The Anchorage Assembly passed an ordinance modifying the labor relations chapter of the Anchorage Municipal Code. Two citizen-sponsors filed an application for a referendum that would repeal the ordinance. The Municipality rejected the application, reasoning that the proposed referendum addressed administrative matters that were not proper subjects for direct citizen legislation. The sponsors filed suit in superior court and prevailed on summary judgment. The Municipality appealed, arguing that the referendum was barred because: (1) state and municipal law grants exclusive authority over labor relations to the Assembly; (2) the referendum made an appropriation; and (3) its subject was administrative, not legislative. Following oral argument, the Supreme Court issued an order on January 10, 2014, affirming the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the sponsors. This opinion explained the Court's reasoning. View "Municipality of Anchorage v. Holleman" on Justia Law

On June 17, 2014, the city council of Powell approved a development plan prosing new construction in the Powell downtown business district by adopting Ordinance No. 2014-10. Relators filed petitions with the city clerk in support of three ballot measures: a referendum to block Ordinance No. 2014-10 from taking effect, an initiative to approve an ordinance repealing Ordinance No. 2014-10, and an amendment to the city charter that would nullify Ordinance No. 2014-10. The city clerk transmitted the three petitions to the Delaware County Board of Elections. As a result of the combined actions of the city council and the board of elections, none of the three ballot measures was certified for the November 4, 2014 ballot. Relators filed this mandamus action to compel with city council and city clerk to place the proposed charter amendment on the ballot. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the proposed charter amendment unlawfully delegated legislative power, and therefore, the city council did not have a clear legal duty to put the measure on the November 4, 2014 ballot. View "State ex rel. Ebersole v. Powell" on Justia Law

On August 5, 2014, Relators submitted a petition to the clerk of council to amend the charter of the City of Maple Heights by limiting the use of photo-monitoring devices to enforce traffic laws. On August 18, 2014, the director of the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections certified that the part-petitions contained sufficient valid signatures to qualify for the ballot. The city council, however, took no action on the petition. On August 25, 2014, Relators this expedited election action in the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the City and its city council to pass an ordinance placing the charter-amendment initiative on the November 4, 2014 ballot. On September 3, 2014, council referred the matter to the Committee as a whole but failed to schedule a vote on the matter. The Supreme Court granted the writ, as the city council failed to submit the charter-amendment initiative “forthwith” as required by the Ohio Constitution. View "State ex rel. Comm. for Charter Amendment Petition v. City of Maple Heights" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether county commissioners could place an ordinance-generated referendum question on the primary election ballot seeking to amend a home rule charter without first seeking election of a commissioned study when the question adopted by the ordinance attempted to abolish certain row offices. In 2013, the Lackawanna County Board of Commissioners sought to direct that a referendum question be placed on the May 21, 2013, municipal primary election ballot proposing to abolish the elected offices of Sheriff, Clerk of Judicial Records, Recorder of Deeds and Register of Wills, and to redefine the duties that had been assigned to those positions as legislative powers under its Charter. Appellant Joseph Pilchesky filed a pro se petition requesting that the trial court strike the ballot question or, in the alternative, that the Board of Elections separate the single ballot question into four queries, one for each of the offices to be abolished. In his petition, Pilchesky also asserted that Ordinance 224 directed a ballot question that proposed a change in the form of government rather than an amendment to the Charter and that such a change can be effected only by petition or ordinance seeking election of a government study commission under 53 Pa.C.S. 2911. The trial court denied the challenge seeking to bar Ordinance 224 from appearing on the primary ballot, and rejeted Pilchesky's argument that the changes to the existing form of government proffered by Ordinance 224 could be accomplished by the statutorily mandated government study commission. In an unpublished memorandum opinion, the Commonwealth Court unanimously affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that in light of the plain language of the Home Rule Law and the considerations Pilchesky raised, the amendment proposed by the Commissioners constituted a change in the form of government that could have been accomplished only by following the procedure outlined in Subchapter B of the Home Rule Law. The decision of the Commonwealth Court was Reversed.View "Pilchesky v. Lackawanna County" on Justia Law

