Appellants, the Libertarian party and three candidates, challenged the constitutionality of North Dakota Century Code 16.1-11-36, contending that the statute as applied to them violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause because it prevented appellants' names from appearing on the 2010 general election ballot despite their winning the party's primary. The court held that the burden imposed by the statute was not undue or excessive and the state had a compelling interest in having a minimum vote requirement before a candidate could appear on the general election ballot. Therefore, the court held that N.D.C.C. 16.1-11-36 was not unconstitutional on First or Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Furthermore, because the law applied equally to all candidates and did not result in unequal treatment, the court held that the statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court. View "Libertarian Party of ND, et al. v. Jaeger" on Justia Law

Relators, Ohioans for Fair Districts and its members, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel Respondent, Secretary of State Jon Husted, to treat Sections 1 and 2 of H.B. 319, which established new congressional districts for the state based on the 2010 decennial census, as subject to referendum, to accept the submission of Relators' referendum-petition summary, and to discharge the duties of Husted's office as provided by Ohio Const. art. II and Ohio Rev. Code 3519.01. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) the writ was consistent with precedent and the plain language of Ohio Const. art. II, and (2) unless a valid referendum petition was timely filed with the secretary of state, H.B. 319 would become effective ninety days from the date the bill was filed by the governor in the office of the secretary of state. View "State ex rel. Ohioans for Fair Dists. v. Husted" on Justia Law

Petitioners Gail Rasmussen and Bethanne Darby sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 15 (2012). If enacted, Initiative Petition 15 would add a provision to the Oregon Revised Statutes that would phase out all estate and inheritance taxes, and related taxes on intra-family property transfers that the state currently has statutory authority to collect. The proposed measure would supersede any Oregon law that purports to impose such a tax. Petitioners were electors who timely submitted written comments to the Secretary of State concerning the content of the Attorney General's draft ballot title and who therefore were entitled to seek review of the resulting certified ballot title to the Supreme Court. Petitioners challenged the caption and "yes" and "no" vote result statements. The Supreme Court reviewed the certified ballot title to determine whether it substantially complied with ORS 250.035(2) (stating requirements for ballot titles). The Court determined that the initiative warranted revision by the Attorney General, and referred the ballot back for modification. View "Rasmussen v. Kroger" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against various officials arising from his name not being placed on the 2010 primary election ballot in Houston. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held that plaintiff's procedural due process claim was properly rejected where plaintiff had no property right to be a candidate. The court also held that plaintiff's substantive due process claim failed because there were no disputed facts regarding plaintiff's application containing an incorrect residential address where plaintiff made an oral admission that he did not live at the listed address. The court further held that plaintiff's Equal Protection claim was properly denied where the actions of the official at issue did not constitute intentional or purposeful discrimination. The court finally held that plaintiff failed to establish that Section 141.032(e) of the Texas Election Code was unconstitutional. Accordingly, because plaintiff filed his application for candidacy in the last hour of the last possible day, which limited his opportunity to refile a correct application, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wilson v. Birnberg, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of prospective political candidates, petition circulators, and voters, appealed from the district court's order awarding summary judgment to the Board of Elections in the City of New York and upholding the State's "Party Witness Rule." The Rule, contained in New York Election Law 6-132, limited who a candidate for a political party's nomination could use to circulate so-called "designating petitions," which allowed the candidate to appear on the party primary ballot. Unless the circulator was a notary public or commissioner of deeds, the Party Witness Rule restricted designating petition circulators to "enrolled voter[s] of the same political party as the voters qualified to sign the petition," the party in whose primary the candidate sought to run. The court held that because plaintiffs were without a right to have non-party members participate in a political party's nomination process, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Maslow v. Board of Elections, NYC" on Justia Law

