DSF challenged the Delaware Elections Disclosure Act as facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as-applied to its 2014 Voter Guide, planned for distribution over the internet within 60 days of Delaware’s general election and planned to cost more than $500. The 2013 Act requires “[a]ny person . . . who makes an expenditure for any third-party advertisement that causes the aggregate amount of expenditures for third-party advertisements made by such person to exceed $500 during an election period [to] file a third-party advertisement report with the Commissioner.,” 15 Del. C. 8031(a). A “third-party advertisement” is a communication by any person (other than a candidate committee or a political party) that: Refers to a clearly identified candidate, is publicly distributed within 30 days before a primary or 60 days before a general election to an audience that includes members of the electorate for the office sought by such candidate. The court granted a preliminary injunction, declaring the disclosure requirements unconstitutional. The Third Circuit reversed, finding the Act narrowly tailored and not impermissibly broad. A disclosure requirement is subject to “exacting scrutiny,” necessitating a “substantial relationship” between the state’s interest and the requirement. The Act marries one-time, event-driven disclosures to the “election period,” which is controlled by the relevant candidate’s term, providing the necessary “substantial relationship” between the requirement and Delaware’s informational interest View "Del. Strong Families v. Attorney Gen. Del." on Justia Law

These five John Doe proceedings, referred to as the “John Doe investigation,” were overseen by a single John Doe judge and organized by a single special prosecutor. The purpose of the John Doe investigation was to root out allegedly illegal campaign coordination between certain issue advocacy groups and a candidate for elective office. The special prosecutor obtained wide-ranging subpoenas and search warrants for twenty-nine organizations and individuals seeking millions of documents. The John Doe judge granted the the motions of various targets to quash the subpoenas and search warrants and ordered the return of all seized property. The Supreme Court invalidated the special prosecutor’s theory of the case and ended the unconstitutional John Doe investigation, holding that the special prosecutor employed theories of law that do not exist in order to investigate citizens who were wholly innocent of any wrongdoing. View "Schmitz v. Hon. Gregory A. Peterson" on Justia Law

A trial court found that the Legislature’s 2012 congressional redistricting plan was drawn in violation of the Florida Constitutional’s prohibition on partisan intent because Florida’s twenty-seven congressional districts were apportioned in such a way as to favor the Republican Party and incumbent lawmakers. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court’s finding that the Legislature’s enacted map was tainted by unconstitutional intent; but (2) reversed the trial court’s order upholding the Legislature’s remedial redistricting plan, as the court failed to give proper legal effect to its determination that the Fair Districts Amendment was violated. Remanded to the trial court with directions that it require the Legislature to redraw certain congressional districts pursuant to the guidelines set forth in this opinion. View "League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individual government contractors, challenged 52 U.S.C. 30119(a)(1) as violating their First Amendment and equal protection rights. 52 U.S.C. 30119(a)(1) barred individuals and firms from making federal campaign contributions while they negotiate or perform federal contracts. The court rejected plaintiffs' challenge because the concerns that spurred the original bar remain as important today as when the statute was enacted, and because the statute is closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms. The court stated that there is no dispute regarding the legitimacy or importance of the interests that support the contractor contribution ban. The ban is not only supported by the compelling interest in protecting against quid pro quo corruption and its appearance, it is also supported by the obviously important interest in protecting merit-based public administration commonly at issue in cases involving limits on partisan activities by government employees. Further, the statute employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms, and does not deprive the plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws View "Wagner v. Federal Election Comm'n" on Justia Law

Tennessee previously recognized only statewide political parties as automatically entitled to have their candidates identified on the ballot by their party affiliation. In 2011, the state created a new designation, “recognized minor party,” for any group that successfully filed a petition conforming to requirements established by the coordinator of elections, bearing, at minimum the signatures of registered voters equal to at least 2.5% of the total number of votes cast for gubernatorial candidates in the most recent election of governor, Tenn. Code 2-1-104(a)(24). In 2012, Tennessee again amended its statutes, requiring recognized minor parties to satisfy specific requirements to maintain their status as a recognized minor party beyond the current election year. Two minor parties filed suit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for plaintiffs’ on an equal-protection challenge to the ballot-retention statute, and on a First Amendment challenge to a loyalty oath requirement. The court concluded that the entirety of the statute is not invalid and vacated summary judgment on plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenges to a section that simply requires a party’s rules of operation to be filed with the Tennessee Secretary of State and is unrelated to the loyalty oath requirement. View "Green Party of Tenn. v. Hargett" on Justia Law

