This was an original action challenging the decennial apportionment of districts in the General Assembly. At issue was whether the 2011 apportionment plan adopted by the apportionment board (Respondents) complied with Ohio Const. art. XI, 7 and 11. The Supreme Court denied Relators' request for declaratory and injunctive relief, holding that Relators failed to adduce sufficient, credible proof to rebut the presumed constitutionality accorded the 2011 apportionment plan by establishing that the plan was unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore, Relators were not entitled to a declaration that the 2011 apportionment plan was unconstitutional or a prohibitory injunction to prevent elections from being conducted in accordance with that plan. View "Wilson v. Kasich" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought a declaratory ruling that Mont. Code Ann. 13-35-227(1) violated their constitutional rights to free speech by prohibiting political expenditures by corporations on behalf of or opposing candidates for public office. Plaintiffs argued that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. FEC barred Montana from prohibiting independent and indirect corporate expenditures on political speech, and that Montana's century-old ban on independent corporate expenditures therefore was invalid. The district court granted ATP's motion for summary judgment on the merits of its constitutional claim, declared section 13-35-227(1) unconstitutional, and denied ATP's request for attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding (1) the statute was constitutional; and (2) Plaintiffs' cross-appeal on the attorneys' fee issue, therefore, was moot. The Court's decision thereafter was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Montana Supreme Court then returned to ATP's cross-appeal on the issue of attorneys' fees and affirmed the district court's order declining to award attorneys' fees to Plaintiffs, holding that equitable considerations did not require the district court to award fees against the State under either the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act or the private attorney general doctrine. View "W. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

This case appealed a district court's denial of Petitioner Jim Brannon's election contest of the Coeur d'Alene city council election in 2009. In the official vote total, Brannon lost the election for seat 2 of the city council to Mike Kennedy by five votes. Brannon then filed an election contest that alleged numerous irregularities and sought to set aside, void, or annul the election. After a bench trial, the district court issued a memorandum decision that affirmed the election result, finding insufficient illegal votes or irregularities to change the outcome of the election. On appeal, Brannon argued that the City delegated its election duties to Kootenai County in contravention of Idaho law, that the district court made numerous factual and legal errors at trial, and that the district court erred in denying Brannon's motion to disqualify and motion for new trial. Upon review and finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court. View "Brannon v. City of Coeur D'Alene" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the Republican Party of Connecticut, brought a declaratory judgment action in which it sought a determination that, because its candidate for the office of governor in the 2010 election received the highest number of votes under the designation of the Republican Party line on the ballot, Defendant, the secretary of the state, was required to list the candidates of the Republican Party first on the ballots for the 2010 election pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 9-249a(a). The trial court granted the joint request of the parties to reserve questions regarding the statute for the Supreme Court. The Court answered, (1) Plaintiff had an available administrative remedy in the present case, which it exhausted; (2) Plaintiff's complaint was not barred by sovereign immunity; and (3) section 9-249a requires that the Plaintiff's candidates for office be placed on the first line of the ballots for the November 6, 2012 election. View "Republican Party of Conn. v. Merrill" on Justia Law

