At issue in this case was a law providing that citizens who appear in person to vote must present photographic proof of their identity. The statute authorized a photographic identification card issued by the State as a valid form of identification. Plaintiffs were two residents who attempted to vote in the primary election using photographic identification cards issued by the City of Memphis Public Library. The residents and City filed a declaratory judgment action arguing (1) the photographic identification requirement violated constitutional protections, and (2) the City qualified as an entity of the State authorized to issue valid photographic identification cards through its public library. The trial court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the photographic identification requirement did not violate constitutional principles, and (2) the photographic identification cards issued by the library complied with the statute for voting purposes. On appeal, the Supreme Court held (1) the issue pertaining to the library cards as photographic identification was moot because a change in the law precluded the use of photographic identification cards issued by municipalities or their libraries for voting purposes; and (2) the photographic identification requirement met constitutional scrutiny. View "City of Memphis v. Hargett" on Justia Law

Petitioner and his political party leader filed a post-election mandamus action seeking the removal of Anthony Veltri, who had been elected and sworn into office as a county commissioner, on the grounds that Veltri did not reside in the proper district, and accordingly, was not eligible for election. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Petitioner and issued a writ of mandamus removing Veltri from his post. The court then seated Petitioner in Veltri's stead as county commissioner. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the issuance of the writ of mandamus was improper, as mandamus was not a proper proceeding by which to challenge the election results, Petitioner was unable to show a clear legal right to the relief sought, and another adequate post-election remedy was available to Petitioner.View "Veltri v. Parker" on Justia Law

Cincinnati for Pension Reform (CPR) qualified an initiative to amend the Cincinnati City Charter for the November 5, 2013 ballot. Because CPR objected to the ballot language adopted by the Hamilton County Board of Elections to describe the proposed amendment, it sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Board to adopt new ballot language and to compel the Secretary of State to approve the new language. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ in part and denied it in part, holding (1) the Board abused its discretion by adopting ballot language that omitted two key provisions of the proposed charter amendment; but (2) CPR did not establish entitlement to a writ against the Secretary of State.View "State ex rel. Cincinnati for Pension Reform v. Hamilton County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Relator sought a writ of prohibition to prohibit the Mahoning County Board of Elections from placing the name of Demaine Kitchen, an independent candidate for mayor of Youngstown, on the November 5, 2013 general election ballot, contending that Kitchen was actually a Democrat and that his profession of independence was not made in good faith. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Relator failed to satisfy his burden of proof, and therefore, the Board did not abuse its discretion by placing Kitchen's name on the ballot. In addition, the Court denied Relator's motion to strike the Board's answer on the grounds of improper service, as Relator failed to demonstrate any harm from the improper service.View "State ex rel. Monroe v. Mahoning County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

On July 11, 2012, Appellees filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and mandamus in the circuit court requesting that the court enter an order (1) declaring that the filing period for independent candidates for municipal offices for the City of Helena-West Helena starts July 27, 2012, and (2) mandating that city officials notify election officials of the proper filing date. The circuit court granted the complaint. Appellants filed a motion to intervene on August 6, 2012 and August 8, 2012. The circuit court denied the motions in orders entered October 12, 2012 and October 18, 2012, concluding that both motions were untimely. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of Appellants' arguments on appeal because (1) the filing period at issue concerned the now-past November 6, 2012 election; and (2) both Appellants won their respective races in the election.View "Etherly v. Newsome" on Justia Law

