Plaintiff, the Chief of Police Services for the City of San Clemente, sued defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after plaintiff was placed on administrative leave after he ran for, and lost, the election of Orange County Sheriff-Coroner. Plaintiff claimed that his placement on administrative leave and subsequent demotion were in unconstitutional retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. The district court concluded that plaintiff's campaign speech was not protected by the First Amendment because he fell into the narrow "policymaker" exception to the general rule against politically-motivated dismissals. Although the court determined that the district court erred in this conclusion, the court agreed that the district court's alternative holding that Michael Carona, the incumbent Orange County Sheriff who won the election at issue, was entitled to qualified immunity because a government official in his position "reasonably but mistakenly" could have believed that political loyalty was required by someone with plaintiff's job responsibilities at the time he ran against Carona. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Hunt v. County of Orange, et al." on Justia Law

Having lost his bid for a Maine Senate seat, plaintiff sued Republican party leadership for defamation libel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and publicly placing him in a false light. The complaint referred to flyers, brochures, and radio and TV ads days before the election that conjured up imaginary wrongs that he had supposedly done as a selectman for the town of Blue Hill, primarily concerning discontinuance of fireworks on the Fourth of July. The complaint referred to "actual malice." The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that false statements were made negligently, not with actual malice. Defamation law "does not require that combatants for public office act like war-time neutrals, treating everyone evenhandedly and always taking the high road. Quite the contrary. Provided that they do not act with actual malice, they can badmouth their opponents, hammering them with unfair and one-sided attacks" View "Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm." on Justia Law

In twelve separate matters, Commonwealth citizens, acting singly or in groups, filed appeals from the Final Plan for legislative redistricting of the Commonwealth, which was devised by Appellee 2011 Pennsylvania Legislative Reapportionment Commission (the "LRC"), in response to the U.S. decennial census. Fourteen days after the appeals were filed, seven days after the matters were briefed, and two days after the appeals were argued, the Supreme Court issued its mandate in a per curiam order filed January 25, 2012. That order declared that the Final Plan was contrary to law under Article II, Section 17(d) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and with the directive in that constitutional provision, the Court remanded the matter to the LRC to reapportion the Commonwealth in a manner consistent with this opinion. View "Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the Secretary and several elected officials, alleging that the officials' application of a Georgia statute that governed absentee voting, Ga. Code Ann. 21-2-381(a)(1)(D), denied him the right to have a ballot mailed to him at the jail and prevented him from voting while he was incarcerated in the fall of 2008. The court vacated the summary judgment entered by the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff's alleged injury was not fairly traceable to any actions of the officials where plaintiff would not have received a ballot at the jail regardless of the officials' application of the statute when he provided only his home address on his application for an absentee ballot. View "Swann v. Secretary, State of Georgia, et al." on Justia Law

In these related original proceedings, Petitioners petitioned the Supreme Court for (1) judgment invalidating the 2011 Final Reapportionment Plan (Plan) for the state legislature adopted by the State Reapportionment Commission, (2) a writ of mandamus directing the Commission to prepare and file a new reapportionment plan for the state legislature, and (3) a writ of mandamus directing the Chief Election Officer to rescind the publication of the Plan. The Supreme Court issued orders granting the petitions and (1) invalidated the Plan, determining it was constitutionally invalid where (i) the Hawaii Constitution expressly mandates that only permanent residents be counted in the population base for the purpose of reapportionment, and (ii) the Plan disregarded this constitutional mandate by including nonpermanent residents in the population base that the Commission used to allocate legislative seats among the islands; (2) directed the Commission to prepare and file a new reapportionment plan that (i) allocates the members of the state legislature among the basic island units by using a permanent resident population base and then (ii) apportions the members among the districts therein; and (3) directed the Chief Election Officer to rescind the publication of the Plan for the state legislature. View "Solomon v. Abercrombie" on Justia Law

