Registered Voter Delilah Gentges sued the Oklahoma State Election Board in the district court of Tulsa County to prevent implementation of SB 692, commonly known as the Voter ID Act. Gentges alleged she had standing as a taxpayer and as a registered voter in Tulsa County. The State Election Board specially appeared in the district court of Tulsa County and asked the court to dismiss this suit. The State Election Board contended Gentges lacked standing and Tulsa County was not the proper venue for a suit against a State agency. The district court of Tulsa County rejected these challenges and the State Election Board asked the Supreme Court to assume original jurisdiction to prohibit the district court of Tulsa County from proceeding further. The Supreme Court granted partial relief by ordering the district court of Tulsa County to transfer the case to the district court of Oklahoma County. Gentges contended the Legislature violated the Oklahoma Constitution by submitting the Voter ID Act to a popular vote without first presenting it to the Governor for veto consideration. She also contended that requiring voters to present certain forms of identification in order to vote would "interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage." After review of the parties' summary judgment paperwork, the trial court ruled: (1) the Oklahoma Constitution does not require presentment of a legislative referendum to the Governor before the referendum is placed on the ballot for a vote; and (2) Gentges lacked standing. Gentges appealed. The Supreme Court concluded after its review that the trial court was correct in ruling the Voter ID Act was validly enacted, but reversed the trial court on the issue of Gentges' standing. The case was remanded for further proceedings.View "Gentges v. Oklahoma State Election Board" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Court of Appeal centered on whether an election held by the City of San Diego to authorize the levying of a special tax complied with articles XIII A, XIII C and XIII D of the California Constitution. In the election at issue, the City did not permit the City's registered voters to vote on the special tax. Instead, the City passed an ordinance that specifically defined the electorate to consist solely of: (1) the owners of real property in the City on which a hotel is located, and (2) the lessees of real property owned by a governmental entity on which a hotel is located. The Court concluded the election was invalid under the California Constitution because such landowners and lessees were neither "qualified electors" of the City for purposes of article XIII A, section 4, nor did they comprise a proper "electorate" under article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (d). Furthermore, the Court concluded the election was invalid under the San Diego City Charter because City Charter section 76.1 required the approval of two-thirds of the "qualified electors" voting in an election on a special tax, and section 6 of the City Charter defined "[q]ualified [e]lectors" as those persons who are registered to vote in general state elections under state law. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment validating the special tax and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to enter judgment against the City. View "City of San Diego v. Shapiro" on Justia Law

Marcus Wallace sought to run as an independent candidate in the June 4, 2013, mayoral election in Edwards, Mississippi. The Edwards Municipal Election Commission declined to place his name on the ballot, questioning the validity of certain signatures on Wallace’s petition for candidacy. Following an emergency appeal to the Supreme Court and a granted writ of mandamus directing the Commission to conduct a hearing, the Commission again denied Wallace’s petition to be placed on the ballot. Because the Supreme Court agreed with the determination of the Special Circuit Judge of the Second Judicial District of Hinds County that the Commission improperly applied Mississippi Code Section 1-3-76 (Rev. 2005), and because the Court found Wallace’s name should have been placed on the mayoral ballot, the Court affirmed. View "Election Commission of the Town of Edwards v. Wallace" on Justia Law

