Petitioners sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 31 (2014). IP 31 ("Oregon Lottery Local Control Act") was a proposed constitutional amendment that would dedicate 50 percent of state lottery net proceeds to a "county revenue distribution fund." IP 31 would amend the Oregon Constitution to provide that "50% of the net proceeds from the State Lottery shall be deposited in a county revenue distribution fund to be created by the Legislative Assembly." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that IP 31's the caption did not reasonably identify the subject matter of the measure as required by Oregon law. Therefore the Court referred the caption to the Attorney General for modification. View "Milne v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. sought to expand its store in the City of Sonora. The City Council postponed its vote on the project while a voter-sponsored initiative was circulated, which proposed to adopt a plan for the contemplated expansion. The Council subsequently adopted the ordinance. The Tuoloumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance sought a writ of mandate based on four causes of action, the first of which asserted that the Council violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by adopting the ordinance without first conducting a complete environmental review. The Court of Appeals granted the writ as to the first cause of action, concluding that when a land use ordinance is proposed in a voter initiative petition, full CEQA review is required if the city adopts the ordinance rather than submitting it to an election. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that CEQA review is not required before direct adoption of an initiative, just as it is not required before voters adopt an initiative at an election. View "Tuolumne Jobs & Small Bus. Alliance v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Appellant submitted an application for a writ of mandamus asking the circuit court to compel Secretary of State Jason Gant to investigate the nominating petitions for Republic candidate Brian Gosh for the November 2012 election in Pennington County. The court dismissed Appellant’s application for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Intervenors to the case moved to award attorney’s fees and to tax costs and disbursements against Appellant. Appellant, in the meantime, appealed the dismissal of her application. Subsequently, after a hearing, the circuit court granted the Intervenors’ motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in awarding the Intervenors attorney's fees after the hearing; (2) the court did not err when it held a hearing on the Intervenors’ motion for attorney’s fees and expenses while Appellant’s appeal on the underlying judgment on the merits was pending before the Court; and (3) Appellant was not entitled to relief on the Intervenors’ motion for attorney’s fees because Appellant failed to assert her issue with the circuit court when given the opportunity to do so.View "Strong v. Gant" on Justia Law

The Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. 441b, sets forth ground rules for the participation of corporations in the electoral process. The Act permits limited corporate participation through separate segregated funds, a type of political action committee. Stop this Insanity and others (collectively, "plaintiffs") filed suit alleging that the restrictions on the segregated funds were unconstitutional. The court concluded that plaintiffs would like to use its segregated fund to solicit the entire public while concealing its expenses for such solicitation. Even assuming plaintiffs' constitutional analysis is correct under Citizens United v. FEC, it is far from a foregone conclusion that the Act is severable in a way that would eliminate the restrictions but leave intact the partial waiver on disclosure. The court concluded that it need not make this determination because plaintiffs' arguments failed on the merits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. View "Stop This Insanity, Inc., et al. v. Federal Election Commission" on Justia Law

Registered Voter Delilah Gentges sued the Oklahoma State Election Board in the district court of Tulsa County to prevent implementation of SB 692, commonly known as the Voter ID Act. Gentges alleged she had standing as a taxpayer and as a registered voter in Tulsa County. The State Election Board specially appeared in the district court of Tulsa County and asked the court to dismiss this suit. The State Election Board contended Gentges lacked standing and Tulsa County was not the proper venue for a suit against a State agency. The district court of Tulsa County rejected these challenges and the State Election Board asked the Supreme Court to assume original jurisdiction to prohibit the district court of Tulsa County from proceeding further. The Supreme Court granted partial relief by ordering the district court of Tulsa County to transfer the case to the district court of Oklahoma County. Gentges contended the Legislature violated the Oklahoma Constitution by submitting the Voter ID Act to a popular vote without first presenting it to the Governor for veto consideration. She also contended that requiring voters to present certain forms of identification in order to vote would "interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage." After review of the parties' summary judgment paperwork, the trial court ruled: (1) the Oklahoma Constitution does not require presentment of a legislative referendum to the Governor before the referendum is placed on the ballot for a vote; and (2) Gentges lacked standing. Gentges appealed. The Supreme Court concluded after its review that the trial court was correct in ruling the Voter ID Act was validly enacted, but reversed the trial court on the issue of Gentges' standing. The case was remanded for further proceedings.View "Gentges v. Oklahoma State Election Board" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Court of Appeal centered on whether an election held by the City of San Diego to authorize the levying of a special tax complied with articles XIII A, XIII C and XIII D of the California Constitution. In the election at issue, the City did not permit the City's registered voters to vote on the special tax. Instead, the City passed an ordinance that specifically defined the electorate to consist solely of: (1) the owners of real property in the City on which a hotel is located, and (2) the lessees of real property owned by a governmental entity on which a hotel is located. The Court concluded the election was invalid under the California Constitution because such landowners and lessees were neither "qualified electors" of the City for purposes of article XIII A, section 4, nor did they comprise a proper "electorate" under article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (d). Furthermore, the Court concluded the election was invalid under the San Diego City Charter because City Charter section 76.1 required the approval of two-thirds of the "qualified electors" voting in an election on a special tax, and section 6 of the City Charter defined "[q]ualified [e]lectors" as those persons who are registered to vote in general state elections under state law. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment validating the special tax and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to enter judgment against the City. View "City of San Diego v. Shapiro" on Justia Law

