In completing their affidavits to an election referendum petition, two affiants provided partially incorrect zip code information. Both circulators' petition pages contained several thousand signatures of registered voters. Despite the incorrect zip codes in the circulator affidavits, the Montgomery County Board of Elections (MCBE) certified that 34,828 of the 48,935 signatures were those of registered voters of Montgomery County, more signatures than were required by law, and certified the bill for placement on the ballot of the November 2012 general election. Seeking to prevent the referendum, Montgomery County filed a complaint against the MCBE, alleging that the MCBE had unlawfully counted the voters' signatures on the circulation petition pages because the zip codes provided by the circulators were erroneous. The circuit court granted Respondents' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the petition pages containing circulators' incorrectly recorded zip codes were invalid. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's ruling and upheld the MCBE's decision, holding that minor errors in the circulator affidavit will not invalidate petition signatures that are already certified by the appropriate administrative body. View "Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 35 v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

Dick Flanagan filed an action in quo warranto challenging the qualifications of David Lucas, the Belmont County sheriff, who was elected to the office and sworn in on January 7, 2013. Specifically, Flanagan claimed that Lucas did not meet the statutory qualifications for a candidate for county sheriff and that Flanagan, the only person appearing on the ballot in the November 6, 2012 election who satisfied the statutory qualifications, was entitled to the office. The Supreme Court dismissed the action for lack of standing, holding that Flanagan, as the losing candidate, had no reasonable grounds to claim entitlement to the office of sheriff and therefore lacked standing to bring this quo warranto action. View "State ex rel. Flanagan v. Lucas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the former Jerauld County State's Attorney, brought a quo warranto action seeking to oust Defendant, the newly-elected State's Attorney, claiming Defendant did not qualify for and was not entitled to the office of Jerauld County State's Attorney. The circuit court denied relief, concluding that Defendant was the rightful holder of the office and was legally entitled to it. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because there was no evidence that Defendant usurped, intruded into, unlawfully held, or exercised the public office of Jerauld County State's Attorney, the circuit court correctly denied quo warranto relief. View "Bridgman v. Koch" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case related to the service of four members of the Board of Directors for the Southern Valley County Recreation District. The State brought usurpation actions against Donald Keithly, Yvette Davis, Patrick Cowles, and Michael Smith (the Directors), alleging they usurped their offices as directors of the Recreation District. The State requested they be removed from office and sought a fine against each of them. Upon the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled that this action was an election contest, rather than a usurpation action, which could be brought by the State. The district court also ruled that the Directors' actions while in office were protected by the de facto officer doctrine. The State appealed, arguing this was a proper usurpation action and the de facto officer doctrine did not apply. The Directors cross-appealed, arguing they are entitled to attorney fees. The Supreme Court concluded the matter was moot and affirmed the district court's order denying attorney fees. View "Idaho v. Keithly" on Justia Law

This case arose from a political battle concerning labor unions. Chula Vista Citizens and the Associations sought to place an initiative on the Chula Vista municipal ballot. The City of Chula Vista requires that initiative proponents be electors (the elector requirement). Because Cal. Elec. Code 9202(a) requires proponents to sign a notice of intent, the effect of Cal. Elec. Code 9207 is that the identities of official proponents are disclosed to would-be signatories of the petition (the petition-proponent disclosure requirement). Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the elector and petition-proponent disclosure requirements, both facially and as applied, violated the First Amendment. Determining that the elector requirement was properly before the court because it implicated the chilling of expression and because the parties had not indicated that there were many pending actions in the California courts, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants as to the elector requirement where the Associations did not have a First Amendment right to serve as official proponents of local ballot initiatives. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants as to the petition-proponent disclosure requirement where the requirement was unconstitutional because they require official initiative proponents to identify themselves on the face of initiative petitions. View "Chula Vista Citizens v. Norris" on Justia Law

