Justia Election Law Opinion Summaries

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Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality and legality of Senate Bill 14 in 2011, which requires individuals to present one of several forms of photo identification in order to vote. The district court held that SB 14 was enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose, has a racially discriminatory effect, is a poll tax, and unconstitutionally burdens the right to vote. The court vacated the district court’s judgment that SB 14 was passed with a racially discriminatory purpose and remanded for further consideration of plaintiffs’ discriminatory purpose claims, using the proper legal standards and evidence; vacated the district court’s holding that SB 14 is a poll tax under the Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments and rendered judgment for the State on this issue; the court need not and did not address whether SB 14 unconstitutionally burdens the right to vote under the First and Fourteenth Amendments; vacated the district court’s judgment on that issue and dismissed those claims; and affirmed the district court’s finding that SB 14 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. 10301(a), through its discriminatory effects and remanded for consideration of the appropriate remedy. Finally, the court remanded with further instructions. View "Veasey v. Abbott" on Justia Law

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In 2014, the Montana Commissioner of Political Practices (COPP) issued a decision finding sufficient evidence that Terry Bannan had violated Montana’s campaign practices laws during the 2010 primary election and that civil adjudication of the violations was warranted. The COPP forwarded the sufficiency decision to the Lewis and Clark County Attorney for consideration. Bannan filed an action for declaratory relief in the Gallatin County District Court alleging that the COPP acted unlawfully by referring its sufficiency findings to the Lewis and Clark County Attorney rather than the Gallatin County Attorney. The Lewis and Clark County Attorney waived his right to participate in the action, citing Mont. Code Ann. 13-37-124(2). Thereafter, the COPP filed an enforcement action against Bannan in the Lewis and Clark County District Court. Bannan filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the COPP was obligated to assert its claims in the Gallatin County declaratory judgment action. The district court in Lewis and Clark County denied Bannan’s motion to dismiss. Bannan appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed Bannan’s appeal as premature, holding that Bannan’s appeal must be characterized as one seeking relief from the denial of a motion to dismiss, and orders denying motions to dismiss are not appealable. View "Motl v. Bannan" on Justia Law

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After a formal investigation, the Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices determined that the National Organization for Marriage (NOM) - a national nonprofit advocacy corporation “dedicated to preserving the institution of marriage as between one man and one woman” - was a “ballot question committee” and was therefore subject to and in violation of the registration and reporting requirements of Me. Rev. Stat. 21-A, 1056-B. The business and consumer docket denied NOM’s petition for review. NOM filed a petition for review of the Commission’s decision, accompanied by a motion for a stay pending the resolution of its appeal. The trial court denied NOM’s request for a stay. NOM then filed a petition with the Supreme Judicial Court seeking “clarification” that the Commission’s decision was automatically stayed or, alternatively, seeking a stay pursuant to the Court’s inherent power to grant a stay. The Supreme Judicial Court denied NOM’s motion for a stay, holding (1) the Commission’s determination is not automatically stayed pending appeal pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 62(e); and (2) the Court declines to stay the Commission’s decision pursuant to its inherent equitable authority. View "Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. Comm’n of Governmental Ethics & Elections Practices" on Justia Law

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In 2013, the Montana Commissioner of Political Practices (COPP) issued a decision finding sufficient evidence that Ronald Murray had violated Montana’s campaign practices laws during the 2010 primary election and that civil adjudication of the violations was warranted. COPP forwarded the sufficiency decision to the Lewis and Clark County Attorney for consideration. Murray filed an action for declaratory relief in the Gallatin County District Court seeking a determination that Jonathan Motl, in his capacity as the COPP, violated Mont. Code Ann. 13-37-124 by referring the sufficiency decision to the Lewis and Clark County Attorney rather than the Gallatin County Attorney. Thereafter, the COPP filed a complaint against Murray in the Lewis and Clark County District Court (the “enforcement action”) alleging the various campaign finance and practice violations in the sufficiency decision. The district court in Gallatin County dismissed Murray’s declaratory relief action for lack of a justiciable controversy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Murray’s declaratory relief action, as Murray had an adequate alternative remedy available to him in that he may assert in the enforcement action issues sought to be declared as a defense in the declaratory action. View "Murray v. Motl" on Justia Law

Posted in: Election Law
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The Commission imposed an $8,690 fine on the Combat Veterans and its treasurer, David Wiggs, in his official capacity, for failing to meet three required reporting deadlines under the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. 431 et seq. Combat Veterans filed suit against the Commission, contesting the fine and charging that the Commission’s procedural errors deprived it of the power to act. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court rejected all of Combat Veterans’ claims and granted judgment to the Commission. At issue, among other things, was whether the Commission’s voting procedures may contravene the Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. 30109(a)(2). The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the Commission’s use of its voting procedure was harmless even if it was in error. In this case, Combat Veterans has failed to show that the Commission’s use of its allegedly flawed voting procedure caused it any prejudice. The court rejected Combat Veterans' remaining challenges, agreeing with the district court's explanations. View "Combat Veterans for Congress v. FEC" on Justia Law

