In a consolidated ballot title case, three sets of petitioners asked the Supreme Court to review the ballot title for Initiative Petition 47 (2014). Initiative Petition 47 (IP 47), if enacted, would have changed the way that liquor was sold in Oregon. IP 47 would eliminate the current system of state-licensed liquor stores and allow "holders of distilled liquor self-distribution permits" (wholesalers) to distribute liquor to "qualified retailers," who would, in turn, sell the liquor to the public. In this case, if the Attorney General had used the word "fee" to describe the "revenue replacement fee," her use of that word would have raised substantial questions. In addition, petitioners challenged the AG's use of language in the "yes" vote result statement. Finding "difficulties" that the Attorney General faced in trying to describe accurately and succinctly the extensive changes that IP 47 would effect, the Court could not say that the remainder of the ballot title did not substantially comply with her statutory obligations. View "McCann v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Libertarian Party sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether the Equal Access to the Ballot Act was in effect. If the Court determined the Act was effective, the Party requested that the South Carolina State Election Commission be ordered to conduct a Libertarian Party primary on June 10, 2014, and place a referendum question on the primary ballot for approval of the use of the convention method of nominating candidates by petitioner in 2016. The Supreme Court granted the petition for original jurisdiction and declared the Act was in effect. However. The Court denied the Party's request to require the Commission to conduct a primary and place a referendum question on the primary ballot. View "SC Libertarian Party v. SC Election Commission" on Justia Law

Appellant submitted a declaration of candidacy to run in the May 6, 2014 primary for an elected position on the Democratic Party State Central Committee and, along with the declaration, submitted a nominating petition containing nine total signatures. The Franklin County Board of Elections rejected Appellant’s declaration because, according to the Board’s judgment, Appellant did not submit five valid signatures to qualify for the ballot. After Appellant unsuccessfully appealed, Appellant filed a complaint for writ of mandamus with the court of appeals. The court denied the writ. The Supreme Court granted the writ and ordered the Board to add Appellant’s name to the May 6, 2014 primary ballot, holding that the Board abused its discretion in determining that the nominating petition did not contain five valid signatures.View "State ex rel. Scott v. Franklin County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Don Davis, in his capacity as the Judge of Probate for Mobile County, appealed a Circuit Court's final judgment in favor of then Secretary of State Beth Chapman and the three members of the Mobile County Board of Registrars: Pat Tyrrell, Shirley Short, and Virginia Delchamps. The matter before the Supreme Court concerned a regulation promulgated by the Secretary in an effort to comply with certain federal election laws and an asserted conflict between that regulation and the residency requirement prescribed by three Alabama election statutes. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court: "Alabama statutory law continues to require, as it long has, that voters who have moved cast ballots at the polling place designated for their new address. Further, Ala. Admin 20 Code (Secretary of State), Reg. 820-2-2-.13(1), was not and is not required by NVRA or HAVA. Because Reg. 820-2-2-.13(1) expressly contradicts Alabama statutory law, it is void."View "Davis v. Bennett" on Justia Law

On March 11, 2014, Anthony Bisignano filed an affidavit of candidacy for Iowa Senate in District 17 with the Iowa Secretary of State. Ned Chiodo filed an objection to the affidavit of candidacy, claiming that Bisignano was disqualified from holding public office based on his prior conviction of the crime of operating while intoxicated (OWI), second offense. A three-person state elections panel denied the objection, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a person convicted of the crime of OWI, second offense, is not disqualified from holding a public office in Iowa.View "Chiodo v. Section 43.24 Panel" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Election Rule 10.7.5, promulgated as a temporary or emergency rule on the evening of the November 5, 2013 election. Plaintiffs were registered electors of the Adams 12 Five Star School District who sued seeking judicial review of the Secretary of State's authority to promulgate the rule, and for an order to direct the Clerk and Recorder of Adams County to finish counting votes and to certify the vote tally for all candidates in the school district director election. The district court ruled that the Secretary acted in excess of his authority in promulgating the emergency rule, and ordered all defendants to complete and certify the vote count for all candidates in the Adams 12 director district 4 election. The Secretary petitioned the Supreme Court for review of whether the district court erred in holding "Rule 10.7.5 [was] contrary to and in conflict with existing election statutes." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Rule 10.7.5 indeed "contravene[d] the election code by permitting a designated election official to usurp the courts' express authority to resolve . . . issues." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court only in holding that Rule 10.7.5 conflicted with existing election rules. View "Hanlen v. Gessler" on Justia Law

