On June 24, 2014, Thad Cochran, a Republican nominee for United States Senator, won the Republican primary runoff. His opponent, Chris McDaniel, filed an election contest with the State Republican Executive Committee (SREC) on August 4, 2014 – forty-one days after the election. The SREC declined to consider McDaniel’s complaint, and McDaniel appealed. The trial judge found that McDaniel did not meet the twenty-day deadline to file his election contest and dismissed the case. On appeal, McDaniel argued that no deadline existed to contest a primary election. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the Supreme Court found that there indeed was a deadline, and McDaniel failed to file his election contest within twenty days. The dismissal was affirmed. View "McDaniel v. Cochran" on Justia Law

On May 15, 2012, Karl H. Lewies won the primary election for the position of Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney. Because he had no opponent in the general election, he knew he would be elected as the prosecuting attorney, and he was. He was scheduled to be sworn into office on January 14, 2013. On November 23, 2012, he filed two petitions for review against the county commissioners of Fremont County. One petition for review was on behalf of Flying "A"Ranch, Inc., and others, and the other petition was on behalf of E. C. Gwaltney, III. The petitions sought to overturn the designation by the county commissioners of certain roads as being public roads rather than private roads. In early 2013, the county commissioners, represented by Blake Hall, the deputy prosecutor hired by the prosecutor that Lewies had defeated in the primary, filed motions in both cases seeking to have Lewies disqualified from representing the petitioners in those cases. Lewies filed motions in both cases to withdraw as counsel for the petitioners. In each of the cases, Lewies had named two of the commissioners in both their official and individual capacities. The commissioners filed motions in both cases to dismiss the actions against them in their individual capacities. Substitution counsel entered appearances for the county commissioners in both cases. The court made preliminary rulings that Lewies could not represent any parties in the two cases; that the county would be awarded attorney fees against him personally for having to file the motion to disqualify; that an action against the two commissioners in their individual capacities could not be joined with a petition for judicial review; and that attorney fees would not be awarded against Lewies for having named them in their individual capacities. During the hearing, Lewies contended that substitution counsel should have been disqualified from representing the commissioners and that a deputy prosecutor should represent them. Ultimately the trial court entered a written order affirming its preliminary rulings. After several hearings, the court entered its memorandum decision in both cases awarding the county attorney fees in the sum of $1,185.00 against Mr. Lewies personally pursuant to Rule 11(a)(1), and Lewies appealed. Because there was no legal basis for the award, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Lewies v. Fremont County" on Justia Law

Following the May 7, 2013, Democratic primary for the Ward 5 seat on the Greenwood City Council, the Greenwood Municipal Democratic Executive Committee certified Dorothy Ann Glenn as the winner and thus the Democratic nominee for the Ward 5 seat on the City Council. Runner-up Andrew Powell challenged the election results, contending that Glenn was not a resident of Ward 5 at the time of the election and that she consequently was ineligible to run for that office. Powell sought a special primary runoff election, without Glenn's name on the ballot. The Circuit Court of Leflore County, Special Election Tribunal, found that Glenn was not a resident of Ward 5, held that she was not qualified to hold the position of Greenwood City Council Member for Ward 5, set aside the results of the election, and ordered a special primary runoff election without Glenn's name on the ballot. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part and vacated the order of the circuit court for a special primary runoff election. View "Glenn v. Powell" on Justia Law

Appellee, the current Pine Bluff mayor, filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that she held the office of mayor through 2016 and a writ of mandamus to prohibit Appellants - the Jefferson County Election Commission and Commissioners - from taking any actions with regard to municipal elections in either the May 2014 primary election or the November 2014 general election. The circuit court found in Appellee’s favor and prohibited Appellants from holding any elections for the Pine Bluff municipal offices of mayor, treasurer, and city clerk and directing them to not count votes or certify winners in such races. After Appellants appealed, the May 2014 primary election was held, and no candidate was certified as the winner of any of those three municipal offices. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) any review of this appeal as it related to the May 2014 primary election was necessarily moot; and (2) because a decision by this Court could not have any practical legal effect with regard to the impending November 2014 election, review of the circuit court’s order prohibiting Appellants from holding elections in November 2014 was also moot. View "Jefferson Cnty. Election Comm'n v. Hollingsworth" on Justia Law

