After the Houston City Council adopted an equal rights ordinance, Relators - residents of the City of Houston - organized a petition drive calling for the City Council to repeal the ordinance or put it to popular vote. The City Secretary certified the petition’s sufficiency, but the City Council denied it, claiming that the petition was invalid because it lacked the required number of valid signatures. Relators sought mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding (1) Relators did not have an adequate remedy by way of appeal for lack of sufficient time for the appeal to be finally resolved; and (2) the City Council did not perform its ministerial duty to immediately reconsider the ordinance after the City Secretary certified the petition’s sufficiency and, if it did not repeal it, to put it on the November 2015 ballot. View "In re Jared Woodfill" on Justia Law

In October 2013, William “Bill” Stone moved from Ashland in Benton County to Holly Springs in Marshall County. He sought the Democratic Party nomination for the newly-created Senate District 10, a district which encompassed parts of Marshall County, including Stone’s home in Holly Springs, and parts of Tate County. In 2015, Steve Hale, a resident of Tate County who also sought the Democratic nomination for District 10, filed an objection to Stone’s candidacy with the State of Mississippi Democratic Executive Committee, arguing that Stone was ineligible to run for that office because he did not meet the two-year residency requirement enunciated in Article 4, Section 42, of the Mississippi Constitution. After a hearing, the Executive Committee rejected Hale’s objection and certified that Stone satisfied the qualifications for candidacy. Hale sought judicial review at the Circuit Court. That court held affirmed. Hale then appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court, finding it was not manifest error in that the Circuit Court held Stone had proven that he had established his domicile in Marshall County and that he therefore was qualified to run for the office of senator for District 10. View "Hale v. State of Mississippi Democratic Executive Committee" on Justia Law

Eric Woolery appealed a trial court order denying his motion seeking an award of attorney fees. Woolery filed his motion after he successfully defended against the verified petition for a peremptory writ of mandate that his political opponent, John Wayne Willard, had filed against Neal Kelley, in his official capacity as Registrar of Voters for Orange County. In his petition, Willard challenged the portion of Woolery's candidate designation under Elections Code section 13107, stating his occupation was “Orange Treasurer/CPA.” The trial court denied the petition on the ground that Woolery established that his stated occupation satisfied the statute's requirements. The Court of Appeal affirmed: the trial court did not err by denying the motion for attorney fees because Woolery's successful defense in this matter neither resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, nor conferred a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of persons, within the meaning of section 1021.5. View "Willard v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Before the 2008 presidential election, federal agents were investigating then-Governor Blagojevich and obtained warrants authorizing the interception of his phone calls. When Barack Obama, then a Senator from Illinois, won the election, Blagojevich was to appoint his replacement. Interceptions revealed that Blagojevich viewed the opportunity to appoint a new Senator as a bonanza. After two trials, Blagojevich was convicted of 18 crimes, including attempted extortion from campaign contributors, corrupt solicitation of funds, wire fraud, and lying to federal investigators. The district court sentenced Blagojevich to 168 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated convictions on five counts, concerning Blagojevich’s proposal to appoint Valerie Jarrett to the Senate in exchange for an appointment to the Cabinet, and remanded. The court rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, but concluded the instructions permitted the jury to convict even if it found that his only request of Obama was for a Cabinet position. A proposal to trade one public act for another, logrolling, is unlike the swap of an official act for a private payment. The instructions do not ensure that the jury found that Blagojevich offered to trade the appointment for a private salary. Because the court affirmed on most counts and concluded that the sentencing range lies above 168 months, Blagojevich is not entitled to release pending further proceedings. View "United States v. Blagojevich" on Justia Law

The Smoke Free Committee sought to subject a 2013 Casper City ordinance governing smoking in public places to a referendum vote. The City Clerk determined that the referendum was sixty-one valid signatures short. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and challenging the City Clerk’s determination. The district court entered an oral ruling in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action; (2) the district court did not err in interpreting Wyo. Stat. Ann. 22-23-1005 and related statutes concerning who is a qualified elector registered in a city for purposes of a municipal ordinance referendum petition; and (3) the district court went beyond the realm of declaratory judgment by finding that the City Clerk acted arbitrarily and capriciously in conducting the petition review as he did. View "City of Casper v. Holloway" on Justia Law