2011 Wis. Act 23 required a photo ID for voting, similar to an Indiana law, which the Supreme Court upheld in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board (2008). After the district court enjoined enforcement of the law, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed two similar injunctions issued by state courts but ordered state officials to make it easier for registered voters to obtain documentation (such as birth certificates) that they may need to obtain photo IDs, or to waive the documentation requirement if obtaining birth certificates proves difficult or expensive. With the state injunctions lifted, the state requested a stay of the federal injunction so that it could use the photo ID requirement in this fall’s election. A divided Seventh Circuit granted a stay and denied reconsideration, noting Wisconsin’s “strong prospect of success on appeal’ and the public interest in using laws enacted through the democratic process, until the laws’ validity has been finally determined. The burden of getting a photo ID in Wisconsin is not materially different from the burden that Crawford deemed acceptable. View "Frank v. Walker" on Justia Law

During the 2000 presidential election, Dewald established and operated political action committees (PACs): “Friends for a Democratic White House” and “Swing States for a GOP White House.” He sent fundraising letters to political donors found on Federal Election Commission donor lists. The PACs collected about $750,000 in contributions, but Dewald remitted less than 20 percent of that amount to the political parties or to outside PACs. He funneled most the money to his for-profit corporation, which provided “consulting and administrative services” to the PACs. Dewald was convicted, under Michigan law, for obtaining money under false pretenses, common-law fraud, and larceny by conversion and ultimately sentenced to between 23 and 120 months. Rejecting Dewald’s preemption claim, the Michigan Court of Appeals reasoned that the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 USC 453 has a narrow preemptive effect. Dewald unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction relief. Dewald later obtained federal habeas corpus relief 28 U.S.C. 2254, on grounds that FECA preempted state law and that the Michigan court’s determination was objectively unreasonable. The Sixth Circuit reversed. There is no clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, holding that FECA precludes a state from prosecuting fraud in the context of a federal election. Even if federal preemption provides “clearly established federal law” in general, the state decision did not unreasonably apply those general principles to this case. View "Dewald v. Wriggelsworth" on Justia Law

Relators circulated petitions in support of a proposed amendment to the city charter that would nullify an ordinance establishing a development plan for property in downtown Powell, Ohio. The city counsel considered the proposed ballot measure and voted unanimously not to submit the amendment to the voters, concluding that the charter amendment constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative authority into private hands. Realtors sought a writ of mandamus to compel the city council and city clerk to place their proposed charter amendment on the November 4, 2014 ballot. The Supreme Court held that the city council properly refused to place the matter on the ballot because the terms of the proposed charter initiative were unconstitutional. Relators then filed a motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court granted the motion for reconsideration and granted a writ of mandamus, holding that the council acted unlawfully when if failed to place the amendment before the voters, as the proper time for an aggrieved party to challenge the constitutionality of the charter amendment is after the voters approve the measure. View "State ex rel. Ebersole v. Powell" on Justia Law

On December 30, 2013, Steven Linnabary filed a declaration of candidacy and nominating petition to run in the Libertarian primary for the office of attorney general. Secretary of State Jon Husted certified Linnabary’s candidacy for the May 6, 2014 ballot. Carl Akers subsequently filed a protest against Linnabary’s candidacy. After a hearing officer issued his report rejecting certain part petitions circulated on behalf of Linnabary due to noncompliance, Husted issued a decision letter adopting the hearing officer’s conclusions, which resulted in a finding that Linnabary no longer had sufficient signatures to qualify for the primary ballot. On March 10, 2014, Linnabary sought a writ of mandamus to compel Husted to restore his name to the ballot. The Supreme Court denied the writ, concluding that Husted reasonably concluded that the part petitions should be invalidated for noncompliance.View "State ex rel. Linnabary v. Husted" on Justia Law