Defendant was convicted of one count of obstruction of justice for failing to disclose the full extent of his knowledge regarding the mailing of a letter that could reasonably be believed to constitute an attempt at voter intimidation. Defendant, a Republican candidate for a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives at the time, contended that there was insufficient probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant and that, therefore, the evidence obtained pursuant to it should have been suppressed at his trial. The court held that there was sufficient probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant to search defendant's home and campaign headquarters. The court rejected defendant's First Amendment claim. Although defendant was never prosecuted for a violation of the election laws, in light of the contents of the letter and the facts surrounding its distribution, there was a fair probability that the campaign mailing constituted a tactic of intimidation intended to induce its recipients to refrain from voting. Accordingly, the order of the district court denying the motion to suppress was affirmed. View "United States v. Nguyen" on Justia Law

At the February 2010 primary, there was no name printed on the Republican ballot for the office of member of the St. Clair County board of review, and no candidate was nominated as a write-in. In March, the Republican Party central committee appointed plaintiff as its candidate, and, in April, made a filing with the county clerk, entitled “resolution/certificate of appointment.” Plaintiff circulated and filed nominating petitions and other required documents, pursuant to Election Code section 7–61. The electoral board sustained an objection so that plaintiff’s name did not appear on the November ballot. Trial and appellate courts affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, first holding that it could address the moot issue under the exception for matters of public interest. The lower courts applied the wrong section of the statute, which contains different sections for different situations. View "Wisnasky-Bettorf v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Sanchez rose through the ranks of Chicago politics and became Commissioner of Streets and Sanitation. He was a leader of the Hispanic Democratic Organization, and, acting as a city official and a political operative, participated in a scheme to award city jobs to campaign workers in violation of orders and consent decrees, known as the Shakman decrees, enjoining the city from patronage hiring for most positions. Del Valle managed campaigns staffed by Sanchez's branch of the HDO and had significant influence in choosing individuals for positions. On retrial, Sanchez was convicted of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and Del Valle of perjury, 18 U.S.C. 1623. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning the court's handling of testimony about driving while intoxicated and arguing with a police officer; denial of severance; and the government's failure to prove economic loss. City jobs are money or property for purposes of mail fraud and the indictment sufficiently alleged deprivation of money or property.View "United States v. Delvalle" on Justia Law

Almost two million Indiana voters cast their ballots for Secretary of State in November 2010. The Indiana Democratic Party sought to have the winner in the election, Republican Charlie White, declared ineligible to assume office because he had not been registered to vote at the address at which he resided in July 15, 2010, the deadline for certifying candidates for state office. The Indiana Recount Commission dismissed the petition and later denied it. The circuit court reversed, directing that the Commission declare White ineligible. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and affirmed the Commission's dismissal, holding that the the Commission's action was not arbitrary, capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law because the Indiana Democratic Party's challenge was untimely. View "White v. Ind. Democratic Party" on Justia Law

Several hundred citizens of the Town of Fishers, including Plaintiffs, filed a petition with the Fishers Town Clerk seeking a referendum on whether the Town should convert itself from a town into a second class city. The Town Council subsequently passed a resolution proposing a reorganization with Fall Creek Township that would merge the two entities into a reorganized city. Plaintiffs filed suit in U.S. District Court, seeking to compel the Town Council to schedule their petition for a referendum. Thereafter, the Fishers Town Council and the Township held a public meeting during which both entities adopted the final reorganization plan. A referendum on the plan was scheduled for the November 2012 general election. The Town Council subsequently passed a resolution ordering a referendum on Plaintiffs' proposal in the general election. Defendants then moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint, which the federal district court denied. The Supreme Court accepted certification to address a question of state law and held that a political unit may reorganize into a city under Indiana's Reorganization Act in a manner that eliminates voting rights recognized under Indiana law, including reorganization as a city with a council elected entirely at large and a mayor appointed by that council. View "Kole v. Faultless" on Justia Law