Appellant Collette Brown, a resident of Concord Township, Delaware County, appealed the Commonwealth Court's order affirming the trial court's dismissal of her petition to place on the November 2014 ballot, a referendum question seeking to change the Township's governmental status from second-class to first-class. Appellant's petition contained 994 signatures (8.5%) out of the Township’s 11,640 registered voters and claimed that as of the 2010 census, the Township had a population density of around 1,258 inhabitants per square mile (“IPSM”). As stated, both figures easily exceeded the statutory thresholds of 300 IPSM and 5% registered voter signatures, which Appellant believed operated as conjunctive preconditions. Seven named qualified electors (“Appellees”) filed objections and claimed the petition was substantively and procedurally defective under Pennsylvania law, which they argued was time-limited to the first municipal or general election occurring at least ninety days after the 2010 census. That same day, the Delaware County Bureau of Elections intervened and requested declaratory relief, claiming that in addition to not satisfying the statutory requirements, the petition should have been dismissed because a home rule study referendum question was already on the ballot (which voters later approved), and that if Appellant’s referendum question were successful, the subsequent change in Township government could violate the Pennsylvania Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that pursuant to 53 P.S. section 55207, second- to first-class township referendum questions shall be submitted to voters at the first general or municipal election occurring at least ninety days after fulfilling both the population density ascertainment and petition signature filing requirements as set forth in the statute. Accordingly, the Court reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In re: Ballot Quest to Concord Twp" on Justia Law

DSF challenged the Delaware Elections Disclosure Act as facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as-applied to its 2014 Voter Guide, planned for distribution over the internet within 60 days of Delaware’s general election and planned to cost more than $500. The 2013 Act requires “[a]ny person . . . who makes an expenditure for any third-party advertisement that causes the aggregate amount of expenditures for third-party advertisements made by such person to exceed $500 during an election period [to] file a third-party advertisement report with the Commissioner.,” 15 Del. C. 8031(a). A “third-party advertisement” is a communication by any person (other than a candidate committee or a political party) that: Refers to a clearly identified candidate, is publicly distributed within 30 days before a primary or 60 days before a general election to an audience that includes members of the electorate for the office sought by such candidate. The court granted a preliminary injunction, declaring the disclosure requirements unconstitutional. The Third Circuit reversed, finding the Act narrowly tailored and not impermissibly broad. A disclosure requirement is subject to “exacting scrutiny,” necessitating a “substantial relationship” between the state’s interest and the requirement. The Act marries one-time, event-driven disclosures to the “election period,” which is controlled by the relevant candidate’s term, providing the necessary “substantial relationship” between the requirement and Delaware’s informational interest View "Del. Strong Families v. Attorney Gen. Del." on Justia Law

These five John Doe proceedings, referred to as the “John Doe investigation,” were overseen by a single John Doe judge and organized by a single special prosecutor. The purpose of the John Doe investigation was to root out allegedly illegal campaign coordination between certain issue advocacy groups and a candidate for elective office. The special prosecutor obtained wide-ranging subpoenas and search warrants for twenty-nine organizations and individuals seeking millions of documents. The John Doe judge granted the the motions of various targets to quash the subpoenas and search warrants and ordered the return of all seized property. The Supreme Court invalidated the special prosecutor’s theory of the case and ended the unconstitutional John Doe investigation, holding that the special prosecutor employed theories of law that do not exist in order to investigate citizens who were wholly innocent of any wrongdoing. View "Schmitz v. Hon. Gregory A. Peterson" on Justia Law

A trial court found that the Legislature’s 2012 congressional redistricting plan was drawn in violation of the Florida Constitutional’s prohibition on partisan intent because Florida’s twenty-seven congressional districts were apportioned in such a way as to favor the Republican Party and incumbent lawmakers. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court’s finding that the Legislature’s enacted map was tainted by unconstitutional intent; but (2) reversed the trial court’s order upholding the Legislature’s remedial redistricting plan, as the court failed to give proper legal effect to its determination that the Fair Districts Amendment was violated. Remanded to the trial court with directions that it require the Legislature to redraw certain congressional districts pursuant to the guidelines set forth in this opinion. View "League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individual government contractors, challenged 52 U.S.C. 30119(a)(1) as violating their First Amendment and equal protection rights. 52 U.S.C. 30119(a)(1) barred individuals and firms from making federal campaign contributions while they negotiate or perform federal contracts. The court rejected plaintiffs' challenge because the concerns that spurred the original bar remain as important today as when the statute was enacted, and because the statute is closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms. The court stated that there is no dispute regarding the legitimacy or importance of the interests that support the contractor contribution ban. The ban is not only supported by the compelling interest in protecting against quid pro quo corruption and its appearance, it is also supported by the obviously important interest in protecting merit-based public administration commonly at issue in cases involving limits on partisan activities by government employees. Further, the statute employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms, and does not deprive the plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws View "Wagner v. Federal Election Comm'n" on Justia Law