Petitioner filed with the Secretary of State's (Secretary) office an affidavit of candidacy as the Republican candidate for Minnesota State Senate, District 61. Petitioner's affidavit did not include a telephone number as required by statute, and therefore, Petitioner's affidavit was rejected. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition with the Supreme Court seeking an order requiring the Secretary to place his name on the 2012 general election ballot as a candidate for state senate. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the Secretary properly rejected Petitioner's affidavit of candidacy because Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements for filing to run for elective office. View "In re Petition of Pfliger" on Justia Law

In June 2012, Petitioner filed an affidavit of candidacy and nominating petition with the Secretary of State's (Secretary) office, seeking to run as an independent candidate for Minnesota state representative. The Secretary rejected Petitioner's nominating petition because it did not bear her residence as required by statute and because Petitioner's statement of political party or political principle exceeded the three-word limit required by statute. Petitioner petitioned the Supreme Court to require the Secretary to list her on the 2012 general election ballot as a candidate for state representative. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the Secretary properly denied Petitioner's nominating petition, as (1) candidates for public office must strictly comply with the statutory requirements for filing for office, and (2) the statement of political party or political principle on the pages of Petitioner's nominating petition exceeded the three-word limit required by statute. View "Anderson v. Ritchie" on Justia Law

On January 27, 2012, the Yuma County Superior Court disqualified Alejandrina Cabrera under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 38-201(C) from appearing on the ballot as a candidate for the San Luis City Council. Concluding that section 38-201(C)'s language requirement must be read "in the context of the political office at issue," the court found that Cabrera was not sufficiently proficient in English to perform as a city council member for San Luis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, in relevant part, that (1) the trial court correctly interpreted section 38-201(C); and (2) the trial court's interpretation of the statute did not unconstitutionally violate Cabrera's right to participate in government. View "Escamilla v. Cuello" on Justia Law

Petitioners brought an original proceeding to the Supreme Court to challenge the validity of Initiative 166. They requested the Court rule that the Attorney General and Secretary of State did not comply with their responsibilities under law when they failed to bar I-166 from appearing on the general election ballot. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Attorney General and Secretary of State acted in compliance with their duties under law, and that the initiative met all statutory requirements. Accordingly, the Court denied the petition. View "Montanans Opposed to I-166 v. Bullock" on Justia Law

Respondent Arthur E. Mallory was Churchill County's district attorney. Appellant John O'Connor is an elector and registered voter within Churchill County. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was the narrow question of whether the office of district attorney is a state office for the purpose of determining whether district attorneys are subject to term limits under the "state office" portion of Article 15, Section 3(2) of the Nevada Constitution. Reviewing the Constitution as a whole, the Supreme Court's resolution of this inquiry was controlled by Article 4, Section 32 of the Constitution, which plainly declares district attorneys to be "county officers." Because Article 4, Section 32 identifies district attorneys as county officers, it follows that the office of district attorney cannot be considered a "state office" for term-limits purposes, and thus, district attorneys are not subject to term limits under the "state office" portion of Article 15, Section 3(2). Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's order denying appellant's petition to set aside respondent's election to a consecutive term as the Churchill County District Attorney. View "In re Contested Election of Mallory" on Justia Law

David Ward and Michael Whittaker were commissioners for the Jefferson County Fire Protection No. 2 (the District). Two citizens of the District, Harry Goodrich and Linda Saunders (the petitioners), initiated a recall proceeding against Ward and Whittaker, alleging various counts of misfeasance. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the recall petition should advance to the signature-gathering phase of the recall process. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and held that one of the four charges against Ward and Whittaker may advance to the next phase of the recall process. View "In re Recall of Ward" on Justia Law

Joseph Lodge was a judge of a county superior court who sought to run for election to a new term in that office. To qualify for the primary election ballot, Lodge needed to obtain 525 valid signatures on his nominating petitions. Lodge timely filed ninety-nine nominating petitions containing a total of 1,110 signatures. Jill Kennedy, a qualified elector, challenged Lodge's petitions, arguing that they did not substantially comply with Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-314, -331, and -333 because they did not specify the office that Lodge was seeking. The superior court entered judgment for Kennedy and ordered that Lodge's name not be placed on the 2012 primary or general election ballots. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the petitions failed to substantially comply with statutory requirements. View "Kennedy v. Lodge" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Stand Up for Democracy petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the Board of State Canvassers to certify its referendum petition for inclusion on the November 2012 ballot. Intervening defendant Citizens for Fiscal Responsibility, challenged the certification of plaintiff’s referendum petition, alleging that it failed to comply with the type-size requirement of MCL 168.482(2) and that the doctrine of substantial compliance, whereby technical deficiencies are resolved in favor of certification, did not apply. The Court of Appeals agreed with both assertions, but concluded it was required to follow its decision in "Bloomfield Charter Township v Oakland County Clerk" and conclude that the petition substantially complied with MCL 168.482(2) and that certification was required. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, overturning "Bloomfield Charter" and dismissed the case: "because MCL 168.482(2) uses the mandatory term 'shall' and does not, by its plain terms, permit certification of deficient petitions with regard to form or content, a majority of [the] Court [held] that the doctrine of substantial compliance is inapplicable to referendum petitions submitted for certification." View "Stand Up for Democracy v. Mich. Sec'y of State" on Justia Law

After the U.S. Supreme Court declared a campaign finance statute in Arizona to be unconstitutional, the Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure Commission sought an opinion from the Nebraska attorney general as to the constitutionality of Nebraska's Campaign Finance Limitation Act (CFLA). Under the CFLA, candidates for certain covered elective offices and other public officials could choose to abide or not to abide by voluntary spending limits. A candidate who abided by the limits and raises and spent qualifying amounts in accordance with the CFLA became eligible for public funds. The attorney general opined that the CFLA would likely be found to be unconstitutional by a court, and the Commission determined it would not enforce the CFLA. The attorney general was then directed to file an action in court to determine the validity of the CFLA. The Supreme Court found that the CFLA substantially burdened the First Amendment rights of Nebraska citizens and that it was, therefore, unconstitutional. View "State ex rel. Bruning v. Gale" on Justia Law

State Attorney-General and county-prosecutor candidates may not accept campaign contributions from Medicaid providers or any person with an ownership interest in a Medicaid provider, Ohio Rev. Code 3599.45. The plaintiff physicians are Medicaid providers who attempted to contribute to Cordray’s 2010 campaign for reelection as Ohio Attorney General. When the campaign learned that the plaintiffs were Medicaid providers, however, it refused to accept their contributions. The plaintiffs challenged the statute. The district court upheld the law as supported by a general interest in “preventing corruption,” stating that the court should not “second guess” the Ohio Legislature’s means of furthering that interest. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The contribution ban is not closely drawn to “avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.” A claim that the law prevents corruption, is “dubious at best.” View "Lavin v. Husted" on Justia Law