Prior to March 2014, Appellant filed for re-election as a candidate for Justice of the Peace and subsequently filed for re-election as a candidate for the office of Helena-West Helena City Treasurer. Appellee filed a petition for writ of mandamus and for declaratory judgment seeking to remove Appellant’s name from the ballot, arguing that Appellant’s actions violated Ark. Code Ann. 7-5-111, which states that a person shall not run for election for more than one state, county, or municipal office if the elections are to be held on the same date. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion to withdraw from the Justice of the Peace election. The circuit court denied Appellant’s motion and disqualified Appellant from the city-treasurer position. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and dismissed in part, holding (1) the circuit court properly interpreted section 7-5-111 and disqualified Appellant from the city-treasurer race; (2) the circuit court did not err by denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss; and (3) Appellant’s argument that the circuit court erred in denying his request for alternative relief to withdraw from the Justice of the Peace ballot was moot. View "Roberson v. Phillips County Election Comm'n" on Justia Law

In August, 2014, Elizabeth Joice filed a nomination paper with the Maricopa County Education Service Agency (“Agency”) announcing her intent to run for a vacant term of the Peoria Unified School District Governing Board. Joice also filed nominating petitions that did not comply with Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-314(D). Raymond Malnar filed this action challenging Joice’s candidacy based on her non-compliant nomination petitions. The superior court upheld Malnar’s challenge and ordered that Joice’s name not be included on the 2014 general election ballot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the record reflected proper service on Joice, the superior court correctly found that it had jurisdiction over the matter; and (2) the superior court imposed an appropriate remedy for the violation. View "Malnar v. Joice" on Justia Law

In 2012, individuals and groups challenging the constitutional validity of a 2012 congressional redistricting plan issued a subpoena duces tecum to Pat Bainter, the president of Data Targeting, Inc., a political consulting company. The challengers sought certain documents in the possession of Bainter, Data Targeting, and the company's employees (collectively, Appellants) related to the redistricting litigation. Bainter did not file a motion for a protective order or raise any legal objection to producing the documents sought by the challengers but instead attended a deposition testifying that he had produced what he had found, which was a limited amount. After being served with additional subpoenas duces tecum including the disputed documents within their scope, and during six months of hearings and filings regarding document production, Appellants did not raise any claim of a First Amendment privilege. It was only after Appellants were held in contempt of court that Appellants raised a belated claim of a qualified First Amendment privilege. Ultimately, the trial court ordered that Appellants produce 538 pages of the disputed documents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Appellants’ belated assertions of a qualified First Amendment privilege had been waived. View "Bainter v. League of Women Voters of Fla." on Justia Law

Arizona Secretary of State Ken Bennett and Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach sought, on behalf of their states, that the Election Assistance Commission (“EAC”) add language requiring documentary proof of citizenship to each state’s instructions on the federal voter registration form. The EAC concluded that the additional language was unnecessary and denied their requests. After Kobach and Bennett filed suit challenging the EAC’s decision, the district court concluded that the agency had a nondiscretionary duty to grant their requests. The EAC appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court’s erred in its conclusion: the decision was "plainly" in conflict with the Supreme Court’s decision in "Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc. (ITCA)," (133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013)). "This is one of those instances in which the dissent clearly tells us what the law is not. It is not as if the proposition had not occurred to the majority of the Court. Applying traditional APA review standards, our thorough reading of the record establishes that Kobach and Bennett have failed to advance proof that registration fraud in the use of the Federal Form prevented Arizona and Kansas from enforcing their voter qualifications." View "Kobach v. United States Election Assistance Commission" on Justia Law

Our Community, Our Dollars filed a local-option petition with the county clerk, who certified that the proposal attained the requisite number of signatures required for the proposal to be placed on the ballot for the upcoming general election on November 4, 2014. The circuit court entered an order rescinding the county clerk’s certification of the local-option petition, concluding that the petition did not attain the required number of signatures. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court clearly erred by refusing to consider in its review a number of signatures that the county clerk failed to count prior to certifying the local-option petition. View "Our Cmty., Our Dollars v. Bullock" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Arizona legislature amended Ariz. Rev. Stat. 15-1441(I) to require the election of two at-large members to the governing board of community colleges located in very populous counties. Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking a declaration that section 15-1441(I) violates Arizona’s constitutional prohibition against special laws. The superior court concluded that the legislation did not violate the special law prohibition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the test set forth in Republic Inv. Fund I v. Town of Surprise, section 15-1441(I) does not violate the special laws provision of article 4, part 2, section 19 of the Arizona Constitution. View "Gallardo v. State" on Justia Law

