A-1 filed suit challenging the constitutionality of four provisions of Hawaii's campaign finance laws under Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. On appeal, A-1 challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commission. The court concluded that Hawaii’s expenditure and noncandidate committee definitions in HRS 11-302 are not vague given the Commission’s narrowing construction; Hawaii's advertising definition in HRS 11-302 is not unconstitutionally vague; the noncandidate committee reporting and disclosure requirements survive exacting scrutiny as applied to A-1 where they were substantially related to Hawaii's important interest in informing the electorate, preventing corruption or its appearance, and avoiding the circumvention of valid campaign finance laws; the disclaimer requirement for advertisements is constitutional under Citizens United; A-1 lacks standing to challenge the electioneering communications reporting requirements; the contractor contribution ban is constitutional even as applied to contributions to legislators who neither award nor oversee contracts; and individual Plaintiffs Yamada and Stewart are entitled to attorney's fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment on the merits, but vacated the fee award, referring the matter to the Appellate Commissioner with instructions. View "A-1 A-Lectrician v. Snipes" on Justia Law

The State appealed a superior court order denying its motion for summary judgment and granting that of petitioners, Annemarie. Guare, Cody Blesedell, Garret Healey, Joan Ashwell, and the League of Women Voters, on their petition for declaratory and injunctive relief. When this case was decided by the trial court, petitioners Guare, Blesedell, and Healey were students enrolled at the University of New Hampshire, and petitioner Ashwell was a volunteer with the New Hampshire League of Women Voters. The order on appeal made permanent a preliminary injunction issued in 2012, pursuant to which the State was required to delete from the standard voter registration form the following language: “In declaring New Hampshire as my domicile, I am subject to the laws of the state of New Hampshire which apply to all residents, including laws requiring a driver to register a motor vehicle and apply for a New Hampshire[ ] driver’s license within 60 days of becoming a resident.” The trial court issued the permanent injunction after concluding that the challenged language violated Part I, Article 11 of the New Hampshire Constitution. On appeal, the State did not challenge the trial court’s issuance of injunctive relief. Rather, the State focused its appellate arguments to the trial court’s determination that the challenged language violated Part I, Article 11. Finding that the challenged language unreasonably burdened the fundamental right to vote, and because, the State failed to advance a "sufficiently weighty interest" to justify the language, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s determination that the challenged language violated Part I, Article 11 of the State Constitution. View "Guare v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant La Mar Gunn appealed a superior court judgment declaring a tie in the November 4, 2014 general election for the Office of the Recorder of Deed for Kent County. Defendant-appellee Betty Lou McKenna moved to dismiss Gunn's election contest, arguing that Gunn failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In response to McKenna's motion, Gunn argued that the petition stated a claim, and pointed to the election recount conducted by two superior court judges, "evidenced 'malconduct on the part of election officers or clerks holding the election,'" because three different county conducted by the superior court (sitting as the Board of Canvass) resulted in three different outcomes. McKenna countered that the judges sitting as the Board of Canvass were not "election officers or clerks holding the election." The superior court denied McKenna's motion to dismiss. On appeal, McKenna argued that the superior court "missed the key point" in her motion, and that the claims asserted in Gunn's petition did not fit within the jurisdictional requirements of 15 Del. C. 5941. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that Gunn's petition failed to allege any "malconduct on the part of election officers or clerks holding the election." Therefore, McKenna's motion should have been granted. This case was remanded to the superior court with directions that the judgment be vacated. View "Gunn v. McKenna" on Justia Law

Several voters filed a challenge to Sandoval County’s administration of the 2012 local election, and the district court concluded that the County’s election procedures were so dysfunctional that an immediate remedy was necessary to avoid voter disenfranchisement in the approaching 2014 election. To remedy the anticipated election day problems, the court entered a preliminary injunction that required the County to adhere to new regulations increasing the number of voting centers and voting machines. County election officials sought interlocutory appellate review of the preliminary injunction prior to the election, but the Tenth Circuit declined to intervene at that time. The election went off without a hitch, and the Court reviewed the County’s challenge to the injunction. In addition, the Court considered a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot presented by the voters who brought the suit. Concluding the issues raised by the grant of the preliminary injunction were mooted by the passage of the 2014 election, the Court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Fleming v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

Florida voters elect judges. The Florida Supreme Court adopted Canon 7C(1) of its Code of Judicial Conduct, stating that judicial candidates “shall not personally solicit campaign funds . . . but may establish committees of responsible persons” to raise money for election campaigns. Yulee mailed and posted online a letter soliciting financial contributions to her campaign for judicial office. The Florida Bar disciplined her for violating a Bar Rule requiring candidates to comply with Canon 7C(1). The Florida Supreme Court upheld the sanction against a First Amendment challenge. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. Florida’s interest in preserving public confidence in the integrity of its judiciary is compelling.. Unlike the legislature or the executive, the judiciary “has no influence over either the sword or the purse,” so its authority largely depends on the public’s willingness to respect its decisions. Canon 7C(1) raises no fatal underinclusivity concerns. The solicitation ban aims squarely at the conduct most likely to undermine public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary: it is not riddled with exceptions. Allowing a candidate to use a committee and to write thank you notes reflect Florida’s effort to respect the First Amendment interests of candidates and contributors. Canon 7C(1) is not overinclusive It allows judicial candidates to discuss any issue with any person at any time; to write letters, give speeches, and put up billboards; to contact potential supporters in person, on the phone, or online; and to promote their campaigns through the media. Though they cannot ask for money, they can direct their campaign committees to do so. Florida has reasonably determined that personal appeals for money by a judicial candidate inherently create an appearance of impropriety. Canon 7C(1) must be narrowly tailored, not “perfectly tailored” to address that concern. View "Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar" on Justia Law

