Since 2005 Indiana has required voters to present photographic identification at the polls. In 2008, the Supreme Court (Crawford decision) held that the statute is compatible with the Constitution. In 2011 Wisconsin enacted a similar statute, 2011 Wis. Act 23. A district court held that Act 23 is unconstitutional and enjoined its implementation. The Seventh Circuit stayed that injunction, but subsequently reversed, holding that the district court’s findings do not justify an outcome different from Crawford, in which the Justices concluded that prevention of voter impersonation on election day and preservation of public confidence in the integrity of elections justify a photo ID requirement, even though persons who do not already have government-issued photo IDs must spend time to acquire necessary documents (such as birth certificates) and stand in line at a public agency to get one. Wisconsin’s law differs from Indiana’s, but not in ways that matter under the analysis in Crawford. View "League of United Latin Am. Citizens of WI v. Deininger" on Justia Law

After the Supreme Court lifted certain Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973c, restrictions that prevented jurisdictions like North Carolina from passing laws that would deny minorities equal access, North Carolina began pursuing sweeping voting reform with House Bill 589. Plaintiffs and the federal government filed suit against North Carolina, alleging that House Bill 589 violates equal protection provisions of the United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act and seeking a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs' preliminary injunction and not preventing certain provisions of House Bill 589 from taking effect. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction as to House Bill 589's elimination of same-day registration and prohibition on counting out-of-precinct ballots. The court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction with respect to the following House Bill 589 provisions: the reduction of early-voting days; the expansion of allowable voter challenges; the elimination of the discretion of county boards of elections to keep the pools open an additional hour on Election Day in "extraordinary circumstances"; the elimination of pre-registration of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds who will not be eighteen years old by the next general election; and the soft roll-out of voter identification requirements to go into effect in 2016. View "Duke v. State of North Carolina" on Justia Law

Doralee Chandler, a registered voter, filed an amended petition for issuance of a writ of mandamus and for declaratory judgment, alleging that Judge Harrison G. Foster II was not a qualified or eligible candidate for circuit judge because he was not a “licensed attorney” for the constitutionally mandated six-year time period preceding the assumption of the office. The circuit court denied Chandler’s petition and granted Foster’s third-party complaint, determining (1) Foster was not “unlicensed” pursuant to Rule VII(C) of the Rules Governing Admission to the Bar despite his failure to timely pay his licensing fee four of the six consecutive years prior to the time for taking office, if elected; (2) the suspension of Foster’s license to practice law due to Foster’s failure to timely renew his licensing fee violated his due process rights; and (3) Rule VII(C) was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in determining that Foster was not “unlicensed” pursuant to Rule VII and in finding that he was qualified to seek the position of circuit judge; and (2) Rule VII(C) is unconstitutional in that it provides for an automatic suspension of a lawyer’s license without procedural due process.View "Chandler v. Martin" on Justia Law

Appellant, a registered voter, petitioned the circuit court for a declaratory judgment that Angela Byrd, a filed candidate for circuit judge, was unqualified and ineligible for that office because she was not a licensed attorney for a six-year time period immediately preceding the assumption of office for circuit judge. Specifically, Appellant alleged that Byrd failed to timely pay her annual bar license fee for the year 2014, and while her license was suspended, she was no longer licensed pursuant to Rule VII of the Arkansas Supreme Court’s Rules Governing Admission to the Bar. In response, Byrd filed a third-party complaint against the Clerk of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, alleging that Rule VII(C) was unconstitutional. The circuit court denied Williams’s petition and granted Byrd’s third-party complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of Kelly v. Martin and Chandler v. Martin, concluding that Byrd was an eligible candidate for circuit judge.View "Williams v. Martin" on Justia Law

On March 3, 2014, Valerie Bailey filed as a candidate for the position of circuit judge in the May 20, 2014 election. Kristen Hulse filed a petition for writ of mandamus and a declaration judgment, alleging that Bailey was not qualified and was ineligible to be a candidate for circuit court judge. On March 19, 2014, the circuit court entered an order granting Hulse’s requested relief, declaring that Bailey was not eligible to seek the office of circuit judge. The deadline for printing ballots was March 21, 2014. On April 22, 2014, Bailey filed an amended notice of expedited appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the basis of mootness, concluding that any decision by the Court would amount to an advisory opinion because the ballots had been printed, mailed to absentee voters, and presented to early voters.View "Bailey v. Martin" on Justia Law

