Thomas Brown ran unsuccessfully to become the Democratic nominee for a seat on the Ashtabula County common pleas court in the Democratic Party primary election. Brown subsequently filed nominating petitions to be a judicial candidate on the Ashtabula County Western Area Court in the general election. The Ashtabula County Board of Elections (Board) rejected Brown’s petitions based on the ballot-access restrictions set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 3513.04. Relators, including Brown, subsequently sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Board and its director (collectively, Respondents) to certify Brown’s candidacy for the Western Area Court, asserting that section 3513.04 is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Relators failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality and failed to demonstrate that section 3513.04 is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State ex rel. Brown v. Ashtabula County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The district court entered a preliminary injunction, enjoining Ohio from enforcing SB 238’s amendments to section 3509.01 of the Ohio Revised Code reducing the EIP [early in person] voting period from 35 days before an election to the period beginning the day following the close of voter registration; providing that, for the 2014 general election, the EIP voting period shall consist of the 35 days prior to the election; and that, for the 2014 general election, all county Boards of Election must set uniform and suitable EIP voting hours for specific days. The state requested that the Sixth Circuit stay provisions “that could possibly require action” before resolution on appeal. The Sixth Circuit denied the motion. The state did not make a strong showing of likelihood to succeed on the merits or demonstrate that they will suffer more than a mere possibility of irreparable harm, but only articulated that failure to stay the Order would harm the “strong public interest in smooth and effective administration of the voting laws” and would “require additional time and money.” Plaintiffs demonstrated that the public will likely suffer significant harm if the stay is granted by arguing that the Order’s contents already have been disseminated to the public. Staying the Order would create confusion, adversely affecting voter turnout during EIP voting if the Order is affirmed on appeal.View "Finn v. Warren Cnty" on Justia Law

Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the “Tennessee Plan,” which governs the way in which judges of the Tennessee appellate courts are initially selected and thereafter stand for election. The court of appeals upheld as constitutional the Judicial Nominating Commission/gubernatorial appointment under the Tennessee Plan, the retention election portion of the Tennessee Plan, and the election of the Tennessee intermediate appellate court judges on a statewide basis. The Special Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) the issue of the constitutional validity of the Judicial Nominating Commission/gubernatorial appointment process under the Tennessee Plan was moot because by the time the Court heard oral argument, the judicial nominating commission portions of the Tennessee Plan were no longer in effect; (2) the retention election portion of the Tennessee Plan satisfies the constitutional requirement that the judges of the appellate courts be elected by the qualified voters of the State; and (3) the election of judges to the court of appeals and court of criminal appeals on a statewide basis does not violate the state Constitution.View "Hooker v. Haslam" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, physicians and Medicaid providers, wanted to support candidates in the 2010 election, but were barred from doing so by Ohio Rev. Code 3599.45, which limits campaign contributions from Medicaid providers. They sued , arguing that the statute was unconstitutional on its face under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court rejected that position on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding unconstitutionality “clear” and “unavoidable.” The district court then entered a permanent injunction. Plaintiffs sought attorneys’ fees and costs (42 U.S.C. 1988) of $665,645.68. A magistrate recommended an award of $454,635.53 in fees and $6,442.03 in costs, with a $100,183 reduction for investigatory work performed before plaintiffs signed a fee agreement; a 25 percent reduction on discovery fees; and a 25 percent reduction on appellate fees. The district court awarded only $128,908.74 in fees and $6,315.00 in costs, drastically cutting hourly rates, striking hours spent on third-party discovery and other miscellaneous matters, and reducing appellate hours by 50 percent. After arriving at its lodestar calculation, the district court further reduced the fees by 35 percent under the Johnson factors. The court expressed concern that “taxpayers will ultimately bear the burden … Plaintiffs are medical doctors presumably abundantly capable of paying for representation” and that “counsel was merely scouring through campaign laws hoping to find an old one … to challenge in the hope of raking in overstated fees.” The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for recalculation before a different judge. View "Lavin v. Husted" on Justia Law

This case centered two policy issues that are often viewed as controversial: (1) racial, ethnic, and gender preferences; and (2) the decennial redistricting process. In 2008 and 2010, the People of California, exercising their reserved initiative powers, changed the way California's State Senate, State Assembly, Congressional, and Board of Equalization voting districts are adjusted after each national census, assigning the corresponding duties to the California Citizens Redistricting Commission. Plaintiffs Ward Connerly and the American Civil Rights Foundation (collectively, Connerly) sued defendants State of California (State), the State Auditor, and the Commission, alleging the method of selecting members of the Commission violated Proposition 209 (Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 31), in that it gave improper preferences based on race, ethnicity, and gender. Connerly then filed an amended complaint, again asserting the selection process for the last six commissioners violated Proposition 209, but adding that the "Applicant Review Panel" also improperly considered race, ethnicity, and gender. These were characterized as “facial” challenges to Government Code section 8252, subdivision (g) based on Proposition 209, for which various remedies were sought. The State and State Auditor demurred in part on the grounds that Proposition 209 did not apply to the selection of public officers, only to public employees. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on this ground. Connerly appealed. Connerly effectively abandoned his amended complaint, and proposed a new legal theory on appeal--but no new facts--in his opening brief, explicitly citing the authority of Code Civ. Proc. section 472c, subdivision (a). Both the State and State Auditor contended it was unfair for Connerly to raise this theory on appeal because they did not get a chance to disprove it factually. They almost entirely ignored section 472c, which allows a plaintiff to propose new theories on appeal. "Connerly has not strayed from his central factual claim that the composition of the Commission was infected by invidious discrimination. There is no reason to deviate from the well-established rule that section 472c allows a plaintiff to propose new theories on appeal from the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend. [. . .] The fact that the instant complaint was found wanting raises precisely the circumstance section 472c was designed to address--to give the plaintiff a final opportunity to propose new facts or legal theories to establish a cause of action. Thus, from the parties' briefing, it appears Connerly can plead at least a prima facie case of equal protection violations. The answer is to apply section 472c, subdivision (a), allow Connerly to amend the complaint again to clarify his new theories, and give respondents the chance to defend the Commission's selection provisions to try to show they comport with federal equal protection principles." View "Connerly v. California" on Justia Law