In this case, a city clerk in a Faulkner Act municipality refused to accept for filing a petition for referendum on the ground that the petition did not have a sufficient number of qualifying signatures. Members of a Committee of Petitioners brought an action in lieu of prerogative writ to have the challenged ordinance put on the ballot. They also brought suit under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c). Ultimately, the trial court granted the Committee members the relief they sought, placing the ordinance before the voters and awarding them, as the prevailing party, attorney’s fees for the deprivation of a substantive right protected by the Civil Rights Act. The Appellate Division affirmed all but the trial court’s finding of a civil rights violation. The Appellate Division determined that the Committee members did not suffer a deprivation of a right because the court provided the ultimate remedy - the referendum. Accordingly, the award of attorney’s fees was vacated. Upon review, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed that the city clerk violated the right of referendum guaranteed by the Faulkner Act. Furthermore, the Court held that the violation of that right deprived the Committee members a substantive right protected by the Civil Rights Act. The vindication of that right under the Civil Rights Act entitled the Committee members to an award of attorney’s fees. The Court therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "Tumpson v. Farina" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs - the Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP, Voces de la Frontera, and numerous individuals - challenged several provisions of 2011 Wis. Act 23, Wisconsin’s voter photo identification act, as unconstitutional. Act 23 requires an elector to present one of nine acceptable forms of photo identification in order to vote. The circuit court declared Act 23’s photo identification requirements unconstitutional and granted permanent injunctive relief, finding that the time, inconvenience and costs incurred in obtaining Act 23-acceptable photo identification impermissibly burden the right to vote. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to prove Act 23 unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, as the burdens of time and inconvenience associated with obtaining Act 23-acceptable photo identification are not undue burdens on the right to vote and do not render the law invalid. View "Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a petition challenging the legal sufficiency of LR-126, a referendum passed by the Legislature that would eliminate election-day voter registration and require all electors to register or to change their voter registration information by 5 p.m. on the last Friday preceding election day. The Legislature directed that the measure be placed on the ballot at the November 2014 general election. Petitioners contended that the title of the bill, which will appear on the ballot, was inaccurate and misleading. The Supreme Court (1) denied Petitioners’ request to declare LR-126 legally deficient and void and order its removal from the ballot; but (2) ordered the Attorney General to clarify the bill title’s reference to the National Voter Registration Act. View "MEA-MFT v. Fox" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the League of Women Voters of Wisconsin Education Network, Inc. and its president, brought a facial challenge to Wisconsin’s voter identification law, asserting that the legislature lacked authority under Article III of the Wisconsin Constitution to require an elector to present Act 23-acceptable photo identification. Act 23 requires an elector to present one of nine acceptable forms of photo identification in order to vote. The circuit court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that the challenged portions of Act 23 were unconstitutional in that they served as a condition for voting at the polls. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to show that the photo identification requirement was on its face an additional qualification for voting; (2) Act 23 was validly enacted pursuant to the legislature’s authority; and (3) Plaintiffs’ facial challenge failed because Act 23’s requirement to present photo identification is a reasonable regulation that could improve and modernize election procedures, safeguard voter confidence, and deter voter fraud. View "League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker" on Justia Law

Karen Chastain submitted to the Kansas City Clerk an initiative petition seeking adoption of an ordinance that would impose additional sales taxes for “capital improvements” and “transportation purposes.” The City filed a petition seeking a declaration that the proposed ordinance violated Mo. Const. art. III, 51. The trial court declared that the proposed ordinance was unconstitutional because the ordinance was used for the appropriation of money. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in concluding that the ordinance violated article III, section 51 because the ordinance merely imposed additional sales taxes, and there was no appropriation. Remanded.View "City of Kansas City v. Chastain" on Justia Law

Doug Clark, the incumbent Constable for the Downtown Justice of the Peace Precinct of Maricopa County, challenged the sufficiency of Jimmy Munoz Jr.’s nominating petitions. The trial court removed Munoz’s name from the ballot for the office of Constable, concluding (1) several of Munoz’s petition sheets were invalid because they contained a photograph of the Maricopa County Constable’s badge that could confuse or mislead voters, and (2) when the signatures on these sheets were excluded, Munoz had fewer than the required number of valid signatures. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Munoz’s petition sheets containing the photograph did not substantially comply with Ariz. Rev. Code 16-315(A), and therefore, the trial court correctly removed Munoz’s name from the primary ballot. View "Clark v. Munoz" on Justia Law

Dan Shooter filed a petition seeking to remove Toby Farmer’s name from the primary ballot for the office of State Senator for Legislative District 13 on the grounds that seven of the signatures on two of Farmer’s petition sheets were signed by persons other than the voters whose names had been signed. Shooter asked the trial court to infer that Farmer knew of the forgeries. The trial court declined to do so and determined that petition forgery had not been proved. Accordingly, the court did not remove Farmer’s name from the ballot. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and denied Farmer’s request for attorney’s fees, holding that the trial court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous and that Shooter did not act in bad faith. View "Shooter v. Farmer" on Justia Law