The Pulaski County Election Commission and some of its commissioners and the Pulaski County Circuit/County Clerk (collectively, “PCEC”) filed a petition for a declaratory judgment, claiming that certain emergency rules promulgated by the Arkansas State Board of Election Commissioners (“ASBEC”) relating to absentee voters were unconstitutional. The circuit court concluded (1) Act 595 of 2013, which amended the State election code to require that voters provide proof of identity when voting, was unconstitutional; and (2) the emergency rules were also unconstitutional because they were derived from the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in finding that the rules relating to absentee voters promulgated by the ASBEC were unconstitutional; but (2) erred in declaring Act 595 unconstitutional because that issue was not pled or developed before the circuit court.View "Ark. State Bd. of Election Comm'rs v. Pulaski County Election Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged Wisconsin’s campaign-finance law in light of the Supreme Court decision, Citizens United (2010), alleging that laws concerning groups that spend money for political speech independently of candidates and parties are vague and overbroad and unjustifiably burden the free-speech rights of independent political speakers in violation of the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit previously invalidated section 11.26(4), which capped at $10,000 the aggregate annual amount a donor could give to state and local candidates, political parties, and political committees. Remaining claims challenge a ban on political spending by corporations, interlocking definitions that determine “political committee” status, “noncoordination” oath and disclaimer requirements for independent political messages, among other provisions. The district court enjoined the ban on corporate political spending, partially enjoined a regulatory disclaimer rule, and denied an injunction on other challenges. The Seventh Circuit vacated with instructions to enter a new injunction to conform to the specificity requirements of FRCP Rule 65(d). On the merits, the court stated that the First Amendment requires a heightened degree of regulatory clarity and close fit between the government’s means and its end; some forms of regulation are categorically impermissible. Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 11 has not been updated to reflect new Supreme Court doctrine; administrative rules do not cohere with the statutes and the state elections agency has given conflicting signals about its intent to enforce some provisions. Certain provisions (the ban on corporate political spending and the cap on the amount a corporation may spend to raise money for an affiliated PAC) are obviously unconstitutional under Citizens. Others fail First Amendment standards as applied to independent political speakers. Some provisions are valid.View "WI Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an unsuccessful candidate for judicial office in Mohave County, Arizona, filed suit challenging the facial and as-applied constitutionality of certain provisions of the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct. The court held that Rule 4.1(A)(6) (the solicitation clause) is unconstitutional as applied to non-judge judicial candidates because it restricts speech that presents little to no risk of corruption or bias towards future litigants and is not narrowly tailored to serve those state interests. The court held that Rules 4.1(A)(2)-(5) - prohibiting speechifying, endorsements, and fundraising - are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve the state's interest in an impartial judiciary, and are therefore unconstitutional restrictions on political speech of non-judge candidates for judicial office. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants.View "Wolfson v. Concannon, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the ballot title for Initiative Petition 38 (2014) (IP 38), arguing that the ballot title does not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). IP 38, if adopted, would alter the Oregon primary election process for certain partisan offices, denominated "voter choice offices" (United States Senator, Congressional Representative, Governor, Secretary of State, State Treasurer, Attorney General, state Senator, state Representative, and any state, county, city, or district partisan office for which the law currently authorizes political party nominations to the general election). In addition, IP 38 would have modified the process for filling vacancies in partisan offices. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2), and referred the title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Dixon v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the ballot title for Initiative Petition 44 (2014) that if adopted, would have enacted statutory provisions to impose certain requirements on food manufacturers and retailers concerning the labeling of genetically engineered foods. The Supreme Court considered the various challenges to the certified ballot title that each petitioner advanced and concluded that only one had merit. The ballot title error that the Court identified in this proceeding was an acknowledged scrivener's error, the correction of which was straightforward and ministerial. The Supreme Court corrected the error and certified the corrected ballot title to the Secretary of State. View "Bates v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law