Pursuant to the Missouri Transportation Development District Act (Mo. Rev. Stat. 238.200), St. Louis City and University City passed resolutions and filed a petition, seeking to create the proposed District to build a trolley-car rail system and to fund the project by imposing up to a one percent sales tax on retail sales in the proposed District. Notice was published in two newspapers for four weeks. No one opposed the proposal or sought to join the suit. In 2007, the court found that the proposal neither illegal nor unconstitutional and certified a ballot question for registered voters residing or owning property within the proposed District. Voters approved the ballot question and, in 2008, the court entered final judgment. The sales tax was imposed and has been paid and collected since 2008. In 2013, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the District was not lawfully created and a permanent injunction barring the District from building and operating the trolley-car system. The district court dismissed some plaintiffs for lack of standing and granted the District summary judgment on another claim as precluded by state judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a plaintiff’s claim that he did not receive constitutionally adequate notice of the state lawsuit. View "Glickert v. Loop Trolley Transp. Dev. Dist." on Justia Law

In this original proceeding, Plaintiff challenged the sufficiency and fairness of the ballot title for a proposal modifying the right to bear arms in the state constitution. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a post-election challenge to ballot titles can be brought under Mo. Rev. Stat. chapter 115. The Supreme Court held (1) a challenge to a ballot title may be brought either before an election under Mo. Rev. Stat. chapter 116 or after an election under chapter 115 if the issue has not been previously litigated and determined; and (2) because the ballot title’s description of the declarations added was sufficient and fair, Plaintiffs did not show an election irregularity under chapter 115. View "Dotson v. Kander" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed an election contest challenging the summary statement in the ballot title of a proposed constitutional amendment, arguing that the ballot title was insufficient and unfair. At issue in this case, like Dotson v. Kander, was whether a challenge to a ballot title may be brought after voters have adopted the measure. The Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiffs were entitled to bring a post-election challenge to the ballot title because Dotson held that Mo. Rev. Stat. chapters 115 and 116 allow for such challenges; and (2) the ballot title was sufficient and fair, and therefore, the results of the election adopting the amendment were valid. View "Shoemyer v. Kander" on Justia Law

Under Arizona’s Constitution, voters may, by ballot initiative, adopt laws and constitutional amendments and may approve or disapprove measures passed by the legislature. Proposition 106 (2000), an initiative aimed preventing gerrymandering, amended Arizona’s Constitution, removing redistricting authority from the legislature and vesting it in an independent commission. After the 2010 census, the commission adopted redistricting maps for congressional and state legislative districts. The Arizona Legislature challenged the map for congressional districts, arguing violation of the Elections Clause of the U. S. Constitution, which provides:The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations. The district court held that the Arizona Legislature had standing to sue, but rejected its complaint on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Elections Clause and 2 U.S.C. 2a(c) permit the use of a commission to adopt congressional districts. Redistricting is a legislative function to be performed in accordance with state prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include referendum and the Governor’s veto. It is characteristic of the federal system that states retain autonomy to establish their own governmental processes free from incursion by the federal government. The Framers may not have imagined the modern initiative process in which the people’s legislative power is coextensive with the state legislature’s authority, but the invention of the initiative was consistent with the Constitution’s conception of the people as the font of governmental power. Banning use of initiative to direct a state’s method of apportioning congressional districts would cast doubt on other time, place, and manner regulations governing federal elections that states have adopted by initiative without involvement by “the Legislature.” View "Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a candidate in 2010 for the State Senate in Senate District 31, which included all of Park County and most of Sweet Grass County. The Commissioner of Political Practices filed a civil enforcement action against Plaintiff in the Lewis and Clark County District Court following an investigation of alleged violations of campaign practice and finance laws. Plaintiff initiated a declaratory action in the Sixth Judicial District Court, Park County, raising issues similar to those raised in the enforcement action. The Sixth Judicial District Court, ordered, sua sponte, that the declaratory judgment action be transferred to Lewis and Clark County. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) as to Plaintiff, the declaratory action in Park County was duplicative, and this was an appropriate basis on which to transfer the matter; but (2) the district court’s transfer of the action to a specific department and judge within the the First Judicial District was improper. View "Wagman v. Motl" on Justia Law