Tennessee previously recognized only statewide political parties as automatically entitled to have their candidates identified on the ballot by their party affiliation. In 2011, the state created a new designation, “recognized minor party,” for any group that successfully filed a petition conforming to requirements established by the coordinator of elections, bearing, at minimum the signatures of registered voters equal to at least 2.5% of the total number of votes cast for gubernatorial candidates in the most recent election of governor, Tenn. Code 2-1-104(a)(24). In 2012, Tennessee again amended its statutes, requiring recognized minor parties to satisfy specific requirements to maintain their status as a recognized minor party beyond the current election year. Two minor parties filed suit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for plaintiffs’ on an equal-protection challenge to the ballot-retention statute, and on a First Amendment challenge to a loyalty oath requirement. The court concluded that the entirety of the statute is not invalid and vacated summary judgment on plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenges to a section that simply requires a party’s rules of operation to be filed with the Tennessee Secretary of State and is unrelated to the loyalty oath requirement. View "Green Party of Tenn. v. Hargett" on Justia Law

Pursuant to the Missouri Transportation Development District Act (Mo. Rev. Stat. 238.200), St. Louis City and University City passed resolutions and filed a petition, seeking to create the proposed District to build a trolley-car rail system and to fund the project by imposing up to a one percent sales tax on retail sales in the proposed District. Notice was published in two newspapers for four weeks. No one opposed the proposal or sought to join the suit. In 2007, the court found that the proposal neither illegal nor unconstitutional and certified a ballot question for registered voters residing or owning property within the proposed District. Voters approved the ballot question and, in 2008, the court entered final judgment. The sales tax was imposed and has been paid and collected since 2008. In 2013, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the District was not lawfully created and a permanent injunction barring the District from building and operating the trolley-car system. The district court dismissed some plaintiffs for lack of standing and granted the District summary judgment on another claim as precluded by state judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a plaintiff’s claim that he did not receive constitutionally adequate notice of the state lawsuit. View "Glickert v. Loop Trolley Transp. Dev. Dist." on Justia Law

In this original proceeding, Plaintiff challenged the sufficiency and fairness of the ballot title for a proposal modifying the right to bear arms in the state constitution. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a post-election challenge to ballot titles can be brought under Mo. Rev. Stat. chapter 115. The Supreme Court held (1) a challenge to a ballot title may be brought either before an election under Mo. Rev. Stat. chapter 116 or after an election under chapter 115 if the issue has not been previously litigated and determined; and (2) because the ballot title’s description of the declarations added was sufficient and fair, Plaintiffs did not show an election irregularity under chapter 115. View "Dotson v. Kander" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed an election contest challenging the summary statement in the ballot title of a proposed constitutional amendment, arguing that the ballot title was insufficient and unfair. At issue in this case, like Dotson v. Kander, was whether a challenge to a ballot title may be brought after voters have adopted the measure. The Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiffs were entitled to bring a post-election challenge to the ballot title because Dotson held that Mo. Rev. Stat. chapters 115 and 116 allow for such challenges; and (2) the ballot title was sufficient and fair, and therefore, the results of the election adopting the amendment were valid. View "Shoemyer v. Kander" on Justia Law

Under Arizona’s Constitution, voters may, by ballot initiative, adopt laws and constitutional amendments and may approve or disapprove measures passed by the legislature. Proposition 106 (2000), an initiative aimed preventing gerrymandering, amended Arizona’s Constitution, removing redistricting authority from the legislature and vesting it in an independent commission. After the 2010 census, the commission adopted redistricting maps for congressional and state legislative districts. The Arizona Legislature challenged the map for congressional districts, arguing violation of the Elections Clause of the U. S. Constitution, which provides:The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations. The district court held that the Arizona Legislature had standing to sue, but rejected its complaint on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Elections Clause and 2 U.S.C. 2a(c) permit the use of a commission to adopt congressional districts. Redistricting is a legislative function to be performed in accordance with state prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include referendum and the Governor’s veto. It is characteristic of the federal system that states retain autonomy to establish their own governmental processes free from incursion by the federal government. The Framers may not have imagined the modern initiative process in which the people’s legislative power is coextensive with the state legislature’s authority, but the invention of the initiative was consistent with the Constitution’s conception of the people as the font of governmental power. Banning use of initiative to direct a state’s method of apportioning congressional districts would cast doubt on other time, place, and manner regulations governing federal elections that states have adopted by initiative without involvement by “the Legislature.” View "Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a candidate in 2010 for the State Senate in Senate District 31, which included all of Park County and most of Sweet Grass County. The Commissioner of Political Practices filed a civil enforcement action against Plaintiff in the Lewis and Clark County District Court following an investigation of alleged violations of campaign practice and finance laws. Plaintiff initiated a declaratory action in the Sixth Judicial District Court, Park County, raising issues similar to those raised in the enforcement action. The Sixth Judicial District Court, ordered, sua sponte, that the declaratory judgment action be transferred to Lewis and Clark County. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) as to Plaintiff, the declaratory action in Park County was duplicative, and this was an appropriate basis on which to transfer the matter; but (2) the district court’s transfer of the action to a specific department and judge within the the First Judicial District was improper. View "Wagman v. Motl" on Justia Law