Appellant Keith Hamaker filed an amendment complaint in the circuit court challenging the Pulaski County Election Commission procedures. After the circuit court entered an order making specific findings and rulings, Hamaker appealed, contending (1) the Commission had no right to allow a voting area undefined by election law, (2) the Commission should be required to force a voter to vote within the confines of a voting booth, (3) a voter does not have the right to vote outside the immediate voting area pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 7-5-309(a)(4), and (4) section 7-5-309 as amended should be declared unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under section 7-5-309 the Commission is not required to force a voter to prepare his or her ballot in a voting booth, (2) section 7-5-309(a)(4) does not state that a voter may not mark a ballot outside of the immediate voting area, and (3) Appellant's remaining arguments were either inappropriate for appellate review or not preserved for appellate review. View "Hamaker v. Pulaski County Election Comm'n" on Justia Law

Appellant sought to intervene in a suit under the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973, that was originally filed in 1996 by the League of United Latin American Citizens, District 19 (LULAC), against the city of Boerne, Texas. LULAC and the city reached a settlement agreement in 1996 and the district court entered a consent decree which provided that city council members would thereafter be elected through at-large elections with cumulative voting. In 2009, LULAC and the city filed a joint motion to reopen the case and modify the consent decree in order to switch to a single-member-district system. The district court granted that motion and appellant, a resident and registered voter of Boerne who opposed the change, filed a motion to intervene. Appellant subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his motion on the grounds that appellant lacked standing. The court held that appellant had standing; that the case was not moot; and appellant had a right to intervene in the case under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of appellant's motion to intervene. The court also held that the district court had the power to modify the consent decree; but the district court abused its discretion in granting LULAC and the city's motion to modify because the record did not show that modifications were warranted. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded the district court's order granting the modified consent decree. View "League of United Latin American Citizens v. City of Boerne" on Justia Law

A year into his term as a circuit court judge, Appellant Charles Bernstein filed a complaint challenging his mandatory retirement pursuant to the Maryland Constitution, naming as defendants the State, Governor, and General Assembly. Appellant argued that Md. Const. art. IV, 3 had application only to judges who attain the age of seventy while they are in office, and thus, a person seventy years or older who was not currently serving as a circuit court judge may be appointed to fill a judicial vacancy or run for judicial office. The Court of Appeals answered questions certified to it as follows: (1) the Maryland Constitution (i) requires a sitting judge to retire upon reaching age seventy, (ii) prohibits the Governor from appointing a person seventy years of age or older to the bench, and (iii) prohibits a person seventy years of age or older from running from judicial office; and (2) the Maryland Constitution does not permit a person seventy years of age or older to run for a judicial office and, if elected, to serve out the entire term. View "Bernstein v. State" on Justia Law

Mike Gilb, who had been appointed to fulfill a second unexpired term on the Mason City Council, took out candidate petitions for the upcoming general election for city council. Relators, registered voters and city residents, sent Respondents, the county board of elections, a letter claiming that Gilb was ineligible pursuant to the term-limit provisions of the city charter. The board considered the letter at its regular meeting, determining that there was no action for it to take at the time. Subsequently, Relators filed an expedited election action, requesting a writ of prohibition to prevent Respondents from certifying Gilb as a candidate and a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents to sustain their protest. The Supreme Court (1) denied Relators' prohibition claim because they failed to establish their entitlement to the requested relief as (a) Respondents had not exercised or were not about to exercise quasi-judicial power, and (b) Relators did not establish that they lacked an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to challenge Gilb's candidacy; and (2) dismissed Relators' mandamus claim for lack of jurisdiction. View "State ex rel. Miller v. Warren County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

On May 23, 2011, John Coble filed with the board of elections a nominating petition to run for municipal court judge at the November 8, 2011 election. On June 1, 2011, Coble withdrew his candidacy. On June 13, 2011, Coble filed a new nominating petition for the same office and the same election. On July 29, 2011, the board rejected Coble's petition and refused to certify him as a candidate for municipal court judge based on a directive issued on July 22, 2011 by the secretary of state declaring that a person who withdraws his candidacy for office cannot file a new declaration and petition for the same office at the same election. Coble subsequently filed an expedited election action for a writ of mandamus to compel the board to certify him and place his name on the November 8, 2011 election ballot. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the board of elections abused its discretion and clearly disregarded applicable law by rejecting Coble's candidacy for municipal court judge due to an applicable exception in Coble's case. View "State ex rel. Coble v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law