Ralph Nader, a candidate in the 2004 election, filed a civil complaint along with four of his presidential electors (collectively, Nader) in 2009 against the Maine Democratic Party and several other entities and individuals involved in the election (collectively, MDP). The complaint alleged that MDP directed the filing of two challenges to Nader's candidacy. MDP filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to Maine's anti-SLAPP statute, which permits defendants to file a special motion to dismiss civil claims against them that are based on the defendants' exercise of the constitutional right to petition. The superior court granted the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for consideration of the special motion to dismiss pursuant to a newly announced standard for applying the anti-SLAPP statute. On remand, the superior court concluded that Nader had satisfied the newly announced standard and denied MDP's special motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the entirety of Nader's complaint against MDP, holding that the motion to dismiss Nader's complaint pursuant to Maine's anti-SLAPP statute should have been granted. View "Nader v. Me. Democratic Party" on Justia Law

On December 21, 2012, Petitioner, the Independence Party candidate in the November 6, 2012 election for the U.S. House of Representatives, filed this petition pursuant to Minn. Stat. 204B.44 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and asserting three claims: (1) Minn. Stat. 202A. 16(2), which identifies those who can participate in and vote at a precinct caucus, violates his First Amendment rights; (2) the Secretary of State improperly withheld from him the e-mail addresses of registered voters in his district in violation of the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act; and (3) the district court's refusal to accept his election contest for filing infringed on his constitutional right of access to the courts. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding (1) laches bars Petitioner's first two claims, as Petitioner unreasonably delayed bringing these claims and granting relief on the claims would do substantial prejudice to the orderly administration of elections; and (2) Petitioner's third claim falls outside the scope of section 204B.44. View "Carlson v. Ritchie" on Justia Law

Under Illinois law, a candidate for the state legislature seeking placement on the general election ballot without having participated in a primary (or having replaced a candidate who did) must submit a nominating petition signed by a certain number of eligible voters. In July 2012, the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners determined that five Republican candidates for the state legislature had not collected the requisite numbers of signatures and denied their petitions to be listed on the ballot in the 2012 general election. In September the candidates and supporters sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the statutory scheme violated their constitutional rights to free speech and association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed, holding that the doctrine of laches barred their claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, after holding that laches does not apply because the delay in filing suit did not impact the Board’’ ability to fashion prospective relief in future elections. The requirement that candidates seeking ballot access submit nominating petitions is reasonable and nondiscriminatory, and serves the important regulatory interests of protecting the integrity of elections from frivolous candidates and preventing voter confusion; it does not unconstitutionally burden the candidates’ and voters’ expressive and associational rights. View "Navarro v. Neal" on Justia Law

Petitioner served two terms as a Public Service Commissioner (PSC). While serving his first term at the PSC, Respondent, campaign manager for Petitioner's opponent in the upcoming election, filed four complaints against Petitioner with the Commissioner of Political Practices (Commissioner), alleging that Petitioner had violated the statutory Code of Ethics by accepting gifts of substantial value from two corporations with which the PSC regularly dealt and by using state resources to aid his reelection campaign and for personal business. Following a three-day hearing on Respondent's complaints, a hearing examiner determined that Petitioner violated Mont. Code Ann. 2-2-104 two times by receiving "gifts of substantial value" and violated Mont. Code Ann. 2-2-121 five times by using state facilities and equipment for election purposes. The Commissioner affirmed, ordering Petitioner to pay $5,750 in fines and $14,945 for the costs of the hearing. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by concluding (1) Respondent had legal standing to file ethics complaints against Petitioner; (2) Petitioner received unlawful gifts; (3) Petitioner improperly used State facilities for political purposes; and (4) the penalty statute for ethics violations was not unconstitutionally vague. View "Molnar v. Fox" on Justia Law

