On August 3, 2015, proponents of the "Community Bill of Rights" presented to the Youngstown City Council a proposed amendment to the city charter of Youngstown. The City Council passed an ordinance directing that the proposal be sent to the Mahoning County Board of Elections for placement on the November ballot. The Board voted not to certify the Community Bill of Rights to the ballot, concluding that it was an unconstitutional law. The City of Youngstown commenced this action against the Board of Elections, its individual members, and Secretary of State Jon Husted seeking a writ of mandamus to compel Defendants to certify the ballot measure to appear on the November ballot. The Supreme Court (1) granted the writ against the Board and its members, holding that the Board exceeded its statutory authority in rejecting the ordinance solely because it considered the measure to be unconstitutional in its effects; but (2) denied the writ against Husted, as Husted had not taken any action with respect to the proposed amendment, and therefore, any relief against him would be premature. View "State ex rel. Youngstown v. Mahoning County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

On August 18, 2015, the Ohio Ballot Board adopted ballot language for State Issue 3, a proposed constitutional amendment to Article XV of the Ohio Constitution. Secretary of State Jon Husted issued the ballot title one week later. On August 27, 2015, Relators, the signature-gathering organization ResponsibleOhio and others, commenced this action seeking a writ of mandamus compelling the Ballot Board to replace the ballot language drafted and approved to accompany Issue 3 on the November 2015 ballot. Relators also sought a writ of mandamus against Husted in connection with Issue 3’s ballot title. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus with respect to four specific paragraphs of the ballot language and denied a writ of mandamus as to the title. View "State ex rel. ResponsibleOhio v. Ohio Ballot Bd." on Justia Law

Electors in the counties of Medina, Fulton, and Athens filed petitions to adopt charters their their respective counties. Secretary of State Jon Husted sustained protests against the three petitions, invalidated the petitions, and ordered that the charter proposals shall not appear on the ballots for the November 3, 2015 general election. Relators commenced this expedited election case seeking a writ of mandamus to compel Husted to reverse his decision and compel placement of the charter measures on the November ballots. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) Husted lacked the authority to reject the petitions on the ground that the charters unconstitutionally interfered with the State’s exclusive authority to regulate oil and gas operations; but (2) Husted’s alternative basis for invalidating the charter petitions, namely that the charters did not satisfy the threshold requirements that define a charter initiative, was within his discretion. View "State ex rel. Walker v. Husted" on Justia Law

On November 20, 2014, the city council of Fremont, Ohio passed an ordinance authorizing the mayor to proceed with the process of removing the Ballville Dam. A referendum petition was delivered to Paul Grahl, Fremont’s city auditor, but Grahl did not transmit the referendum petition to the board of elections. Appellants sought a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals seeking to compel Grahl to transmit a certified copy of the ordinance, along with the petitions, to the board of elections. The appellate court denied the writ, concluding that the ordinance was not subject to referendum. The Supreme Court reversed and granted the writ, holding that the ordinance was subject to referendum. View "State ex rel. Szymanowski v. Grahl" on Justia Law

On May 4, 2015, Bernabei resigned as treasurer for three Democratic campaigns and filed his statement of candidacy and nominating petitions with the Stark County Board of Elections declaring his independent candidacy for Mayor of Canton. Nine protestors filed a protest against Bernabei’s candidacy. The Board of Elections members deadlocked on the protest. Secretary of State Jon Husted broke the tie in favor of certifying Bernabei’s independent candidacy for the November 2015 ballot. Relator, one of the protestors, filed the present suit for a writ of prohibition, asserting that Bernabei was not a genuine resident of Canton on the date he filed his nominating petitions and that he did not actually disaffiliate from the Democratic Party before filing his petitions. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) Relator was not entitled to a writ of prohibition based on an alleged residency defect; and (2) Realtor failed to demonstrate that he presented clear and convincing evidence on the disaffiliation question, that Husted abused his discretion, or that Husted acted in clear disregard of applicable law. View "State ex rel. Morris v. Stark County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

