Before the 2010 primary election, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether Appellant Dennis Montoya, a candidate for a Court of Appeals judgeship, was properly disqualified by the Secretary of State (the Secretary) from receiving public campaign funding under the New Mexico Voter Action Act (the Act). This case gave the Court its first opportunity to construe the Act, explain its previous oral ruling affirming the Secretary, and to address Appellant’s constitutional challenges to the Act as well as the civil penalty the Secretary imposed upon him. The dispute in this case centered on the provision in Section 1-19A-5(A), that "[a]n applicant candidate may contribute an amount of seed money from the applicant candidate's own funds up to" the $5000 limit. Appellant argues that his "general" contributions were intended to cover other kinds of expenses such as the costs of seeking his party's support at local preprimary convention gatherings leading up to the state preprimary convention. As such, these contributions were not intended to pay for the kinds of expenses that seed money is intended to cover and to limit. The Supreme Court concluded that when Appellant contributed more than $8000 of his own money to the campaign, while simultaneously applying for public funds, he violated the Act. Under the law, the Secretary had no choice but to disqualify him from public financing, and she did so. Furthermore, the Court concluded Appellant "misplaced" his reliance on "a number of federal cases to suggest that a civil penalty cannot be imposed on him for voluntarily exercising his First Amendment right to free speech." The Court affirmed the district court's judgment in this case. View "Montoya v. Herrera" on Justia Law

Petitioner Donna Boley filed a petition asking for a writ of mandamus directed to Respondents, the Secretary of State of West Virginia and Frank Deem. Petitioner was an incumbent state senator seeking re-election for the Third Senatorial District (District 3). Deem sought to challenge Petitioner for the Republican Party's 2012 nomination and was certified as eligible by the Secretary to have his name placed on the ballot. Petitioner filed the petition challenging Deem's eligibility to be a candidate for state senator against her, asserting that Deem did not met the residency requirements contained in the state Constitution and the Senate Redistricting Act of 2011. Deem conceded that a plain reading of the residency requirements made him ineligible to be a candidate for state senator in District 3 but argued that the residency requirements should be declared unconstitutional. The Supreme Court found that the residency requirements were constitutional and granted the requested writ, ordering the Secretary to withdraw her certification of Deem's candidacy for state senator in District 3 and commanding that Deem's name be removed from ballots to be used in the May 2012 Republican party primary election. View "State ex rel. Boley v. Tennant" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint and moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, alleging section 16, article V, of the Iowa Constitution, as implemented by Iowa Code sections 46.2, 46.4-46.10, and 46.14, violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the laws. The court concluded that the State Judicial Nominating Commission was a "special limited purpose" entity for its sole function was to select the most qualified candidates for judicial appointments and forward the names of these candidates to the Governor for a final appointment. This narrow function had a disproportionate effect on a definable group of constituents - members of the Iowa Bar - over other voters in the state. Therefore, the election of the attorney members of the Commission was an election of special interest. Applying rational basis review, the court agreed that the district court's Iowa system of election for the Commission's attorney members by and from members of the Iowa Bar was rationally related to Iowa's legitimate interests. Therefore, Iowa's system did not violate plaintiffs' rights under the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Carlson, et al. v. Justice David Wiggins, et al." on Justia Law

In 2009, the Arizona Legislature amended Ariz. Rev. Stat. 9-821.01, which, as amended, barred a city from electing its city council in partisan elections or in ward-based primaries combined with at-large general elections. The City of Tuscon filed this case against the State, claiming that the amendments to section 9-821.01 did not apply to it as a charter city. The superior court entered judgment for the State. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court's judgment, holding that because Arizona's Constitution includes a provision authorizing eligible cities to adopt charters, and because a charter city has the power to frame its own organic law, including the power to determine who its governing officers shall be and how they shall be selected, section 9-821.01, as amended, did not displace the method that voters of the City of Tuscon chose under its 1929 charter for electing council members. Remanded to the superior court for entry of summary judgment in favor of the City of Tuscon. View "City of Tuscon v. State" on Justia Law

In an October 2007 election, Kenai Peninsula Borough voters approved local initiatives establishing term limits for members of the Borough Assembly and the school board. But voters also reelected five incumbents who, by the terms of the initiatives, would be ineligible to serve an additional term. The Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers (ACT) filed a lawsuit against the Borough requesting a court declaration that the initiatives applied to candidates chosen in the October 2007 election and that the seats held by the five incumbents were vacant. The Borough argued that the initiatives were invalid. The superior court granted partial summary judgment to ACT and partial summary judgment to the Borough and, therefore, did not designate either as the prevailing party. ACT appealed the superior court's decision not to name a prevailing party and argued that ACT should have been named the prevailing party. After its review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that ACT and the Borough both prevailed on distinct issues central to the case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court’s decision not to name a prevailing party or award attorney's fees and costs to either party. View "Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. Kenai Peninsula Borough" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the validity of two 2005 Kenai Peninsula Borough (Borough) ordinances: one enacted by the Borough Assembly and the second enacted by voter initiative. The Borough Assembly enacted an ordinance in June 2005 that increased the sales tax rate from two percent to three percent. In an October 2005 election, Borough voters passed an initiative that required prior voter approval for all Borough capital projects with a total cost of more than one million dollars. The Alliance for Concerned Taxpayers (ACT) challenged the sales tax increase and sought to enforce the capital projects voter approval requirement. The superior court granted summary judgment to the Borough on both matters: on the sales tax issue, reasoning that a 1964 voter action allowed the increase and the 2006 referendum defeat ratified it; and on the capital projects voter approval issue, reasoning that Proposition 4 was an unconstitutional use of the initiative power to appropriate a public asset. ACT appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment on the sales tax issue and the capital project voter approval issue, concluding the 1964 voter authorization of a three-percent sales tax preserved the Borough's right to raise the rate to three percent, and that the 2006 defeat of the referendum to repeal the rate increase constituted a ratification of the increase. On the voter approval issue, the Court concluded that allowing voters to veto any capital improvement projects of over $1 million had the effect of diluting the Borough Assembly's exclusive control over the budget and was therefore an impermissible appropriation. View "Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. Kenai Peninsula Borough" on Justia Law