Marcus Wallace sought to run as an independent candidate in the June 4, 2013, mayoral election in Edwards, Mississippi. The Edwards Municipal Election Commission declined to place his name on the ballot, questioning the validity of certain signatures on Wallace’s petition for candidacy. Following an emergency appeal to the Supreme Court and a granted writ of mandamus directing the Commission to conduct a hearing, the Commission again denied Wallace’s petition to be placed on the ballot. Because the Supreme Court agreed with the determination of the Special Circuit Judge of the Second Judicial District of Hinds County that the Commission improperly applied Mississippi Code Section 1-3-76 (Rev. 2005), and because the Court found Wallace’s name should have been placed on the mayoral ballot, the Court affirmed. View "Election Commission of the Town of Edwards v. Wallace" on Justia Law

In this case, a city clerk in a Faulkner Act municipality refused to accept for filing a petition for referendum on the ground that the petition did not have a sufficient number of qualifying signatures. Members of a Committee of Petitioners brought an action in lieu of prerogative writ to have the challenged ordinance put on the ballot. They also brought suit under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c). Ultimately, the trial court granted the Committee members the relief they sought, placing the ordinance before the voters and awarding them, as the prevailing party, attorney’s fees for the deprivation of a substantive right protected by the Civil Rights Act. The Appellate Division affirmed all but the trial court’s finding of a civil rights violation. The Appellate Division determined that the Committee members did not suffer a deprivation of a right because the court provided the ultimate remedy - the referendum. Accordingly, the award of attorney’s fees was vacated. Upon review, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed that the city clerk violated the right of referendum guaranteed by the Faulkner Act. Furthermore, the Court held that the violation of that right deprived the Committee members a substantive right protected by the Civil Rights Act. The vindication of that right under the Civil Rights Act entitled the Committee members to an award of attorney’s fees. The Court therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "Tumpson v. Farina" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs - the Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP, Voces de la Frontera, and numerous individuals - challenged several provisions of 2011 Wis. Act 23, Wisconsin’s voter photo identification act, as unconstitutional. Act 23 requires an elector to present one of nine acceptable forms of photo identification in order to vote. The circuit court declared Act 23’s photo identification requirements unconstitutional and granted permanent injunctive relief, finding that the time, inconvenience and costs incurred in obtaining Act 23-acceptable photo identification impermissibly burden the right to vote. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to prove Act 23 unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, as the burdens of time and inconvenience associated with obtaining Act 23-acceptable photo identification are not undue burdens on the right to vote and do not render the law invalid. View "Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a petition challenging the legal sufficiency of LR-126, a referendum passed by the Legislature that would eliminate election-day voter registration and require all electors to register or to change their voter registration information by 5 p.m. on the last Friday preceding election day. The Legislature directed that the measure be placed on the ballot at the November 2014 general election. Petitioners contended that the title of the bill, which will appear on the ballot, was inaccurate and misleading. The Supreme Court (1) denied Petitioners’ request to declare LR-126 legally deficient and void and order its removal from the ballot; but (2) ordered the Attorney General to clarify the bill title’s reference to the National Voter Registration Act. View "MEA-MFT v. Fox" on Justia Law