The Center broadcasts advertisements, maintains a website, publishes a weekly e-mail newsletter, produces a bi-weekly radio show, and engages in other forms of mass media communications. Its tax exempt status under section 501(c)(4) is incompatible with partisan political activity, so the Center cannot endorse candidates. During election seasons, the Center runs advertisements that refer to the positions of candidates or to ballot issues and call for actions such as contacting candidates. The Center claims that it feared that Illinois’s new campaign finance laws (10 ILCS 5/9) would require it to register as a “political committee” and to disclose election-related expenditures and significant contributors and that its donors require assurances that their identities will not be disclosed. The Center argued that the law was vague and overbroad. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the Illinois law is modeled on federal law. The Center did not establish that the statute “prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech,” or that its “deterrent effect on legitimate expression is ... real and substantial.”View "Ctr, for Individual Freedom v. Madigan" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a candidate for the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, invoked the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction seeking a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents, including the secretary of state and members of the state election commission, to comply with W. Va. Code 3-12-11(e) and approve the release of matching funds to his campaign. Petitioner, a participant in the Supreme Court Public Campaign Financing Pilot Program, argued that because he complied with the applicable requirements set forth in the Pilot Program, and because one of the privately finances candidates spent a sum sufficient to trigger the matching funds provisions, the election commission was statutorily required to disburse matching funds to his campaign. The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus requested by Petitioner, holding (1) the matching funds provisions set forth in the Pilot Program violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment; and (2) therefore, Petitioner failed to establish a clear legal right to the relief sought. View "State ex rel. Loughry v. Tennant" on Justia Law

Earls filed nomination papers for alderman of Chicago’s 28th Ward on November 22, 2010, for an election to take place on February 22, 2011. An objector complained to the board of election commissioners that Earls and her husband, joint owners, were claiming homeowner property tax exemptions for properties other than the one in which they resided. The Municipal Code states that: “A person is not eligible for an elective municipal office if that person is in arrears in the payment of a tax or other indebtedness due to the municipality.” Earls had obtained documentation that, as of November 17, 2010, she had no outstanding debt for parking, water, administrative hearings, inspection fees, cost recovery, and tax/licensing. The Earls waived the extra exemptions and made payment to the county treasurer. The board concluded that property taxes owed because of unauthorized exemptions did not mandate ineligibility for municipal office. The trial court affirmed. The appellate court reversed on the last business day before the election, and directed that Earls’ name be removed from the ballot or that voters be given written notice that Earls had been disqualified. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, but declined to order a new election. Earls’ property taxes were owed to the county collector, not the city. View "Jackson v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In four cases, each involving a ballot proposal to amend the Michigan Constitution, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the groups proposing the amendments properly exercised their right to petition for constitutional amendments in compliance with the constitutional and statutory safeguards. Upon review of the cases, the Court reaffirmed prior caselaw holding that an existing provision is only altered when the amendment actually adds to, deletes from, or changes the wording of the provision. Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed that an amendment only abrogates an existing provision when it renders that provision wholly inoperative. Applying the meanings of "alter" and "abrogate" to the cases at issue, the Court concluded that none of the ballot proposals altered an existing provision of the Constitution because none of them actually "add to, delete from, or change the existing wording of the provision . . . ." View "Protect Our Jobs v. Bd. of State Canvassers" on Justia Law

In this primary election case, Choco Meza, chair of the county democratic party, determined that petitions filed with Monica Caballero's application for a place on the county democratic party primary election ballot as a candidate for justice of the peace did not contain the required number of valid signatures. Caballero sued Meza, the county democratic party, and the county, and sought injunctive relief precluding them from omitting her name from the ballot. Tomas Uresti, Caballero's opponent, intervened. The trial court subsequently issued a temporary injunction effectively compelling Meza to place Caballero's name on the ballot. Uresti applied for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its temporary injunction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for mandamus relief as moot, as the primary election, which Meza won, had concluded. View "In re Uresti" on Justia Law

