This was an expedited election case in which Relators, taxpayers and committee members representing the petitioners supporting the issue, requested a writ of mandamus to compel Respondent, the county board of elections, to submit a levy-decrease question to the electorate at the November 6, 2012 general election. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the board of elections neither abused its discretion nor clearly disregarded Ohio Rev. Code 5705.261 and 5705.192 by removing Relators' levy-decrease initiative from the November 6 ballot where the voter-approved levy did not increase the rate of the preexisting voter-approved levies. View "State ex rel. Taxpayers for Westerville Sch. v. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

This was an expedited election case for writs of mandamus and prohibition to find Akron Ordinance No. 271-2012 to be invalid and to order Respondents, the Summit County board of elections and the secretary of state of Ohio, to reconvene forthwith and adopt ballot language that properly described the proposed charter amendment for the November 6, 2012 general election. The Supreme Court denied the writs, holding that Relator did not establish his entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief, as (1) the proposed charter amendment did not violate the Akron Charter; and (2) the board of elections and secretary of state did not abuse their discretion or clearly disregard applicable law by rejecting Relator's argument concerning the approved ballot language, and the ballot language for the proposed charter amendment approved by the board of elections and secretary of state properly described the amendment. View "State ex rel. Kilby v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Appellee brought a lawsuit challenging 11 C.F.R. 104.20(c)(9), a regulation promulgated by the Federal Election Commission (FEC), that purported to implement section 201(f)(2)(F) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), 2 U.S.C. 434. The court held that appellee easily satisfied the requirements of 5 U.S.C. 702 and demonstrated his Article III standing by showing that he would be unable to obtain disclosure of information under the BCRA because of the allegedly unlawful restrictions imposed by section 104.20(c)(9). On the merits, the court held that the district court erred in holding that Congress spoke plainly when it enacted 2 U.S.C. 434(f), thus foreclosing any regulatory construction of the statute by the FEC. Moreover, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, the court did not find that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue in this case. Indeed, it was doubtful that, in enacting 2 U.S.C 434(f), Congress even anticipated the circumstances that the FEC faced when it promulgated section 104.20(c)(9). The court reversed and vacated summary judgment in favor of appellee, remanding to the district court. Upon remand, the district court shall first refer the matter to the FEC for further consideration. View "Van Hollen, Jr. v. FEC, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner brought an original action seeking a writ of mandamus requiring the Secretary of State to accept its petitions for an initiated constitutional amendment to be placed on the November 6, 2012 ballot. Petitioner sought the writ of mandamus against the Secretary, requiring him to accept Petitioner's petition as timely filed containing, prima facie, the required number of signatures for an initiated constitutional amendment, and further ordering the Secretary to permit Petitioner thirty days to cure any shortcomings in its petition. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition, holding (1) Petitioner had standing to invoke the Court's jurisdiction; but (2) Petitioner failed to submit a facially valid petition and did not qualify for the additional thirty days to cure deficiencies. View "Ark. Hotels & Entm't Inc. v. Martin" on Justia Law

The Constitution Party of Kansas, Curt Engelbrecht, and Mark Pickens sued the Secretary of State of Kansas, in his official capacity, alleging that their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights are violated by the Secretary's refusal, consistent with Kansas law, to keep track of Kansas voters' affiliation with the Constitution Party because the Constitution Party is not a recognized political party under Kansas law. In the district court, the parties stipulated to a Joint Statement of Facts and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court ruled for the Secretary, determining that Kansas's system of tracking party affiliation did not unconstitutionally burden the plaintiffs' rights. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the district court misapplied controlling Tenth Circuit precedent in evaluating their claim, and that under the proper analytical criteria, reversal is warranted. The Constitution Party did not contend that summary judgment was improper due to a lack of evidence in the record to support the Secretary's legal argument. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found no merit to the Constitution Party's argument and affirmed the district court's decision. View "Constitution Party of Kansas, et al v. Kobach" on Justia Law

This was an action for writ of mandamus to compel Respondent, the Beaver Township Board of Trustees, to adopt a resolution to cause the Mahoning County Board of Elections to submit to the Beaver Township electors the question of whether the township should adopt a limited home-rule government. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Relators did not strictly comply with the applicable statutory procedure, as Relators did not submit the proper petition to the board of township trustees as required by Ohio Rev. Code 504.01(A)(4), instead submitting a petition purporting to be under Ohio Rev. Code 504.14 to the township fiscal officer. Section 504.14 did not apply because Beaver Township had not adopted limited home-rule government. View "State ex rel. Davis v. Beaver Twp. Bd. of Trs." on Justia Law

Jolivette served as a Republican State Legislator and Butler County Commissioner, 1997-2010; he also served on the Butler County Republican Party’s Central Committee. In November 2011, Jolivette filed a Declaration of Candidacy to run as a Republican for the Office of State Representative for Ohio’s 51st House District. Pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 3513.05, Jolivette submitted part-petitions containing 72 signatures; he failed to sign one, containing 17 signatures, and six signatures on the other signed petitions were of “questionable validity.” The Board of Elections met; Jolivette argued in favor of certifying his petition. Two weeks later Jolivette withdrew his candidacy as a Republican and resigned from the Republican Party Central Committee. He prepared a nominating petition to run as an independent candidate for the same office and did not vote in any party primary. Members of the Republican Party challenged his candidacy on the basis that he was not unaffiliated from the Republican Party. The Board of Elections approved Jolivette’s petition, but scheduled a protest hearing. After the protest was granted, Jolivette filed suit. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding no merit to Jolivette’s constitutional claims. View "Jolivette v. Husted" on Justia Law

Appellants filed a complaint against Appellees, the public school district, members of the district's board of directors, and others, alleging (1) subsequent to the federal decennial census, the district was required to adopt new district lines and the district had failed to do so in violation of Ark. Code Ann. 6-13-631; and (2) the voters were entitled to a new school board pursuant to section 6-13-631. The circuit court found in favor of Appellants. Appellants subsequently filed a motion for payment of prevailing-party attorneys' fees, which was denied. Appellants appealed, arguing that the circuit court' findings were equivalent to a finding that there had been a violation of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act and that, because the circuit court could have awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to the Act, Appellants were entitled to attorneys fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants did not prevail on anything other than the claim made pursuant to section 6-13-631, and because that statute does not provide for an award of attorneys' fees, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the same. View "Fluker v. Helena-West Helena Pub. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

This was an original action pursuant to Ohio Const. art. XVI, 1 for a writ of mandamus compelling Respondent, the Ohio Ballot Board, including the secretary of state, to reconvene forthwith to replace ballot language previously adopted with ballot language that properly described the proposed redistricting amendment so that it may appear on ballot for the November 6, 2012 general election. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that Relators established that the ballot board's condensed ballot language for the proposed constitutional amendment was defective, and thus invalid, because it contained factual inaccuracies and material omissions that had the effect of misleading the voters. View "State ex rel. Voters First v. Ohio Ballot Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that she broke an unwritten rule and suffered the consequences when she challenged a sitting superior court judge for his seat in a local election while she was serving as a temporary superior court commissioner. The court concluded that, while the timing and targeted effect of the superior court's policy were suspicious, the court did not reach the merits of plaintiff's federal or state law retaliation claims because the judges of the superior court's Executive Committee enjoyed legislative immunity for their decision to alter the minimum qualifications to serve as a temporary commissioner. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. View "Schmidt v. Contra Costa County, et al" on Justia Law