Chad Taylor received the most votes in the Democratic Party primary for United States Senate for Kansas and was declared the winner. Taylor subsequently drafted a letter of withdrawal from the Senate race and submitted it to Kris Kobach, the Secretary of State. Kobach denied Taylor’s request that his name be withdrawn from nomination for election on the basis that the request did not comply with the requirements for withdrawal under Kan. Stat. Ann. 25-306b(b). Taylor filed a petition for writ of mandamus and emergency motion for temporary restraining order seeking, inter alia, an order directing Kobach to recognize and effectuate Taylor’s letter of withdrawal from the Senate race and prohibiting Kobach from including his name on the ballot race for the 2014 general election. The Supreme Court granted Taylor’s petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the uncontroverted contents of Taylor’s letter to Kobach satisfied the statutory requirements for withdrawal, and therefore, Kobach had no discretion to refuse to remove Taylor’s name from the ballots. View "Taylor v. Kobach" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, registered voters seeking to invalidate the Montana Districting and Apportionment Commission’s (Commission) assignment of two “holdover senators” in its final 2013 redistricting plan, filed a complaint against the State and Secretary of State (collectively, "State") seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The district court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment and denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that (1) the Commission did not violate the public’s “right to know”; (2) the Commission is part of the legislative branch and is not an agency, and that it is therefore exempt from statutes promulgating the right of participation; and (3) Plaintiffs’ argument that the Commission violated Plaintiffs’ right of suffrage was without merit.View "Willems v. State" on Justia Law

On August 5, 2014, the Mingo County Democratic Executive Committee nominated a candidate to fill a vacancy created by the former Family Court Judge for the Eighth Family Circuit. The Mingo County Commission was requested to place the candidate on the ballot for the general election scheduled for November 4, 2014. Seeking compliance with the state’s election laws, the Secretary of State ordered the Ballot Commissioners of Mingo County to remove from the 2014 general election ballot any and all references to an election to fill an unexpired term of judge for the Eighth Family Court Circuit. The Ballot Commissioners did not respond, and the Secretary of State sought extraordinary relief from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ of mandamus, holding that the Ballot Commissioners lacked the authority to sua sponte place a candidate for a judicial office on the ballot. View "State ex rel. Tennant v. Ballot Comm’rs of Mingo County" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Montana Legislature enacted Legislative Referendum 127 (LR-127) as a referendum to be put to a public vote at the time of the November 2014 general election. Petitioners filed a petition challenging the legal sufficiency of LR-127, alleging that the Attorney General’s legal review of the proposed ballot measure was incorrect and seeking to enjoin the State from placing the measure on the general election ballot. The Supreme Court ordered that the State was enjoined from placing LR-127 on the 2014 general election ballot, holding that the proposed ballot measure was not legally sufficient because the title of LR-127 did not comply with the plain meaning of the Legislature’s 100-word limit found in Mont. Code Ann. 5-4-102.View "MEA-MFT v. Fox" on Justia Law

Thomas Brown ran unsuccessfully to become the Democratic nominee for a seat on the Ashtabula County common pleas court in the Democratic Party primary election. Brown subsequently filed nominating petitions to be a judicial candidate on the Ashtabula County Western Area Court in the general election. The Ashtabula County Board of Elections (Board) rejected Brown’s petitions based on the ballot-access restrictions set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 3513.04. Relators, including Brown, subsequently sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Board and its director (collectively, Respondents) to certify Brown’s candidacy for the Western Area Court, asserting that section 3513.04 is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Relators failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality and failed to demonstrate that section 3513.04 is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State ex rel. Brown v. Ashtabula County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The district court entered a preliminary injunction, enjoining Ohio from enforcing SB 238’s amendments to section 3509.01 of the Ohio Revised Code reducing the EIP [early in person] voting period from 35 days before an election to the period beginning the day following the close of voter registration; providing that, for the 2014 general election, the EIP voting period shall consist of the 35 days prior to the election; and that, for the 2014 general election, all county Boards of Election must set uniform and suitable EIP voting hours for specific days. The state requested that the Sixth Circuit stay provisions “that could possibly require action” before resolution on appeal. The Sixth Circuit denied the motion. The state did not make a strong showing of likelihood to succeed on the merits or demonstrate that they will suffer more than a mere possibility of irreparable harm, but only articulated that failure to stay the Order would harm the “strong public interest in smooth and effective administration of the voting laws” and would “require additional time and money.” Plaintiffs demonstrated that the public will likely suffer significant harm if the stay is granted by arguing that the Order’s contents already have been disseminated to the public. Staying the Order would create confusion, adversely affecting voter turnout during EIP voting if the Order is affirmed on appeal.View "Finn v. Warren Cnty" on Justia Law