Appellants, two Minnesota-based, grassroots advocacy organizations and their leaders, filed suit claiming that a provision of the Minnesota Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA), Minn. Stat. 211B.01 et seq., inhibits appellants' ability to speak freely against school-funding ballot initiatives and, thereby, violates their First Amendment rights. The court rejected the county attorney's renewed challenge to standing; because the speech at issue occupies the core of the protection afforded by the First Amendment, the court applied strict scrutiny to legislation attempting to regulate it; the county attorneys failed to demonstrate that the interests advanced in support of section 211B.06 - preserving fair and honest elections and preventing fraud on the electorate - is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government interest where the section is both overbroad and underinclusive and is not the least restrictive means of achieving any stated goal; and the attorney general is immune to suit. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "281 Care Committee, et al. v. Arneson, et al." on Justia Law

On April 15, 2014, the Columbus Coalition for Responsive Government filed a precirculation copy of a proposed initiative ordinance with the Columbus city clerk. On July 15, 2014, the Coalition submitted 497 part-petitions to the clerk. Andrea Blevins, the Columbus city clerk, refused to submit the proposed initiative to city council on the grounds that the part-petitions were defective because the Coalition had failed to file a certified precirculation copy of the proposed initiative ordinance with the city auditor in compliance with Ohio Rev. Code 731.32. The Coalition sought a writ of mandamus to verify the petition signatures and submit the petition to city council. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that section 731.32 requires strict compliance. View "State ex rel. Columbus Coal. for Responsive Gov’t v. Blevins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Nelson Waikiki, Jr. was one of seven candidates for the Maui County Mayoral seat in the August 9, 2014 special primary election. Plaintiff received the fourth highest number of votes in the election. On August 22, 2014, Waikiki requested a re-vote or a re-count due to conspiracy and corruption by election officials. Chief Election Officer Scott Nago moved to dismiss the complaint as untimely and for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court granted the motion, holding that Waikiki failed to present specific facts or actual information of mistakes or error sufficient to change the results of the election, and therefore, Waikiki could prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. View "Waikiki v. Nago " on Justia Law

At issue in the case was a proclamation made by Chief Election Officer Scott Nago on Friday August 8, 2014 that closed two polling places on the Big Island and postponed the elections for Precincts 04-01 and 04-02. The next day, the primary election went forward as scheduled. On Friday, August 15, 2014, the election proceeded for Precincts 04-01 and 04-02 and was subsequently completed. On August 21, 2014, Plaintiffs, none of whom identified were registered voters of precincts that were closed on Saturday, August 9, 2014 or candidates for elected office, filed an election contest complaint against Nago and the Office of Elections, alleging that Nago should be fired because voters were denied their right to vote. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, holding (1) Plaintiffs were not proper parties to the election contest and lacked the requisite standing under Haw. Rev. Stat. 11-172; and (2) even if Plaintiffs had standing, the complaint failed to set forth any allegations that would demonstrate errors, mistakes, or irregularities that would change the election result. View "Cermelj v. Nago " on Justia Law

Plaintiff William O'Brien appealed a Superior Court order that granted summary judgment in favor of the New Hampshire Democratic Party and Raymond Buckley, Chairman of the New Hampshire Democratic Party, and denied plaintiff’s motion. The trial court ruled that plaintiff, who was a Republican candidate for re-election to the New Hampshire House of Representatives, did not have standing to file an action for damages under RSA 664:14-a (2008), the "Robocall Statute." In light of the fact that the Democratic party had fewer candidates than it had spaces on the November ballot, plaintiff sought "Democratic write-in votes in the September 14, 2010, primary so that he could appear on the ballot in the November cycle for elections as both (R)epublican and (D)emocrat." The day before the primary, defendants called 394 households with a prerecorded political message. Plaintiff received the highest number of votes in the Republican primary, winning a place on the general election ballot as a Republican. He did not secure enough votes in the Democratic Primary to also appear on the November ballot as a Democrat. In the general election, plaintiff won a seat in the House of Representatives. Plaintiff filed a complaint with the office of the Attorney General, alleging that defendants violated the Robocall Statute, because they were "responsible for calls containing a prerecorded political message that lacked the statutorily required disclosures." In August 2011, the Democratic Party entered into a consent agreement with the attorney general to resolve claims for the alleged violation of the statute; the agreement was not an admission that defendants violated the statute. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in dismissing the lawsuit and denying his motion for summary judgment. He contended that the plain language of the statute was broad and intended to include candidates who are the subject of a prerecorded political message. Alternatively, he claimed that, even if the statute was deemed to be ambiguous, the legislative history did not support the trial court’s interpretation. The Supreme Court concluded after its review that plaintiff did not allege an injury flowing from the alleged statutory violation. Therefore, he did not have standing. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision.View "O'Brien v. New Hampshire Democratic Party " on Justia Law