Plaintiff filed a complaint contesting the second special election for councilmember for District IV, City and County of Honolulu, alleging errors in the counting of the votes and the handling of the ballots. Plaintiff, a nonpartisan candidate for the District IV councilmember seat, had lost the election by forty-one votes. The Supreme Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants, the Chief Election Officer and the State Office of Elections, holding that Plaintiff failed to show in his pleadings actual information of errors, mistakes, or irregularities sufficient to change the outcome of the election. View "Waters v. Nago " on Justia Law

Following the census conducted in 2010, the General Assembly enacted redistricting plans for the North Carolina Senate and House of Representatives and for the North Carolina districts for the United States House of Representatives. Plaintiffs sought to have the redistricting plans declared invalid on constitutional and statutory grounds. The trial court concluded that the General Assembly applied traditional and permissible redistricting principles to achieve partisan advantage and that no constitutional violations occurred. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed as to the twenty-six districts drawn to comply with the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, holding that the trial court erred when it applied strict scrutiny before making adequate findings of fact, but because the trial court correctly found that each of the twenty-six districts survived strict scrutiny, the case need not be remanded for reconsideration under what may be a less demanding standard of review; and (2) affirmed as to the remaining challenged districts. View "Dickson v. Rucho" on Justia Law

Paul Sorum appealed a district court order denying his January 2014, petition for a writ of mandamus. The petition requested an order to compel Governor Jack Dalrymple and Secretary of State Al Jaeger to execute and enforce North Dakota's election laws by removing the Democratic-NPL and Republican party candidates for governor and lieutenant governor from the 2012 November general election ballot because of improper certification of endorsement by the Secretary of State's office. The writ also sought to invalidate the election results for those offices and certify the election results after disqualifying all ballots made in support of the removed candidates. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Sorum v. Dalrymple" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Alabama's ballot access statute violates their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the Secretary and adopted much of the district court's reasoning contained in its memorandum opinion and order. The court held that plaintiffs' constitutional claims failed where plaintiffs did not present evidence showing that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the State's restrictions on petition-based ballot access unconstitutionally burdens their associational rights. Rather, the burden on plaintiffs was slight, and the State's interests in treating all political parties fairly and in setting a deadline that provides sufficient time to verify the petition signatures outweigh the burden to plaintiffs' associational rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Stein v. AL Secretary of State" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether a law firm’s post-election forgiveness of a political campaign committee’s unpaid legal fees, which were incurred due to the firm’s representation of a candidate in a ballot challenge, is subject to the contribution limitations established in the Philadelphia Campaign Finance Law (as applicable in 2007). The Commonwealth Court held that the post-election forgiveness of debt would constitute a “contribution” to the candidate’s political campaign under Section 1001(6) of the Code, and, thus, was subject to the $10,000 per year contribution limitation set forth in Section 1001(2). After its review, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the law firm’s forgiveness of debt would not constitute a contribution to the candidate’s political campaign as the debt at issue was not incurred “for use in . . . influencing the election of the candidate.” View "O'Connor v. City of Phila." on Justia Law

The Meridian city council acted upon the recommendation of the former mayor in appointing Defendant as corporation council for the city. Plaintiffs, taxpayers of the city, filed a petition of quo warranto seeking Defendant’s removal from the office of corporation council. The trial court granted the writ and ordered Defendant’s removal from the office, concluding that the Meridian city charter clearly and unambiguously required the current mayor to recommend all appointments to offices or positions within the city. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly determined that the charter required the recommendation of the mayor for the appointment of the corporation counsel for the city. View "DeMayo v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Democratic candidate Bobbie Miller successfully challenged independent incumbent Dimp Powell for the office of mayor of Isola. Prior to the election, the Municipal Election Commission of Isola approved the placement of Miller’s name on the ballot despite the fact that a Democratic Municipal Executive Committee was not in existence by the time of the qualifying deadline for candidates. Powell challenged the Election Commission’s decision in circuit court via a writ of mandamus, requesting the court to order the Commission not to place Miller’s name on the ballot or, in the alternative, to order that any votes cast for Miller not be counted. After an emergency evidentiary hearing, held the week prior to the election, the court denied relief. Powell appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear Powell’s challenge via a writ of mandamus. The appropriate procedural mechanism for challenging the decision of a municipal authority was through a bill of exceptions under Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75. The Court affirmed the outcome of the circuit court’s holding. Because the Court affirmed on jurisdictional grounds, it did not reach the merits of whether Miller’s name should not have been permitted on the ballot when there was no Democratic Municipal Executive Committee in existence at the time of the qualifying deadline. View "Powell v. Municipal Election Comm'n Town of Isola" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an election complaint to contest the November 2014 general election. Plaintiff was not listed on the ballot as a candidate for any officer in the November 2014 general election. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing and, in the alternative, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, holding that Plaintiff could prove no set of facts that would entitle her to any type of relief from the results of the general election, and therefore, Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "Dejean v. Nago" on Justia Law

In 2014, the City of Draper passed and adopted a Resolution that levied a tax on property located within the Traverse Ridge Special Service District. Petitioners, five residents, collected certified voter signatures and asked the City to refer the Resolution to voters of the District. The City rejected the referendum petition, asserting that the tax levy was a nonreferable administrative action. Petitioners filed a petition for writ of extraordinary relief. The Supreme Court granted the relief sought, holding (1) the Resolution was properly referable to the voters because it was legislative in nature; and (2) the City’s constitutional challenge to the subjurisdictional referendum statute failed. View "Mawhinney v. Draper City" on Justia Law

This case involves a challenge to Mississippi's disclosure requirements for ballot initiatives proposing amendments to the state constitution. Plaintiffs, Mississippi citizens, contend that the disclosure requirements impermissibly burden their First Amendment rights. The district court agreed and enjoined Mississippi from enforcing the requirements against small groups and individuals expending "just in excess of" Mississippi's $200 disclosure threshold. The court concluded that plaintiffs have standing where they have shown that they have a legitimate fear of criminal penalties for failure to comply with Chapter 17 of the Mississippi Code's disclosure requirements; plaintiffs' as-applied challenge, asserted both as a collective group and by each plaintiff individually, failed because the record is bereft of facts that would allow the court to assume that plaintiffs intend to raise "just in excess of" $200 as a group or as individuals; the requirements that Mississippi has enacted under Chapter 17 survive plaintiffs' facial challenge under the exacting scrutiny standard where the government has identified a sufficiently important government interest in its disclosure scheme to have an interest in knowing who is lobbying for Mississippians' vote, and is substantially related to this informational interest; and, therefore, the court reversed the district court's order and rendered judgment in favor of defendants were plaintiffs' as-applied and facial constitutional challenges failed. View "Justice, Jr., et al. v. Hosemann, et al." on Justia Law