On January 31, 2013, Yeager submitted a declaration of candidacy to the Richland County Board of Elections, to seek the Republican Party nomination to represent the 5th Ward in the Mansfield City Council. His petitions contained sufficient valid signatures. Yeager was the only person to file a declaration of candidacy. R.C. 3513.02 provides that if in an odd-numbered year, the number of declared candidates seeking a particular party’s nomination does not exceed the number of candidates that party is entitled to nominate, then no primary will be held, and election officials shall certify the declared candidate(s) for inclusion on the general-election ballot. The board of elections certified Yeager’s candidacy for the general-election ballot without a primary, at its March 14, 2013 meeting. On April 2, 2013, the board determined that Yeager was not a qualified elector in the 5th Ward and did not reside at 462 Lily Street, the address listed on his voter-registration form. On July 9, the board officially voted to remove Yeager’s name from the November ballot. The Ohio Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus, holding that the board, which had not received a written protest or held a hearing, acted untimely and in disregard of clearly-established law. View "Yeager v. Richland Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether Vermont’s nominating petition process for independent candidates for President of the United States unduly burdened the rights of such candidates and their supporters under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.  Upon review, the Court concluded that the trial court correctly held that it does and affirmed the trial court’s judgment for plaintiffs Ross “Rocky” Anderson, an independent candidate for President in the 2012 election and his campaign coordinator, plaintiff Benjamin Eastwood. Plaintiffs gathered 1400 signatures from at least twenty-two towns and cities.  However, supporters were delayed and ultimately frustrated in their nomination efforts by the Secretary of State’s interpretation of 17 V.S.A. 2402. As a result, plaintiffs were only able to get town clerk certification for 580 signatures before a June 14 deadline. The trial court concluded that overall, the statute appeared to be a reasonable regulation of elections.  Nonetheless, the trial court denied the State’s motion to dismiss and granted plaintiffs permanent injunctive relief on the ground that the Secretary of State’s requirement that town clerks certify only names listed on original statements (as opposed to faxes or photocopies of those statements) unduly burdened plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  The trial court denied plaintiffs’ request that the court eliminate the certification requirement altogether. The State appealed, arguing that the “original statement” requirement serves important state interests and imposes only a minor burden on plaintiffs’ rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the Secretary of State’s requirement that town clerks certify only original statements when performing their function pursuant to 17 V.S.A. 2402(a)(4) unconstitutionally burdened plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.  Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and permanent injunction for plaintiffs. View "Anderson v. Vermont " on Justia Law

Petitioners obtained sufficient signatures to challenge a proposed tax increase approved by the Orem City Council via a referendum petition. The referendum petition was scheduled to go to a vote in the November 2013 election. In November 2012, the city attorney filed a final ballot title with the city recorder. Dissatisfied with the chosen language for the ballot title, Petitioners filed a petition for extraordinary relief, challenging the wording. The Supreme Court held that the city attorney did not abuse his discretion in drafting the proposed ballot title and that the proposed wording satisfied the statutory direction that the title be an impartial and true statement of the purpose of the measure. View "Burr v. City of Orem" on Justia Law

The Suffolk County Legislature imposed term limits on county officials, including the district attorney. Respondent, who was elected district attorney in 2001, was designated as a candidate in the upcoming primary election even though he would have served more than the term limit if elected. Petitioners, registered voters and a candidate for district attorney, commenced this special proceeding seeking to invalidate the designating petitions. Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the authority to enact a restriction on the number of consecutive years a person can serve as district attorney rests with the State rather than the County. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order finding the designating petitions valid, holding that the County is without the power to regulate the number of terms the district attorney may serve, and therefore, Respondent was eligible to hold the office he sought. View "Hoerger v. Spota" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned plaintiff's filing of an administrative complaint with the FEC alleging that various organizations violated election laws during their efforts to keep him off the ballot. The FEC dismissed the complaint and the district court subsequently granted summary judgment against plaintiff, later denying his motion to alter or amend its judgment. Plaintiff appealed. The court rejected plaintiff's claim of competitor standing where he sought to compel FEC enforcement against his opponents years after the campaign had run its course, and claim of informational standing where he asserted an injury that was not sufficiently concrete to confer standing. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal and concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the suit because plaintiff lacked standing. View "Nadar v. FEC" on Justia Law