NOM, a nonprofit advocacy organization, appealed the district court's dismissal of its amended complaint for lack of subject-matter-jurisdiction. NOM was seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that New York Election Law 14-100.1, which defined the term "political committee" for the purposes of state elections, violated the First Amendment. The court determined that NOM's case presented a live controversy that was ripe for consideration and vacated the district court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction. Because that conclusion prevented the district court from reaching the merits of NOM's claims, the court declined to comment on the substance of NOM's claims in the first instance. Therefore, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "National Organization for Marriage, Inc. v. Walsh" on Justia Law

Tiffany Alston, a former member of the Maryland House of Delegates, was removed as a delegate after she was convicted and sentenced for misconduct in office. Before Alston fulfilled the conditions of her sentence, the assistant attorney general declared her removed from her House seat by operation of law. Gregory Hall was nominated to fill Alston's seat. While Hall's nomination was before the Governor, the Governor requested that the Democratic Central Committee of Prince George's County (Central Committee) withdraw the nomination. Hall filed a complaint seeking to prevent the withdrawal of his nomination. Alston filed, as an intervener and third-party plaintiff in the same case, a separate complaint seeking a declaration that she had been merely suspended, rather than removed, from her House seat because her conviction and sentence had been converted into probation before judgment. The circuit court ruled (1) Alston had been removed by operation of law on the date she was sentenced for her misconduct in office conviction; and (2) the Central Committee had the power to rescind Hall's nomination at any time before the Governor made the appointment. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding no error in the circuit court's judgment. View "Hall v. Prince George's County Democratic Cent. Comm." on Justia Law

Independent candidate Gary Trudell and voter Myron Dorfman challenged the constitutionality of Vermont’s schedule for filing candidate petitions, alleging that the uniform deadline for all party (major and minor) and independent candidates was discriminatory and impermissibly impinged upon the associational and voting rights of candidates and voters under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the filing deadline was a reasonable, nondiscriminatory regulation, justified by Vermont’s regulatory interests, the Court affirmed the lower court decision declaring the deadline constitutional. View "Trudell v. Vermont " on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, filed a pro se complaint seeking an injunction to require Arkansas Secretary of State Mark Martin to place Appellant's name as a candidate for President of the United States on the 2012 Democratic primary ballot and to register all convicted felons to vote in that primary election. The circuit court granted Martin's motion to dismiss the complaint. Appellant appealed and filed a motion seeking permission to file a supplemental brief. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot and declared the motion moot, holding (1) because the election for which Appellant wanted his name placed on the ballot had already occurred, and the time for registering to vote in that election had passed, the appealed question was moot; and (2) neither exception to the mootness doctrine applied here. View "Judd v. Martin" on Justia Law

he issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned a recall petition against Mayor Terecia Bolt and Councilman Dennis Jenson of the town of Marcus. The petition included ten charges against the mayor, and six against the councilman. THe superior court concluded that only one charge against the mayor and one against the councilman was legally sufficient to support a recall election. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that none of the charges were factually or legally sufficient, and accordingly reversed the superior court's decision on the one remaining charge. View "In re Recall of Bolt" on Justia Law

The Town of Oxford introduced a resolution proposing to annex a number of acres of submerged lands. Petition circulators subsequently submitted a petition for referendum regarding the proposed solution. The petition was submitted before the public hearing on the annexation resolution but before the final enactment of the resolution. The Town Commissioners determined that the signatures affixed before final enactment of the resolution were invalid, and therefore, a referendum was not required. Petitioner filed this action, contending that the referendum petition was valid. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Petitioner, holding that signatures on a referendum petition may be collected before final enactment of the targeted annexation resolution. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the court of special appeals was correct in concluding that, pursuant to Md. Code Ann. art. 23A, 19, petition signatures gathered after introduction, but prior to commencement of the forty-five day period after final enactment of the resolution, could not be counted toward petitioning the resolution to referendum; and (2) by not counting pre-enactment signatures, the referendum effort did not succeed in obtaining a sufficient number of petition signatures for a referendum election to be held. View "Koste v. Town of Oxford" on Justia Law