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After the Houston City Council adopted an equal rights ordinance, Relators - residents of the City of Houston - organized a petition drive calling for the City Council to repeal the ordinance or put it to popular vote. The City Secretary certified the petition’s sufficiency, but the City Council denied it, claiming that the petition was invalid because it lacked the required number of valid signatures. Relators sought mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding (1) Relators did not have an adequate remedy by way of appeal for lack of sufficient time for the appeal to be finally resolved; and (2) the City Council did not perform its ministerial duty to immediately reconsider the ordinance after the City Secretary certified the petition’s sufficiency and, if it did not repeal it, to put it on the November 2015 ballot. View "In re Jared Woodfill" on Justia Law

Posted in: Election Law
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In October 2013, William “Bill” Stone moved from Ashland in Benton County to Holly Springs in Marshall County. He sought the Democratic Party nomination for the newly-created Senate District 10, a district which encompassed parts of Marshall County, including Stone’s home in Holly Springs, and parts of Tate County. In 2015, Steve Hale, a resident of Tate County who also sought the Democratic nomination for District 10, filed an objection to Stone’s candidacy with the State of Mississippi Democratic Executive Committee, arguing that Stone was ineligible to run for that office because he did not meet the two-year residency requirement enunciated in Article 4, Section 42, of the Mississippi Constitution. After a hearing, the Executive Committee rejected Hale’s objection and certified that Stone satisfied the qualifications for candidacy. Hale sought judicial review at the Circuit Court. That court held affirmed. Hale then appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court, finding it was not manifest error in that the Circuit Court held Stone had proven that he had established his domicile in Marshall County and that he therefore was qualified to run for the office of senator for District 10. View "Hale v. State of Mississippi Democratic Executive Committee" on Justia Law

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Eric Woolery appealed a trial court order denying his motion seeking an award of attorney fees. Woolery filed his motion after he successfully defended against the verified petition for a peremptory writ of mandate that his political opponent, John Wayne Willard, had filed against Neal Kelley, in his official capacity as Registrar of Voters for Orange County. In his petition, Willard challenged the portion of Woolery's candidate designation under Elections Code section 13107, stating his occupation was “Orange Treasurer/CPA.” The trial court denied the petition on the ground that Woolery established that his stated occupation satisfied the statute's requirements. The Court of Appeal affirmed: the trial court did not err by denying the motion for attorney fees because Woolery's successful defense in this matter neither resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, nor conferred a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of persons, within the meaning of section 1021.5. View "Willard v. Kelley" on Justia Law

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Before the 2008 presidential election, federal agents were investigating then-Governor Blagojevich and obtained warrants authorizing the interception of his phone calls. When Barack Obama, then a Senator from Illinois, won the election, Blagojevich was to appoint his replacement. Interceptions revealed that Blagojevich viewed the opportunity to appoint a new Senator as a bonanza. After two trials, Blagojevich was convicted of 18 crimes, including attempted extortion from campaign contributors, corrupt solicitation of funds, wire fraud, and lying to federal investigators. The district court sentenced Blagojevich to 168 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated convictions on five counts, concerning Blagojevich’s proposal to appoint Valerie Jarrett to the Senate in exchange for an appointment to the Cabinet, and remanded. The court rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, but concluded the instructions permitted the jury to convict even if it found that his only request of Obama was for a Cabinet position. A proposal to trade one public act for another, logrolling, is unlike the swap of an official act for a private payment. The instructions do not ensure that the jury found that Blagojevich offered to trade the appointment for a private salary. Because the court affirmed on most counts and concluded that the sentencing range lies above 168 months, Blagojevich is not entitled to release pending further proceedings. View "United States v. Blagojevich" on Justia Law

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The Smoke Free Committee sought to subject a 2013 Casper City ordinance governing smoking in public places to a referendum vote. The City Clerk determined that the referendum was sixty-one valid signatures short. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and challenging the City Clerk’s determination. The district court entered an oral ruling in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action; (2) the district court did not err in interpreting Wyo. Stat. Ann. 22-23-1005 and related statutes concerning who is a qualified elector registered in a city for purposes of a municipal ordinance referendum petition; and (3) the district court went beyond the realm of declaratory judgment by finding that the City Clerk acted arbitrarily and capriciously in conducting the petition review as he did. View "City of Casper v. Holloway" on Justia Law

Posted in: Election Law