Ohio voters can cast a ballot in person on Election Day, or by using absent voter’s ballot procedures, Ohio Rev. Code 3509.01. One can vote by mail or early, in person, at a designated location if a request is timely received. Overseas uniformed military, those subject to disability or confinement, those in unforeseen hospitalization and those confined for a misdemeanor or awaiting trial can submit ballot applications up to 90 days before an election. Boards of elections send teams to obtain the ballots from confined voters. While teams visit nursing homes up to a month before the election, they wait until Election Day to visit the jails: persons jailed after 6:00 P.M. on the Friday before Election Day who are not released in time to vote on Election Day and who have not already voted are unable to vote. If a voter or the voter’s minor child is “confined in a hospital as a result of an accident or unforeseeable medical emergency” an absentee ballot application can be delivered to the board by 3:00 P.M. on Election Day and the ballot can be entrusted to a family member or to a team for delivery. No corresponding provision exists for persons in jail on Election Day. Plaintiffs alleged violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, the Voting Rights Act, and the Seventeenth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit instructed the district court to dismiss. The organizational plaintiff did not establish concrete and particularized injury to itself or its members. Even if it could demonstrate Article III standing, it asserts the rights of third parties. Its relationship with the persons whom it seeks to help—unidentified, future late-jailed voters—does not resemble the close relationship of the lawyer-client or doctor-patient relationships recognized by the Supreme Court. View "Fair Elections OH v. Husted" on Justia Law

On August 21, 2014, the Secretary of State certified a proposed initiated act known as “An Act to Increase the Arkansas Minimum Wage” to the county boards of election commissioners and advised the county boards that the proposed initiated act would be Issue No. 5 on the November 4, 2014 general-election ballot. Petitioner brought this original action challenging the sufficiency of the petition, contending that the petition had not been timely filed and that the proposed initiated act was not facially valid because it relied on forged notaries to reach the signature threshold. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the petition was timely filed and that the petition, on its face, contained the requisite signatures of a sufficient number. View "Stephens v. Martin" on Justia Law

On June 24, 2014, Thad Cochran, a Republican nominee for United States Senator, won the Republican primary runoff. His opponent, Chris McDaniel, filed an election contest with the State Republican Executive Committee (SREC) on August 4, 2014 – forty-one days after the election. The SREC declined to consider McDaniel’s complaint, and McDaniel appealed. The trial judge found that McDaniel did not meet the twenty-day deadline to file his election contest and dismissed the case. On appeal, McDaniel argued that no deadline existed to contest a primary election. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the Supreme Court found that there indeed was a deadline, and McDaniel failed to file his election contest within twenty days. The dismissal was affirmed. View "McDaniel v. Cochran" on Justia Law

On May 15, 2012, Karl H. Lewies won the primary election for the position of Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney. Because he had no opponent in the general election, he knew he would be elected as the prosecuting attorney, and he was. He was scheduled to be sworn into office on January 14, 2013. On November 23, 2012, he filed two petitions for review against the county commissioners of Fremont County. One petition for review was on behalf of Flying "A"Ranch, Inc., and others, and the other petition was on behalf of E. C. Gwaltney, III. The petitions sought to overturn the designation by the county commissioners of certain roads as being public roads rather than private roads. In early 2013, the county commissioners, represented by Blake Hall, the deputy prosecutor hired by the prosecutor that Lewies had defeated in the primary, filed motions in both cases seeking to have Lewies disqualified from representing the petitioners in those cases. Lewies filed motions in both cases to withdraw as counsel for the petitioners. In each of the cases, Lewies had named two of the commissioners in both their official and individual capacities. The commissioners filed motions in both cases to dismiss the actions against them in their individual capacities. Substitution counsel entered appearances for the county commissioners in both cases. The court made preliminary rulings that Lewies could not represent any parties in the two cases; that the county would be awarded attorney fees against him personally for having to file the motion to disqualify; that an action against the two commissioners in their individual capacities could not be joined with a petition for judicial review; and that attorney fees would not be awarded against Lewies for having named them in their individual capacities. During the hearing, Lewies contended that substitution counsel should have been disqualified from representing the commissioners and that a deputy prosecutor should represent them. Ultimately the trial court entered a written order affirming its preliminary rulings. After several hearings, the court entered its memorandum decision in both cases awarding the county attorney fees in the sum of $1,185.00 against Mr. Lewies personally pursuant to Rule 11(a)(1), and Lewies appealed. Because there was no legal basis for the award, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Lewies v. Fremont County" on Justia Law