Two petitioners sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 11 (2014). Among them, petitioners advanced a host of arguments asserting various inadequacies of the ballot title. After careful review, the Supreme Court found the ballot title did not substantially comply with ORS 250.035(2). Therefore, the Court referred the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification.View "Buehler v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Appellees in this case were seventeen-year-olds who would have been eighteen by the 2008 general election. After exhausting their administrative remedies, Plaintiffs filed separate complaints in the circuit court against the Maryland State Boar of Elections (MSBE), alleging that the MSBE violated several provisions of the Election Law Article by prohibiting seventeen-year-olds who would be eighteen by the next general election from casting any votes in non-partisan primary elections for county school boards. The circuit court concluded that the voter eligibility requirements of the Maryland Constitution did not apply to non-partisan elections for Boards of Education, municipal elections, and local ballot questions not mandated by the Constitution. The Court of Appeals vacated the circuit court and held that seventeen-year-olds who will turn eighteen by close of voter registration before the next general election were constitutionally and statutorily entitled to vote in primary elections, whether partisan or non-partisan, subject to all other provisions of the Constitution and statutory election law. Remanded.View "State Bd. of Elections v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Appellant Green Mountain Future (GMF) appealed the grant of summary judgment, which found that it was a political action committee (PAC) and violated a number of provisions of the Vermont campaign finance laws. GMF argued the trial court erred in not applying a narrowing construction created by the U.S. Supreme Court in "Buckley v. Valeo," (424 U.S. 1 (1976)), to the definition of a PAC under Vermont campaign finance laws, and that without that construction the registration and disclosure laws are unconstitutional under the overbreadth doctrine of the First Amendment and the vagueness doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State cross-appealed the $10,000 civil penalty assigned by the trial court, asserting that that court abused its discretion by misapplying certain factors and imposing a penalty for only one of GMF's violations. This case largely turned on the scope and continuing vitality of the "magic words" that GMF argued were required by "Buckley." GMF argued that its advertisements were purely issue advocacy and did not seek to affect the outcome of an election, in this case for Governor of Vermont. The State argued that GMF's advertisements were transparently employed to defeat the candidacy of Brian Dubie for Governor, although they did not state so explicitly. The Supreme Court held that the "magic words" were not required to make the applicable campaign finance statute constitutional. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision on summary judgment and the civil penalty, except that it remanded for reconsideration of the penalty for the violation of the identification requirement.View "Vermont v. Green Mountain Future" on Justia Law

In 2000, Arizona voters approved a referendum that statutorily directed the Legislature to annually increase the base level of the revenue control limit for K-12 public school funding. The measure was codified as Ariz. Rev. Stat. 15-901.01. For several years, the Legislature adjusted the base level and transportation support level annually for inflation, but the 2010-11 budget (HB 2008) included an adjusted to the transportation support level only. Subsequent budgets likewise did not include base level adjustments. Several school districts and other parties sued the State Treasurer and State, alleging that HB 2008 amended or repealed a voter-approved law in violation of the Voter Protection Act (VPA). The superior court dismissed the complaint for failing to state a claim, ruling that section 15-901.01 was not mandatory and that voters "cannot require the legislature to enact a law that provides for the appropriation" prescribed in the statute. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no constitutional impediment existed to the electorate's directive, and legislative adjustments to section 15-901.01's funding scheme are limited by the VPA. View "Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist. v. Ducey" on Justia Law

In 2011, the La Plata Town Council passed four resolutions, including an annexation resolution acquiring a tract of land. Several citizens of La Plata subsequently published a petition to refer the Council's annexation resolution to referendum. The town manager declared that sufficient signatures had been submitted. As such, the annexation resolution was suspended and all four resolutions were referred to referendum. Several referendum opponents filed a petition for judicial review of the manager's report validating the signatures and advancing the referendum to a vote. The circuit court judge ruled in favor of the referendum opponents, holding, inter alia, that although the petition for referendum presented foremost a land annexation resolution, the inclusion of the additional resolutions invalidated the petition. The Court of Appeals vacated the opinion and remanded, holding (1) where the petition for referendum contained legislative enactments that were collateral to the land annexation resolution but did not obfuscate the subject matter of the petition for referendum, the additions do not invalidate the petition; and (2) the town manager acted within his authority when he published Town policies for the validation and verification of signatures for referendum.View "Town of La Plata v. Faison-Rosewick LLC" on Justia Law