In 2006, the Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless and Service Employees International Union, Local 1199 sued Blackwell, then Ohio Secretary of State, challenging provisions of Ohio’s 2006 Voter ID law under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The parties negotiated consent orders in 2006 and 2008. NEOCH and SEIU successfully sought attorneys’ fees with respect to the 2008 orders. The Ohio Secretary of State appealed the fee and cost award, and the parties ultimately negotiated a consent decree signed by the district court in April 2010. In June 2010, the plaintiffs again sought attorneys’ fees and costs, for work performed regarding prior motions for attorneys’ fees submitted in the litigation, during the appeal of the award of attorneys’ fees, and negotiating the consent decree. The district court granted the motion in part, but because it found that the motion regarded a supplemental fee request, it reduced the fee award to three percent of the award granted in the main case. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the state’s argument that the 2010 consent decree was a settlement in full of all of the plaintiffs’ claims, waiving any claim for further attorneys’ fees. View "NE OH Coalition for Homeless v. Sec'y of State of OH" on Justia Law

In these two cases, Petitioners, members of the Minnesota Legislature and others, filed petitions pursuant to Minn. Stat. 204B.44 seeking an order requiring Mark Ritchie, the Minnesota Secretary of State, to use the titles designated by the Minnesota Legislature for two proposed constitutional amendment ballot questions that were scheduled to appear on the November 2012 general election ballot. Petitioners contended that by failing to use the title designated by the Legislature for each ballot question, Respondents failed to comply with the statutory requirement to "provide an appropriate title" for the ballot question. The Supreme Court granted the petitions, holding that when the Legislature has included a title for a ballot question in the bill proposing a constitutional amendment, the "appropriate title" the Secretary of State must provide for that ballot question is the title designated by the Legislature. View "Limmer v. Ritchie" on Justia Law

This action was brought under Minn. Stat. 204B.44 seeking to correct an alleged error in the preparation of the ballot for the general election. Specifically, Petitioners sought to prevent the people of Minnesota from voting on the question of whether photographic identification should be required to vote in Minnesota. Without expressing an opinion as to the merits of changing Minnesota law to require photographic identification to vote, the Supreme Court concluded that Petitioners were not entitled to relief, holding that Petitioners did not meet their burden of demonstrating that there was an error that required the judiciary to intercede. View "League of Women Voters Minn. v. Ritchie" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a school district is subject to the campaign-finance reporting requirements found in Minn. Stat. 211A and whether the complaint in this matter stated a claim under Minn. Stat. 211B.06, which prohibits the dissemination of false campaign material. The Supreme Court held (1) a school district is a "corporation" under section 211A.01 and therefore can qualify as a "committee" subject to chapter 211A's campaign-finance reporting requirements if it acts "to promote or defeat a ballot question"; (2) because Appellants' complaint, filed with the Office of Administrative Hearings, stated a prima facie claim that the school district here was a "committee" under section 211A.01 that promoted a ballot question, the ALJ assigned to the matter erred in dismissing the complaint without an evidentiary hearing; and (3) the complaint failed to state a prima facie violation of section 211B.06 with respect to two allegedly false statements. Remanded. View "Abrahamson v. St. Louis County Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In this original proceeding, the issue before the Supreme Court concerned the election complaint filed by Plaintiff Khistina DeJean. She was one of four candidates for mayor of Honolulu in the August 11, 2012 primary election. She came in last, and challenged the primary alleging (among other things) that some polling places opened late, and the media discriminated against her. Plaintiff argued that the cumulative effect of these issues meant she was not treated fairly in the election. Plaintiff asked the Court to allow her to remain on the November 6, 2012 general election ballot as candidate for mayor. "It is not sufficient for a plaintiff challenging an election to allege a poorly run and inadequately supervised election process that evinces room for abuse or possibilities of fraud. An election contest cannot be based upon mere belief or indefinite information." Accordingly, the Supreme Court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants and dismissed Plaintiff's case. View "Dejean v. Nago " on Justia Law