In response to time demands of this primary election appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court entered a per curiam order on an expedited basis vacating the order of the Commonwealth Court and directing that Appellee Michael W. Beyer’s name be stricken from the primary ballot for the Democratic Party nomination for the Office of Representative in the General Assembly for the 131st Legislative District. In the per curiam order, the Court stated that an opinion would follow; this was that opinion. Beyer filed nomination petitions with the Department of State seeking placement of his name on the ballot for Democratic Nomination for the Office of Representative in the General Assembly. Appellant Objectors, qualified electors residing in the 131st Legislative District, petitioned to set aside the nomination petition on grounds that Beyer intentionally misrepresented his occupation as “lawyer” on both his Statement of Financial Interests (SOFI) and nomination petitions. At a hearing, .Beyer confirmed he had graduated law school, but had yet to pass or even take any state’s bar examination. Consequently, he was not licensed to practice law at the time he circulated his nomination petitions. He listed his occupation as “lawyer,” he said, because he understood the definition of “lawyer” as found in the Oxford English Dictionary to include someone who studied the law. He therefore thought it fair comment to describe his profession or occupation as “lawyer” on his nomination petition. Though she found that he likely used the title of “lawyer” to “enhance his stature with the electorate,” the trial judge accepted Beyer's explanation that he believed his having studied law and graduated law school in the past, alone, entitled him to claim the occupation. Appellant Objectors contended the Commonwealth Court erred in failing to find that Beyer’s self-designation as a lawyer-by-occupation represented a material defect borne of the intent to mislead the electorate. The Supreme Court agreed: the defect was both material to an elector’s decision to nominate a legislator and incurable by amendment because the candidate knew his representation had the potential to mislead signers about his credentials for the legislative office he sought. Having demonstrated as much, Objectors met their burden of disproving the presumptive validity of the contested nomination petition. Striking Mr. Beyer’s petition under such circumstances to avoid misleading the electorate was consistent with the Election Code’s purpose of protecting, and not defeating, a citizen’s vote. View "In Re: Nom. of Michael W. Beyer" on Justia Law

Russell brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Kentucky Secretary of State, Attorney General, and other state and local officials, alleging that Kentucky Revised Statute 117.235(3), which creates a 300-foot no-political-speech buffer zone around polling locations on election day, violated Russell’s free-speech rights. Russell’s business property is 150 feet from a polling location, with a four-lane highway and guardrails between. Citing the statute, Sheriff’s deputies have removed political signs from his property on previous election days, and the statute’s language prohibits Russell from, on his own property, waving signs and offering campaign literature to passersby. The district court declared the statute unconstitutional, and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The Sixth Circuit granted a partial stay of that injunction, which was issued only days before the 2014 general election, and expedited an appeal. The court then affirmed, holding that it had jurisdiction over the case, that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit against any of the remaining defendants, and that the statute facially violates the First Amendment because Kentucky failed to carry its burden of showing why it required a no-political-speech zone vastly larger than the Supreme Court has previously upheld. View "Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Arizona Legislature enacted a new law requiring voter registration forms to list the two largest parties, as well as provide a blank line for “other party preferences.” See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-152(A)(5). The Arizona Green Party, the Arizona Libertarian Party, and three of their members (together, Plaintiffs) brought this action alleging that the new voter registration form violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because the form failed to “treat equally the four parties with Statewide continuing ballot access.” The district court granted summary judgment for the State. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of establishing that section 16-152(A)(5) is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. View "Ariz. Libertarian Party v. Bennett" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Governor nominated Michael McCarthy for a Massachusetts judgeship. The nomination failed to garner the necessary votes for confirmation. Nearly one month later, Mary-Ellen Manning, a former member of the Executive Council, who had initially abstained from voting, delivered a letter to the Governor stating that she consented to the appointment of McCarthy. Neither the Governor nor the Secretary took further steps regarding McCarthy’s nomination in response to the letter. In 2013,the Governor resubmitted McCarthy’s nomination to the Council for the same judicial position. The nomination again failed to garner the votes needed for confirmation. The Governor never signed, and the Secretary of the Commonwealth never issued, a commission to McCarthy. McCarthy and Manning later filed a complaint against the Governor and the Secretary seeking to establish that McCarthy’s first nomination had resulted in his successful appointment to the judgeship, and therefore, McCarthy was entitled to a commission for that office. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court declined to grant the requested relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because the Governor took no action to effectuate a judicial appointment and the Secretary had no legal duty to act, Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief. View "McCarthy v. The Governor" on Justia Law

Two associations and two individuals brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging two requirements that the State of California and the City of Chula Vista, California, place on persons who wish to sponsor a local ballot measure: (1) the requirement that official proponents of local ballot initiatives be electors, thereby excluding non-natural persons such as corporations and associations; and (2) the requirement that official initiative proponents identify themselves on the face of the initiative petitions. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The en banc court of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the requirement that the official proponent of an initiative be an elector does not violate Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association; but (2) the requirement that the name on the official proponent of an initiative be disclosed on the face of the initiative petitions satisfies exacting scrutiny under the First Amendment. View "Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs v. Norris" on Justia Law