Shortly before the 2011 election, the Chaffee County Clerk and Recorder received a Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) request from Marilyn Marks for access to voted paper ballots from the 2010 general election. Because the Clerk believed that Colorado law prohibited disclosing voted ballots, and because Marks requested the ballots within twenty days of an upcoming election, the Clerk filed an action in district court under section 24-72-204(6)(a) seeking an order prohibiting or restricting disclosure of the ballots. Before the district court ruled on the merits of the Clerk's request, however, the General Assembly enacted section 24-72-205.5, C.R.S. (2014), providing that voted ballots are subject to CORA and describing the process by which records custodians must make them available. The Clerk then produced a single voted ballot for Marks to inspect, and the parties agreed that the only remaining issue in the case was whether Marks was entitled to costs and attorney fees. The Supreme Court held that where an official custodian sought an order prohibiting or restricting disclosure under section 24-72-204(6)(a), a prevailing records request or is entitled to costs and attorney fees in accordance with section 24-72-204(5). "Under section 24-72-204(5), a prevailing records requestor is entitled to costs and attorney fees unless the district court finds that the denial of the right of inspection was proper. Here, the district court's order reflects that the Clerk's denial of Marks' request was proper. Consequently, Marks is not entitled to attorney fees in this case." The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals holding to the contrary. View "Reno v. Marks" on Justia Law

A narrow majority of voters in the City of Houston adopted an amendment to their City Charter that was approved in the November 2, 2010 election. The amendment created a “Dedicated Pay-As-You-Go Fund for Drainage and Streets.” After the election, several voters filed an election contest seeking a declaration that the ballot proposition was invalid and a determination that the adoption of the amendment was invalid. The ballot in this case did not make clear that the amendment imposed charges directly on many voters. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the City. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the City did not adequately describe the chief features of the charter amendment on the ballot, the proposed amendment was not submitted with such definiteness and certainty that voters would not be misled. Remanded. View "Dacus v. Parker" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging a state law redrawing the Wake County Board of Education electoral districts, arguing that under the new redistricting plan, some citizen’s votes will get significantly more weight than other’s in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of one person, one vote and the North Carolina Constitution’s promise of equal protection. The district court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss and denied plaintiffs’ motion to amend as futile. The court concluded that plaintiffs’ allegations in support of their claim that the law violates the one person, one vote principle suffice to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Thus, plaintiffs have stated a claim upon which relief could be granted against the Wake County Board of Elections and the district court therefore erred in dismissing their suit. The court affirmed, however, the denial of the motion to amend because the state officials plaintiffs proposed to add as named defendants are not amenable to suit. View "Wright v. North Carolina" on Justia Law

Shortly before the 2011 election, the Chaffee County Clerk and Recorder received a Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) request from Marilyn Marks for access to voted paper ballots from the 2010 general election. Because the Clerk believed that Colorado law prohibited disclosing voted ballots, and because Marks requested the ballots within twenty days of an upcoming election, the Clerk sought a declaration that it was prohibited from disclosing the ballots. Before the district court ruled on the merits of the Clerk's request, the General Assembly enacted 24-72-205.5, C.R.S. (2014) that made voted ballots subject to CORA. The Clerk thereafter produced a single voted ballot for Marks to inspect. The only remaining issue in the case was whether Marks was entitled to costs and attorney fees. After its review, the Supreme Court held that when an official custodian sought an order prohibiting or restricting disclosure, a prevailing requestor was entitled to costs and attorney fees unless the district court found that the denial of the right of inspection was proper. The district court in this case found the denial was proper, therefore Marks was not entitled to attorney fees. View "Reno v. Marks" on Justia Law