Former Massachusetts state senator Wilkerson, pleaded guilty to attempted extortion (18 U.S.C. 1951) based on her acceptance of money in exchange for favorable influence in her official capacity on issuance of a liquor license and sale and development of publicly-owned land. The district court received a lengthy presentence report, conducted a thorough hearing, and stated reasons for imposing a sentence of 42 months, near the middle of the guidelines. The First Circuit affirmed. The court’s statement that "tax violation by a public official is not a personal matter" is most plausibly interpreted as a segue to make a "larger point" about the public implications of an over-engaged official's failure to attend to her own legal responsibilities. Its statement that Wilkerson "was simply inattentive and inattentive in a way that permitted her to have access to money that she should not have had" was fair comment on the implications of non-compliance with campaign-finance requirements. Its statement that Wilkerson's engagement as a college "consultant" was one of "a series of very embarrassing things" she did in response to her financial troubles was specific to the circumstances of the arrangement. The district court's skeptical appraisal of the arrangement was reasonable. View "United States v. Wilkerson" on Justia Law

This proceeding arose from an objection filed on March 6, 2012 by Appellant, the Nebraska Republican Party, with the Nebraska Secretary of State in which it challenged, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 32-624, the candidate filing of Bob Kerrey for the U.S. Senate. The Secretary of State issued his determination opinion concluding that Kerrey's name could appear on the May 15, 2012 primary election ballot. Appellant filed a petition for review of the determination opinion. The district court dismissed the case on March 21, 2012 with prejudice. At issue on appeal was whether section 32-624, which requires that an order be made by a judge "on or before the fifty-fifth day preceding the election" in order to reverse a decision of the Secretary of State, would prohibit the Supreme Court from granting relief after that fifty-five-day limitation period had run. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under the statutory procedure established by the Legislature, it lacked the authority to grant the relief sought by Appellant because the fifty-five limitation period had run. View "Neb. Republican Party v. Gale" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court addressed an Application for Relief in an Election Code matter, over which it retained limited jurisdiction following a remand on October 4, 2010. The issue involved the effect of the District Court's decision in "Morrill v. Weaver," (224 F.Supp.2d 882 (E.D. Pa. 2002)). In "Morrill," Section 2911(d) of the Election Code (25 P.S. 2600 et seq.), which the federal court construed as imposing a district residency requirement for affiants circulating nomination papers violated the First Amendment. The district court permanently enjoined the Commonwealth from enforcing the statutory provision, and the Commonwealth did not appeal that decision. The question of the constitutionality of Section 2911(d) and the effect of Morrill arose in connection with a challenge to the nomination paper submitted by Carl Stevenson as an independent candidate for the office of State Representative in Pennsylvania’s 134th Legislative District in the 2010 general election. Michael Gibson and Robert Mader filed a petition to set aside in the Commonwealth Court, raising both signature challenges and a global challenge to Stevenson’s nomination paper. The objectors' global challenge alleged that signatures on three pages of the nomination paper were invalid because the circulator of those pages resided outside the 134th Legislative District, in supposed violation of Section 2911(d). Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth and the Secretary are bound by the district court decision in "Morrill" and may not enforce Section 2911(d) as written. View "In Re: Nomination Petitions and Papers of Carl Stevenson" on Justia Law

During the 2008 campaign, Joe, a plumber working near Toledo, asked then-candidate Obama about a proposed tax plan’s impact on Joe’s ability to own a business. The interaction was replayed by national media. Joe later accepted media requests and criticized Obama’s policies, resulting in Senator McCain’s reference to "Joe the Plumber." After Joe’s media moment, employees of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, Obama supporters, searched his name in databases and that the Inspector General found no legitimate agency purpose for those searches. Defendants were suspended from their positions. Joe filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation and violation of privacy rights. The district court granted defendants judgment on the pleadings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not suffer sufficient adverse action: he did not suffer a threat to his livelihood, was not defamed, did not endure a search or seizure, and did not experience the public disclosure of embarrassing information. He did not allege continuing investigation or "chilling" of First Amendment rights; "a person of ordinary firmness" would not be deterred or chilled. In his privacy claim, Joe did not identify an interest "fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." View "Wurzelbacher v. Jones-Kelley" on Justia Law