council position in the general election. On the authority of State ex rel. Crowl v. Delaware County Bd. of Elections, also decided today, the Supreme Court granted a writ, concluding that the Board abused its discretion in rejecting the four petition signatures and in denying Relator a place on the ballot. View "State ex rel. Burroughs v. Summit County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Relator, Douglas Crowl, gathered signatures on a nominating petition to run for the position of Porter Township trustee in the November 3, 2015 general election. Crowl timely filed the petition with the Delaware County Board of Elections. The Board marked eight signatures as not genuine and determined that Crowl’s petition did not have enough valid signatures to qualify for the ballot. Crowl objected, but the Board denied the protest. Crowl sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Board to place his name on the November 2015 general-election ballot. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that because the Board admitted that the eight signatures in question were genuine, the Board abused its discretion when it denied Crowl a place on the ballot. View "State ex rel. Crowl v. Delaware County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

In 2014, Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted decided to remove several members of the Lucas County Board of Elections from their positions. The Lucas County Republican Party Executive Committee (LCRP) formally recommended Kelly Bensman and Benjamin Roberts for appointment. Husted rejected the recommendations by letter. The executive committee subsequently sought a writ of mandamus compelling Husted to appoint Bensman and Roberts to seats on the Board. The Supreme Court denied the application for a writ of mandamus, holding that Husted did not abuse his discretion, and therefore, LCRP was not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the appointment of Bensman or Roberts. View "Lucas County Republican Party Executive Comm. v. Husted" on Justia Law

Kelly Horwitz and Cason Kirby were both candidates in the August 27, 2013, election for District 4 of the Tuscaloosa Board of Education. Kirby was certified as the winner of the election. The certified vote totals were 416 votes for Kirby and 329 votes for Horwitz. Horwitz contested the results. The trial court entered a "Final Order Denying Contest" in which, among other things, it concluded that the affidavits established that no more than 70 illegal votes had been cast in the election. On November 24, 2013, Horwitz filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court's judgment; that motion was denied by operation of law on February 24, 2014. Horwitz appealed the trial court's order denying her election contest. Based on the applicable law and facts, the Supreme Court concluded that "Phase I" of the election contest yielded a total of 159 ballots that should have been rejected. The judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case remanded back to the trial court for the conduct by the trial court of Phase II of the contest. View "Horwitz v. Kirby" on Justia Law

Giorgio was the Chief Financial Officer of Suarez, a direct-marketing company. He and his boss asked employees to donate $5,000 each to political candidates, promising that the company would reimburse the donations. When the scheme was disclosed, Giorgio admitted to soliciting money from “straw campaign donors” in violation of campaign-finance laws that then banned all corporate donations to candidates, 2 U.S.C. 441b, and individual donations of more than $5,000 per candidate in an election cycle. Federal law also bans people from “mak[ing] a contribution in the name of another person,” 52 U.S.C. 30122. He signed a plea agreement. After a jury acquitted his co-conspirators, he tried twice to withdraw his plea. The district court declined and sentenced him at the bottom of the (much-lowered) guideline range—to 27 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Giorgio is a sophisticated and well-educated businessman, not apt to misunderstand what he was signing. Giorgio did not show that there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty even if he could show conflicted counsel based on the company’s paying for his defense. Giorgio admitted his guilt and insisted on sticking to his plea even when asked, after trial, if he wanted to withdraw it. View "United States v. Giorgio" on Justia Law

Petitioners, four of the prospective sponsors of a proposed referendum petition, asserted that they prepared and attempted to submit a referendum application but were denied the opportunity based on Utah Code 20A-7-302, which states that “persons wishing to circulate a referendum petition shall file an application with the lieutenant governor within five calendar days after the end of the legislative session at which the law passed.” The petition implied that the five-day deadline is unconstitutional because referenda sponsors, as a practical matter, cannot comply. The Supreme Court declined to grant the requested relief, holding that even if the Court accepted the petition’s factual allegations, Petitioners failed to provide the Court with a sound basis for declaring Utah Code 20A-7-302 unconstitutional on its face or as applied to the facts they alleged. View "Gricius v. Cox" on Justia Law

Colleen O’Toole is currently a judge and announced her intention to run for election in 2016 to one of the three contested seats on the Supreme Court of Ohio. O’Toole and her judicial campaign committee challenged the constitutionality of several provisions of the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, including Rule 4.4(E) and sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction only with respect to Rule 4.4(E) which states that: The campaign committee of a judicial candidate may begin soliciting and receiving contributions no earlier than one hundred twenty days before the first Tuesday after the first Monday in May of the year in which the general election is held. If the general election is held in 2012 or any fourth year thereafter, the campaign committee of a judicial candidate may begin soliciting and receiving contributions no earlier than one hundred twenty days before the first Tuesday after the first Monday in March of the year in which the general election is held. The district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the campaign committee failed to demonstrate likelihood of success on the merits or likelihood of irreparable harm. View "O'Toole v. O'Connor" on Justia Law