Two petitioners sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition (IP) 28 (2012). Before 2009, Oregon imposed a 6.6 percent tax rate on a corporation's "taxable income." In 2009, the voters approved Ballot Measure 67, which modified the marginal tax rate that corporations pay on their taxable income. Petitioner Patrick Green raised a single challenge to the caption, the "yes" vote result statement, the "no" vote result statement, and the summary. He contended that each part of the ballot title was defective because it referred to a tax on "corporate income" rather than a tax on corporate "profits" or "taxable income." He reasoned that the use of the phrase "corporate income" was misleading because it failed to communicate that the tax would fall only on corporate profits. Petitioner Dan Harmon raised a similar challenge, noting that what the IP would have modified was a corporate excise tax and that the ballot title should have either referred to an excise tax or used the phrase "taxable income." In his view, either phrase would have been more accurate and less misleading than the use of the unmodified term "income." In each instance, the certified ballot title used the term "income," even though that term can refer to more than one type of income and even though those differing types of income may have significantly different tax consequences. The Supreme Court concluded the Attorney General advanced no legitimate reason for not using a more accurate term, which would reduce the potential for misleading the voters that the certified ballot title currently presents. The Court agreed with Petitioners that referring to a tax on corporate "income" was, without more, misleading. Accordingly, the Court referred the caption, the "yes" result statement, the "no" result statement, and the summary to the Attorney General for modification. View "Green/Harmon v. Kroger" on Justia Law

LULAC filed suit against the City alleging that the voting method adopted by the City Charter diluted minority voting strength, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973. The City and LULAC settled in December 1996, and the district court entered a consent decree in accordance with the parties' settlement. At issue on appeal was whether the district court properly granted a joint motion by the City and LULAC to modify temporarily the consent decree. Because the court concluded that the district court erred in approving the temporary modification without following the procedures mandated by an earlier panel, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Leag. of Untd. Latin Amer. Ctzn. v. City of Boerne, et al." on Justia Law

The Nevada Constitution authorized the citizens of Nevada to enact statutes and amend the Nevada Constitution through the initiative process. To place an initiative on the ballot, proponents must obtain signatures from a number of registered voters equal to 10 percent of the votes cast in the previous general election. This signature requirement was also subject to a geographic distribution requirement known as the All Districts Rule. Plaintiffs sought an order declaring the All Districts Rule unconstitutional and enjoining the state from enforcing it. The court held that plaintiffs have not demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue on their claims that the All Districts Rule violated either the Equal Protection Clause or the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Angle, et al. v. Miller" on Justia Law

During the 1981 New Jersey gubernatorial election, the Democratic National Committee and others sued the Republican National Committee, and others, alleging that defendants targeted minority voters for intimidation, in violation of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1971, 1973, and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. RNC allegedly mailed sample ballots to individuals in precincts with a high percentage of minority registered voters and included individuals whose postcards were returned as undeliverable on a list of voters to challenge at the polls and enlisted off-duty officers to intimidate voters by standing at minority precinct polling places, wearing “National Ballot Security Task Force” armbands. Some allegedly wore visible firearms. In 1982, RNC and DNC entered into a consent decree, national in scope, limiting RNC's participation in voter fraud prevention without advance court approval. The decree was modified in 1987 and was the subject of enforcement actions in 2000, 2004, and 2008. The district court denied, in part, a motion to modify or vacate the decree, but made modifications. The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that if RNC does not hope to engage in conduct that would violate the decree, it is puzzling that it would pursue vacatur so vigorously. despite significant modifications. View "Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican Nat'l Comm." on Justia Law

Herschel Young was sworn in as presiding commissioner of Cass County in 2011. Teresa Hensley, the prosecuting attorney for the county, subsequently filed a quo warranto action in reliance upon Mo. Rev. Stat. 115.350, alleging that Young usurped the office of presiding commissioner because he was not qualified to be a candidate for elective public office due to a 1995 felony conviction. The circuit court granted Hensley's petition and ordered Young's ouster from office. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 115.350, as applied to Young, did not operate retrospectively in violation of the state constitution; (2) quo warranto was the appropriate remedy, and the petition was based on applicable law; and (3) section 115.350 does not violate the equal protection clause of the state constitution because it had a rational basis under the law. View "State ex inf. Hensley v. Young" on Justia Law