In 2008, candidates for the U.S. presidency and vice-presidency collected signatures on nomination papers throughout the Commonwealth. The papers bore the political designation "Libertarian." The candidates failed to secure the indorsement of the national Libertarian party at its convention. The Libertarian Association of Massachusetts contacted the Secretary of the Commonwealth and requested that the names of the persons who won the party indorsement be substituted for the names of the candidates listed on the nomination papers. The Secretary refused. The federal trial court held that G. L. c. 53, 14, which governs filling a vacancy where a candidate nominated for "state, city or town office" withdraws, dies, or otherwise becomes ineligible prior to election, was unconstitutionally vague. On remand, the judge stayed the vagueness claim pending a state court clarification. Plaintiffs then sought a state court declaration that section 14 provides a minor party, which does not qualify as a "political party" under Massachusetts law, a means to "substitute" the names of candidates chosen at its national convention for those listed on nomination papers. After deciding to resolve the case, despite it being moot, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that section 14 applies to presidential electors. Although the section is not a model of clarity, it requires that all candidates gather signatures. View "Libertarian Assoc. of MA v. Sec'y of the Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Collins served as a city councilman and vice-mayor of East St. Louis. In 2002 he moved to the suburbs, but continued to use his previous address to vote East St. Louis and to establish residency for election to as precinct committeeman for the Democratic Party. Federal agents checked tax filings to verify his residency and discovered that Collins had not filed federal or state income tax returns for almost two decades. Convicted of multiple counts of tax evasion, willful failure to file tax returns, and voter fraud, he was given a within-guidelines sentence of 50 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court used pattern jury instructions for tax evasion, which properly define the required element of willfulness and need no clarification to distinguish tax evasion from negligent failure to file. It is not “remotely plausible” to attribute tax delinquency of almost two decades to negligence. The court properly stated Illinois law regarding requirements for establishing voting residency. The evidence was “easily sufficient” to support the verdict. Collins did not file tax returns, and to hide his income, commingled personal and business accounts, used a false Employer Identification Number, and misappropriated the Social Security Number of his deceased business partner. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law

Appellants challenged the amendments to the state earnings tax statutes, Mo. Rev. Stat. 92.105 through 92.125, raising several arguments. The trial court dismissed Appellants' second amended petition with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the amendments did not violate Mo. Const. art. III, 51, as the initiative was not used for a de facto appropriation of money to pay the election costs to continue the earnings tax; (2) the requirement to hold recurring elections without providing state funds did not constitute an unfunded mandate in violation of the Hancock Amendment; and (3) Appellants did not state a claim for violation of an amendment to the city charter of Kansas City because the initiative process did not amend Kansas City's charter, and therefore, the constitutional requirements of Mo. Const. art. VI, 20 regarding amendments to a city's charter were not applicable. View "Dujakovich v. Carnahan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of MCL 169.252(1), which sets limits on individual campaign contributions per “election cycle,” and includes criminal penalties. Plaintiff attested that he wished to make contributions to the candidate committees of individuals running for state House and state Senate in Michigan in 2010 in excess of the limits imposed for an individual. The district court denied a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court properly considered that there was no showing of irreparable harm to plaintiff while there would be significant harm to defendant and the public if a preliminary injunction issued; that the only hard evidence in the case was that the statutory limits are not indexed to inflation, a showing that did not lead to the conclusion that plaintiff had a strong likelihood of success on the merits; and that there was no empirical evidence to determine the effect of individual contribution limits on the power to mount a campaign. View "McNeilly v. Land" on Justia Law

The Government appealed the district court's grant of Defendants-Appellees WIlliam Danielczyk and Eugene Biagi's motion to dismiss count four, paragraph 10(b) of their indictment, which alleged that they conspired and facilitated direct contributions to Hillary Clinton's 2008 presidential campaign in violation of federal election laws. The district court reasoned that in light of "Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission" (130 S.Ct. 876 (2010)), section 441b(a) of the Election Campaign Act of 1971 was unconstitutional as applied to Appellees. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court and reversed, finding that the lower court misapplied "Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont," (539 U.S. 146 (2003)) as the basis for its dismissal of count four. View "United States v. Danielczyk" on Justia Law