On May 4, 2015, Francis H. Cicchinelli Jr., who had a long history as a Democratic Party candidate and officeholder in the city of Massillon, filed a statement of candidacy and nominating petitions with the Stark County Board of Elections declaring his independent candidacy for Mayor of Massillon in the November 2015 election. Four protestors filed a protest of Cicchinelli’s candidacy. The Board of Elections members deadlocked on the protest. Secretary of State Jon Husted broke the tie in favor of certifying Cicchinelli’s independent candidacy for the November ballot. Relators, two of the protestors, filed suit in the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to prevent Husted and the Board of Elections from placing Cicchinelli’s name on the ballot, arguing that Cicchinelli’s claim of independence could not have been made in good faith. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Relators failed to present any evidence that the declaration was not made in good faith. View "State ex rel. Richards v. Stark County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Common Cause is a national organization that advocates for elimination of barriers to voting. ICommon Cause Indiana challenged the constitutionality of Indiana Code 33-33-49-13, which establishes the process for electing judges to the Marion Superior Court in Marion County. This system is unique in Indiana, as it is the only office where primary election voters do not vote for as many candidates as there are persons to be elected to that office in the general election. Common Cause contends that the procedure violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court and Seventh Circuit agreed.The statute burdens the right to cast a meaningful vote without sufficiently weighty interests to justify such a burden. In the context of partisan judicial elections, which the state has chosen to adopt as its preferred system for selecting judges for the Marion Superior Court, the asserted benefits and interests surrounding partisan balance do not justify the burden placed on the right to vote. View "Common Cause Ind. v. Individual Members of the Ind. Election Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced an action alleging various constitutional violations with respect to the presidential ballot. Along with his complaint, Plaintiff filed an affidavit of indigence pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws chapter 261, 27B requesting a waiver of normal court fees and litigation costs. In his affidavit, Plaintiff claimed indigence on the ground that he received public assistance in the form of veterans’ benefits. The judge concluded that Plaintiff was not indigent because he had the ability to pay the normal and extra fees and costs. At issue on appeal was whether Plaintiff, who received federal veterans’ benefits and a Massachusetts property tax abatement that were not dependent on his economic circumstances, was considered indigent under Mass. Gen. Laws chapter 261, 27A and therefore entitled to a waiver despite having ample financial resources to pay court fees and costs. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judge’s decision denying Plaintiff’s request for a waiver of normal and extra court fees and litigation costs, holding that the statute was not intended to provide for a waiver under the circumstances of this case. View "Reade v. Sec’y of Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, three civil rights organizations, filed suit alleging that Nevada violated, and continues to violate, Section 7 of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), 52 U.S.C. 20506(a)(2)(A). Section 7 requires states to distribute voter registration materials and to make assistance available to people who visit, and make certain requests of, public assistance offices. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court concluded, however, that plaintiffs have Article III standing by plausibly alleging they have suffered injury in fact fairly traceable to the State’s noncompliance with Section 7 of the NVRA. The court also concluded that plaintiffs have also satisfied the statute’s notice requirement in two ways. First, they notified the State that violations were occurring 120 days before an election, thus authorizing them to file suit after waiting 20 days from the date of their notification. Second, they plausibly alleged that the State was violating Section 7 within 30 days of a federal election, thus permitting them to file suit without first notifying the State (even though plaintiffs in fact had done so). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. The court denied as moot plaintiffs' motion for judicial notice and instructed the district court to assign the case to a different district judge. View "Nat'l Council of La Raza v. Cegavske" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Chris Korpi and plaintiff-respondent Julie Collier were supporters of competing candidates in a local school board election. To educate voters about the candidates he supported, Korpi registered Collier's name and the name of an advocacy group she formed as domain names, and then redirected all Internet users who visited those Web sites to the Web sites for the candidates he supported. Collier filed this action against Korpi, alleging he registered the domain names and illegally used them to mislead the public into thinking she supported his candidates. Korpi moved to strike Collier's complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied Korpi's motion because it found he failed to show Collier's claims arose from free speech activities protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. Although the court acknowledged political commentary was the quintessential form of free speech, it concluded Korpi's conduct in registering the domain names and redirecting Internet traffic did not further Korpi's free speech rights. The Court of Appeal disagreed, reversed and remanded. Registering the domain names and redirecting Internet users to the other Web sites assisted Korpi in exercising his free speech rights because those acts provided him with additional forums to reach the public with information about the school board candidates. "The statute required nothing more." Regardless whether Korpi's conduct advanced or assisted him in exercising his free speech rights, Collier argued the anti-SLAPP statute did not protect Korpi's criminal impersonation of another to deceive the public. "It is not enough that the defendant's conduct violated a civil statute; the defendant's conduct must be criminal to deprive the defendant of the broad protection the anti-SLAPP statute provides for free speech and petition activities. [. . .] Korpi does not concede his conduct was criminal and Collier failed to offer evidence establishing Korpi's conduct was criminal as a matter of law." Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Korpi's motion without determining Collier presented evidence establishing a probability of prevailing on her claims. "Our conclusion the anti-SLAPP statute applies to Korpi's conduct should not be construed as an approval of his conduct." View "Collier v. Harris" on Justia Law