In 2009, the Governor appointed District Judge Sheri Raphaelson to fill a vacancy in Division V of the First Judicial District Court created when then-District Judge Tim Garcia was appointed to the New Mexico Court of Appeals, leaving an unexpired term of office. A year later, as required by Article VI, Section 35 of the New Mexico Constitution, Judge Raphaelson successfully ran in a partisan election to remain in office as Judge Garciaís successor. On March 11, 2014, Judge Raphaelson filed a declaration of candidacy to place her name on the ballot for retention in the 2014 general election in accordance with Article VI, Section 34 of the New Mexico Constitution and NMSA 1978, Section 1-8-26 (2013). In the general election, Judge Raphaelsonís fell short of the 57 percent votes necessary to retain the office as stipulated by Article VI, Section 33(A) of the New Mexico Constitution. Days after the 2014 general election, despite her unsuccessful retention election, Judge Raphaelson publically declared her intent to remain on the bench until January 1, 2017, not January 1, 2015. Judge Raphaelson contended for the first time that her six-year term of office had begun on January 1, 2011, after her successful partisan election, and that she had mistakenly stood for retention prematurely. Upon review of this matter, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a judge elected in a partisan election is subject to retention in the sixth year of the predecessor judge's term, and that by failing to win enough votes for retention, Judge Raphaelson lost her seat. "Any effort to remain in office beyond December 31, 2014 contravened the Constitution, justifying our writ of quo warranto." View "King v. Raphaelson" on Justia Law

At issue in this mandamus proceeding was the City of Houston’s equal rights ordinance. Relators - two signers of a referendum petition calling for the repeal of the ordinance - contested the wording of the ballot language. Two days after the City Council adopted the current ballot language, Relators petitioned for emergency and mandamus relief, noting that the deadline for revising the ballot language had not yet passed. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, directing the City Council to word the proposition such that voters will vote directly for or against the ordinance. View "In re Williams" on Justia Law

Appellee Adrian Shipman filed a Petition Appealing the Attorney General's Ballot Title for Legislative Alternative Measure 42A in the First Judicial District of Hinds County. The petition asked the circuit court to review the ballot title drafted by the Attorney General for the Alternative Measure, which the Legislature proposed as an amendment to Measure 42, itself a ballot measure proposed by petition of qualified electors pursuant to Section 273 of the Mississippi Constitution. Although the Legislature of the State of Mississippi, as appellant, raised several issues, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the circuit court had no authority to entertain an appeal of the Attorney General's ballot title for a legislatively created amendment to a ballot measure. Accordingly, the Court reversed the circuit court's judgment. View "Legislature of the State of Mississippi v. Shipman" on Justia Law

Appellee Emily Kane ran for elective office while she was employed at the Albuquerque Fire Department (the AFD) as a captain. Article X, Section 3 of the Charter of the City of Albuquerque (1989), and the City of Albuquerque Personnel Rules and Regulations Section 311.3 (2001), prohibit city employees from holding elective office. Kane sought injunctive relief to allow her to hold elective office while retaining her employment with the AFD. She argued that the employment regulations of the City of Albuquerque (the City) violated: (1) the First and Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution; (2) Article VII, Section 2 of the New Mexico Constitution; and (3) Section 10-7F-9 of the Hazardous Duty Officers' Employer-Employee Relations Act (the HDOA). The district court granted Kane the relief she sought, but the Supreme Court reversed. The Court found the City's employment regulations did not violate the First Amendment because they regulated conflicts of interest, and they were therefore rationally related to the legitimate government purpose of promoting administrative efficiency. In addition, the Court held these regulations did not violate Article VII, Section 2 because they constituted conditions of employment that did not add additional qualifications to elective public office. Finally, the City's employment regulations were not preempted by Section 10-7F-9 because personnel rules touched issues of local rather than general concern, and they were within the City's authority to promulgate. View "Kane v. City of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether an initiative petition filed under the Optional Municipal Charter Law (known as the Faulkner Act), requiring the City of Camden to create and maintain its own police force, and enjoining the municipality from replacing its police force with a countywide police force, unlawfully restricted the municipality's legislative authority or was preempted by state fiscal statutes. Defendants, a group of City voters acting as a Committee of Petitioners (Committee), attempted to block the regionalization of the City's police services. The Committee invoked the Optional Municipal Charter Law. The Committee submitted an initiative petition for the adoption of a proposed ordinance that would have required the City of Camden to create and maintain its own police force, and would have enjoined the City from disbanding its municipal police force and replacing it with a regionalized or countywide police force. The Committee obtained, on its petition, the number of voter signatures required by the Faulkner Act. It sought to have its initiated ordinance certified by the municipal clerk, considered by the City Council, and, if not enacted by the Council, placed on the ballot for voter approval in the 2012 General Election. Plaintiffs Mayor Dana L. Redd, Camden's Mayor, and Camden's Council President Francisco Moran filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the Committee's Faulkner Act initiative. The trial court found that the proposed ordinance constituted an invalid divestment of the City's legislative authority. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for a determination whether the state fiscal statutes preempt the proposed ordinance. Although the Supreme Court concurred with the Appellate Division that the proposed ordinance does not constitute an improper divestment of the municipal governing body's legislative power, it disagreed with the panel's remand of the case for further inquiry into the question of preemption. The Supreme Court found no evidence of a legislative intent to preempt the initiative and referendum procedure set forth in the Faulkner Act in either the municipal finance or police statutes cited in this appeal. Instead, the Court found a legislative intent in some of the statutes to retain the Faulkner Act's procedures, including its initiative and referendum provisions. Thus, the Committee's Faulkner Act initiative was not preempted. Notwithstanding the Court's holdings that the proposed ordinance neither effected an unlawful divestment of legislative power nor was preempted by state statutes, the relief sought by the Committee in its 2012 petition was not granted in a manner consistent with the Faulkner Act. Because the reorganization that the ordinance was intended to forestall was completed more than two years ago, the ordinance as drafted was inconsistent with then-current circumstances. Accordingly, the ordinance might no longer be supported by all of the citizens who backed it with their signatures, and it could not meaningfully be evaluated by the voters. The presence of an out-of-date ordinance on the ballot would contravene the Faulkner Act's objective that voters be presented with a clear, understandable proposed ordinance that they may accept or reject as they see fit. Accordingly, The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Appellate Division's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for entry of a judgment barring the Camden Municipal Clerk from certifying the Committee's petition. View "Redd v. Bowman" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality and legality of Senate Bill 14 in 2011, which requires individuals to present one of several forms of photo identification in order to vote. The district court held that SB 14 was enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose, has a racially discriminatory effect, is a poll tax, and unconstitutionally burdens the right to vote. The court vacated the district court’s judgment that SB 14 was passed with a racially discriminatory purpose and remanded for further consideration of plaintiffs’ discriminatory purpose claims, using the proper legal standards and evidence; vacated the district court’s holding that SB 14 is a poll tax under the Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments and rendered judgment for the State on this issue; the court need not and did not address whether SB 14 unconstitutionally burdens the right to vote under the First and Fourteenth Amendments; vacated the district court’s judgment on that issue and dismissed those claims; and affirmed the district court’s finding that SB 14 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. 10301(a), through its discriminatory effects and remanded for consideration of the appropriate remedy. Finally, the court remanded with further instructions. View "Veasey v. Abbott" on Justia Law