Voter Verified’s patent, issued in 2008 and claiming priority from an application filed in 2000, patent discloses and claims automated systems and methods for voting in an election. It features a self-verification procedure by which machine and human error may be detected and corrected before the ballot is submitted by the voter for tabulation. The voter enters a vote into an electronic voting station, which temporarily records the voter’s input in digital storage and generates a corresponding printed ballot. That printed ballot is then checked for accuracy, either by visual inspection by the voter or by a computerized scanning mechanism capable of comparing the face of the printed ballot with the vote data represented in the station’s temporary storage. Only ballots deemed consistent with the voter’s intended or recorded input are accepted for final tabulation. The district court held that claims 1-93 were not infringed, that claims 49 and 94 were invalid, and that other claims were not invalid. The Federal Circuit affirmed, noting that several of the steps involved in the alleged infringement require action by the voter. View "Voter Verified, Inc. v. Premier Election Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an otherwise qualified voter in Puerto Rico who was removed from the voter registration roll because she did not vote in the 2008 general election. Plaintiff filed suit on September 12, 2012, seeking a preliminary injunction to redress that removal. The injunction would have required the government to reinstate more than 300,000 voters to the registration roll in time for the federal election on November 6, 2012. The district court denied Plaintiff's request. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction, holding that the record and the parties' arguments failed to demonstrate that such extraordinary relief could be granted only weeks before the election without creating uncertainty and confusion in the Puerto Rico electoral process. Although the Court recognized the importance of Plaintiff's claims in this case, the Court declined to jeopardize the electoral process as a whole by acting precipitously on evolving claims that had not yet been adequately analyzed or developed by Plaintiff. View "Colon-Marrero v. Conty-Perez" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit granted Ohio a stay of the district court’s October 26 order granting a preliminary injunction that requires the state to count provisional ballots cast in the wrong polling place due to poll-worker error (wrong-place/wrong-precinct ballots) in the November election. The court previously affirmed an order that Ohio count right-place/wrong-precinct provisional ballots caused by poll-worker error. Plaintiffs failed to show strong likelihood of success on the merits of constitutional claims concerning wrong-place/wrong-precinct ballots. The salient feature of the right-place/ wrong-precinct problem was disenfranchisement, by worker error, of voters who arrive at the correct place, a situation caused by Ohio’s system of multi-precinct polling places. Though voters rely on workers to direct them to the proper precinct in the polling place, they are not as dependent in identifying their correct polling place. Ohio law requires officials to provide notice of where they are eligible to vote; information is easily accessible. There is sparse evidence of workers sending voters to the wrong polling location. The state has a legitimate interest in maintaining its precinct-based voting system; there is a strong public interest that militates against changing the rules during early voting. The injunction would interfere with orderly election administration and cause confusion among poll workers and voters. View "Serv. Emps. Int'l Union Local 1 v. Husted" on Justia Law

The Washington constitution limits municipal indebtedness to protect taxpayers from legislative and voter improvidence. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether the city of Wenatchee (City) would exceed its debt limit by entering into a "contingent loan agreement" (CLA) with appellant Greater Wenatchee Regional Events Center Public Facilities District (District) to help the District finance a regional events center. The District argued that the CLA was not subject to the City's debt limit because it created a "contingent" liability, triggered only if the District is unable to make payments on the District's bonds. Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected this argument because the City was unconditionally obligated to service the District's debt if the District could not and because the risk of loss fell upon the City and its taxpayers: "[o]ur decision accordingly places the approval of the CLA in the hands of the voters." View "In re Bond Issuance of Greater Wenatchee Reg'l Events Ctr." on Justia Law

This was the latest in a series of opinions by the Court of Appeals involving the constitutional provision and the implementing legislation authorizing a limited number of slot machines at specified Maryland facilities, including facilities in the area of Anne Arundel County (County). A County zoning ordinance authorized slot machines in certain areas of the County. The circuit court determined that the ordinance was not subject to referendum under the County charter. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (1) held the circuit court's judgment was appealable, as (i) the Legislature no no intention of applying the non-appealability principle of Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 12-302(a) to cases under the Election Article, and (ii) where the Election Article authorizes judicial review but is silent regarding an appeal, Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc.12-301 authorizes an appeal; and (2) reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded with instructions to order that the ordinance be placed on the ballot at the general election in accordance with the referendum provisions of the County charter, holding that the ordinance was simply a local ordinance re-zoning an area, and as such, it was not exempt from a referendum. View "Citizens Against Slots At The Mall v. PPE Casino Resorts Md., LLC" on Justia Law

The Stanford Defendants brought this case under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA), Tex. Bus. & Com. Code 24.001 et seq., to recover approximately $1.6 million in political contributions made to various political committees by the Stanford Defendants between 2000 and 2008. Because the court concluded that (1) the Receiver could stand in the shoes of the creditors of the Stanford Defendants, (2) the Receiver's TUFTA claims were brought within one year after the transfers were or reasonably could have been discovered by the claimant, and (3) they were not preempted, the court rejected the Committees' arguments and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Janvey v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign, et al" on Justia Law