Voters filed suit against Officials challenging the process by which Officials confirmed the eligibility of voters who register on election day (election day registrants or EDRs). Voters also challenged a provision of the Minnesota Constitution denying the right of persons under guardianship to vote, as well as the sufficiency of notice afforded to such persons under certain Minnesota statutes. The court concluded that Voters could not prevail on their 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims based on Officials' failure to verify EDR's voting eligibility before allowing EDRs to cast their votes where Voters raised no allegations of the "aggravating factors" identified in Pettengill v. Putnam County R-1 School District; alleged no discriminatory or other intentional, unlawful misconduct by Officials sufficient to implicate section 1983; and alleged no defects causing Minnesota's voting system to be so "fundamentally unfair" that relief under section 1983 would be appropriate. Further, Voters lacked standing to raise their remaining claims where the amended complaint failed to allege that any plaintiff has been denied the right to vote by a constitutional provision barring persons under guardianship from voting. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Voters claims and denial of their motion for summary judgment as moot. View "Minnesota Voters Alliance, et al. v. Ritchie, et al." on Justia Law

Eight defendants who held positions with Clay County, Kentucky, were charged with conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), based on participation in a vote-buying scheme in three election cycles, 2002 to 2007. Candidates pooled money to pay “vote haulers” to deliver voters for a particular slate of candidates. To ensure that they voted for the correct slate, co-conspiring election officers and poll workers reviewed the ballots. When the proper slate was confirmed, the voter got a token or marking and was paid in a location away from the polls. Conspirators retained lists to avoid double payments and to keep track of whose votes could be bought in future elections and used absentee voting and voter-assistance forms to implement the scheme. When electronic voting machines were introduced, conspiring poll workers misinformed voters that they did not need to click “cast ballot” after selecting candidates; poll workers would enter the voting booth after the voter exited and change the electronic ballot to reflect the slate before casting the ballot. The Clay County Board of Elections was alleged to be the racketeering enterprise in the conspiracy. They were convicted after a seven week trial. The Sixth Circuit vacated, based on cumulative errors in evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

Petitioners claimed that Article V, Section 16(b) of the state charter was unconstitutional. They argued that section 16(b) deprived them of their inherent right to be free of age-based discrimination, particularly because the section mandates that jurists retire the year they turn 70 years old. In prior decisions, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that Article V, Section 16(b) was not so irrational as to be considered unconstitutional. The Court denied petitioners' application for relief and dismissed the case with prejudice. View "Friedman v. Corbett" on Justia Law

In 2010, voters approved an amendment to the Florida Constitution providing for express new state constitutional standards to govern the apportionment of legislative districts. Those standards were enumerated in Fla. Const. art. III, 21. Pursuant to its Fla. Const. art. III, 16 jurisdiction, the Supreme Court declared the Legislature's original plan apportioning districts for the Senate to be facially invalid, whereupon the Legislature adopted a revised plan. The Supreme Court upheld the facial validity of the revised plan. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint alleging that the revised Senate map violated the express standards contained in article III, section 21. The Legislature moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, asserting that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a challenge to the 2012 legislative apportionment plan. After the circuit court denied the motion, the Legislature sought extraordinary relief directing the circuit court to dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate fact-based challenges to the validity of the 2012 legislative apportionment plan, that the circuit court's exercise of jurisdiction here would not interfere with the binding judgment of the Supreme Court, and that the Legislature failed to meet its burden of demonstrating entitlement to relief. View "Fla. House of Representatives v. League of Women Voters of Fla. " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of certain sections of California Senate Bill 6 (SB 6). SB 6, implementing California's Proposition 14 (Prop. 14), fundamentally changes the California election system by eliminating party primaries and general elections with party-nominated candidates, and substituting a nonpartisan primary and a two-candidate runoff. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the appeal; Plaintiff Chamness' case was not moot where his claim was capable of repetition because future election administrators would deny him the ability to use the designation "Independent" on the primary ballot; Plaintiffs Frederick's and Wilson's appeal were moot because they only sought declaratory relief affecting future elections; and Intervenor Galacki's claims regarding his write-in candidacy and the vote he cast for himself in the general election were moot. In Case No. 11-56449, the court held that Chamness failed to establish that SB 6 severely burdened his rights, and upheld the constitutionality of the statute as reasonably related to furthering the state's important interest in efficiently regulating elections. In Case No. 56303, the court held that the trial court acted well within its discretion in concluding that allowing Galacki to intervene would entail substantial delays and inefficiencies resolving the case, and in therefore denying Galacki's motion as untimely. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order granting defendants summary judgment and denying Galacki's motion to intervene. View "Chamness v. Maldonado" on Justia Law