The Pulaski County Election Commission (PCEC) filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the circuit court challenging the constitutionality of certain emergency rules promulgated by the Arkansas State Board of Election Commissioners (ASBEC) relating to absentee voters. The circuit court declared (1) the emergency rules were derivative of Act 595 of 2013, which amended the Arkansas election code to require that voters provide proof of identity when voting; (2) the Act was unconstitutional; and (3) the emergency rules were also unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the circuit court correctly ruled that the rules relating to absentee voters promulgated by the ASBEC were unconstitutional; but (2) the circuit court erred in declaring the Act unconstitutional, as that issue was not pled or developed before the court. View "State Bd. of Election Comm'rs v. Pulaski County Election Comm’n" on Justia Law

In a consolidated ballot title case, three sets of petitioners have petitioned the Supreme Court to review the ballot title for Initiative Petition 58. Initiative Petition 58 (IP 58), essentially identical to Initiative Petition 47 (IP 47), would change the way that liquor is sold in Oregon by “eliminat[ing] the current system of state-licensed liquor stores” and allowing "'holders of distilled liquor self-distribution permits' (essentially wholesalers) to distribute liquor to 'qualified retailers,' who would, in turn, sell the liquor to the public." The Attorney General certified the ballot title for IP 58 before we issued the Supreme Court issued its opinion regarding IP 47, and two petitioners argued that the phrase "wholesale sales tax" did not avoid the problem that the Court noted in the IP 47 opinion. As noted in the IP 47 case, the phrase “sales tax” had more potential to confuse voters than to describe IP 47, and by extension IP 58, accurately. "[W]e cannot overlook [petitioners'] point that the phrase 'sales tax' is so commonly associated with a tax imposed at the point of a retail sale that the use of the phrase 'wholesale sales tax' may do more to confuse matters than clarify them." Accordingly, the Court referred the ballot title for IP 58 back to the Attorney General for modification. View "McCann v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

After the person elected in 2012 to the office of County Sheriff could not assume the office for health reasons, County Commissioners appointed Relator as acting Sheriff until someone could be appointed to occupy the office. The County Democratic Central Committee (DCC) appointed Respondent to occupy the office. Relator filed this original action in quo warranto, claiming that Respondent did not meet the qualifications to assume the office of Sheriff. Relator asserted that he had standing to bring this action because he remained acting Sheriff. The Supreme Court granted the writ and reinstated Relator as acting County Sheriff until the DCC could appoint a qualified person, holding (1) Relator had standing to bring this action in quo warranto; and (2) Respondent failed to meet the statutory qualifications to be a County Sheriff.View "State ex rel. Swanson v. Maier" on Justia Law

Petitioners filed a petition for extraordinary writ relief concerning certain documents in the possession of Respondents, non-parties to litigation regarding the constitutional validity of the 2012 plan apportioning Florida’s congressional districts under the Fair Districts Amendments. Petitioners contended that the documents demonstrated “the surreptitious participation of partisan operatives in the apportionment process," but the First District Court of Appeal precluded the admission of the documents. The Supreme Court granted relief to Petitioners and stayed the enforcement of the First District’s order, holding that the circuit court was not precluded from admitting the documents into evidence, subject to a proper showing of relevancy, but that the court must maintain the confidentiality of the documents by permitting disclosure or use only under seal in a courtroom closed to the public. View "League of Women Voters v. Data Targeting, Inc." on Justia Law

John Kelly petitioned the circuit court for issuance of a writ of mandamus and for declaratory judgment, asserting that Judge Timothy Fox was ineligible to be a candidate for the position of circuit judge in the election for the judgeship scheduled to be conducted on May 20, 2014 because he was delinquent in the payment of his licensing fee in 2013, and therefore, he was not a “licensed attorney” for the six years immediately preceding the date of assuming office, as constitutionally mandated. The circuit court denied relief, finding that although Fox had been suspended for being delinquent on his annual license fee, this did not constitute a revocation or termination of his license, and therefore, Fox was an eligible candidate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) even though Fox failed to pay his annual license fee for forty-five days in 2013, he remained a licensed attorney during the period of delinquency because his license was not terminated and his name was not removed from the list of licensed attorneys; and (2) therefore, the circuit court correctly found that Fox was eligible to be a candidate for the position of circuit judge. View "Kelly v. Martin" on Justia Law