In May 2012, election officials in six Colorado counties had the theoretical ability to learn how individuals voted because the ballots were traceable. Citizen Center, a Colorado non-profit organization, sued the Secretary of State and the clerks for five of the six counties, contending that the use of traceable ballots violated members' federal constitutional rights involving: (1) voting, (2) free speech and association, (3) substantive due process, (4) equal protection, and (5) procedural due process. In addition, Citizen Center sued five of the clerks for violation of the Colorado Constitution. All defendants moved to dismiss for lack of standing, and the clerks included an alternative argument for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court dismissed the complaint on standing grounds without reaching the merits of the clerks' argument under Rule 12(b)(6). Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded: (1) the claims were partially moot because the Secretary of State adopted new regulations banning some of the challenged practices; (2) Citizen Center had standing on the "live" parts of the claims involving denial of equal protection and procedural due process, but its alleged injury in fact was too speculative for standing on the right-to-vote, free-speech-and-association and substantive-due-process claims; and (3) the first amended complaint failed to state a valid claim against the clerks for denial of equal protection or procedural due process. These conclusions resulted in a termination of all claims except the federal claims against the Secretary of State for denial of equal protection and procedural due process. View "Citizen Center v. Gessler" on Justia Law

Petitioners, acting individually and on behalf of a ballot-question committee, filed this original action challenging the timeliness and sufficiency for an initiative petition for a proposed constitutional amendment with the popular name of “The Arkansas Alcohol Beverage Amendment” that was certified by Respondent in his official capacity as Arkansas Secretary of State for the November 4, 2014 general election ballot. Intervenors were members of a ballot-question committee and the sponsor of the proposed constitutional amendment. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding (1) the petition was timely filed; and (2) the ballot title was legally sufficient. View "Richardson v. Martin" on Justia Law

In September 2010, the New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office received information regarding polling telephone calls made to New Hampshire residents that were described as containing negative content about United States congressional candidate Ann McLane Kuster. The AG investigated, and concluded that the Bass Victory Committee (he authorized campaign committee of former United States Congressman Charles F. Bass) had engaged in “push-polling” as defined in RSA 664:2, XVII (2008) (amended 2014) without complying with the disclosure requirements set forth in RSA 664:16-a. The Attorney General appealed a superior court order that dismissed his petition for civil penalties against the Committee. The AG argued that the trial court erroneously determined that the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) preempted RSA 664:16-a. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire Attorney General v. Bass Victory Committee " on Justia Law

After the General Assembly passed Act 595 of 2013, Appellees, registered voters in Pulaski County, filed a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief, arguing that sections of the Act that allegedly placed an additional qualification and impairment on Arkansas residents before they could exercise their right to vote violated the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court concluded that Act 595 was unconstitutional, enjoined and restrained Appellants, the Secretary of State and the Commissioners of the State Board of Election Commissioners, from enforcing any proof-of-identity provisions of the Act and from enforcing their rules promulgated as a result of the Act, and granted a preliminary injunction against Appellants from enforcing Act 595’s proof-of-identity requirements in favor of Appellants. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s ruling that Act 595 was unconstitutional on its face, holding that the Act’s requiring proof of identity was unconstitutional on its face and imposed a requirement that fell outside the ambit of Ark. Const. art. III, 1. View "Martin v. Kohls" on Justia Law

Steven Glovsky sought to solicit signatures for his nomination to the second district seat on the Governor’s Council on the sidewalk immediately outside the entrance to a supermarket owned by Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc. Despite believing he had a right under article 9 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to solicit signatures on the property, Glovsky left the property after a store manager informed him Roche Bros. prohibited this activity. Glovsky filed suit, requesting relief under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act for a violation of his rights “by threats, intimidation or coercion.” The superior court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated and set aside the portion of the judgment dismissing Glovsky’s request for declaratory relief under article 9 and affirmed the remainder of the judgment, holding (1) Glovsky adequately alleged a right to solicit nominating signatures outside the supermarket, but (2) Roche Bros. did not violate this right by threats, intimidation or coercion. Remanded for entry of a judgment dismissing the request for declaratory relief as moot. View "Glovsky v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc." on Justia Law

Aspiring Ohio state court judges must run for office and must follow the Code of Judicial Conduct, promulgated by the Ohio Supreme Court. The Code limits candidates’ campaign-related speech to help maintain an “independent, fair, and impartial judiciary,” free of “impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” After the Sixth Circuit struck parts of the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct, Ohio narrowed its Code. As amended, all judicial candidates—incumbents and challengers—are subject to restrictions on direct, personal monetary solicitation; bans on public political party speeches and endorsements of other candidates; and a prohibition on receiving campaign money earlier than 120-days before the primary. Platt, an attorney who wishes to run for Ohio judicial office, wanted to publicly endorse other candidates, directly solicit campaign funds in person, and to receive campaign contributions without the time limitations. Platt sued to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the rules as applied to non-sitting judicial candidates. The district court denied Platt’s request, holding that Platt failed to show a strong likelihood of success on the merits of his First Amendment claims and that the requested injunction would cause substantial harm to sitting judicial candidates who would still be subject to the restrictions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Platt v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Grievances & Discipline" on Justia Law