The Board of County Commissioners of Frederick County (BOCC) appointed a nine-member charter board in 2011. The Maryland Constitution provides that the BOCC shall hold a special election for consideration of additional nominated charter board members under certain circumstances. Petitioners, individuals who sought membership on the charter board, circulated a petition in support of nominating candidates for consideration at a special election. The Frederick County Board of Elections (the Board) determined that Petitioners did not satisfy the statutory and constitutional requirements necessary for the BOCC to call a special election. The circuit court judge affirmed the determination made by the Board that the petition contained an insufficient number of valid signatures to require the BOCC to hold a special election. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and held (1) the Board applied the correct standard for reviewing and validating petition signatures under Md. Code An. Elec. Law 6-203(a), as interpreted by the Court in recent opinions; (2) the doctrine of collateral estoppel was not applicable to the circumstances of this case; and (3) the mandatory petition signature requirements in 6-203(a) and COMAR 33.06.03.06B(1) were not unconstitutional. View "Burruss v. Bd. of County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Montana state law provides that a "corporation may not make ... an expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political committee that supports or opposes a candidate or a political party." Mont. Code 13–35–227(1). The Montana Supreme Court rejected a claim that the statute violated the First Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed the Montana decision, based on its 2010 decision, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, in which the Court struck down a similar federal law, holding that "political speech does not lose First Amendment protection simply because its source is a corporation." Dissenting Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan stated that "Montana’s experience, like considerable experience elsewhere since the Court’s decision in Citizens United, casts grave doubt on the Court’s supposition that independent expenditures do not corrupt or appear to do so." View "Am. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock" on Justia Law

California law permits public employees to create an agency shop bargaining unit so that all employees are represented by a union. Employees who do not join must pay "chargeable expenses;" the union may not require nonmembers to fund ideological projects. In 2005, SEIU, a public-sector union, sent its annual "Hudson notice," setting and capping monthly dues, and stating that the fee could increase without notice. That month, the Governor called for a special election on propositions opposed by SEIU. After the 30-day objection period, SEIU sent a letter announcing a temporary 25% dues increase and elimination of the cap: an "Emergency Temporary Assessment to Build a Political Fight-Back Fund." Nonmembers could not avoid paying. The district court entered summary judgment favoring a class of nonmembers who paid into the fund. The Ninth Circuit reversed, employing a balancing test: whether procedures reasonably accommodated interests of the union, the employer, and nonmember employees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the case is not moot, despite SEIU offering a refund. When a state establishes an agency shop that exacts union fees as a condition of public employment, dissenting employees are forced to support an organization with whose principles they may disagree. Compulsory subsidies for private speech are subject to exacting First Amendment scrutiny and cannot be sustained unless there is a comprehensive regulatory scheme and compulsory fees are a necessary incident of the larger regulatory purpose that justified the required association. When a union imposes a special assessment or dues increase to meet undisclosed expenses, it must provide fresh notice and may not exact funds without consent. Failure to provide a fresh Hudson notice was unjustified; treatment of nonmembers who opted out after the initial Hudson notice also ran violated the First Amendment. They were required to pay 56.35% of the special assessment even though all the money was slated for electoral uses. View "Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union Local 1000" on Justia Law

Jamilah Nasheed appealed from the trial court's judgment in favor of Robin Wright-Jones on Wright-Jones' petition challenging the qualifications of Nasheed to run for election in the Democratic Party primary for state senator for the 5th district. The trial court found the residency requirement of the Missouri Constitution was ambiguous and Nasheed did not satisfy that requirement to run in the 5th district. An exception in Mo. Const. art. III, 6 provides that if the repportionment of the districts is less than one year before the general election, candidates may reside in any district from which a portion was incorporated into the new district where the candidate seeks office, even if the candidate does not reside in that incorporated portion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Nasheed was eligible to run in the 5th district because the exception did not require Nasheed to live within the boundaries of the reapportioned senate district she sought to represent. View "Wright-Jones v. Nasheed " on Justia Law

Rochelle Gray appealed from the judgment of the trial court in favor of Sylvester Taylor on Gray's petition challenging the qualifications of Taylor to run for election in the Democratic Party primary for state representative in the 75th district. The trial court held that although Taylor did not reside within the boundaries of the new district, the Missouri Constitution required only that he have resided for one year in the county or any of the district from which the new district was created through reapportionment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in the context of reapportionment within one year of a general election, the Constitution requires that a candidate satisfies the one-year residency requirement by residing in the county or any district from which a portion was incorporated in the new district where the candidate seeks office, even if the candidate does not reside in that portion. View "Gray v. Taylor" on Justia Law