In 2014, the Montana Commissioner of Political Practices (COPP) issued a decision finding sufficient evidence that Terry Bannan had violated Montana’s campaign practices laws during the 2010 primary election and that civil adjudication of the violations was warranted. The COPP forwarded the sufficiency decision to the Lewis and Clark County Attorney for consideration. Bannan filed an action for declaratory relief in the Gallatin County District Court alleging that the COPP acted unlawfully by referring its sufficiency findings to the Lewis and Clark County Attorney rather than the Gallatin County Attorney. The Lewis and Clark County Attorney waived his right to participate in the action, citing Mont. Code Ann. 13-37-124(2). Thereafter, the COPP filed an enforcement action against Bannan in the Lewis and Clark County District Court. Bannan filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the COPP was obligated to assert its claims in the Gallatin County declaratory judgment action. The district court in Lewis and Clark County denied Bannan’s motion to dismiss. Bannan appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed Bannan’s appeal as premature, holding that Bannan’s appeal must be characterized as one seeking relief from the denial of a motion to dismiss, and orders denying motions to dismiss are not appealable. View "Motl v. Bannan" on Justia Law

After a formal investigation, the Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices determined that the National Organization for Marriage (NOM) - a national nonprofit advocacy corporation “dedicated to preserving the institution of marriage as between one man and one woman” - was a “ballot question committee” and was therefore subject to and in violation of the registration and reporting requirements of Me. Rev. Stat. 21-A, 1056-B. The business and consumer docket denied NOM’s petition for review. NOM filed a petition for review of the Commission’s decision, accompanied by a motion for a stay pending the resolution of its appeal. The trial court denied NOM’s request for a stay. NOM then filed a petition with the Supreme Judicial Court seeking “clarification” that the Commission’s decision was automatically stayed or, alternatively, seeking a stay pursuant to the Court’s inherent power to grant a stay. The Supreme Judicial Court denied NOM’s motion for a stay, holding (1) the Commission’s determination is not automatically stayed pending appeal pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 62(e); and (2) the Court declines to stay the Commission’s decision pursuant to its inherent equitable authority. View "Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. Comm’n of Governmental Ethics & Elections Practices" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Montana Commissioner of Political Practices (COPP) issued a decision finding sufficient evidence that Ronald Murray had violated Montana’s campaign practices laws during the 2010 primary election and that civil adjudication of the violations was warranted. COPP forwarded the sufficiency decision to the Lewis and Clark County Attorney for consideration. Murray filed an action for declaratory relief in the Gallatin County District Court seeking a determination that Jonathan Motl, in his capacity as the COPP, violated Mont. Code Ann. 13-37-124 by referring the sufficiency decision to the Lewis and Clark County Attorney rather than the Gallatin County Attorney. Thereafter, the COPP filed a complaint against Murray in the Lewis and Clark County District Court (the “enforcement action”) alleging the various campaign finance and practice violations in the sufficiency decision. The district court in Gallatin County dismissed Murray’s declaratory relief action for lack of a justiciable controversy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Murray’s declaratory relief action, as Murray had an adequate alternative remedy available to him in that he may assert in the enforcement action issues sought to be declared as a defense in the declaratory action. View "Murray v. Motl" on Justia Law

The Commission imposed an $8,690 fine on the Combat Veterans and its treasurer, David Wiggs, in his official capacity, for failing to meet three required reporting deadlines under the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. 431 et seq. Combat Veterans filed suit against the Commission, contesting the fine and charging that the Commission’s procedural errors deprived it of the power to act. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court rejected all of Combat Veterans’ claims and granted judgment to the Commission. At issue, among other things, was whether the Commission’s voting procedures may contravene the Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. 30109(a)(2). The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the Commission’s use of its voting procedure was harmless even if it was in error. In this case, Combat Veterans has failed to show that the Commission’s use of its allegedly flawed voting procedure caused it any prejudice. The court rejected Combat Veterans' remaining challenges, agreeing with the district court's explanations. View "Combat Veterans for Congress v. FEC" on Justia Law