Appellants, members of the U.S. House of Representatives, along with the Florida House of Representatives, appealed from a district court order granting final summary judgment to appellees, the Florida Secretary of State and various intervening parties. At issue was whether a state constitutional provision, Amendment Six, establishing standards for congressional redistricting that was approved by the people by initiative was contrary to the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The court held that Florida voters' act of lawmaking according to the state's expressly enumerated lawmaking process was fully consistent with the commands of the Elections Clause, and consonant with the understanding given to the Elections Clause by the Supreme Court in Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant and Smiley v. Holm. The court also held that the factors enumerated in Amendment Six have been for many years commonly considered by legislative bodies in congressional redistricting and long accepted by the courts as being lawful and consistent with the powers delegated to the state legislatures by the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Brown, et al. v. State, et al" on Justia Law

The First Circuit previously rejected claims that Maine's laws regulating political action committees were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Plaintiffs then challenged the law applicable to ballot question committees (BQCs), Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 21-A, 1056-B, imposing registration and disclosure requirements on entities that finance election-related advocacy. The district court upheld the law on summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, upholding the law's definition of "contribution." Plaintiffs demonstrated no circumstances in which the statute fails to provide them fair warning of its reach. The $100 reporting threshold is narrowly tailored to meet Maine's compelling interest in an informed electorate.View "Nat'l Org. For Marriage, Inc. v. McKee" on Justia Law

A proposed referendum in this case would require the electorate to decide at the November 2012 general election whether to accept or reject the California state Senate district map certified by the Citizens Redistricting Commission. If the referendum qualifies, the state Senate map certified by the Commission would automatically be stayed, presenting the question of what Senate districts should be used for the 2012 primary and general elections of the State. The Supreme Court held (1) if the proposed referendum qualifies for the November 2012 general election ballot and triggers a stay of the Commission's certified Senate district map, the Commission's state Senate map should be used on an interim basis for the June and November 2012 elections, pending the outcome of the referendum; and (2) if the proposed referendum does not qualify for the ballot, the Commission's state Senate map will continue to be used for the 2012 election and future elections until replaced pursuant to Cal. Const. art. XXI by new maps drawn by a future newly constituted Commission following the 2020 census. View "Vandermost v. Bowen" on Justia Law

Dennis Varnau, an independent candidate for sheriff of Brown County, filed a protest against Dwayne Wenninger's candidacy for sheriff in the 2008 elections. The board of elections denied the protest because it was not filed by a member of the appropriate party. Following the election victory by Wenninger, Varnau filed a complaint for a writ of quo warranto to oust Wenninger from the office and to place Varnau in that office. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Varnau did not establish that Wenninger lacked the qualifications under Ohio Rev. Code 311.01(B) to hold the office of sheriff for his third four-year term, and the court of appeals properly denied the writ; and (2) the court of appeals did not err by denying Wenninger's request for attorney fees when he prevailed on Varnau's quo warranto claim. View "State ex rel. Varnau v. Wenninger" on Justia Law

Former New Mexico state treasurer Defendant-Appellee Robert Vigil and his former deputy, co-Defendant Ann Marie Gallegos allegedly hatched a plan to find work for his political rival's wife so that the rival couldn't challenge him in the next election. According to the complaint, Defendants solicited bids for a state contract and insisted that any interested contractor hire Samantha Sais (the wife) on any terms she wished. Plaintiff SECSYS agreed to the plan in principle, but ultimately could not come to terms with Ms. Sais. When negotiations broke down, Defendants allegedly chose another contractor who agreed to Ms. Sais' terms. Mr. Vigil was ultimately indicted, convicted, and sentenced to prison for his role in this scheme. Plaintiff sought damages from Mr. Vigil and Ms. Gallegos in their individual capacities for violating its Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection for discriminating against the company when it refused to acquiesce to Ms. Sais' demands: "So that leaves SECSYS with the remarkable argument that it was discriminated against in violation of the federal Constitution not because it was unwilling to pay, but because it was willing to pay only some of an allegedly extortionate demand." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found no evidence that Defendants enforced Ms. Sais' demands with the purpose of discriminating against those who failed to meet them: "every indication in the record before [the Court] suggest[ed] the defendants would have been just as happy if SECSYS had met its full demand as it was when another bidder eventually did so." The Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants. View "SECSYS, LLC v. Vigil" on Justia Law